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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the processes of policy making and implementation of tall building 
development, as well as the management of visual impacts on regionally protected 
views in particular, in central London between 2000 and 2008, from the initiation of the 
Greater London Authority to the end of Ken Livingstone's era as Mayor of London. 
During this eight year period, more than forty tall building projects were processed 
through the planning system. Regional and local planning authorities, private 
developers and heritage groups have diverse interests in tall building planning and 
hence conflicts result regarding policy and implementation processes. The case study of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road—part of an emerging cluster of tall buildings at Blackfriars 
Bridge, Southwark—provides a useful exemplar. It is not located in an area that was 
designated as appropriate for tall buildings and is situated close to central London's 
historic monuments and conservation areas.  
 
I will argue that while a high degree of design quality in tall buildings has been 
achieved, a severe lack of conflict resolution has led to an upward spiralling of 
antagonistic interactions, uncertainty and the prolongation of the planning process. 
Moreover, emerging regional and local policy has strengthened the position of tall 
building supporters while gradually marginalising opposing heritage groups. Nor has 
planning policy and assessment methods provided a clear enough basis for decision 
making. The resulting ambiguity has been exploited by opposing camps which arrive at 
divergent conclusions regarding tall building projects. Furthermore, the involvement of 
private sector experts in governmental processes has led to perceptions by heritage 
groups of conflicts of interest. The thesis concludes by summarising the key aspects 
identified with regard to the translation of the urban renaissance agenda into tall 
building policies, the effectiveness of implementing these policies, and the impacts of 
planning processes on visual impact assessments. 
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1. Introduction  
 
When considering planning processes for tall buildings, it is crucial to note that London 
occupies a distinct position in regulating tall building development amongst major 
world cities. In London, the visual impact of tall buildings on heritage assets of 
international and national significance generates the greatest amount of controversy. 
London has been described as one of four alpha world cities: a centre of global 
businesses (Beaverstock et al 1999; Sassen 1991).1 Like the other major world cities of 
New York, Tokyo and Paris, London seeks to attract visitors, workers and economic 
investment from around the globe and global businesses often want to represent their 
corporate image through tall buildings (House of Commons 2002). Although tall 
buildings have been built in London since the 1960s and 70s, the capital's visual image 
is still represented to a significant degree by its significant historic remains, which 
include urban conservation areas, historic parks and monuments, and four World 
Heritage Sites designated by UNESCO (ibid.). However, between 2000 and 2008 
London witnessed a significant tall building boom, particularly in the central area.  
 
This boom was possible because the new Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, was a 
strong supporter of tall buildings which he considered to be vital for London 
economically as well as aesthetically (GLA 2001b), and he had the authority to 
encourage them. The new Labour government, which came into power in 1997, 
established a new regional government for London, the Greater London Authority 
(GLA), which Livingstone was elected to lead as mayor. GLA was charged with 
producing regional policy to determine London's approach to planning (OPSI 1999). 
This major change to London's governance was preceded by the influential report of the 
Urban Task Force that advocated an urban renaissance (Urban Task Force 1999). 
Centrally, this report introduced a strong focus on the quality of architectural and urban 
design as well as a spatial approach to planning, aimed at revitalising the centres of 
cities (Cullingworth and Nadin 2006; Allmendinger 2011). From 1999 onwards, and 
under Livingstone's leadership, London sought to establish and confirm its world city 
status by enhancing its visual image based on the central goal of achieving the highest 
quality of architecture and urban design.  
 
                                                 
1 Sassen considered only New York, Tokyo and London.  
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In contrast to London where the regulation of the visual impact of tall buildings is based 
on policies of design quality, the other world cities mainly use geometric means of 
regulation. New York and Tokyo regulate building height via zoning and setback 
regulations. Geometric definitions of setbacks are aimed at ensuring that tall buildings 
do not block the light and air required by neighbouring buildings and the streetscape 
(Weiss 1992). New York's Department of City Planning determines Special Purpose 
Districts within which high floor area ratios are permitted and thus tall building 
development is possible (New York Department of City Planning 2010). Similarly in 
Tokyo, zoning law and setback specifications regulate the height and form of tall 
building development (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2010). In these two world 
cities, the visual impact of tall buildings is not controversial in planning terms.   
 
Paris represents an example of where there is very strong protection of the visual 
significance of its heritage. In order to conserve its historic townscape, Paris defines 
strict height thresholds through the Plan des Hauteurs within which no building can be 
higher than thirty-seven metres, thereby prohibiting the development of tall buildings in 
the city centre (Mairie de Paris 2010a; b). As a result, tall building development is 
confined to the area of La Défense outside of the historic city (Gordon 1999; Short 
2007; Tavernor 2007a). In London, the visual impact of tall buildings is also a sensitive 
issue. However, regulation is geared towards promoting development, and tall buildings 
are encouraged in locations defined by the London Plan and related tall building 
guidance. Only ten view corridors have been defined geometrically since 1991 within 
which tall buildings are not permitted (GOL 1998; Nicolaou 2004; Tavernor 2004a). 
Appropriate locations for tall buildings were not defined prior to 2000 which has led to 
significant amounts of uncertainty about the appropriateness of tall buildings in central 
London (House of Commons 2002).  
 
Central London, where a large number of tall buildings have been proposed since 1999, 
contains some of England's most precious heritage assets. Assessments by governmental 
agencies have concluded that tall buildings built since the 1960s have often been of 
poor architectural quality, are located in inappropriate places, and consequently have 
negative visual impacts on London's heritage assets (Parker and Catchpole 1984; LPAC 
1998; RFAC 1998; House of Commons 2002). As a result, governmental agencies  at 
national, regional and local levels reformed the planning system and produced strategic 
policy and guidance that seeks to regulate tall building design so as to significantly 
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increase the quality of development projects and protect heritage assets. Based on the 
national planning agenda of an urban renaissance, the London Plan produced by the 
GLA placed the spatial approach to planning at its centre, thus strongly encouraging the 
highest quality of design (GLA 2004a). The importance of producing design of the 
highest quality was reaffirmed by Planning Policy Statement 1 (PPS1) in 2005 (ODPM 
2005c).  
 
Despite these efforts, a number of factors give rise to doubts about the effectiveness of 
tall building policies and related implementation processes. Instead of achieving greater 
certainty, resolving the conflicting interests involved and speeding up the decision 
making processes, tall building planning has resulted in problems that allow the 
questioning of the effectiveness of relevant policy and guidance. Eleven out of forty-
four tall building projects proposed in central London have not been decided at local 
level but have been called in by the Secretary of State to be decided at a public inquiry. 
The consistent, major reason for call-ins has been their visual impact on significant 
heritage assets. Public inquiries for tall buildings can extend by one or two years the 
application process before a final decision is reached by the Secretary of State (see 
appendix 6). This is a serious delay for developers, for whom the viability of a project 
depends on timely financial returns. Also, millions of pounds of public and private 
money have been spent on these public inquiries on professional and legal fees. 
 
There is no agreement as to a remedy to this dilemma. While some parties argue for 
precise determinations of tall building locations within local area-led master plans, 
others are opposed to this approach and fear overregulation (House of Commons 2002). 
Furthermore, the planning processes of tall buildings have led to conflicts between the 
Secretary of State and the government's advisory bodies, CABE and English Heritage, 
as well as between regional and local levels of government (ibid.). Conflict of interest 
allegations and accusations of secret decision making at regional level have led to 
governmental inquiries that put in doubt the credibility of their advisors (Greater 
London Assembly 2002; House of Commons 2005). Nationally, the government was 
humiliated when UNESCO criticised the outcomes of the system and the resulting 
visual impact of tall buildings on World Heritage Sites in 2007 (DCMS 2007b). Thus, 
despite strict planning policy and guidance, the recent reforms to the planning system 
have not resolved the problems of prolonged planning processes, uncertainty, and the 
conflicts when considering tall building planning applications. 
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This thesis considers a particular subset of planning research: the management of visual 
impacts of tall buildings on urban heritage assets in central London. The case of the tall 
building project of No.1 Blackfriars Road will be used as the primary case study. In 
relation to the case study, the essential policies and the precedent cases that have had 
significant impacts on the planning process will be examined. Particular focus will lie 
on the interplay between private developers, consultants, planning authorities and third 
parties in these planning processes. It will be demonstrated how the management of 
visual impacts is interdependently related to considerations of design quality, locations 
of tall buildings, expected financial returns and planning obligations, as well as issues of 
certainty, speed of decision making, influence, inclusion, credibility, expertise and 
objectivity in planning. In order to investigate these issues, I will consider the following 
research questions:  
 
How was the agenda of urban renaissance translated into tall building policy, in 
particular with regard to regulating any visual impact on heritage assets? 
 
How effectively has the planning system been implemented with regard to tall 
building projects in central London? 
 
What impact did the planning process have on visual impact assessments in 
London from 2000 to 2008? 
 
Based on the case study, the thesis seeks to develop a frame of key issues for further 
research on the management of visual impacts on urban heritage assets. Chapter 2 
considers the processes of policy making of the London Plan, from the initial stages 
from 2001 to 2006, and pre-application discussions with the GLA. The drafting of the 
London View Management Framework (LVMF) and the supplementary guidance to the 
London Plan regulating visual impact are examined in chapter three. The processes of 
consultation and assessment with the governmental advisors—formally termed non-
departmental governmental bodies (but often referred to as quangos)—CABE and 
English Heritage and their main tall building policy, the Guidance on Tall Buildings 
(GOTB), are considered in chapter four. Chapter five looks at the local policy making, 
consultation and decision making of the London Borough of Southwark, within which 
the case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road is located, as well as the impact of UNESCO as 
an external force. Chapter six discusses the public inquiry process regarding the No.1 
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and 20 Blackfriars Road projects, both of which were scrutinised within a joint public 
inquiry, alongside the Doon Street public inquiry which is located on a site nearby in 
adjacent Lambeth.  
 
While chapters two to six each focus on one specific process of policy making and 
implementation, chapter seven seeks to draw on the results of these chapters and 
discusses the most significant key patterns in relation to the effectiveness of the tall 
building planning process. These key patterns are: Conflict resolution, visual impact 
assessment, credibility and the impact of private sector expertise on the work of 
governmental organisations. Finally, chapter eight will explicitly address each of the 
three research questions raised in this introduction. It will reiterate the major factors in 
translating the urban renaissance agenda into tall building policy. The most important 
aspects regarding the effectiveness of implementing these policies in central London 
will be summarised, and the impacts of planning processes on visual impact 
assessments will be discussed. The next section considers the rise of tall building 
development in London and the new planning system in place during the Labour 
administration. Furthermore, the problems of this system identified by academic 
literature and governmental reports are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
1.1 Tall building planning in central London  
 
This section discusses the recent history of tall building planning in London and 
provides the background to understanding the context of the principal case study. The 
major changes in governmental institutions are introduced alongside the findings of 
research by academics and that commissioned by the UK government and quangos. At 
the same time, the major governmental and private organisations involved in tall 
building development are introduced and their roles within tall building planning are 
discussed. Appendix 1, which provides brief descriptions of the most relevant 
organisations, can be used throughout the thesis. This section also shows the results of 
existing research regarding tall building planning and visual impacts in central London. 
Section 1.2 following this section then considers the case study of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road in relation to tall building projects. Section 1.3 discusses the methods used to 
conduct this thesis.  
 
The emergence of a boom in tall buildings in London  
Prior to 1986 the Greater London Council (GLC), led by Mayor Ken Livingstone, acted 
as a stronghold against tall building development in central London (Simon 1996). 
Livingstone was originally a politically independent politician who sought to constrain 
tall building development and thus conserve the historic skyline (ibid.). After the 
Thatcher government disbanded the previous regional administration, the GLC, in 1986, 
deregulation of development opened up London for what were deemed 'speculative 
ventures' (Travers 2004; Fainstein 2001: 39). Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's big 
bang agenda brought with it the deregulation of the planning system (Cullingworth and 
Nadin 2006). The philosophical foundation for planning under the Thatcher 
administration was the belief that only the market can deal with the complexity of 
planning, and therefore all planning decisions made should be based on market 
principles (Thornley 1991). In addition, the establishment of the London Docklands 
Development Corporation (LDDC) to redevelop the abandoned docks to the east of 
central London changed the relationships between the London boroughs and private 
developments from an adversarial to a partnership approach (Travers 2004). This was a 
major factor that permitted the establishment of an Enterprise Zone at the Isle of Dogs 
in Canary Wharf in 1982 (Fainstein 2001).  
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Essentially, planning powers previously held by local planning authorities were shifted 
to the owners of the Enterprise Zone (Thornley 1991). Within the boundaries of the 
Enterprise Zone, development did not have to conform to most planning regulations and 
firms were allowed to deduct 100% of their expenditures on construction from their 
income taxes (Fainstein 2001). Furthermore, American style tall buildings with large 
floor plates for traders, which where favoured by emerging potential occupants, were 
encouraged (Hebbert 1998). Between 1989 and 2009, a number of banks, law firms and 
media centres located to tall buildings at Canary Wharf in preference to central London 
(Gordon 2001). Canary Wharf is not subject to investigation in this thesis because it is 
not located in the central area, and because the special regulations of an Enterprise Zone 
that apply there are no longer in force. 
 
In 1998, with the advent of the Blair administration, Deputy Prime Minster John 
Prescott—Secretary of State for the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions (DETR)—commissioned a think tank called the Urban Task Force chaired by 
the internationally renowned architect Richard Rogers—Lord Rogers of Riverside—to 
lead a group of urban experts to carry out research into causes of urban decline and 
recommend practical solutions to generate an urban renaissance (Albers 2001).2 The 
influential report that resulted, Towards an Urban Renaissance, encouraged the 
densification of central urban areas. It proposed that appropriately located tall building 
development is one way of fulfilling this aim (Urban Task Force 1999). The general 
thrust of this document is that people should be attracted to move back into city centres 
so as to revitalise urban living. As the key requirement to achieve this re-urbanisation, 
the report lays out the ambitious vision of a 'compact and well-connected city' (ibid.: 
54). The major spatial innovation of this vision is the densification of the built 
environment around key transportation nodes. The hypothesis is that if the density of 
development around transport nodes is increased then pubic transport becomes 
affordable. Crucially, the key diagram used to visualise the spatial impact of 
densification suggests that an increase in density around transportation nodes might be 
achieved by an increase in height of the built environment, but it is not specified that tall 
buildings are the best way of achieving these ends. Indeed, more traditional urban 
blocks are illustrated by the Urban Task Force as also providing high density 
development (ibid). The significance of quality of design had been formalised through 
                                                 
2 Richard Rogers received his peerage in August 1996 (House of Lords 2008). 
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the Planning Policy Guidance 1 (PPG1) under the auspices of John Gummer, the then 
Secretary of State (Department of Environment 1997; Cullingworth and Nadin 2006).  
 
A proposal for a very tall building in the City of London signalled the emergence of a 
tall building boom in central London. On 10 April 1992, the IRA detonated a bomb in 
the City that severely damaged the Baltic Exchange (Short 2004). In 1996, the 
development company, Trafalgar House, submitted plans to propose the tallest building 
in London and Europe, the Millennium Tower 386 metre high, designed by the 
internationally renowned architectural firm, Foster and Partners, to replace the damaged 
Baltic Exchange at the location on 30 St Mary Axe. Due to strong objections from 
English Heritage and SAVE Britain's Heritage, the proposed building was redesigned 
and reduced in height to 179.80 metres. 30 St Mary Axe was granted planning 
permission by the City of London in 2000 (ibid.). 
 
The Greater London Authority and the London Plan 
In 2000, under the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, the Greater London Authority 
(GLA) was established and became the planning authority for the London region (GLA 
2004a). Ken Livingstone—Mayor of London from 2000 to 2008 and the elected leader 
of the GLA—was in favour of tall building developments which he considered to be a 
central part of a world city vision for London (GLA 2001c). Ken Livingstone also 
regarded tall buildings in the centre of London as visual symbols for a modern world 
city and announced that he would promote them wherever they create attractive 
landmarks, help to provide a coherent location for economic clusters and where they act 
as a catalyst for regeneration, provided that they are acceptable in terms of the design 
and impact on their surroundings (GLA 2001c). In economic terms, tall building 
development in central areas is attractive for property developers because it can yield 
very high financial returns (Charney 2007) and because there is good demand as global 
businesses want to represent their global image through tall buildings (House of 
Commons 2002). However, the corporate outlay and financial risk is high, so that tall 
buildings are only usually considered in relatively stable financial times (Colin 
Buchanan and Partners 2008; Böhm-Ott 2000).  
 
Assessments by quangos and the House of Commons confirm that tall buildings built in 
the 1970s and 1990s had negative impacts on the immediate setting and on the city 
skyline as a whole. As a result, it was recommended that good architectural and urban 
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design of tall buildings is of paramount importance and that LPAs should clearly 
designate areas in which tall buildings are appropriate so that they appear to cluster in a 
controlled area instead of being pepper potted across the city (RFAC 1963; LPAC 1998; 
LPAC 1999; House of Commons 2002). Tavernor and Nicolaou argued that the London 
Plan contains advice on how tall building locations are to be determined, but that it does 
not define these in detail (Nicolaou 2004; Tavernor 2007b). Indeed, some local 
authorities, such as the City of London, purposefully resisted attempts to define the 
extent of tall building locations, as is evident in the public inquiry documents regarding 
the Heron Tower from 2002 (PINS 2002a).3 The thesis considers how tall building areas 
have been defined in the London Plan and—in relation to the specific case study of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road—the LB Southwark policy making processes. The identification 
of areas  designated for tall building development within policy carries  significant 
importance for implementation making processes. According to the 1990 Town and 
Country Planning Act, the decisions made by regional and local planning authorities—
in this case the GLA and the LB Southwark—must be based on policy (OPSI 1990a). 
Therefore, an investigation of the determination of tall building areas exposes the 
struggle for tall building development and the resistance by heritage groups and 
opposing local boroughs. Furthermore, the meaning of the more or less precise 
determination of tall building areas for decision making and public inquiry processes is 
revealed.   
 
It is widely recognised that various iterations of Mayor Livingstone's London Plan 
actively sought to promote tall building development (McNeill 2002b; Tavernor 2004a 
and 2004b). This approach is enshrined in the finalised 2004 publication of the London 
Plan (Tavernor 2007a and 2007b; Charney 2007). On the one hand, it is argued that 
Livingstone's support of tall buildings was due to the social and financial benefits to 
London, and in particular the shortage of affordable housing which developers of tall 
buildings should provide through S106 agreements (Ross 2001; Thornley et al 2005; 
Gordon 2003; McNeill 2002a). Section 106 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning 
Act determines that negative impacts of development should be mitigated through 
obligations provided by the developer (OPSI 1990a). In London, the early stages of the 
                                                 
3 Indeed it appears that the lack of a precise determination of tall building locations is a phenomenon 
appearing across many English cities. According to Short (2007), planning policies in Liverpool indicate 
locations of clusters but do not define exact extents of appropri ate areas. Planning documents for 
Manchester and Newcastle do not specify tall building locations but rather include general statements that 
define appropriate locations qualitatively (ibid.). Only Birmingham specifies exact locations appropriate 
for tall buildings (ibid.). 
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planning process and at the planning application submission stage, the nature and extent 
of these obligations were to be negotiated and agreed between the developer, the GLA 
and the LPA.  
 
The GLA is heavily dependent financially on national government due to the very 
limited budget available to it to provide important infrastructure (Travers 2004; Gordon 
2003). As a result, it has been argued that Mayor Livingstone sought to obtain the 
means to provide affordable housing and infrastructure improvements through S106 
agreements from developers in response to his support of tall building developments 
(Ross 2001). On the other hand, Livingstone sought to transform London into a city that 
displays its world city status visually through tall buildings (House of Commons 2002; 
Tavernor 2007a; McNeill 2002b; Buck 2002 et al). Since the early 1990s, the LPAC 
and the Department of Environment— under then Secretary of State John Gummer—
had put forward reports that emphasised the importance of London's world city status 
(Travers 2004). Yet given Livingstone's previous reputation as a socialist politician, the 
elitist world city focus of London has been described as rather surprising (Travers and 
Gordon 2010). The thesis extends this debate by focussing on the effects that the strong 
advocacy of tall buildings has had on policy making and implementation processes. In 
this regard, key wording in relevant policy and guidance, the London Plan and the 
LVMF, are analysed in depth.  
 
Principally, Lord Rogers as chief architectural advisor to Ken Livingstone was charged 
with bringing the vision of an urban renaissance into the regional planning of the GLA 
and the London Plan. Since 2000, when Livingstone became the GLA's first mayor, 
London's development has been regulated through regional policy—the London Plan 
(GLA 2004a)—which encourages tall building development through a set of tall 
building policies. In Towards the London Plan (GLA 2001c)—the precursor to the draft 
London Plan (GLA 2002a)—Livingstone defined for the first time his official vision for 
London as a world city. This document states that the future development of London is 
to be based on three fundamental principles: i) strong and diverse economic growth; ii) 
social inclusion; and, iii) fundamental improvements in environmental management and 
the use of resources (ibid.).  In the draft London Plan, these principles were incorporated 
into London Plan policies 4B.1 to 4B.12, regulating the design and location of tall 
buildings (ibid.). The finalised London Plan (GLA 2004a) incorporated the belief that 
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good design leads to social and economic wellbeing as advocated in the Urban Task 
Force Report.4  
 
The first sentence of the London Plan's policies on the issue of design is: 'Good design 
is central to all the objectives of this plan' (GLA 2004a: 173). Charney (2007) argued 
that Lord Rogers and Mayor Livingstone fiercely defended the quality of architecture 
agenda so as to support tall building development in London. On the other hand, 
Tavernor (2004a; 2007b) put forth the argument that the quality of architecture agenda 
had already been formulated by the conservative administration within the Planning 
Policy Guidance 1 (PPG1). Tavernor's reasoning suggests that the London Plan simply 
extended the approach formulated in the PPG1. While the 1991 Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act demanded that regional and local planning authorities 
formulate policy based on national policy, it also allowed for discretion in adapting 
national policy on the regional and local levels (OPSI 1991).  
 
The thesis evaluates how the GLA enshrined the national agenda of encouraging good 
architectural and urban design in the London Plan so as to support tall building 
development. It has been established that the private sector had privileged access to the 
setting of the London Plan policies through the London Development Agency (LDA) 
and through developers who had confidential meetings with leading GLA officials 
(Travers 2004; Thornley et al 2005). Furthermore, accusations of client politics have 
been raised, including the argument that prominent architects such as Richard Rogers 
and Norman Foster were treated favourably by the GLA (McNeill 2002b; Charney 
2007). Contrary to this, it has been argued that the high degree of credibility and 
experience of these architects was critical for enshrining the national planning agenda of 
high design quality in the London Plan (Tavernor 2004a; Polina 2007). The thesis 
analyses the interaction of members of private developers' design teams with GLA 
officials in implementation processes. Furthermore, the impact of agreements between 
the GLA and private developers that were achieved within pre-application discussions 
on emerging policy is analysed in depth. In a number of cases, the GLA agreed to 
support tall building projects within pre-application processes. The thesis discusses the 
impact of these agreements on the processes of the London Plan policy making.  
 
                                                 
4 The London Plan was subsequently amended by the new mayor, Boris Johnson (GLA 2009). 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that the private sector had privileged access to the 
London Plan policy making process either directly through having access to the mayor 
and leading officers (Gordon 2003; Thornley et al 2002) or indirectly through the LDA 
(Travers 2004; Thornley et al 2005). As a result, these academics have argued that the 
big tent approach advocated by the GLA failed because the privileged access provided 
to private businesses excluded other groups from influencing regional policy making to 
an equal extent. The thesis focuses on implementation processes of development 
control, and in particular on pre-application discussions and processes of assessment 
within the GLA and also at the LB Southwark. Interviews with GLA and LB Southwark 
planning officers responsible for the No.1 Blackfriars Road project are critically 
compared to interviews with design team members such as architects and planning 
consultants in order to establish what the critical path for the design team was for 
assuring agreement with the GLA and the LB Southwark. Furthermore, the impact of 
agreements achieved in early pre-application discussions on the further drafting of the 
London Plan and the London View Management Framework (LVMF) is examined in 
detail.  
 
The LVMF and visual impact assessments  
Since the beginning of the recent revival of tall building proposals, conflicts about the 
visual impacts of tall buildings have emerged. In the mid 1980s, researchers from the 
London Research Centre recommended a set of fifty views to provide special protection 
of the Palace of Westminster and St Paul's Cathedral (Catchpole 1987). As there was no 
regional government at the time, national government limited this ambitious approach 
to a set of ten views. These were protected through the Regional Planning Guidance 3: 
Annex A (RPG3A) published in 1998, but they had been in use informally since 1991 in 
order to prevent the visual intrusion of tall buildings on these nationally important 
historic symbols (GOL 1998). With the advent of the tall building boom around 2000 
the debate about the protection of views arose again and the London Planning Advisory 
Committee (LPAC) recommended the protection of twenty-nine views (LPAC 1998). 
LPAC was a body established after the abolition of the Greater London Council and 
charged with advising national government on the development of London's regional 
policy (Cullingworth and Nadin 2006).  
 
Regarding the geometric protection measures of the LVMF, it has been argued that 
lobbying successes by prominent developers resulted in a narrowing of several of the 
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ten geometrically protected view corridors in the finalised 2007 version of the LVMF 
(Markham 2008; Kufner 2009).5 Furthermore, it has been argued that specific visual 
assessment methods advocated by the LVMF allowed for tall building development in 
the background of geometric view corridors (Craggs 2007; Markham 2008; Kufner 
2009). The thesis considers in detail the drafting of the LVMF guidance including the 
development of the 2005 draft LVMF, the consultation process with stakeholders and 
the development of the 2007 LVMF. Amendments made to geometrically defined view 
corridors are assessed based on discussions of the wording of key paragraphs and 
interviews with the experts who wrote them. 
 
In addition to these geometric measures, the Qualitative Visual Assessment (QVA) is 
also regulated via policy and guidance. At national level, views from within and 
towards conservation areas are protected through the national Planning Policy Guidance 
15 (PPG15)—in force from 1994 until 2010—which sets out a wider set of rules for 
planning and regulating the setting of historic buildings and the subsequent impact of 
modern buildings—of which tall buildings have the greatest impact on the historic 
environment (Department of the Environment 1994).6 Crucially, the PPG15 introduced 
the terminology that a development should preserve and enhance the settings of 
significant heritage assets. With the establishment of the GLA in 2000, the new regional 
government was charged with developing specific London guidance—the 
Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) as part of the London Plan—to update 
methods of visual protection. This SPG is the London View Management Framework 
(LVMF).7  
 
It has been argued that computer generated images (CGIs) also known as Accurate 
Visual Representations (AVRs) in the LVMF, cause problems for the visual 
assessments because they do not represent human visual perception accurately 
(Tavernor 2007a; Nicolaou 2004). AVRs are two-dimensional images within which 
                                                 
5 The view corridors have been widened again in the first revision, the July 2010 draft of the London 
View Management Framework (LVMF) published under the new mayor, Boris Johnson (GLA 2009).  
6 The PPG15 was effective until 2009 and was replaced in 2010 with the Planning Policy Statement 15: 
Planning for the Historic Environment (PPS15) (DCLG 2010).   
7 Supplementary guidance documents relating to the London Plan focussing speci fically on the matter of 
tall buildings and views were published in the following order: 
Interim strategic planning guidance on tall buildings, strategic views and the skyline in London (GLA 
2001b); London Plan: London View Management Framework draft SPG (GLA 2005a); London View 
Management Framework: The London Plan Supplementary Planning Guidance (GLA 2007b). Recently a 
revised version of the LVMF was published by the new mayor, Boris Johnson, in July 2010 (GLA 
2010a).  
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photorealistic representations of proposed projects are inserted in photographs (GLA 
2007b). Furthermore, it is argued that there is the potential for subjective decision 
making by the producers of AVRs involved which might lead to the downplaying of 
negative visual effects (Carmona et al 2010; Bosselman 1998; Day 2002; Stewart 2003). 
The alternative use of serial images has been questioned because the assessments differ 
with regard to each individual image (Tavernor and Gassner 2010). The thesis considers 
the appropriateness of the QVA method for assessing tall building developments as 
defined in the consecutive drafts and finalised version of the LVMF. Furthermore, an 
assessment of the background of views is discussed using the example of the St James's 
Park townscape view from Horse Guards Road within which the No.1 Blackfriars Road 
case study is visible. The terminology used in the QVA is assessed regarding its 
suitability for reaching objective conclusions within expert assessments. An important 
part of this discussion are key paragraphs of the draft 2005 LVMF and the finalised 
2007 LVMF, interviews with the expert consultants who wrote these paragraphs and 
interviews with experts who have used the LVMF in the production of townscape 
assessments and within expert panel assessments.  
 
The roles of the quangos: English Heritage and CABE 
Despite such strict policy regulation, a large number of tall buildings have been 
proposed in the central area of London, and many have been granted planning 
permission—in particular in the City of London, Canary Wharf and the northern parts 
of the London Boroughs of Southwark and Lambeth. The visual impact of tall buildings 
has been a continuous source of disagreement amongst supporters of tall building 
developments on the one hand and heritage groups on the other hand (House of 
Commons 2002). Two quangos have been of particular importance when it comes to the 
assessment of tall building projects. English Heritage, the government's advisory body 
regarding the protection of England's built heritage assets, has consistently taken the 
position that tall building projects in central London should not be granted planning 
permission due to their visual impacts on the World Heritage Sites (WHS) (the Tower 
of London and the Westminster World Heritage Sites, including the Palace of 
Westminster), listed buildings and conservation areas, as well as major open spaces 
including London's historic Royal Parks (McNeill 2002b; Short 2004; Charney 2007; 
Tavernor 2007b).8 As a result, English Heritage recommended that in numerous cases 
                                                 
8 English Heritage was established under the 1983 National Heritage Act (Her Majesty's Stationary Offi ce 
1983).  
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the national government call in these tall building planning applications in order that 
they are determined at the highest level by the Secretary of State following a public 
planning inquiry.9   
 
In a public inquiry, an inspector from the Planning Inspectorate (PINS) hears evidence 
from both supporters and opponents of a tall building proposal. According to the 2000 
Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules, following the 
public inquiry the inspector publishes a report which is considered by the Secretary of 
State who then reaches a final verdict on whether or not planning permission is granted 
to the project in question (OPSI 2000a). Appendix 6 shows that these processes can take 
between one and two and a half years. This is explained in Chapter 6 in relation to a 
major public inquiry regarding the joint consideration of the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road projects. In addition, the Doon Street Tower public inquiry is evaluated in order to 
aid the discussion by allowing a comparison of the argumentative processes used by 
opponents and supporters of the projects and the conclusions reached by planning 
inspectors and the Secretary of State. I attended both public inquiries so that, in addition 
to the analysis of documents such as proofs of evidence, barristers' submissions and 
planning inspectors' and Secretary of State reports, data accessed through participant 
observation—the argumentative rationale seeking to establish proof—is analysed.  
 
The Commission on Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) has a different 
advisory role to that of English Heritage. CABE is concerned with the design quality of 
significant development projects nationally as enshrined in the joint DETR and CABE 
publication, By Design, Urban design in the planning system: towards better practice 
(DETR and CABE 2000a). CABE was established by Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott's DETR to assess development projects with the aim of ensuring that the 
national agenda's goal of the highest quality architecture and urban design was 
implemented (Tavernor 2007b). As a result of opposing assessments of tall building 
projects, conflicts between these two quangos emerged and were played out in public 
inquiry procedures, such as that for the Heron Tower (PINS 2002a). Therefore, 
resolution of the divergent views reached in assessments conducted by CABE and 
English Heritage was sought (House of Commons 2002).  
 
                                                 
9 See appendix 2 for a full list of projects and appendix 7 for a table detailing the eleven public inquiry 
cases and showing which organisations argued in support and which in opposition to the projects. 
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The Guidance on Tall Buildings (GOTB) was an attempt to streamline the assessment 
processes conducted by CABE in their Design Review Panel (DRP) and by English 
Heritage in its London Advisory Committee (LAC) so that both quangos would agree 
on a joint position and assessment procedure. This was intended to prevent quangos 
from reaching divergent assessment conclusions. However, the GOTB maintains that 
the two bodies have different statutory remits (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). The 
GOTB has not been considered in academic research so far. Rydin (2003) suggested 
that because quangos are isolated from democratic control they are subjected to interest 
group influence which leads to significant influence by them on policy produced by the 
quangos. The thesis discusses the appropriateness of the GOTB for resolving the issue 
of divergent recommendations to the national government by English Heritage and 
CABE. Interviews with experts who contributed to writing the GOTB and documentary 
evidence are used to examine interdependencies between the English Heritage, CABE 
and non-governmental interest groups.  
 
Academics have argued that both CABE and English Heritage have repeatedly been 
criticised by those aggrieved by their assessments (McNeill 2002b; Polina 2007; 
Charney 2007; Markham 2008). The thesis considers the relationship of CABE and 
English Heritage with diverse interest groups as advocates of interests and via the 
involvement of private sector experts in both quangos as members of assessment panels. 
In relation to the assessment processes within the CABE DRP and English Heritage's 
LAC, both the contribution of expert involvement as well as the problem of resulting 
conflict of interest accusations are discussed in terms of their impact on the 
effectiveness of tall building planning. Furthermore, the potential for subjectivity in the 
assessment of design proposals has been identified both generally (Carmona 1998a) and 
specifically in the CABE Design Review Panel (CABE DRP) process (Parnaby and 
Short 2008). In addition, it has been suggested that private design teams and their 
architects tend to use presentation materials and an argumentative rationale in order to 
convince assessors of the merits of their projects (Carmona et al 2010).  
 
The thesis discusses the conduct of assessments of tall building developments within the 
CABE DRP and English Heritage's LAC. To this end, interviews with panel members, 
assessment reports and interviews with design team members whose projects have been 
assessed therein are used. Particular consideration is given to how CABE and English 
Heritage assure objectivity within assessment processes in the light of the technical and 
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rhetorical possibilities used by private design teams in presenting tall building projects. 
Up to this point, this introduction has discussed the governmental bodies at national and 
regional levels with high levels of influence on tall building planning in central London, 
as well as the most important advisory bodies (quangos). However, there are also a 
number of non-governmental interest groups and international organisations which have 
an interest in protecting London's most cherished heritage assets from the visual impacts 
of tall building development. 
 
Third (non-governmental) parties' influence on tall building planning processes 
A range of organisations seek to protect central London's heritage assets from what they 
consider the visual intrusion of tall buildings, and a number of private developers are 
interested in developing tall buildings due to the very significant financial gains 
expected. These include international organisations, managers of World Heritage Sites 
(WHS) and pressure groups. The Historic Royal Palaces, which manage the Tower of 
London, seek to prohibit the visibility of tall buildings in relation to the Historic Royal 
Palaces. Both the Eastern Cluster in the City of London and the London Bridge 
Opportunity Area are in close proximity to the Tower of London, a WHS located in the 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets. The City of Westminster, besides being a local 
borough and seeking to protect its conservation areas, also manages the Westminster 
WHS which includes the Palace of Westminster (WCC 2007c).  
 
On a national level, England's WHSs are surveyed by ICOMOS UK which acts as a 
direct contact for the managers of WHSs and as an advisor to UNESCO. On accepting 
World Heritage status for significant buildings and ensembles, the UK government 
entered into an agreement to protect WHSs from any harm based on the UNESCO 
convention on protecting the world's heritage passed in 1972 (UNESCO 1972). Thus 
UNESCO is able to exert significant political pressure on the UK government when 
ICOMOS reports that WHSs are not being protected appropriately. Pendlebury (et al 
2009) argues that weaker conservation lobbies particularly tend to call in UNESCO as 
an ally. Hebbert and McKellar (2008) have affirmed that UNESCO has had significant 
impacts on London's tall building development. The impact of UNESCO on the 
emerging LVMF, the GOTB and the planning processes of No.1 Blackfriars Road and 
related tall building projects is considered. Furthermore, the thesis sheds light on the 
influence UNESCO has had on governmental agencies and the dynamics that have 
resulted from this.  
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On the London level, the Dean and Chapter of St Paul's Cathedral seek to protect the 
visual integrity of St Paul's within the London skyline. The Royal Parks Agency 
(hereunder abbreviated as the Royal Parks) is concerned with tall building development 
visible from within the parks, which is common for most locations throughout central 
London. Markham (2008) has identified the Royal Parks—often represented by the 
acclaimed landscape architect, Hall Moggridge—as an interest group regarding tall 
buildings. SAVE Britain's Heritage (abbreviated hereunder as SAVE) has taken on the 
mission of preventing the demolition of significant heritage sites, many of which are 
located in central London. SAVE uses campaigning to gather support for its 
conservation efforts but occasionally also gets involved in planning processes directly, 
as they did for 30 St Mary Axe (Short 2004; Charney 2007) and Smithfield.  SAVE has 
strong ties with the heritage community and is thus able to exert pressure on English 
Heritage and other governmental organisations in order to get these to represent its 
interests in heritage protection. Furthermore, HRH the Prince of Wales has twice 
spoken out publicly against tall buildings (HRH Prince of Wales 2001 and 2008). Thus 
he has been identified as an influential force in the UK planning system (Charney 
2007).  
 
Journalists of media outlets, and the London Evening Standard in particular, have 
published large numbers of articles critical of tall building development in London. Sir 
Simon Jenkins has been identified as an outright opponent of tall building development 
(McNeill 2002b; Charney 2007). In addition, there are also influential people such as 
Sir Nicolas Serota and local pressure groups such as Bankside Residents Against the 
Tate Tower (BRATT), that have exerted significant influence, even causing a judicial 
review after a public inquiry in the case of the Tate Tower, a tall building proposed in 
very close proximity to the highly regarded Tate Modern Gallery (Harris 2008). The 
impacts and roles of these third parties are not considered in a separate chapter but 
instead are part of the discussion throughout the thesis.  
 
Private sector design teams 
Due to the increasing complexity of the tall building planning processes through the 
emergence of new policies and guidance and the high risk of failing to achieve planning 
consent due to strong opposition by heritage groups, private developers have tended to 
hire a range of consultants in their attempts to navigate a successful way through this 
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complexity. Townscape consultants, experts in the visual assessment of tall buildings 
with extensive historical knowledge, have acquired a central role when presenting the 
visual impact of tall buildings (Tavernor 2007b). The developer, who finances the 
project, leads the design team and acts as the principal lobbyist for the tall building 
project: The greater the influence of the developer and his team, the greater the 
likelihood of a successful outcome. 
 
The developer's design team at its core (also often referred to as the core design team) 
consists of an architectural firm (responsible for designing the project), planning 
consultants (advising the team on existing and emerging policy and guidance and acting 
as an important contact to regional and local planning officers), public relations 
consultants (dealing with media inquiries and also often acting as providers of 
information regarding political circumstances) and solicitors (advising on the legal 
ramifications of the planning documentation). Due to the high level of controversy 
regarding the visual impact of tall buildings, townscape consultants (advising on ways 
of improving the visual appearance of the project in relation to heritage assets and 
producing a townscape assessment as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA)) have acquired a role of similar importance in the team. In addition, if a public 
inquiry takes place, the developer hires high ranking barristers who lead the 
presentation of evidence and arguments heard by the planning inspector. The thesis 
discusses the roles of architects, as well as townscape, visualisation, planning and public 
relations consultants and solicitors who, led by the developer, form the core of the 
private design team.  
 
Research regarding the roles and significance of private sector experts on tall building 
planning processes has been scarce. The multiple roles of Lord Rogers as the leader of 
the Urban Task Force, architectural advisor to former Mayor Ken Livingstone and as a 
private architect working on tall building projects on behalf of developers have been 
identified (McNeill 2002b; Charney 2007; Tavernor 2007b). However, as of yet, only 
insinuations regarding potential conflicts of interest on the part of Lord Rogers have 
been put forward (McNeill 2002b; Charney 2007). The thesis considers the involvement 
of private sector experts in policy making and implementation processes regarding the 
London Plan, the LVMF as well as within the assessment panels of English Heritage 
and CABE. Such an examination has not yet been undertaken but is merited 
significance not least because Allmendinger in his approach to planning under the new 
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Labour government has concluded that planning appeared to have been 'contracted out', 
since the production of evidence required to demonstrate the conformity of projects with 
policy was handed over to consultants and experts (Allmendinger 2011: 85).  
 
The involvement of private sector experts in public service is important due to the 
principles of public life set out in a report published by the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life in 1997, the so called Nolan Report (Nolan 1997a). The Nolan Report 
stressed that there have been serious abuses of planning processes (ibid.). In order to 
improve the accountability of local governments in the public interest the report lists the 
principles of selflessness, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership 
which should govern the conduct of local government officials (Nolan 1997b). It 
appears that the most problematic aspect is the 'public perception of impropriety' rather 
than actual cases of misconduct or even corruption (Nolan 1997a: 70).  
 
The most important issues arising from the Nolan Report from this thesis are: i) 
honesty, government officials have to declare any conflicts of interest, based on which 
the person declaring them is excluded from working on the issues to which the interest 
relates; ii) objectivity, which means that choices such as the granting of planning 
permission have to be made based on the merit of projects; iii) integrity, which means 
that government officials should not be compromised by any obligations to outside 
organisations; and, iv) openness, which means that information regarding decisions 
made should only be withheld from the public if wider public interests so demand 
(Nolan 1997b). The thesis examines what the impacts of private sector expert 
involvement in public sector work have been and how governmental agencies  have 
implemented the Nolan principles.  
 
Local borough tall building policy  
London's local boroughs have different attitudes towards tall building development. 
Some boroughs see them as an opportunity to solidify their status as a centre for 
international corporations or as kick-starters for regeneration, while others emphasise 
their negative impacts. The City of London is located in one of the most historically 
significant parts of London, containing a large number of conservation areas. According 
to the 1990 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act, conservation areas 
are recognised for their 'special architectural or historic interest the character or 
appearance of which it is desirable to preserve or enhance' (OPSI 1990b: Part2, Section 
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69). However, the City is recognised as London's premier business district and has 
purposively restricted the size of its residential areas (PINS 2002a). It has been argued 
that the City of London seeks to maintain its tradition as a centre for British 
corporations (Kaika 2010). Since the millennium, tall buildings have become visual 
signifiers for what Sklair (2006) has recognised as global corporations that seek to be 
housed in iconic buildings. Thus, the hypothesis emerges that the visual dominance of 
tall buildings, which results from their sheer height, is related to the economic 
consideration of seeking to attract global businesses.  
 
The Corporation of London commissioned a report which argued that in order to 
continue to thrive as a world leading financial centre, increasing density through tall 
building development was inevitable (Plank et al 2002). The reason for this is that the 
City of London sees its primary role as a leading world centre for international finance 
and business within which significant firms, active on a global level, have located their 
headquarters (Hebbert 1998). Consequently, there has never been a large residential 
community lobby for the protection of conservation areas in the City of London seeking 
to resist tall building development in the planning processes (PINS 2002a). Prior to the 
millennium, the tightening of heritage controls led to the displacement of office 
developments to the City fringes and also to Canary Wharf located in the London 
borough of Tower Hamlets in the 1980s (Hebbert 1998). During the rise of Canary 
Wharf, the City of London saw itself in competition with Canary Wharf with regard to 
attracting global corporations (Gordon 2001).The latest City of London UDP states that 
the character of conservation areas can be enhanced by new development and tall 
buildings, primarily located in the Easter Cluster, which are seen as a key means for 
reinforcing the status of a leading world centre for business and finance (City of London 
2002). As a result, leading City of London planners have argued in public inquiry 
processes that tall buildings contribute positively to the consolidation of existing 
clusters despite criticism by English Heritage and other heritage organisations (PINS 
2002a).  
 
The so called Eastern Cluster of tall buildings, in which a large number of tall building 
projects are being developed, is situated in the City between St Paul's Cathedral—one of 
London and the nation's most important religious symbols—and the Tower of London, a 
World Heritage Site protected by an international heritage policy and UNESCO (City of 
London 2002). It is argued that the City of London has purposefully resisted defining 
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the exact boundaries of the areas appropriate for tall buildings (PINS 2002a; Tavernor 
2007b). The designation of areas appropriate and not appropriate has been made 
continuously by quangos (LPAC 1999) and indeed by the House of Commons (2002). 
The thesis examines the reasons behind this purposeful ambiguity in regional (London 
Plan) and local policy making in relation to the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge in 
Southwark (Southwark UDP) and partly also in the City of London UDP. It will be 
argued that the reasons for this ambiguity are both strategic (allowing for tall building 
proposals in areas that developers determine so as not to restrict developers' ability to 
identify the most promising sites for tall building development) and economic 
(developers are able to obtain sites that are not identified as tall building areas for a 
cheaper price than when sites are officially identified as tall building areas), as well as 
political (sometimes politicians are not able to gain the support of their constituents to 
get consent for a tall building policy). 
 
In the Eastern Cluster, a number of tall building projects were only granted planning 
permission after considerable controversy: the Heron Tower, 30 St Mary Axe (known as 
the Gherkin), the Minerva Tower and 20 Fenchurch Street were all subjected to fierce 
debate amongst experts and the public at inquiries.10 In these entire cases, heritage 
bodies argued that tall buildings would have detrimental visual effects on the settings of 
cultural and religious heritage assets of national significance. In relation to the case 
study of No.1 Blackfriars Road, the public inquiry processes and decisions regarding 
these projects have had important implications. Planning permissions for these 
precedent cases have opened up central London to further tall building proposals.  
 
Contrary to the aspirations of the City of London, London's other historic core, the City 
of Westminster, has an urban planning policy that actively discourages tall building 
development. Like the City of London, Westminster contains large expanses of 
conservation areas (WCC 2007c). These conservation areas are fiercely protected for 
their residents by Westminster's planning department through national policies, such as 
the PPG15, and local policies enshrined within the Unitary Development Plan (UDP).  
                                                 
10 Heron Tower was called in in 2001 and was granted planning permission in 2002 (PINS 2002; ODPM 
2002).The Minerva Tower was subject to significant controversy but the project was cancelled by the 
developer (DCMS 2007a).  20 Fenchurch Street was called in in 2006 and granted planning permission in 
2007 (DCLG 2007b). 20 Fenchurch Street was regarded as being situated outside of the Eastern Cluster. 
Appendix 2 contains images of the projects and details about the firms involved. Appendix 6 shows the 
dates of call-ins, public inquiries and the Secretary of State's decision making in relation to the various 
tall building projects. 
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For instance, Westminster's UDP states that '[h]igh buildings are generally not in 
keeping with the established scale and character of much of Westminster. Their 
appearance disrupts the skyline of the City and intrudes upon cherished views of 
Westminster's pre-eminent buildings and monuments' (WCC 2007c: 511). As a result, 
tall building development has been confined to small areas in Paddington (ibid.) and in 
front of Victoria Station.11 Up to this point, three foci of tall building development have 
been discussed. The City of London which seeks to attract them to maintain its status as 
the prime location for global firms, Canary Wharf in the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets which seeks to attract them in competition with the City of London, and the 
City of Westminster where tall buildings are met with reservation.  
 
However, from 2005 onwards the focus of tall building development shifted towards the 
northern parts of Southwark and Lambeth just across the River Thames to the south of 
the Cities of London and Westminster. It has been noted that the London Plan gave the 
mayor the power to override local borough planning decisions in cases of significant 
strategic importance (Travers and Gordon 2010). The tall building cases of Vauxhall 
Tower and Black Prince Road, located in the LB Lambeth, and Potter's Fields and Tate 
Tower, located in the LB Southwark, are examples in which the mayor used his  powers 
to support tall building projects in public inquiry processes, overriding the planning 
decision of the local boroughs (PINS 2004a; b; 2009c; Bar-Hillel 2004). The next 
section introduces the case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road and sets out the reasons why 
this case study is particularly well suited to address the central research questions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Several tall buildings are being proposed at Victoria Station, lead by the developer, Land Securities, 
and designed by the architect fi rm, Kohn Peddersen Fox Associates (see Appendix 2 for details).   
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1.2 Case study  
 
This section introduces the case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road. It sets out why No.1 
Blackfriars Road is a useful exemplar for addressing the central research question of 
how the urban renaissance agenda has been translated into tall building policy making 
and implementation processes in central London. No.1 Blackfriars Road project is 
located in the north-western corner of the London Borough of Southwark (marked with 
a blue dot in map 1; 1 in image 1) and has been designed to provide the pinnacle of a 
proposed cluster at the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge. It provides a useful focus for 
any thesis because influential proponents and opponents were in strong disagreement 
about the contributions and the constraints regarding tall building projects proposed 
there. This section includes a map, images of the proposed cluster, and a data sheet 
summarising the main components of No.1 Blackfriars Road. Key sections of planning 
law are discussed to illustrate why, in light of the divergent interests of the private and 
governmental organisations involved, this proposal proved particularly difficult to 
resolve. 
 
The cluster of tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge 
The fact that a cluster of tall buildings has been proposed at the southern end of 
Blackfriars Bridge which will be very visible up and down the River Thames at the 
heart of London raises significant questions about the visual image of London. Large 
clusters have only been located so far in the City of London and at Canary Wharf. Three 
tall building schemes have been proposed at Blackfriars Bridge. The King's Reach 
Tower Redevelopment (3 in image 1) is a proposal to renovate an existing office tower 
increasing its height by 17 metres, with new lower buildings around its base. This tower 
was designed by Make Architects in conjunction with the developer, Simone Halabi, to 
be 127.9 metres high.12 The two major projects at Blackfriars Bridge are No.1 
Blackfriars Road and 20 Blackfriars Road. No.1 Blackfriars Road was designed by Ian 
Simpson Architects for the Liverpool-based developer, Beetham Organisation (1 in 
image 1). It was designed to contain a hotel in the form of a tall building, a podium and 
a smaller adjacent building incorporating affordable housing.  Because of its proposed 
height of 170 metres and its presence in a LVMF townscape view, No.1 Blackfriars 
                                                 
12 The developer for the Kings Reach Tower redevelopment project might have changed but exact details 
have not been made public knowledge. 
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Road is the most dominant visually of the three projects.13 20 Blackfriars  Road (2 in 
image 1) was designed by Wilkinson Eyre Architects for the developer, Land Securities 
Plc, and was subsequently bought by Circleplane. 20 Blackfriars Road comprises of two 
towers, a 148 metre tall residential tower and a 105 metre tall commercial tower.  
 
The prominent location of the case study 
No.1 Blackfriars Road is a highly controversial project because it is located in an area 
that does not yet have a cluster of tall buildings. The London boroughs of Southwark 
and Lambeth ranked amongst the poorest 10% of boroughs in England (GLA 2002k). 
Conflict between proponents and heritage groups regarding the appropriateness of the 
No.1 Blackfriars Road project was perhaps inevitable because of the site’s prominent 
location. However, it is, or will be very well served by transport links. As part of the 
Thameslink 2000 rail enhancement scheme, Blackfriars Station is to be redeveloped, 
including the provision of a new entrance at the southern side of Blackfriars Bridge 
(Department for Transport 2006). Thereby, the southern side of Blackfriars Bridge 
should fulfil an important requirement of the London Plan's policy 4B.10 which states 
that tall buildings have to be appropriate to the transport capacity of an area (GLA 
2004a). Furthermore, its location at the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge fulfils the 
London Plan criteria of policy 4B.3: tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge would 
maximise the potential of the site in terms of building density and transport capacity 
(ibid.). 
 
Positive contributions by tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge 
Prior to discussing the specific positive contributions from and constraints on No.1 
Blackfriars Road, the nature of policy and decision making within the national planning 
system needs to be taken into account because only in this light does it becomes clear 
why there was significant uncertainty as to whether No.1 Blackfriars Road and related 
projects could be granted planning permission. The current planning system is based on 
a plan-led approach which establishes a hierarchy between national, regional and local 
levels of planning policy through the 1991 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
(OPSI 1991). However, based on Section 54A of the 1990 Town and Country Planning  
Act, the planning system is flexible in nature so that each proposal can be assessed on  
                                                 
13 No.1 Blackfriars Road was initially proposed at 226.5 metres height. During the planning process, No.1 
Blackfriars Road was reduced to 180 metres (July 2007) and later even to 170 metres (December 2007) 
(PINS 2009a).  
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its own merits (OPSI 1990a). While planning policies are streamlined through the 
policy hierarchy, decisions regarding individual planning proposals may depart from 
policy if there are material considerations that are significant enough to lead to 
overruling policy (Cullingworth and Nadin 2006).  
 
Moreover, it has been stressed repeatedly that the interdependence between policy 
making and implementation had significant effects on emerging policy (Barrett and 
Fudge 1981; Allmendinger 2003). Tewdwr-Jones (2002) stresses this duality between 
discretion—the power granted to local planning authorities (LPAs) to formulate their 
own policies and make their own decisions flexibly based on the merits of individual 
planning proposals—and prescription—the hierarchy established via the plan-led 
approach by which regional and local policy have to be in conformance with national 
policy. He describes this duality as an 'unhappy ideological conflict between the 
discretionary natures of British planning' (Tewdwr-Jones 2002: 84). Greater certainty in 
regulation is one of the primary aims of the plan-led approach (Barker 2006a). 
Developers should be in a position to know the conditions under which proposed 
projects will be granted planning permission since regional and local policy are based 
on national policy (ibid.). Barker (2006b), however, concludes that these goals have 
been compromised by the length and complexity of the planning process. As a solution 
she proposes that planning authorities should adopt more of a partnership approach with 
the private sector, the information regarding the planning application should be reduced 
and that government should call in fewer planning applications (ibid.).  
 
In the light of these central requirements of planning law, the specific merits—the pros 
and cons—of No.1 Blackfriars Road are of significant importance because these are the 
major factors that need to be considered by governmental decision makers when 
determining planning consent. The part of Southwark in which the proposed cluster of 
tall buildings is situated on the River Thames across from the City of London, 
Blackfriars Bridge (and more recently the Millennium Bridge) thereby providing 
positive links to the City's business activities. This link to the City makes the location 
attractive for high-end development. The London Plan, under the heading of the 'Blue 
Ribbon Network', defines the principles for building near London's waterways (GLA 
2004a: 193). Policy 4C.20 states that tall building projects proposed close to a 
waterway, the most important of which is the River Thames, have to provide an 
appropriate mix of uses including public uses and open spaces. Furthermore, any open 
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spaces provided are supposed to be accessible to the public (ibid.). For tall buildings 
located at Blackfriars Bridge, large public open spaces at ground floor level are 
proposed. A publicly accessible viewing gallery at the top of the building is also 
proposed for No.1 Blackfriars Road.  
 
The proposed cluster of tall buildings is part of the wider regeneration strategy focusing 
on the 'London South Central/Central Activity Zone', which is designated in the London 
Plan and is reflected in Southwark's UDP (GLA 2004: 234; LB Southwark 2007c). The 
issue of regeneration—to tackle deprivation and improve the living situation of 
inhabitants—is at the heart of Southwark's UDP (LB Southwark 2007c). The opening of 
the Tate Modern in 2000 (Manson 2001) was a kick-off for significant regeneration 
there. Since its opening, the Tate Modern has attracted more than two million visitors 
annually. Importantly, the Tate Modern kick-off has given leaders and inhabitants the 
confidence to believe it is possible to improve the living environments in Southwark 
through regeneration, principally attracting large developments. Prior to 2000, 
Southwark was among the 'top ten deprived areas in the country' (ibid.: 12). 
Regeneration at Elephant and Castle is a central issue in Southwark's most recent UDP. 
Elephant and Castle (T4 in map 1) is also identified as an Opportunity Area in the 
London Plan (LB Southwark 2007c). The proposed cluster of tall buildings at 
Blackfriars Bridge is seen as a gateway to the Blackfriars Road Boulevard scheme 
which is supposed to link regeneration in the north to Elephant and Castle further south-
sucking some of the wealth of Westminster and the City towards Southwark.14 Finally, 
the projects at No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road together would provide the contribution of 
around 150 units of affordable housing and around £14.000.000 through Section 106 
agreements (see appendix 10 for details).  
 
Four projects have set precedents for the acceptability principle of tall buildings close to 
the south bank of the River Thames. In November 2003, following a highly 
controversial public inquiry, the Secretary of State granted planning permission to the 
London Bridge Tower (also known as the 'Shard of Glass')—a 310 metre tall building 
located at London Bridge (ODPM 2003). The London Bridge Tower (T3 in map 1) was 
the first tall building granted planning permission in Southwark and will be the tallest 
mixed-use tower in Europe. The earlier King's Reach Tower (3 in image 1) is an 
                                                 
14 Alongside the proposed Blackfriars Road Boulevard, there are a number of proposals some of which 
have already been realised, such as the Palestra building (PINS 2009a). 
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existing tall building completed in 1978 and was given planning permission to be 
refurbished and enlarged in height by four floors (LB Southwark 2005c). Policy 4B.8 of 
the London Plan encourages tall building projects in locations where they consolidate 
existing clusters (GLA 2004). Therefore, the King's Reach Tower redevelopment 
project has set a precedent for the acceptability of further tall building projects close to 
nearby Blackfriars Bridge.  
 
The site of No.1 Blackfriars Road itself a scheme achieved planning consent in 2002 for 
a tall building for Sainsbury's (DCLG 2009a) and together with the planning permission 
to redevelop the Kings Reach Tower, there were already two consented schemes for 
new tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge. Further west, the building housing London 
Weekend Television, commonly known as the LWT tower, extends the precedent for 
tall buildings towards Waterloo Station, the Waterloo Opportunity Area being a 
designated tall building location in the London Borough of Lambeth (GLA 2007f). The 
precedents that have been set by these projects suggest that tall buildings might be 
appropriate in terms of contributing to the consolidation of clusters of tall buildings in a 
large area spanning from London Bridge to Blackfriars Bridge and Waterloo. Therefore, 
the proposed tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge, if granted planning permission, would 
set a significant precedent confirming the acceptability of tall buildings in this larger 
area.  
 
Constraints on tall building projects at Blackfriars Bridge 
The location of the proposed cluster at Blackfriars Bridge was challenged by English 
Heritage and the City of Westminster because the compliance with regional and local 
policy is uncertain. Locations in which tall building proposals are appropriate are 
designated in the London Plan and in local boroughs' UDPs. The London Plan has 
designated Opportunity Areas which are capable of accommodating substantial growth 
through development (GLA 2004a). Tall building development is seen as appropriate 
for intensifying building density and mixed uses (ibid.). Therefore, tall buildings are 
seen as an appropriate way to facilitate growth in Opportunity Areas. London Bridge 
and Waterloo have been identified as Opportunity Areas because these are located at 
major transport hubs which are capable of providing transportation for the large 
amounts of people living or working in tall buildings.  
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Due to the high degree of controversy surrounding tall building proposals, the House of 
Commons demanded that local boroughs identify suitable locations within their UDPs 
(House of Commons 2002). For example, the City of Westminster defines the 
Paddington Special Policy Area appropriate (WCC 2007c). However, the London 
Borough of Southwark did not explicitly define the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge 
as appropriate since local politicians voted in opposition (Strategic Director of 
Regeneration 2007). For this reason, English Heritage and the City of Westminster have 
argued during consultation that tall building proposals cannot be granted planning 
permission since the London Borough of Southwark has not established a tall building 
policy for that area (LB Southwark 2007a). Furthermore, they have argued that 
Blackfriars Bridge is not suitable for tall building development because the location has 
not been identified as an Opportunity Area in the London Plan (ibid.). Their criticism 
was based on criteria 2.6 of the Guidance on Tall Buildings (GOTB) which requires 
local authorities to identify tall building areas (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). The 
latest national planning policy, PPS1, also demands that local development plans clearly 
identify areas and specify the type of development for which planning application may 
be sought at the specified sites (ODPM 2005c). Local planning decisions have to be 
based on both the GOTB and the policies contained in the PPS1. Therefore, a local 
authority is able to grant planning consent for tall building development only if this is 
proposed at a location that lies within a specified area, or if a case can be made for tall 
buildings because of excellent transport links.  
 
Tall building proposals at Blackfriars Bridge have been criticised by English Heritage, 
the City of Westminster and the Royal Parks for their visual impact on a number of 
significant views. The proposed buildings would be visible within the St James's Park 
towards Horse Guards Road townscape view, which has recently been designated as a 
strategic view in the LVMF (GLA 2007b). Furthermore, St James's Park (P1 in map 1) 
is a conservation area that has been designated within the City of Westminster UDP 
(WCC 2007c). The urban design and conservation policies of the Westminster UDP 
seek to regulate the visibility of tall buildings, even though these are not proposed 
within the conservation area. Tall buildings which are visible may have adverse effects, 
diminishing the historic significance of a conservation area (ibid.). The Royal Parks 
Agency—the management of London's Royal Parks—has demonstrated in more precise 
terms how the City of Westminster and the Royal Parks think about the protection of 
views from within St James's Park. Research carried out on behalf of the Royal Parks 
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shows that tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge would have to be 92 metres or lower in 
order not to be visible from within St James's Park (Colvin and Moggridge 2001).  
 
As has been shown above, tall buildings proposed at Blackfriars Bridge will have 
heights ranging from 105 to 170 metres. It can be concluded from these facts that 
English Heritage, the City of Westminster and the Royal Parks all regard the mere 
visibility of tall buildings as an adverse impact on a view. Furthermore, No.1 
Blackfriars Road and the Doon Street Tower have been described as potentially visually 
detrimental to the Westminster and Tower of London World Heritage Sites (WHSs) in a 
report by the DCMS for UNESCO (DCMS 2007a). The position of heritage bodies 
stands in stark contrast to that of proponents of tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge, the 
GLA and the London Borough of Southwark, as well as private developers. These 
proponents of tall buildings argue that the visual impact of tall buildings on views is of 
minor significance and may even contribute in a beneficial manner to the visual 
enjoyment (PINS 2009a). 
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Map 1: Areas in which tall building developments were granted planning permission between 2000 
and 2008. Locations at which tall buildings were granted planning permission are shown in light blue. 
The dark blue dot indicates the location of the No.1 Blackfriars Road project. The bold black outline 
indicates the area of central London (outlines are based on the map referred to in Circular 1/08 (GOL 
2008c)). A more detailed map and a data set containing images and information about the private firms 
involved in the forty-three tall building projects proposed in central London are contained in appendix 2. 
Source: Author 
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Key to map 1 
 
Case study 
Dark blue dot  No.1 Blackfriars Road 
 
Tall building areas most important in relation to the case study 
Light blue  Tall building projects proposed 
T1   Eastern Cluster in the City of London 
T2   Blackfriars Bridge and Waterloo tall building cluster 
T3   London Bridge Tower 
T4   Elephant and Castle 
 
Monuments 
M1   Palace of Westminster (World Heritage Site) 
M2   St Paul's Cathedral 
M3   Tower of London (World Heritage Site) 
 
Conservation areas 
C1   Somerset House 
C2   Roupell Street conservation area   
 
Royal Parks 
P1   St James's Park 
P2   Green Park 
P3   Hyde Park 
P4   Regent's Park 
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Image 1: The cluster of tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge  
This is a view of proposed tall buildings in the north-western corner of the London Borough of 
Southwark. The tallest building is the No.1 Blackfriars Road project (1). To the left of No.1 Blackfri ars 
Road, the two towers of the 20 Blackfriars Road project can be seen. Further to the left, the Wedge House 
project (5) is located and to the far left, part of the Holland Street Buildings project (6) can be seen. To 
the right in the background, the Doon Street Tower project (4) can be seen. To the right of No.1 
Blackfriars Road is the King's Reach Tower redevelopment (3), an existing tower which is proposed to be 
renovated and ext ended in height by 17 metres.  
 
The images resemble views from the northern part of Millennium Bridge in the City of London. Source of 
top image: Tavernor 2008g: 41; source of bottom image: Tavernor 2008e: 18; the original images have 
been cropped and black lines and numbers inserted by the author. 
Both original images are © Hayes Davidson. 
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Case study project 
 
 
No.1 Blackfriars Road   (also referred to at times as Beetham London) 
 
Proposal date and height:  2005: 226 m  
2006: 180 m  
2007: 170 m 
 
 
Design Team 
 
Developer:    Beetham Organization 
 
Architect:    Ian Simpson Architects 
   
Planning consultant:   DP9 Planning Consultants 
 
Townscape consultant:   Robert Tavernor Consultancy 
 
Visualisation consultant:  Cityscape3D (for the final AVR images) 
Hayes Davidson (panoramic AVRs) 
     Miller Hare 
 
Solicitors:    Herbert Smith LLP 
 
Public relations consultant:  Four Communications 
 
Barrister (at public inquiry):  Russell Harris QC of Landmark Chambers 
 
 
Project facts15 
 
Approximate construction cost: 1 bil lion British pounds (in 2005, the project was 
estimated at 500 million pounds)16 
 
Total rentable area:    76,060 square metres  
 
Hotel use: 261 bedroom super luxury hotel operated by Jumeirah 
(not finalised)  
 
Flats: 64 luxury residences on the top floors,  
 32 flats of intermediate housing located at plaza level  
 
Public viewing gallery: 993 square metres of publicly accessible viewing, 
gallery located at the very top of the tall building 
 
Restaurant: 372 square metres at ground floor 
 
Servicing and car parking: 11,935 square metres 
 
Ground floor: Public plaza at ground floor level  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This information was taken from the most up-to-date published fact sheet (Red Chilli 2011).  
16 The information in brackets was taken from an offici al press announcement by the Beetham 
Organization in 2005 (Beetham Organization 2005).  
 46 
1.3 Research methods 
 
This section discusses the methods used to access the data that is considered within the 
thesis. Diverse methods were used to access data that includes documents, interviews 
and participant observation. The limitation on access to these data types is explained. 
Furthermore, it is discussed how I dealt with the ethical issues involved in using 
interviews. It is shown how I interacted with interviewees at the different stages of the 
research process in order to ensure that the integrity of interviewees is protected. In 
addition, my approach to the consideration of data and to developing explanations and 
conclusions is  set out, based on the different data types generated while researching the 
various types of policies and planning documents as well as the fieldwork processes.  
 
Data sources and access 
The data used in this thesis include policies, assessment reports by regional and local 
planning authorities and non-departmental governmental bodies, planning application 
documents produced by the developers' design team members as well as evidence 
produced for public inquiry procedures by both proponents and objectors of tall 
building projects and reports produced by planning inspectors and the Secretary of 
State. Many of those documents were either accessible online or I made requests to the 
relevant parties asking them to provide me with them. Public inquiry documents were 
available online only shortly prior to and during the inquiries. In addition, interviews 
with twenty-four key people were conducted between summer and winter 2007. These 
key experts are part of the developers' design teams, governmental and non-
governmental bodies as well as consultants who are employed by governmental 
agencies for the development of policies and guidance and as experts on panels at 
CABE DRP and English Heritage's LAC. Matrix 1, located at the end of this section, 
lists the experts with whom interviews were conducted.  
 
Interviewees were chosen so that an expert from every part of the core design team and 
experts from governmental organisations could be covered. The goal was to obtain a 
variety of different views based on the different types of work that each expert is 
conducting. During the interview process, further interviewees were identified who 
were described by other interviewees as crucial for tall building planning processes. 
Furthermore, I conducted participant observation at local borough planning meetings for 
the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road projects, each held over one evening. The most 
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substantial part of the participant observation was conducted at the public inquiries for 
the Doon Street Tower (held from 6 to 26 March 2008) as well as at the joint No.1 and 
20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry (held from 9 September to 2 October 2008). A 
matrix of the experts observed at the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry is 
included in chapter 6.  
 
Interviews were conducted during the planning application process while pre-
application discussions between the design team and governmental and non-
departmental governmental bodies were continuing. Because the projects were the 
subject of heated debates, and much was at risk for both proponents and opponents, 
some documents were inaccessible at that time and a number of processes which would 
have been interesting to witness could not be accessed. Appendix 8 shows the temporal 
relationship of the planning processes of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road in relation to the 
times at which I conducted fieldwork. In particular, I learned that design team members 
and panel members who are part of assessment processes at CABE DRP and English 
Heritage's LAC would not have been happy with a student being present. Therefore, I 
had to restrict data regarding these processes to the officially published assessment 
reports and interviews with people who had attended these.  
 
Some reports were subject to restrictions from public access. It proved possible to 
obtain these later through freedom of information requests once the exemption through 
Section 43 (exemption due to commercial interests) of the Freedom of Information Act 
was no longer an issue. Pre-application discussions between the developers' design team 
and members of the GLA (such as Mayor Livingstone and leading planning officers), 
local borough planners and politicians, as well as leading personnel at CABE and 
English Heritage could not be accessed directly in terms of being able to observe these. 
Typically, there are also no published minutes of these discussions. Therefore, data 
were restricted to the reports showing the end results of pre-application discussions. In 
addition, data on pre-application discussions were gained through interviews with 
experts who had participated in these.   
 
Research ethics 
In order to gain access to interviewees, I wrote formal letters explaining to each 
individual what my research was about and which topics I aimed to discuss.17 Letters 
                                                 
17 A general template letter can be found in appendix 26. 
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were either addressed directly to interviewees or to heads of departments and principals 
of firms, requesting an interview or asking to pass on my request to the person most 
knowledgeable. Furthermore, the interviewees received a one page abstract describing 
my research in more detail.18 I decided to use this approach because I had learned from 
initial conversations with insiders that the matter of tall buildings was a very sensitive 
one. Because of that I wanted to make sure that I provided interviewees with the 
information that would allow them to understand that I was undertaking PhD research, 
and what I was aiming to find out, so that interviewees would be able to prepare. Within 
a three month period, I communicated with interviewees directly or with their personal 
assistants and arranged dates for interviews. Through interviewees who recommended 
me to their colleagues, I gained access to the heads of the assessment processes and to 
members of the associated expert panels. Approximately 150 emails were exchanged 
with interviewees, a process which I also used to obtain information about the area of 
knowledge and work of each interviewee. I used this additional information to optimise 
my preparation for each individual interview.19 
 
At the start of each interview, I explained my research again briefly and asked each 
interviewee to mention during the interview whether they wanted me to keep certain 
passages confidential. Consequently, I have not used these passages directly within the 
thesis but rather as background information to better understand the tall building 
planning process. In addition, I asked every interviewee at the end of the interview 
whether there were any questions they felt uncomfortable with so that I would be able to 
mark those in order to ensure that I was not using information which could potentially 
hurt the interviewee.  
 
In the spring of 2011 when I was close to completing the thesis, I sent an updated 
abstract and the individual transcript to each interviewee. By this time I had gained in- 
depth knowledge about potentially sensitive topics and I was able to evaluate whether 
certain quotes could potentially harm interviewees' integrity. Where appropriate I 
alerted interviewees to relevant paragraphs within their transcripts which I intended to 
cite in the thesis and which I thought could potentially hurt the integrity of the 
interviewee. As a result, I amended one of the quotes used in the thesis. I think that this 
process was critical since I had used an open form of questioning in my interviews, 
                                                 
18 The information sheet sent to interviewees is included in appendix 27. 
19 An example of a sheet to structure my questions during interviews can be found in appendix 28. 
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encouraging the interviewee to tell their individual story rather than answering narrowly 
defined questions. The results of this interview technique were twofold. First, the stories 
told typically went far beyond the initial questions I had asked and thereby allowed me 
to access the meaning attributed by interviewees to policies and implementation 
processes. The access to the different meanings inherent in the processes for tall 
building planning was critical for my evaluation of the effectiveness of the tall building 
planning system used in central London. Second, due to the open type of interviewing, 
experts tended to revert to colloquial speech. Due to the controversial nature of tall 
building development, some emotional statements were made by interviewees. I have 
done my best to avoid using emotional statements in cases in which I thought that this 
could harm the integrity of the interviewee.  
 
In this feedback process from interviews, I also asked interviewees whether they would 
allow me to refer to them using their actual name. During the process of writing the 
thesis, I used coded pseudonyms. Matrix 1, at the end of this section, lists the persons 
whom I interviewed. In cases where interviewees did not permit me to use their name or 
when interviewees had left the company in relation to which the interview was 
conducted, I have maintained the use of pseudonyms in the form of typical English first 
names. One interviewee requested to be taken out of the list of interviewees.  
 
Balancing the explanations developed from the data  
The previous sections of this introduction have set out the roles and the divergent 
interests of the parties involved in tall building planning in central London, as well as 
major planning policy and implementation processes. This discussion has also shown 
the complex nature and the various relationships between the parties. A central issue in 
researching this complex policy and implementation context is to balance and critically 
discuss the conclusions that can potentially be drawn from the data. There is the risk 
that conclusions are drawn that could be influenced by a one-sided focus on certain data 
while leaving out other sources. At the same time, there is always the risk that biases 
manifest themselves based on the subjective accounts by interviewees or that biases 
occur which I establish myself during the interpretation of the data. Therefore, a central 
requirement for detailed case studies is to make the different explanations that are 
possible explicit (Yin 1994). In order to overcome potential biases and to strengthen the 
validity of conclusions, a wide variety of data sources and different types of data 
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representation were used wherever possible so that each conclusion can be scrutinised 
and challenged.  
 
Yanow (2000) argues that policies are frames that use language to shape perceptions 
and understanding and by doing so policies entail courses of action. Yanow 
recommends that the analyst maps the architecture of policy debate relative to the policy 
issue under investigation by identifying the language used and the meaning of policy 
texts (Yanow 2000: 12, 13). The thesis considers the language used in the policies of the 
London Plan and the LVMF. The meaning of policies is examined based on 
consultation responses by proponents and opponents of tall building development in 
conjunction with data gained through interviews.  
 
In order to strengthen the validity of the explanations derived from data, rival 
explanations were developed and weighed against each other in terms of plausibility and 
strength of evidence, taking into account planning law and the interests and agendas of 
the parties involved. Miles and Huberman (1994) call this process the triangulation of 
data sources. Within this process, different data sources were used from which the 
different explanations were drawn. The foremost purpose for using different data 
sources is that single data sources might lead to one-sided explanations which might 
result in biased explanations. These biases needed to be overcome. 
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Matrix of interviewees 
 
 
Architects 
Ben Duckworth 
Christian Male 
John Morgan  
Graham Morrison 
 
Jason Parker 
 
Project architect for the redevelopment of the Tate Modern 
Gallery for Herzog & de Meuron Architects 
Project architect for No.1 Blackfriars Road for Ian Simpson 
Architects 
Associate at All ies and Morrison Architects until 2008; lecturer 
at Mackintosh School of Architecture, Glasgow School of Art 
Partner at Allies and Morrison Architects; architect for Elizabeth 
House and member of English Heritage's London Advisory 
Committee 
Project architect for Make Architects  
Private sector consultants 
Ethan  
John Hare 
 
 
Frank 
Ian Lindsley 
 
Dr. Chris Miele 
 
Joseph Robson 
 
Roger 
Anna Rose 
 
Peter Stewart 
 
Senior solicitor at law firm working on tall buildings in London 
Director at Miller Hare, a consultancy firm that specialises in 
visualising architectural projects, including tall buildings; co-
author of the 2005 draft LVMF and again appointed by the GLA 
to develop the LVMF further since 2010 
Head of urban research at a private consultancy 
Founding member of Jefferson Communications; public 
relations consultant on a large number of controversial tall 
building projects in central London 
Partner in the Planning and Development Department at 
Montagu Evans; townscape and planning consultant for the 
Doon Street Tower and co-author of the 2007 LVMF   
Founder of AVR London, a company that specialises in 
visualising architectural projects, including tall buildings   
Planning consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Director at Space Syntax, an international consultancy that 
specialises in the analysis of pedestrian movement 
Founder and head of Peter Stewart Consultancy; townscape 
consultant; member of English Heritage's London Advisory 
Committee and Director of the design review programme at 
CABE from 1999 to 2005 
Dev eloper 
Justin 
 
Chairman of the Beetham Organization; developer for No.1 
Blackfriars Road 
Non-gov ernmental 
departmental bodies 
Nick 
Paddy Pugh 
William 
 
 
Member of CABE design review; co-author of the 2007 
Guidance on Tall Buildings  
Director of English Heritage's London Advisory Committee 
Head of CABE design review in 2007 
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Regional and local planning 
authorities 
Fred Manson 
Adrian Dennis  
 
Martin Scholar 
Alexandra Reitman 
 
 
Former Director of Regeneration at LB Southwark 
Team Leader in the Major Applications Team in the 
regeneration and neighbourhoods department of the London 
Borough of Southwark; case officer for No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Strategic planning manager for development plans at the GLA 
and case officer for No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Senior policy officer at the GLA during the Livingstone 
administration, and subsequently under Boris Johnson 
Matrix 1: Experts interviewed between summer and winter 2007  
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2. The London Plan 
 
This chapter considers the development of the London Plan (GLA 2004a)—the regional 
development strategy intended to regulate the planning of London for twenty years. The 
policy making process incorporated the formal stages of early policy proposals, draft 
policies, consultation and examination in public processes and the finalised policies. A 
diagram providing an overview of the formal policy making stages  of the London Plan, 
including the associated Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG), i.e. the London 
View Management Framework (LVMF), is provided.  
 
The development of the London Plan—from Towards the London Plan (GLA 2001c), 
the Interim Guidance on Tall Buildings (GLA 2001b) and the draft London Plan (GLA 
2002a) to the finalised London Plan (GLA 2004a)—took place prior to the case study of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road. However within these documents, the most important policies 
for regulating tall building development in central London were drafted, in relation to 
which No.1 Blackfriars Road had to be designed. Furthermore, a number of significant 
precedent tall building cases were in the midst of planning while these policies were 
being developed. During pre-application discussions, regional and local planning 
agencies had determined their positions towards these projects prior to the finalisation 
of the London Plan. This aspect of simultaneity is taken into account in considering the 
policy making of the London Plan. During this period of time, supporters and opponents 
of tall buildings established their positions and a mode of interaction emerged that 
would then determine the interactions between the design team for No.1 Blackfriars 
Road and governmental parties as well as stakeholders from 2006 onwards. The draft 
Further Alterations to the London Plan (FALP) were published in 2006 and occurred 
simultaneously to the planning process for No.1 Blackfriars Road (GLA 2006a). 
 
The chapter starts with considering the reasoning behind the positions taken by 
supporters and opponents of tall buildings in central London. The rhetoric of a world 
city used by Mayor Ken Livingstone to emphasise the need for tall building 
development is scrutinised regarding its validity and its implications for planning 
practice. The 4B policies of the London Plan, which regulate aspects of architectural 
and urban design and define locations suitable for tall building development, are 
assessed in terms of their meaning for the different governmental and private 
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organisations involved. The involvement in policy making of a set of experts partly 
stemming from the private sector are analysed in relation to the positive and negative 
impacts on planning practice. The finalised London Plan policies  and the emergent 
FALP are analysed in relation to their meaning for private and governmental 
organisations involved in tall building planning practice, and in particular in relation to 
tall building development at Blackfriars Bridge and the No.1 Blackfriars Road project. 
Finally, pre-application discussions between design team members of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road with the GLA are assessed with a focus on the roles of planning and public 
relations consultants for interacting with the GLA as well as the decision making 
hierarchy within the GLA.  
 
 
Figure 1: Policy making stages of the London Plan and the London View Management Framework.  
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2.1 The emergence of divergent positions towards tall 
buildings  
 
This section examines the reasoning behind the positions of the different groups, those 
promoting and those opposing tall building development in the early years of Ken 
Livingstone's era as Mayor of London between 2000 and 2001. The documents that 
most clearly exemplify these positions are the Interim strategic planning guidance on 
tall buildings, strategic views and the skyline of London (GLA 2001b), published by the 
Greater London Authority in October 2001, and Sky space around London's inner parks: 
A contribution to the Greater London Authority's new Spatial Development Plan 
(Colvin and Moggridge 2001), submitted by the Royal Parks in July 2001. The positions 
set out as well as the rhetoric used in these documents is examined in terms of their 
meaning within these early stages of tall building planning in central London.  
 
The mayor's position 
In May 2001, Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London since April 2000, argued that tall 
building development was a central means for maintaining London's world city status 
(GLA 2001a). Without tall buildings, he argued, global corporations would locate their 
headquarters in other European cities. In the interim guidance, Livingstone defined his 
perception of the contribution that tall building development makes to the world city 
role of London (ibid.). Tall buildings, he argued, provide top quality floor space, 
clusters of tall buildings improve the skyline and free-standing tall buildings help to 
promote regeneration and identify important locations (ibid.). Concentrating new office 
floor space close to public transport infrastructure was determined as the strategic 
planning goal (GLA 2001b). The rhetoric using the metaphor of a world city is 
maintained throughout the London Plan policy making process, as is shown in the 2001 
Towards the London Plan, the 2002 draft London Plan and the finalised 2004 London 
Plan (GLA 2001c; GLA 2002a; GLA 2004a). From this rhetoric resulted the claim that 
London needed to allow tall building development if it was to retain its world city 
status.  
 
In May 2001, Ken Livingstone published Towards the London Plan: Initial proposals 
for the mayor's Spatial Development Strategy (GLA 2001c). Towards the London Plan 
contains only statements of general support for tall building development. Livingstone's 
policy agenda and strong support for tall building development was first set out in more 
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defined terms in the Interim strategic planning guidance on tall buildings, strategic 
views and the skyline of London (GLA 2001b). In the introductory statement, 
Livingstone addresses the parties objecting to his supportive approach to tall building 
development.   
 
This of all my proposed planning policies has attracted the most interest from the 
media and from other interested parties – particularly those who wish to object 
to my views – or misrepresent them as a dire threat to life as we know it. Some 
objectors have claimed that my policies would allow us to recreate Manhattan in 
London, or turn Hyde Park into Central Park, with a ring of tall buildings all 
around. These are false claims. Policies will remain in place to protect 
conservation areas and strategic views although I am reviewing these policies to 
ensure they are not over-restrictive. (GLA 2001b: 3) 
 
In 2000 and during the mayoral election campaign, Ken Livingstone had announced that 
he would support tall building projects as clusters and as stand alone buildings and that 
he had 'no objection to London having the tallest of buildings' (ibid.: 3). Although the 
interim guidance contained statements by the mayor that tall buildings would be located 
in the City of London and Canary Wharf, map 2 shows that tall building proposals were 
located in the City of London but also in North Lambeth and Southwark, as well as in 
the City of Westminster. Furthermore, map 2 also shows that tall building projects were 
being proposed in visual distance to the Palace of Westminster, the Tower of London, 
St Paul's Cathedral and St James's Park. Therefore, the statement that new tall buildings 
would only be located in the City and Canary Wharf was not substantiated.  
 
The interim guidance stated that the projects of London Bridge Tower, Vauxhall Tower, 
Tate Tower and Paddington Station tower were being tested by Livingstone, that he 
supported the projects and that he did not want to hold up these developments based 'on 
the grounds of prematurity' (GLA 2001b: 6). Prematurity occurs when a decision to 
grant planning permission is made regarding a project that will determine the meaning 
and impact of a policy that is not yet published in a finalised version (ODPM 2005a). 
Furthermore, the interim guidance also contained a visual assessment of the Heron 
Tower project which was about to be subjected to a public inquiry in October 2001, 
immediately after publication of the interim guidance. It was stated that with the 
proposed Heron Tower, while reducing the amount of sky space in the background of 
St. Paul's Cathedral, enough sky space would be left to maintain the monuments' visual 
integrity on the skyline. Due to the high architectural quality of the building, 
Livingstone concluded that the visual impact would be beneficial (GLA 2001b). The 
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Heron Tower was granted permission by the City of London just a month after the 
publication of Livingstone's initial statement in favour of tall buildings, but in February 
2000 it was immediately called in by the Secretary of State following a request by 
English Heritage (PINS 2002a). Since Livingstone had already given his agreement to 
support the projects mentioned above, he had to keep his word and shape regional 
policy and guidance so that the projects could be granted planning permission. 
Consequently in terms of future policy guidance, Livingstone stated that the RPG3A 
viewing corridors might be narrowed and that wider setting consultation areas and 
backdrop assessments might be unnecessary (GLA 2001b).  
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Map 2: RPG3A viewing corridors and significant monuments in spatial relation to tall building 
proposals around 2001. The drawing is based on the map included in the RPG3A (GOL 1998).  
Source: Author  
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Key to map 2 
 
Tall building projects consented or proposed around 2000 to 2001 
1  30 St Mary Axe      
2  Heron Tower     
3  Paddington Basin 
4   Paddington Station Tower   
5  Tate Tower 
6  London Bridge Tower    
7  Vauxhall Tower     
8  Potter's Fields     
9  51 Lime Street     
10  Minerva Tower     
11a-c   Victoria Transport Interchange buildings   
   
Central London's key monuments 
M1  Palace of Westminster 
M2  St. Paul's Cathedral 
M3  Tower of London 
 
View corridors protected through RPG3A 
V1  Alexandra Palace towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V2  Parliament Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V3  Parliament Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V4   Kenwood to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V5  Primrose Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V6  Primrose Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V7  Greenwich Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V8  Blackheath Point to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V9  Richmond Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V10  Westminster Pier to St. Paul's Cathedral 
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Heritage groups' position 
In July 2001, Colvin and Moggridge, landscape architects appointed by the Royal Parks 
to protect their interests, published Sky space around London's inner parks: A 
contribution to the Greater London Authority's new Spatial Development Plan, 
expressing concern that central London's Royal Parks would be harmed by the visibility 
of tall buildings (Colvin and Moggridge 2001). The PPG 15 introduced the assessment 
criteria that development should preserve and enhance conservation areas (Department 
of the Environment 1994). If it were not possible to establish proof that this was the 
case then it must be concluded that a development, such as a proposed tall building, 
harms the conservation area. The position of opponents of tall buildings is  directly 
opposed to Ken Livingstone's approach.  
 
The sky above these contours (mAOD) needs to be kept open to protect the 
integrity of the inner London Parks. Any buildings which rise above these levels  
diminish the parks. (Colvin and Moggridge 2001: Map 6) 
 
The position of the Royal Parks was that the integrity of the Royal Parks can only be 
protected if the sky space visible from within the parks is kept unobstructed from 
buildings (ibid.). From this point of view, every building that is visible from within any 
of the central London parks harms the setting of the parks, implying material harm, and 
therefore these buildings are unacceptable. Map 3 displays the spatial relationship 
between the sky space defined by Colvin and Moggridge and proposals for tall 
buildings that were in discussion at the time of the publication of the interim guidance. 
The tall buildings that had been proposed or were under discussion: i) in the City of 
London, the Heron Tower at 183 metres and the Minerva Tower at 217 metres; ii) in the 
LB Southwark, the London Bridge Tower at 305 metres; iii) in the LB Lambeth, the 
Vauxhall Tower at 180 metres; and, iv) in the City of Westminster, as well as two tall 
buildings at Paddington Station at 40 and 42 stories high.  
 
A comparison of these building heights with the height thresholds of the contour lines in 
map 3 reveals that all of these projects would have been too tall to meet the proposed 
regulations set out by Colvin and Moggridge. Therefore, all of the projects mentioned 
above would have been rendered unacceptable if a decision maker followed the Royal 
Parks' contour approach. This radical position was shared by English Heritage, as 
proven through a Mori report (English Heritage 2000a), and was the position taken later 
in the consultation process regarding the 2002 draft London Plan (GLA 2003b). In June 
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2001, English Heritage published another Ipsos Mori report which argued that the 
majority of the English population did not want tall buildings in London and that visual 
protection through the RPG3A of the important monuments such as St Paul's Cathedral 
and the Palace of Westminster should remain in place as it was (English Heritage 2001). 
The position that no tall buildings might be acceptable was shared by the Prince's 
Foundation, the Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Historic Royal Palaces (GLA 
2003b). 
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Map 3: The contour map proposed by Colvin and Moggridge in spatial relation to tall building 
proposals. The drawing is based on the map contained in the document, Sky space around London's inner 
parks: A contribution to the Greater London Authority's new Spatial Development Plan (Colvin and 
Moggridge 2001: map 4). Source: Author 
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Key to map 3 
 
Tall building projects consented or proposed around 2000 to 2001 
1  30 St Mary Axe      
2  Heron Tower     
3  Paddington Basin 
4   Paddington Station Tower   
5  Tate Tower 
6  London Bridge Tower    
7  Vauxhall Tower     
8  Potter's Fields     
9  51 Lime Street     
10  Minerva Tower     
11a-c   Victoria Transport Interchange buildings       
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The meaning of the positions for the London Plan process  
In order to understand these initial positions to tall building development by the 
supportive GLA and Mayor Livingstone and the opposing heritage groups, it first has to 
be established what the planning goals of the opposing camps were. Academics  have 
argued that in the London Plan, the mayor permitted increases in density—and therefore 
supported tall building developments—in return for requesting significant contributions 
from developers towards affordable housing (Ross 2001; Thornley et all 2005; Gordon 
2003; McNeill 2002). In my interviews, experts involved in the London Plan process on 
behalf of the GLA made the same argument. The rationale was that developers would 
provide affordable housing through Section 106 (S106) agreements and Livingstone 
would in turn support the tall building projects proposed. Acquiring significantly high 
S106 contributions were one of the goals advocated by the Urban Task Force Report 
that has repeatedly been stressed by the House of Commons, governmental reports and 
the DCLG (Urban Task Force 1999; House of Commons 2002; DCLG 2007a).  
Therefore, it can be argued that Livingstone was trying to address an emerging 
problem—that of an expected shortfall in housing.  
 
As the quote from the interim guidance cited above shows, Livingstone rendered the 
arguments of objectors to tall building development as false and as overstatements 
(GLA 2001b). Therefore, it must be established whether the claims of objectors were 
based on sound reasoning and facts. As map 2 shows, the precedent projects of Heron 
Tower, Vauxhall Tower and the London Bridge Tower, supported by Livingstone, 
would be visible either in views towards or from within the most significant monuments 
of central London, St Paul's Cathedral, the Palace of Westminster and the Tower of 
London. Furthermore, reports from the 1960s show that decision making bodies at that 
time also sought to ensure that tall buildings were of the highest design quality and 
located in appropriate locations (RFAC 1962). However, later reports argued that many 
of the tall building projects permitted then had negative visual impacts and were of poor 
architectural quality, concluding that policy and regulation used then had not led to high 
quality development (Parker and Catchpole 1984; Catchpole 1987). Map 3 shows that 
tall buildings proposed since 2000 were not placed immediately around the parks. In the 
1970s, tall buildings were located in close proximity to the Royal Parks (see Catchpole 
1987 and Parker and Catchpole 1984). Looking at the details of claims  such as those of 
the Royal Parks that the parks would soon resemble New York's Central Park, it must 
be concluded that these were overstatements.  
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In terms of Livingstone's strong support for tall building projects the interim guidance 
also contained the important aesthetic argument that tall buildings were a crucial 
component of London's world city image (GLA 2001b). The world city rhetoric stems 
from observations of the financial markets of cities such as New York or Paris (McNeill 
2002a). It also appears plausible to follow the line of reasoning of McNeill (2002b) and 
Tavernor (2007a) who argued that Livingstone perceived tall buildings as a key factor 
in producing the visual image of a world city skyline. Buck (2002) has argued that one 
of Livingstone's major concerns was the symbolic image of London. However, the 
world city rationale did not withstand the scrutiny of the House of Commons panel and 
expert witnesses. The persuasively constructed argument that tall buildings were 
necessary for London's future development was refuted (House of Commons 2002). 
Indeed, it was concluded that tall buildings made a very limited contribution to the 
agenda of an urban renaissance (ibid.). In addition, the 1999 Urban Task Force Report 
argued that high density development can also be achieved through mid-rise 
development (Urban Task Force 1999). However, the House of Commons maintained 
that the fact that some people, such as Mayor Livingstone, enjoy the sight of tall 
buildings is an argument in favour (ibid.). The world city thesis alone is too simplistic 
for a complete discussion of the role and impact of tall building development.  
 
To sum up this section, heritage groups perceived Livingstone's 2001 approach to tall 
building policy and implementation as an act of deregulation threatening their positions 
to safeguard central London's heritage assets. As a result, heritage advocacy groups 
sought to promote the position of ruling out the visibility of tall buildings across central 
London, intending to threaten the success of tall building applications. In terms of 
conflict resolution, the two opposing positions were mutually exclusive. Thus, the stage 
was set for an exacerbation of conflict between supporters and opponents of tall 
building development.  
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2.2 The London Plan 4B policies 
 
The interim guidance and Towards the London Plan had provoked detailed responses 
from heritage groups in 2001. The next step in the development of the London Plan 
policy process was the publication of a draft policy in 2002—the draft London Plan 
(GLA 2002a)—the precursor to the finalised London Plan (GLA 2004a). As part of the 
policy making process, Section 13 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act requires 
that every person is given the opportunity to make a representation for or against the 
proposed draft policy (OPSI 1990a). Once a draft version of a policy has been 
produced, stakeholders are asked to submit written representations commenting on the 
impact of the policy on their interests. This consultation process is carried out by the 
relevant regional or local planning authority (ibid.). Within the process of the 
Examination in Public (EiP)—as defined in Section 20 of the act—government 
appointed inspectors from the Planning Inspectorate examine the draft policy in 
conjunction with objections and concerns raised within the consultation process (ibid.). 
Based on the inspectors advice, the Secretary of State then has the power to make 
directions for amendments to the proposed development plan (ibid.). 
 
This section examines the meaning of the 4B policies of the draft London Plan, and in 
particular a key paragraph of Policy 4B.8 which deals with locations for tall buildings, 
as well as the spatial definition of the Central Activities Zone (CAZ) which is related to 
this policy. The positions taken by heritage groups and private developers and those 
taken by the examiners in the EiP to these policies within consultation responses are 
considered. Finally, the meaning of those policies is discussed with regard to the issues 
of the central requirement of planning law for a plan-led approach in relation to the 
content of the policies, i.e. by providing flexibility for developers, and the impacts of 
tall building proposals in the planning process during the consultation phase. 
Furthermore, the impact of the development and the contents of the emerging London 
Plan for the No.1 Blackfriars Road project are assessed.   
 
The development of the London Plan 4B policies  
Regarding tall building development, Section 4B of the 2002 draft London Plan 
contains policies regulating aspects of architectural and urban design, including tall 
building development. Among the 4B policies, 'Policy 4B.8 Tall Buildings – location' 
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gained particular importance and, within the consultation process, interested parties 
sought to influence the shaping of this policy in divergent ways. Policy 4B.8 states: 
 
Tall buildings will be particularly appropriate where they create attractive 
landmarks enhancing London's character, help to provide a coherent location for 
economic clusters of related activities or act as catalyst for regeneration. 
 
Major clusters could be located in the Central Activities Zone and the Isle of 
Dogs and either clusters or stand alone tall buildings in some Opportunity Areas, 
including Paddington, Waterloo, London Bridge, Stratford, Elephant and Castle, 
and Croydon. (GLA 2002a: 248) 
 
At the time of publication of the draft London Plan, a large number of tall buildings 
were in the midst of implementation processes.20 The proposed Central Activities Zone 
(CAZ) covered most of the City of London, approximately half of the City of 
Westminster, large areas in the London Boroughs of Camden, Tower Hamlets, 
Southwark and Lambeth, as well as smaller areas of the London Boroughs of Hackney 
and Kensington and Chelsea (ibid.: 52) (see map 4). Based on the proposed policy 4B.8, 
tall building development would have been appropriate in most areas within the CAZ. 
This approach stood in strong contrast to the constraints proposed by the RPG3A and in 
particular those proposed through the Royal Parks contour map. Although the Royal 
Parks contour map would have allowed buildings higher than 150 metres in the Eastern 
Cluster in the City of London, these would have been visible in views from the Tower 
of London outwards and would have been perceived to be unacceptable by the Historic 
Royal Palaces and English Heritage. Following the publication of the 2002 draft 
London Plan, stakeholders had the opportunity to respond to the proposed policies in 
writing. Consultation responses to the 2002 draft London Plan were published by the 
GLA in January 2003 (GLA 2003a). Evidentially, heritage groups were aware of tall 
building proposals in 2003 since Stage 1 reports containing assessments of the proposed 
tall building projects had been published by the GLA.21  
 
Heritage groups strongly argued against the contents of Policy 4B.8. The City of 
Westminster took the position that there were very few areas which are appropriate for 
tall buildings in Westminster (ibid.). Tall buildings had been proposed in the 
                                                 
20 Map 4 shows the locations of these tall building proposals and the outlines of the proposed CAZ (grey) 
and Opportunity Areas (indicated through dotted outlines). 
21 Stage 1 and 2 reports regarding tall building proposals were published by the GLA. These were:  
Paddington Basin (GLA 2002c), Commercial Street Tower (GLA 2002d), 51 Lime Street (GLA 2002e), 
Vauxhall Tower (GLA 2002f), Minerva Tower (GLA 2002g), Potters Fields (GLA 2002h), London 
Bridge Tower (GLA 2002i) and Middlesex Street (GLA 2002j). 
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Westminster areas of Paddington Station (3) and Victoria Station (11). English Heritage 
perceived 4B.8 as overly permissive regarding tall buildings and argued that it did not 
clearly define which exact locations where suitable (ibid.). Similarly, the LB Lambeth 
and ICOMOS UK objected and argued for the use of contextual assessments in order to 
determine tall building locations (ibid.). ICOMOS was concerned about tall building 
proposals which they feared would impact on the Tower of London (see map 4, 
numbers 6, 8 and 10) (ibid.). The most radical position was taken by the Prince's 
Foundation stating that tall buildings will not be appropriate in most locations (ibid.).  
 
On the other hand, developers were very supportive of the 4B policies, and Policy 4B.8 
in particular. The developers, Land Securities, British Land, Legal and General, Sellar 
Property Group, Berkeley Homes and Minerva Plc, were proposing tall buildings and 
argued in support of the draft London Plan policies in the consultation process (ibid.). 
There is also evidence of controversy between the GLA and local boroughs regarding 
the appropriateness of tall buildings south of the River Thames. After the consultation 
process regarding the draft London Plan and prior to the publication of the finalised 
London Plan in 2004, the LB Lambeth refused to grant planning permission to the 
Vauxhall Tower (number 7 in map 4) in 2003 which led to an appeal procedure in 2004 
(PINS 2004a). The LB Lambeth and Westminster City Council appeared at the appeal 
against the developer, St George's Plc (a sub-division of the developer, Berkeley 
Homes), and the GLA (ibid.). Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State John 
Prescott granted planning permission, overruling the recommendation for refusal by the 
planning inspector (ODPM 2005e).  
 
The proposed 2002 draft London Plan and the arguments made within the consultation 
process were scrutinised in the EiP process which started in March 2003 and which 
resulted in a report in July 2003. The policies determining the quality of architecture, 
mixed use development and an increased density level around transport nodes were 
supported with minor amendments by the examiners (Richardson and Simpson 2003). 
Policy 4B.8 was found to lack coherence. The examiners noted that the mayor was 
aware that only parts of the CAZ would be appropriate for tall buildings (ibid.).  English 
Heritage's objection to the requirement for local boroughs to promote tall building 
development, contained in Policy 4B.8, was successful. The examiners recommended 
rewording the policy so that the mayor would be strictly bound by his own policies, but 
some leeway would be given to local boroughs to decide for themselves in which 
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locations they would want to promote tall building development and where to restrict 
them (ibid.).  
 
The meaning of the 4B policies  
According to the principles of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, a plan-led 
approach had to be adopted necessarily. This means that to be lawful, the regional 
development plan—the London Plan in this case—had to reflect the policies of national 
government (OPSI 1990a; ODPM 2005a). In the academic literature, there are two 
prevailing views regarding the meaning of the 4B policies. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that both the emerging and finalised London Plan are based on the focus on good 
architectural and urban design contained in the Urban Task Force Report and By Design 
published jointly by the DETR and CABE (Tavernor 2004a and 2007b). On the other 
hand, it has been argued that it was Livingstone who framed the debate about the 
London Plan with the focus on high quality architecture and urban design, and that 
Livingstone and Rogers were the main promoters of that approach, which was entwined 
with tall building advocacy (Charney 2007). 
 
The contents of the '4B.1 Design for a compact city', 4B.2 'Promoting world class 
architecture and design' (GLA 2002a: 241) and '4B.3 Maximising the potential of sites'  
policies (ibid.: 243) show that the design criteria of the draft London Plan were based 
on the national planning agenda, which puts high quality of architecture and urban 
design at its centre, as set out in the 2000 White Paper and the Urban Task Force Report 
which later became enshrined in the Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering 
Sustainable Development (PPS1) (ODPM 2005c). Policy 4B.3 requires development 
proposals to achieve the highest possible density in as far as density could be supported 
by a local context and transport capacity. Tall building development is legitimate if it 
maximises the density potentials of sites where public transport can support higher 
capacities. Furthermore, tall building proposals have to be designed to enhance the 
public realm and achieve the highest architectural standards. Policies 4B.1, 4B.2 and 
4B.3 are manifestations of the agenda of the 2000 White Paper (DETR 2000b) which is 
fully based on the Urban Task Force Report from 1999 (Urban Task Force 1999). The 
draft London Plan incorporates the same value hierarchy: good architectural and urban 
design is paramount in matters of planning. This confirms the conclusion that the 4B 
policies of the London Plan were fully based on the Urban Task Force Report, the 2000 
White Paper and emerging national policy. In legal terms, therefore, the incorporation 
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of the central values of good architecture and urban design, as well as the densification 
around transport nodes follow the policy hierarchy demanded through the plan-led 
system.  
 
It is not the foregrounding of the quality of architecture alone, but rather the designating 
of the whole of the CAZ as appropriate for tall building development which is the most 
significant attempt at tall building advocacy. In her assessment of the 2004 London 
Plan, Nicolaou concludes that strategic advice on how to determine tall building 
locations is contained in it but preferred locations are not specified (Nicolaou 2004).22 
The 2003 Guidance on Tall Buildings (GOTB) opposes this, requiring governmental 
decision makers to support tall buildings only where these contribute to the 
consolidation of clusters. Stand alone buildings would not be acceptable (English 
Heritage and CABE 2003). While the encouragement of tall building development in 
the whole of the CAZ as proposed through the draft London Plan (GLA 2002a) was 
limited in the EiP, it was not determined how appropriate locations for tall buildings 
should be des ignated. Doing so, the EiP examiners granted discretion to regional 
government to determine for themselves how appropriate locations should be identified. 
Discretion on regional and local levels is one of the central goals of the plan-led system 
(Tewdwr-Jones 2002). In this case, this led to a trade-off on discretion for conflict 
resolution. The conflict about determining appropriate tall building locations was not 
resolved while discretion was maintained.  
 
Policy 4B.8 was produced to allow and even encourage, tall building development in 
the whole of the CAZ as well as in Opportunity Areas so that developers could propose 
these wherever they identified opportunities for financial gain, thereby making a tall 
building a viable option. It was not predetermined in which locations tall buildings were 
appropriate. Developers have argued in interviews that the financial viability of tall 
building projects depends on the availability of suitable sites. Furthermore, it has been 
argued by experts in interviews that sites need to be available at a price that allows the 
achievement of significant financial gain so that taking the risks involved in tall 
building development are justified.  
                                                 
22 Short concluded that in other English cities, such as Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, policies that define precise areas appropri ate for tall buildings have not been 
developed (Short 2007).  
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Designating the exact extent of tall building locations would have counteracted the 
flexibility needed by developers. The proposed CAZ in conjunction with Policy 4B.8 
provided for this flexibility.  
 
Within this rationale, the struggle between the GLA and the City of Westminster, the 
LB Islington and the LB Lambeth about the designation of locations appropriate for tall 
buildings is directly linked to the tall building projects being proposed. Map 4 shows 
that a large number of the projects proposed during the writing of the 2002 draft London 
Plan were for stand alone buildings that would not contribute to the consolidation of 
clusters. If any of these projects had been granted planning permission, the responsible 
LPA and opposing heritage groups would have stood very little chance of arguing 
against other tall buildings proposed in the immediate vicinity. An important principle 
of UK planning law is that existing grants of planning permission which are directly 
related to a proposed project are material considerations and future decisions have to be 
consistent with previous decisions (PINS 2010a). Therefore, a precedent decision would 
have been set that would have provided the opportunity for developers and other 
supporters of tall buildings to argue that future decisions should be based on previous 
decisions and that therefore planning permission should be granted.  
 
The planning process for No.1 Blackfriars Road took place later, in early 2004. 
However, the development of these central London Plan policies had significant 
impacts on this case. Exact boundaries of locations appropriate for tall buildings were 
not defined. This made it possible to propose tall buildings at Blackfriars Road. 
Furthermore, the principle of quality of architecture and urban design was enshrined in 
the London Plan and supported within the EiP (Richardson and Simpson 2003). The 
proposal for No.1 Blackfriars Road as indeed all of the tall building projects proposed, 
and in particular when these were subject to high levels of controversy, had to be 
designed to the highest standards and regional and local governments as well as 
quangos had to affirm this. The related processes regarding the assessment of 
architectural and urban design quality is addressed throughout the rest of the thesis. The 
ambiguous nature of designating locations appropriate for tall buildings became an issue 
of particular importance during the planning process of No.1 Blackfriars Road. 
Opponents of the project challenged it on the grounds that no specific tall building 
policy had been produced for this specific site, thereby causing a public inquiry (GOL 
2008a).  
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Map 4: The policy proposal of the draft London Plan regarding the CAZ and Opportunity Areas in 
relation to proposed tall building projects in 2002, 2003.  The area covered by the CAZ is represented 
in grey, while the proposed Opportunity Areas are shown as dotted circles. The drawing of the CAZ area 
is based on the map contained in the draft London Plan (GLA 2002a: 52).    
Source: Author 
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Key to map 4 
 
Tall building projects proposed up to 2002 
1  30 St Mary Axe      
2  Heron Tower     
3  Paddington Basin 
4   Paddington Station Tower   
5  Tate Tower 
6  London Bridge Tower    
7  Vauxhall Tower     
8  Potter's Fields     
9  51 Lime Street     
10  Minerva Tower     
11a-c   Victoria Transport Interchange buildings  
12  Ropemaker Place 
13  122 Leadenhall Street 
 
Proposed Opportunity Areas 
O1  Waterloo Opportunity Area 
O2  London Bridge Opportunity Area 
O3  Elephant and Castle Opportunity Area 
O4  Vauxhall/Nine Elms/Battersea Opportunity Area 
O5  Paddington Opportunity Area  
O6  Whitechapel/Aldgate Opportunity Area 
O7  Kings Cross Opportunity Area  
O8  Bishopsgate/South Shoreditch Opportunity Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
2.3 The key experts drafting the London Plan 
 
This section discusses the effects of the key experts who were involved in the writing of 
the London Plan as advisors to Mayor Ken Livingstone and the GLA. Primarily, the 
discussion focuses on the prominent architect, Richard Rogers, Lord Rogers of 
Riverside, and head of the Richard Rogers Partnership (RRP). In relation to key 
positions held at the GLA, academics have identified Nicky Gavron, who held the 
position of deputy mayor from 2000 until 2003 (West et al 2002). Judith Mayhew 
became head of spatial development, while she had been the political leader of the 
Corporation of the City of London previously (Thornley et al 2002; McNeill 2002a). 
Besides Rogers, Ricky Burdett, then Professor of Urbanism at the London School of 
Economics, and who also contributed to the Urban Task Force Report under the 
leadership of Rogers, became 'architectural advisor to the mayor of London' (LSE 
2009a).  
 
However, the most important role in the GLA besides the mayor was held by Lord 
Rogers of Riverside who became 'Chief Advisor to the Mayor on Architecture and 
Urbanism' (GLA 2002a: x). Rogers was the chairman of the Urban Task Force (Urban 
Task Force 1999). McNeill reports that the Greater London Assembly criticised and 
questioned the appointment of Lord Rogers (ibid.). Charney insinuates that 
Livingstone's support of Rogers' design of the tall building, 122 Leadenhall Street in the 
City, might have been due to Rogers' role as mayoral advisor (Charney 2007). Not only 
was Lord Rogers appointed to this leading role at the GLA, he also is an acclaimed 
architect with a significant amount of large-scale projects in London, including tall 
buildings. Furthermore, he has also published widely on issues of urbanism and gained 
an international reputation as an urbanist (Polina 2007). Due to the selflessness principle 
of the Nolan Report, holders of public office should not seek to achieve financial gain 
or material benefits for themselves or for people related to them (Nolan 1997a). 
Therefore, the question arises of how the leading role taken by Lord Rogers impacted 
on the planning process for tall buildings. Furthermore, since insinuations of potential 
favourable treatment have been voiced by academics, I will consider whether Rogers 
maintained selflessness within his key position at the GLA.  
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The debate about Lord Rogers' role at the GLA  
In February 2001, a debate emerged between the mayor and members of the Greater 
London Assembly about the involvement of Lord Rogers as mayoral advisor because he 
was a practising architect in London at the same time (Greater London Assembly 2001). 
Articles in the Architects' Journal reported on allegations of conflicts of interest 
regarding Richard Rogers' role as mayoral advisor (Booth 2001; Taylor 2001). 
Furthermore, arguments inside the GLA planning division over Rogers' official 
appointment as advisor while being involved in major master planning projects were the 
subject of discussion in the media (Booth 2001). The GLA reacted in September 2001 
with a report on Richard Rogers' contract with the GLA and the means to avoid actual 
conflicts of interest (Brown 2001a). In order to avoid conflicts of interests in relation to 
Lord Rogers, Professor Malcolm Grant, an independent member of the Standards 
Committee, was appointed to monitor the projects by RRP in relation to his work at the 
GLA (ibid.). Grant stated that the Greater London Assembly should not 'approach these 
potential conflicts of interest from a perspective of deep rooted suspicion but rather 
should start from the assumption of honesty' (Brown 2001b: 4.1.). Grant's role in 
monitoring Rogers' work was to ensure the avoidance of financial gain by Rogers 
through his involvement in GLA decision making and thereby safeguard the GLA from 
damaging accusations (ibid.).  However in 2002, conservative members of the Greater 
London Assembly argued that the proposed paid consultancy role of Rogers represented 
a conflict of interest issue, taking into account his work as an architect in London and 
his unpaid advisory role to the mayor (Greater London Assembly 2002). The report on 
Rogers' contract also points out the significant importance of Rogers' expertise gained 
from chairing the Urban Task Force for developing the London Plan (Brown 2001a).  
 
At the hearing to the House of Commons report on tall buildings, SAVE Britain's 
Heritage argued that the 'mayor, the Corporation of London, big business and architects 
have a relationship which can only be described as cosy' (House of Commons 2002: 
31). English Heritage, the Conservative Group of the Greater London Assembly and the 
London Forum of Amenity and Civic Societies argued that there was a lack of 
accountability in the policy making process of the London Plan (ibid.). The House of 
Commons, however, referred to the possibility for public scrutiny during the 
consultation process and the Secretary of State's right to direct changes to the emerging 
London Plan (ibid.). Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, occupying the position of 
Secretary of State at the time, argued in favour of Livingstone's pro-tall building 
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policies (ibid.). In subsequent public inquiries, Prescott, acting as Secretary of State 
from May 1997 to May 2006, would support five major tall building cases and would 
refuse to call in the controversial Bishopsgate Tower (also known as the DIFA tower or 
Pinnacle) located in the City of London.23 It was also supported strongly by Livingstone 
and the GLA, as is evident in the Stage 1 report (GLA 2005g).  
 
The need for expertise versus perceptions of conflicts of interest  
As a starting point for the discussion of the impact of Lord Rogers within the London 
Plan process and his key advisory role within the GLA, the insinuation included in 
Charney's article (2007) that tall building projects designed by RRP might have been 
treated favourably is taken. If proven to be correct in practice, this would have been a 
serious accusation, and indeed a breach of the principles of public life. Crucially, the 
Nolan Report demands that '[h]olders of public office should not place themselves 
under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might 
influence them in the performance of their official duties' (Nolan 1997b: 1). Lord 
Rogers, however, has long been a highly prominent architect in Britain and 
internationally. Indeed, the Richard Rogers Partnership (RRP) has worked on the tall 
building projects of 122 Leadenhall Street in the City of London, Paddington Basin 
(Merchant Square) in the City of Westminster and 360 London in the London Borough 
of Southwark (see appendix 2 for more details on the projects). RRP has also worked on 
tall building projects at Canary Wharf: Riverside South and Heron Quay West. 
However, projects located at Canary Wharf are not the subject of this thesis. 
Furthermore, Rogers' architectural practice had been commissioned for large master 
planning projects such as the Tate Bankside master plan, Greenwich Peninsula master 
plan and the Paddington Basin master plan. Therefore, there was the potential for 
conflicts of interest on the part of Lord Rogers due to his dual role, as also confirmed by 
Professor Grant from the Standards Committee (Brown 2001b).  
 
However, it needs to be established whether there actually was favourable treatment by 
the GLA of the projects Rogers was involved in. As part of Lord Rogers' contract, a 
report of projects had to be sent to Officer Richard Brown from the Architecture and 
Urbanism Unit of the GLA so that any potential conflict of interest could be identified 
(Brown 2001b). Furthermore, every instance in which Lord Rogers was involved in an 
                                                 
23 These precedent tall building public inquiries were: Heron Tower (2001), London Bridge Tower 
(2002), Tate Tower (2003), Potters Fields (2005) and Vauxhall Tower (2005).  
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advisory capacity to local boroughs had to be reported (ibid.). In the event that RRP 
became involved in 'any site Rogers is engaged on behalf of the GLA', he was required 
to withdraw from his GLA involvement (ibid.: 2.4). Therefore, due to the potential for 
conflicts of interest arising from the dual roles of Rogers, a very high level of scrutiny 
was applied.  
 
GLA assessments of the three tall building projects designed by RRP can be compared 
with the range of tall building projects proposed in central London between 2000 and 
2008. The Paddington Basin master plan project was described as high quality 
urbanism, acceptable visually within views and situated within an appropriate location 
for tall buildings (GLA 2002l). Some reduction in height was seen as a positive 
amendment (ibid.). 122 Leadenhall Street was also described as high quality 
architecture and situated appropriately due to its location within the existing Eastern 
Cluster in the City of London (GLA 2004b). It was concluded that the project was 
acceptable visually due to the precedents set by the 30 St Mary Axe and Heron Tower, 
projects which are located in close proximity (ibid.). 360 London was also described as 
high quality architecture, located appropriately in relation to the Elephant and Castle 
master plan and acceptable visually (GLA 2008b). Improvements to the ground floor 
design were demanded (ibid.). As appendix 4 shows, more than 50% of the projects 
assessed by the GLA were described as high quality of design (21% as highest design 
quality and 4% as world class design). Only in 18.5% of all the cases were 
improvements to the urban design recommended and 360 London was one of those. The 
assessments of the visual impact of the RRP projects were on average, with 52.5% 
being described as acceptable within views. The assessments of the suitability of the 
locations were also on average. In 39.5% of all cases, the locations were found to be 
suitable. In 18.5% of the cases, the locations were justified on the basis that they 
consolidated an existing cluster. In conclusion on the issue of favourable treatment, no 
evidence can be found that the projects RRP was involved in were treated favourably. 
The assessments of the projects appear to have been evaluated very similarly when 
compared with the forty-three tall building projects proposed overall in central London 
between 2000 and 2008. In the end, the GLA was supportive of tall building projects 
throughout 2000 to 2008. Therefore, the fact that the projects RRP was involved in were 
supported does not represent a deviation from the average.  
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It must also be doubted whether RRP had a competitive advantage over other 
architectural firms in the tall building sector due to Rogers' involvement in the GLA. As 
has been described above, RRP worked on three tall building projects. In comparison to 
this, Foster and Partners were commissioned for five tall building projects (30 St Mary 
Axe, 51 Lime Street, Walbrook Square, Bishops Place Building 3 (Northgate) and 
Hampton House Redevelopment). Kohn Pedersen Fox (KPF) also worked on five tall 
building projects (Heron Tower, Bishopsgate Tower and Victoria Transport Interchange 
Building 2, 7 and 7a). Wilkinson Eyre worked on four projects (Victoria Transport 
Interchange Building 8, North East Quadrant Office and Residential Building and 20 
Blackfriars Road). Allies and Morrison worked on three tall building projects (100 
Bishopsgate, Elizabeth House and Eileen House).24 This comparison shows that RRP 
was one of five international architectural firms with several commissions for tall 
buildings in central London.  
 
The reasons for the appointment of Lord Rogers to key roles within the GLA are stated 
in the report to the Standards Committee regarding his  contract. Malcolm Grant from 
the Standards Committee divides Rogers' role into three major parts: i) improving the 
quality of London's major developments in accordance with the Urban Task Force 
Report and the 2000 White Paper; ii) reviving London's public realm in particular in 
relation to quality in architecture; and, iii) promoting best practice in urban design at the 
policy level (Brown 2001b). Due to Rogers' leading role in the production of the Urban 
Task Force Report, he was able to bring significant experience to implementing the key 
principles of improving the quality of architecture and the public realm. Furthermore, as 
has been discussed in the previous section, the 4B policies of the London Plan were 
produced in conformance with the Urban Task Force Report.  
 
In conclusion to this section, it has been shown that there was potential for conflict of 
interest regarding Lord Rogers' dual role as a key expert within the GLA and as a 
practising architect. However, actual favourable treatment by the GLA or the mayor in 
the assessments of projects RRP was involved in has not been proven. Concerns such as 
those as voiced by Charney (2007) that favourable treatment might have occurred in the 
case of 122 Leadenhall Street cannot be substantiated. Furthermore, there is a strong 
case for the need for the expertise of Rogers within the GLA, both in terms of 
implementing the Urban Task Force agenda and as a source of credibility for planning 
                                                 
24 A comprehensive list of these projects and the private firms involved is included in appendix 2. 
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decisions, in particular in providing powerful evidence at public inquiries. It has also 
been demonstrated that due to the obvious potential for conflict of interest, Rogers' 
involvement in the GLA was subject to heightened scrutiny by the Standards 
Committee (Brown 2001a; 2001b).  
 
However, and despite the scrutiny, when considering the temporal relationship between 
the conflicts of interest allegations and the measures taken by the GLA and the 
Standards Committee, it is evident that concerns regarding Rogers' role could not be 
removed completely. Accusations regarding Rogers' role were repeated in the House of 
Commons Report (House of Commons 2002). The Greater London Assembly also 
voiced new concerns in 2002 (Greater London Assembly 2002). Evidentially, the 
perception of conflicts of interest was maintained despite the scrutiny by the Select 
Committee and a lack of proof of misuse of powers. These incidents took place prior to 
the case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road. However in 2007, interviewees from heritage 
groups as well as private consultants stated that a coalition between the architectural 
sector and the GLA and Mayor Livingstone was perceived. All in all,  these perceptions 
of conflicts of interest and client politics have contributed to increasing the conflict 
between supporters and opponents of tall building development. In the view of 
opponents, the GLA lost credibility as a result.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
2.4 The finalised London Plan and the FALP 
 
This section considers the designation of locations appropriate for tall buildings in the 
finalised regional development strategy, The London Plan: Spatial Development 
Strategy for Greater London (2004 London Plan) (GLA 2004a), and the draft Further 
Alterations to the London Plan (Spatial Development Strategy for Greater London) 
(FALP) published in September 2006 (GLA 2006a). Particular attention is paid to the 
level of certainty for developers of tall buildings provided by these policy documents. 
Academics have argued that the London Plan strongly favoured and supported tall 
building development (McNeill 2002b; Charney 2007; Tavernor 2007b). I argue that 
despite this strong support, the imprecise determination of locations suitable for tall 
building development led to a great deal of uncertainty amongst developers, local 
planning authorities, as well as heritage groups. Only with the publication of the FALP, 
which contained a large Opportunity Area that included the site of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road, did a higher level of certainty emerge. In addition, it is argued that a planning 
culture resulted that focussed on the establishment of precedent cases which in turn 
would provide certainty that a number of locations were suitable for tall buildings. In 
reaction to a policy that did not allow them to represent their interests as they wished, 
heritage groups used counter tactics as a last resort to influence the London Plan, which 
culminated in the involvement of UNESCO. As a result, developers' uncertainty about 
the success of their projects in the planning process was severely increased and a 
number of tall building projects were potentially threatened to be called in by the 
Secretary of State. 
 
The finalised 2004 London Plan policies 
The efforts to designate the whole of the CAZ as appropriate for tall buildings through 
the 2002 draft London Plan were rejected within the EiP (Richardson and Simpson 
2003). Nonetheless, Mayor Livingstone and the GLA remained determined to support 
and indeed encourage tall building development in central London. The finalised 
version of the London Plan, published in February 2004, established the same 
Opportunity Areas in central London that were proposed in the 2002 draft London Plan 
(GLA 2004a). As can be seen in map 5, the borders of the Central Activities Zone 
(CAZ) were amended. Policy 5B.2 defines that development density needs to be 
maximised in the CAZ (ibid.). Policy 4B.8 Tall Buildings – location determined that the 
mayor would promote tall building development in the CAZ and Opportunity Areas 
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where it creates attractive landmarks and helps to provide coherent locations for 
economic clusters and/or acts as catalysts for regeneration (ibid.). Policy 4C.20 stated 
that tall buildings would be appropriate at water spaces—the so called Blue Ribbon 
Network—if they are of the highest design quality and successfully integrated spatially 
in relation to water spaces (ibid.). The 2004 London Plan, while incorporating the 
restrictions proposed by the EiP in 2003, continued to strongly advocate tall building 
development, including the suggestion of the possibility of its appropriateness along the 
River Thames and adding the qualities of landmark and regeneration catalysts. The 
location of the project at No.1 Blackfriars Road met all of these policy requirements as 
is demonstrated in planning application documents (Ian Simpson Architects 2006). 
Therefore based on these policy requirements, it was possible to argue that No.1 
Blackfriars Road was acceptable. Importantly, precise definitions of areas in which tall 
buildings were or were not tall buildings are appropriate were not developed. Thus, the 
2004 London Plan continued to provide flexibility for developers who would be able to 
propose tall buildings if they were able to establish that their projects met the standards 
defined.   
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Map 5: The designated CAZ in the finalised 2004 London Plan relative to tall building projects 
consented and proposed at the time of the publication. The drawing is based on the map provided in 
the 2004 London Plan (GLA 2004a: 232). Source: Author  
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Key to map 5 
 
Tall building projects proposed or consented during 2004 
1  30 St Mary Axe      
2  Heron Tower     
3  Paddington Basin 
4   Paddington Station Tower   
5  Tate Tower 
6  London Bridge Tower    
7  Vauxhall Tower     
8  Potter's Fields     
9  51 Lime Street     
10  Minerva Tower     
11a-c   Victoria Transport Interchange buildings  
12  Ropemaker Place 
13  122 Leadenhall Street 
14  259 City Road 
15  City Road Basin Site A 
16  Broadgate Tower 
17  Bishopsgate Tower 
 
Proposed Opportunity Areas 
O1  Waterloo Opportunity Area 
O2  London Bridge Opportunity Area 
O3  Elephant and Castle Opportunity Area 
O4  Vauxhall/Nine Elms/Battersea Opportunity Area 
O5  Paddington Opportunity Area  
O6  Whitechapel/Aldgate Opportunity Area 
O7  Kings Cross Opportunity Area  
O8  Bishopsgate/South Shoreditch Opportunity Area 
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By 2007, pressure for tall building development shifted from the City of London 
towards the northern parts of the London Boroughs of Lambeth and Southwark (see 
map 6). For the Opportunity Area of Waterloo, a tall building framework was 
established by the GLA in cooperation with the LB Lambeth (GLA 2007a). The tall 
building projects of Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House, both located in the LB 
Lambeth, had already been proposed (PINS 2008; 2009b). Much to the detriment of the 
developers of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge, 
however, was not designated as an Opportunity Area in the London Plan and the LB 
Southwark did not manage to achieve agreement amongst politicians to pass a local tall 
building policy for the area (Strategic Director of Regeneration 2007).  
 
The GLA had supported No.1 Blackfriars Road since it was first discussed within pre-
application discussions and, as a result, they were keen to grant permission to the 
project (GLA 2005e). Precedents for tall buildings in the area had been set through the 
consented height extension to the existing King's Reach Tower and a project by the 
architects, Foster & Partners, for Sainsbury's at the site of No.1 Blackfriars Road (ibid.).  
However, a precedent for a new tall building at a comparable height to No.1 Blackfriars 
Road had not been set. A tall building—the so called Tate Tower—proposed in 2001 by 
the developer, London Town Plc, adjacent to Tate Modern was rejected by the LB 
Southwark and, despite its being granted permission following an appeal, it did not get 
built (Harris 2008). As a result, developers and the GLA did not have a basis for 
constructing the argument that a precedent of a comparable height had been set that 
would have permitted the conclusion that No.1 Blackfriars Road would definitely 
succeed if a public inquiry was requested by English Heritage. In interviews that I 
conducted with architects and developers, as well as CABE officials, there was a broad 
consensus that the lack of supporting tall building policy and the strong resistance from 
a number of heritage groups resulted in a great degree of uncertainty for the design 
teams of tall building projects in northern Lambeth and Southwark.  
 
In 2007, the GLA established a policy basis for tall building development at the 
Southwark side of Blackfriars Bridge. The draft Further Alterations to the London Plan 
(Spatial Development Strategy for Greater London) (FALP) published in September 
2006 defined a large Opportunity Area along the southern side of the River Thames 
spanning from London Bridge in Southwark through northern Lambeth to 
Vauxhall/Nine Elms in Wandsworth (see map 6, dark grey area) (GLA 2006a). As can 
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be seen in map 6, the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road and Doon Street Tower projects are 
now located within an Opportunity Area in which tall building development is 
considered appropriate.  
 
In their EiP report published in September 2007, the examiners of the draft FALP 
concluded that the changes made to tall building policies since the original 2004 
London Plan have been slight (Shepley, Langton, Nixon 2007). Regarding the 
Opportunity Areas proposed by the FALP, the examiners stated that the inclusion of 
these is supported and that the designated localities are perceived as contributions to the 
further development of London's role within the UK economy and as a world city 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the concerns raised by some parties that the London Plan was 
overly supportive of tall building development were dismissed by the examiners  (ibid.).  
Through this consent, the tall building area at Blackfriars Bridge was established at the 
regional level. However, this still did not produce the certainty needed to grant planning 
permission to No.1 Blackfriars Road and remove the possibility of a call-in and a public 
inquiry. English Heritage, the WCC and the Royal Parks maintained their objections 
and it was stated that if the project was granted planning permission by the LB 
Southwark, then English Heritage would ask the Secretary of State to seek a call-in (LB 
Southwark 2007a). 
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Map 6: Opportunity Areas established through the draft Further Alterations to the London Plan 
(FALP) relative to consented and proposed tall building projects. The drawing is based on the map 
contained in the FALP (GLA 2006a: A83). Source: Author 
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Key to map 6 
 
Opportunity Areas 
Dark grey  London Bridge Bankside Opportunity Area 
Light grey  Other Opportunity Areas designated in the 2006 draft of the FALP 
 
A  Borough and Bankside Opportunity Area 
B   London Bridge Opportunity Area 
C  Elephant and Castle Opportunity Area 
 
Tall building projects consented or proposed in the northern parts of the London 
Boroughs of Southwark and Lambeth  
 
6  London Bridge Tower    
7  Vauxhall Tower     
8  Potter's Fields  
18   King's Reach Tower Redevelopment 
22  No.1 Blackfriars Road 
23  20 Blackfriars Road 
27   Doon Street Tower 
30  Castle House 
32  360 London 
35  Elizabeth House 
36  Eileen House 
39  Hampton House Redevelopment 
40  Vauxhall Sky Gardens 
41  81 Black Prince Road 
42  Vauxhall Bondway Tower 
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Certainty through the finalised and amended London Plan?  
Academics have argued that the London Plan was  very much a pro tall building policy, 
both in its emerging states (McNeill 2002a; Tavernor 2004a and 2004b), as well as in 
the finalised version in 2004 (Tavernor 2007a and 2007b; Charney 2007). Interviews 
with design team members and heritage groups confirm this conclusion as does a report 
by UNESCO (UNESCO 2006a). This might suggest that the London Plan and the 
further amendments through the FALP did provide a great deal of certainty for 
developers of tall buildings. However, was the London Plan process successful in 
providing certainty for developers and were conflicts resolved effectively? Justin, the 
developer of No.1 Blackfriars Road, provides his perception of the London Plan:  
 
Justin: 
I think the clarity that is emerging out of the London Plan is going to be helpful. 
It may mean that some things are restricted. […] There will be other things that 
come along that maybe challenge the plan which will be interesting. I think that 
from our experience we would in the future like to be as near as possible to the 
plan. We are not looking for extra challenges. 
 
Juergen: 
How did you prove that in the end that this is actually a suitable site for a tall 
building? How were you able to say: this is a site where a tall building could 
happen? 
 
Justin: 
As I said to you earlier, we looked at this as a commercial opportunity. You 
know, as a developer you must think commercially. […] It would be stupid to 
have just an idealistic or utopian approach. 
 
The interview with the developer, Justin, was conducted in December 2007 after the 
FALP had been published and examined within the EiP. UNESCO had threatened to de-
list central London's World Heritage Sites (WHSs) and No.1 Blackfriars Road had been 
referred to as a threat to the Westminster WHS (UNESCO 2006a). While the 2004 
London Plan did provide the flexibility needed for developers, and for Justin and No.1 
Blackfriars Road in particular, to propose tall buildings in areas for which neither 
specific regional nor local tall building policy had been made, it also produced a serious 
degree of uncertainty. As Justin argues, as a developer he was looking for a commercial 
opportunity. Therefore on the one hand, the broad designation of tall building areas—
not defining clear boundaries of appropriate areas—allowed him to identify the site of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road. On the other hand, the ambiguity contained within the London 
Plan by not specifying the exact extent of tall building locations failed to provide 
certainty since, according to the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, decisions 
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regarding the granting of planning permission have to be based on finalised policy 
(OPSI 1990a). In the absence of such policy, the planning decision could potentially be 
regarded as premature (ODPM 2005a). The potential for prematurity causes the risk of 
failure within a possible public inquiry and also the risk of judicial review in the event 
that a party opposed to the project challenges the legal validity of either the planning 
decision or the public inquiry decision respectively.  
 
The FALP provided a greater degree of certainty for developers since it designated an 
Opportunity Area containing the northern parts of Southwark and Lambeth. However at 
the same time, those local boroughs which sought to oppose tall building development, 
such as Westminster, and heritage groups which demanded increased protection of 
heritage assets, were marginalised. Within EiP processes and through the House of 
Commons, it was concluded that local boroughs were not allowed to produce policy that 
would prohibit tall buildings within their borough boundaries (House of Commons 
2002; Richardson and Simpson 2003). Furthermore, the proactive tall building 
advocacy through the London Plan and FALP was supported by national government as 
is evident in the EiP report regarding the FALP (Shepley, Langton, Nixon 2007). Thus, 
conflicts between the supporters and opponents of tall building development were not 
reduced. Instead, conflicts were exacerbated with heritage groups resorting to tactics, 
such as alerting UNESCO as a strong ally, in order to attack tall building advocacy 
efforts in central London.  
 
In conclusion to this section, some certainty was provided by the 2004 London Plan. 
Considering the 4B.8, 4C.20, 5B.2 policies in conjunction, the location of the proposals 
for No.1 Blackfriars Road fulfilled the criteria for a tall building location. The lack of 
definition of the exact extent of tall building areas within the 2004 London Plan allowed 
developers to propose tall buildings in large areas of central London, which however 
also caused a high level of uncertainty. The FALP provided a greater degree of certainty 
because it determined the extent of an Opportunity Area which included the project's 
site. According to the plan-led approach, local policy has to follow regional policy 
(OPSI 1991). But still, uncertainty for developers prevailed since a local tall building 
policy was not established in Southwark. In particular, the 2007 Guidance on Tall 
Buildings (GOTB) required that a local tall building policy must be available to make 
decisions on the granting of planning permission (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
Based on these policy requirements, heritage groups would have been able to request a 
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call-in because divergent interpretations of the London Plan policies were possible. The 
level of uncertainty for developers was increased by the concerns of heritage groups that 
No.1 Blackfriars Road would set a precedent for a cluster of tall buildings at Blackfriars 
Bridge, a consideration that increased their level of opposition to the project.  
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2.5 Pre-application discussion with the GLA 
 
This section considers pre-application discussions between developers' design teams 
and the Greater London Authority. The discussion draws primarily on interviews with 
the planning consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road and the GLA case officer responsible 
for the same project. Particular attention is paid to the decision making structure within 
the GLA and the central role of expert advice provided by planning and public relations 
consultants for the developers' design teams. Furthermore, it is evaluated how effective 
and also how inclusive pre-application discussions with the GLA are in the light of 
criticism by the Greater London Assembly.  
 
Section 4 of the 2000 Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order determines 
that local planning authorities (LPAs) are required to consult the Mayor of London on 
planning applications (OPSI 2000b). Furthermore, the order determines that the mayor 
may decide whether he grants the LPA the right to determine the planning application 
on its own or whether he decides to direct refusal of the granting of planning permission 
with regard to strategic grounds (ibid.).25 In order for the mayor and the GLA to 
determine what their position towards a specific planning application is, the developer 
and the design team have to engage in a pre-application discussion with GLA officers 
and the mayor. Guidance regarding the pre-application discussion provided by the GLA 
states that developers have to apply for this service in writing (GLA 2007h). Figure 2 
contains a diagram that shows the GLA pre-application discussion phase in relation to 
the planning application and post-application phases.  
 
Prior to the actual discussion between the GLA and the design team, a case officer from 
the GLA assesses the information provided by the design team (ibid.). The GLA pre-
application discussion takes place in the form of a meeting (ibid.). Following this 
meeting, the GLA writes a Stage 1 report that sets out concerns and recommendations 
for amendments to a design. In this stage of the planning process, the design team is 
able to react to GLA feedback and amend the design so that all concerns of the GLA are 
addressed. Once a planning application has been submitted, the GLA is consulted by the 
local borough. The GLA then writes a Stage 2 report that sets out whether the GLA 
                                                 
25 The right to grant and refuse planning permission, thereby exercising the full planning powers of a 
local authority, was granted to the mayor of London by the 2007 Greater London Authority Act (OPSI 
2007). With regard to No.1 Blackfri ars Road, this power was not yet in effect. 
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supports the granting of planning permission, leaves the planning powers to the local 
borough, or whether the GLA recommends refusal, which would result in the GLA 
overruling the local borough should it grant planning permission according to the 2000 
Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order (OPSI 2000b). 
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Figure 2: Pre-application process of the Greater London Authority. The diagram includes an 
illustration of the possibility of a call-in and a subsequent public inquiry. 
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GLA pre-application discussion 
Roger, the planning consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road, working for the DP9 
planning consultants, framed the pre-application discussions with the GLA as follows: 
 
With [the] GLA you would go and see them prior to submitting for planning 
permission. You present the scheme. You take them through issues that you 
know they could be concerned about. With the GLA it is [sustainable] energy, 
affordable housing and views. These are the kind of key issues, and you would 
go and show them the material. Then you would probably see them again until 
the planning application was in. There is obviously a formal process for the 
GLA. They have to write a statement. Once you are at the point of submission, 
you then begin the formal process.  
 
Roger distinguishes the pre-application stage from the stage after the planning 
application submission and from his account the design team enters these processes well 
informed. As a result, the process is perceived as a critical stage, but from the design 
team's point of view it is manageable by addressing the known key issues of the GLA. 
This has also been confirmed by architects interviewed in relation to pre-application 
discussions with the GLA. The central issue then for the design team is that the key 
issues which are of primary concern to the GLA must be known prior to entering into 
any pre-application discussion. DP9 acted as the lead planning consultant on twenty-one 
of the total forty-three tall building cases in central London between 1999 and 2009 (see 
appendix 3). They therefore know what the most relevant aspects are for the GLA and 
they have gained this experience in cooperation with the GLA, so that support is very 
likely. The survey of GLA demands and conclusions (appendix 4) shows that the GLA 
was very consistent in insisting on the provision of affordable housing in accordance 
with the London Plan policies and that the quality of architecture and urban design were 
monitored in detail in all cases. The survey also shows that the GLA and the mayor 
concluded in more than 50% of the cases (which were all of those that were visible 
within protected views) that the visual impacts were acceptable.  
 
The planning consultant is critical for the design team at this stage as they have access 
to GLA officers and can gather information about the key concerns. These concerns are 
discussed with the developer and the other key consultants. This allows the design team 
to shape the design of the project to meet GLA requirements. The finalised 2004 
London Plan states that proposals for tall buildings must be highly energy efficient 
(Policy 4B.6), must include the provision of 40% of affordable housing (if located 
within the CAZ) on the buildings site and (Policy 3A.7) must be of high quality of 
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architecture and urban design and must present coherent reasoning why the building's 
visual appearance is acceptable when visible within a strategic view (Policy 4B.9) 
(GLA 2004a). The GLA Stage 1 letter from December 2005 shows that the design team 
of No.1 Blackfriars Road had taken into account the issues of energy efficiency, 
affordable housing and views (GLA 2005e). In this first Stage 1 letter, the GLA 
criticised the design of the lower level buildings. At a later stage and after several 
amendments to the design, the Stage 1 letter from July 2007 and the Stage 2 letter from 
February 2008 show that the design team had been able to resolve these issues within 
the further design process (GLA 2007e; 2008a). As is evident from the Stage 1 and 2 
letters, the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road was able to cooperate successfully 
with the GLA and, as a result, secured support for the project.  
 
Within the design team, a central function of planning consultants and public relations 
consultants is to know how the internal political decision making structure of the GLA 
works. Having worked on a large number of tall building projects in central London, 
consultants such as DP9 know planning officers and decision makers personally. Martin 
Scholar, the GLA case officer for No.1 Blackfriars Road, describes the GLA's internal 
decision making structure as follows:   
 
Within the office there was some discussion about the design of the building. 
Some people thought it was great. Other people thought it was terrible. We sort 
of reached a position within the mayor's policies: it is a world class building. 
Beetham Organization has got a track record of doing big tall buildings and this 
is acceptable.  
 
There is a broad policy that the mayor will promote tall buildings. It's sort of an 
in-house discussion really amongst officers, amongst professionals to see their 
views on a particular building. It's an interesting environment to work in. The 
agenda is getting development done.  
 
Scholar described the communication link between the design team and the GLA. While 
the GLA case officer is the main contact for the design team, the case officer is 
accountable to Giles Dolphin, Head of Planning, and Colin Wilson, the Strategic 
Planning Manager. Both Dolphin and Wilson were in turn accountable to the mayor, 
Ken Livingstone. Scholar characterises the assessment process within the GLA as a 
discursive yet hierarchical process. As could also be confirmed in the interview, the 
GLA's internal decision making process was governed by the mayor, Ken Livingstone. 
Thus, even if officers recommended not approving a project, the mayor could overrule 
this based on his supportive position towards tall buildings. This circumstance was 
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known to private design teams and planning and public relations consultants advised the 
core design team on the best course of action. For the design team, this meant that they 
presented their project in pre-application discussions to the mayor, with extensive 
advance knowledge about his current concerns, in order to secure his support. Effective 
interaction with the GLA meant taking into account the most important GLA concerns 
so as to get the support of Mayor Livingstone who was generally supportive of tall 
building projects. Because the mayor was the top decision maker, it was very unlikely 
that any changes of mind will occur that could produce uncertainty regarding the 
support of the GLA subsequently. 
 
There have been concerns voiced by the Greater London Assembly that privileged 
access to leading GLA officers and the mayor might jeopardise the public accountability 
of pre-application discussions. The Greater London Assembly did accuse Mayor 
Livingstone of holding secret negotiations with developers (Greater London Assembly 
2002). The assembly recognised that planning law allows the mayor to exclude the 
public from these meetings (ibid.). However, the assembly had received criticism from 
London boroughs which demanded meetings with regard to the mayor's planning 
decision processes being publicly accessible in a way similar to the planning decision 
meetings of local boroughs (ibid.). The Assembly argued that the key deliberations 
within these meetings and the merits of London's most significant planning projects 
should be discussed openly (ibid.). Particular concerns were raised about meetings of 
the mayor and his  planning officers with developers and representatives of tall building 
projects (ibid.). They argued that a few powerful developers had direct access to and 
influence on the mayor's planning decisions (ibid.). Out of fourteen schemes presented 
to the mayor in those meetings, six projects concerned tall buildings proposed in central 
London. Crucially, the people present at the meetings in question advocating the 
projects were developers, architects (in five of the six cases) and planning consultants 
(in three of the six cases).26 In order to resolve this problem, the assembly 
recommended in a report that the mayor more clearly distinguish between his role of 
giving strategic advice to developers and that of taking strategic planning decisions 
(ibid.). In terms of the GLA, this report confirmed that the design teams initially 
approached the Mayor of London and key GLA people in order to discuss the merits of 
                                                 
26 These schemes were: 30 St Mary Axe (also known as Swiss-Re or Gherkin), Heron Tower, London 
Bridge Tower, Tate Tower (termed 44 Hopton Street), St Botolph's House and Fenchurch Street Tower 
(Greater London Assembly 2002). 
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their project with the aim of achieving support early on. The interview accounts by 
Roger and Martin Scholar confirm that the same decision making structure was in place 
in 2007 regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road and other tall buildings cases and especially 
regarding important precedent cases. Pre-application discussions only included the GLA 
and the design team. Other parties such as neighbouring boroughs, heritage groups or 
local interest groups were excluded from this process.  
 
Despite this criticism, it has to be taken into account that the national government in the 
2001 Green Paper and in reviews of the planning system, such as the Killian Pretty 
report, have consistently argued that an increase in early pre-application discussions is 
necessary to reduce planning uncertainty prior to planning application submissions 
(DTLR 2001; Killian Pretty 2008). Those proposing tall buildings have made use of this 
opportunity, especially since due to their controversial nature agreement is sought with 
the GLA early on. The design team has to expect that a number of other parties will 
seek to oppose the project, something which increases the importance of GLA support 
even more. There are also reasons for secrecy within pre-application discussions. The 
GLA guidance for pre-application discussions mentions that while there is a right for 
the public to request information regarding GLA pre-application discussions and the 
documents submitted, there is also the possibility of exempting these types of 
information from public access on commercial grounds (GLA 2007h). As the developer, 
Justin, explained in his interview, developers are in competition with other developers 
and they do not want their competitors to know which projects they are about to propose 
prior to this being announced publicly, so as not to get a market disadvantage. In 
addition, developers would be disadvantaged if they have not already acquired the site 
for the project at the stage of the pre-application discussions. Developers seek to keep 
their plans secret as long as the planning process allows so that they have a better 
position in price negotiations with the land owner.  
 
The design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road was highly effective within the pre-
application discussion due to the high quality of architecture produced by the architect 
and the design brief that fitted with the London Plan objectives, but importantly also 
due to the knowledge and experience of planning consultants. With regard to the GLA, 
the design team managed to obtain certainty in the form of GLA support for the further 
planning process. Criticism voiced by the GLA in 2005 (GLA 2005e) was taken into 
account and subsequently led to GLA approval of the project (GLA 2007e; 2008a). This 
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certainty, which had been gained by the design team, reduced the risk of conflict within 
the planning application stage and, therefore, the pre-application discussion with the 
GLA in the No.1 Blackfriars Road case can be described as an effective planning tool. 
However, the other side of the coin is that the type of pre-application discussion used in 
cases of tall buildings is not inclusive but rather exclusive, accessible only for the 
principal negotiating parties, the GLA and the developers. This has led to accusations of 
secrecy and privileged access to the mayor and key decision makers (Greater London 
Assembly 2002). Although there is a high level of transparency provided through the 
publication of initial representations and Stage 1 and 2 reports, transparency is 
incomplete. The details  discussed between the GLA and developers within pre-
application discussions can not be accessed by any other party. In summary, while the 
pre-application stage is effective in the sense that it increases certainty for the 
developer, it is a trade-off at the expense of inclusion which was assigned significant 
importance through the Urban Task Force Report and the national planning policy PPS1 
(Urban Task Force 1999; ODPM 2005c)  
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2.6 Conclusions 
 
The London Plan both in its emerging and finalised stages, is coherent with the urban 
renaissance agenda of the national government. The overarching principles of good 
architecture and urban design and densification around transport nodes are translated 
into the London Plan policies in a way that strongly supports and indeed encourages tall 
building development, confirming the stance contained within the London Plan towards 
tall building development. However, the designation of areas appropriate for tall 
buildings appears crucial for the success or failure of such projects. In particular, the 
attempts to designate the whole of the CAZ and the Opportunity Areas as appropriate 
provided flexibility for developers to propose tall buildings in all of these locations.  
 
While these measures encouraged the private sector to propose more tall buildings, a 
great deal of uncertainty was produced at the same time. Based on the experience from 
the 1960s, heritage groups felt threatened by the possibility that tall buildings might be 
granted planning permission in locations that would cause visual harm to central 
London's heritage assets. As a result, heritage groups developed radical positions 
seeking to prohibit the visibility of tall buildings from within or towards all heritage 
assets. They succeeded partly in the London Plan policy process, managing within the 
EiP process to restrict the blanket designation of the CAZ as being appropriate for tall 
buildings. Despite this limitation on the encouragement of tall building development in 
the London Plan, the GLA and Mayor Livingstone supported the granting of planning 
permission for a number of precedent cases which began to incrementally consolidate 
existing and new tall building locations. These precedent cases constituted an 
immediate threat to heritage groups which feared that if granted planning permission, 
heritage protection regarding prospective tall building projects would be severely 
weakened. Thus, precedent cases, such as No.1 Blackfriars Road which—if 
successful—was bound to set a precedent for tall buildings south of the River Thames 
outside of the established clusters of the City of London and Canary Wharf, became 
attractors of increased conflict between supporters and opponents of tall buildings. 
Uncertainty for developers resulted from the lack of designating the exact extent of 
areas appropriate for tall building development because it allowed opponents to 
challenge projects that otherwise met the policies of the London Plan.  
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The conflict between supporters and opponents might have potentially been reduced by 
finding some middle ground. For tall building supporters, this would have meant 
determining the exact extent of areas appropriate for tall buildings, thereby potentially 
introducing height restrictions in areas where tall buildings were most likely to have 
visual impacts on heritage assets. At the same time, this would have increased the 
likelihood that developers would have proposed fewer numbers of tall buildings due to 
the expected increases in costs for designated sites and height limits. For opponents, a 
departure from the radical position would have meant accepting a degree of visual 
intrusion of tall buildings in relation to heritage assets, although potentially only of a 
limited extent. However as has been demonstrated, both supporters and opponents 
adopted radical and mutually exclusive positions. In the London Plan process, the GLA 
maintained its radical position throughout, as did heritage groups. The EiP limited the 
promotion of those radical positions to a degree but did not achieve the resolving of the 
conflict between the opposing camps. Discretion at regional level, allowing the GLA to 
impose the designation of tall building areas on local boroughs, was traded off against 
conflict resolution. Moreover, ambiguous designations of tall building areas by the GLA 
and local boroughs were not prevented. As a result, heritage groups felt marginalised 
through what they perceive to be overly permissive tall building policies. This apparent 
lack of conflict resolution culminated in the involvement of UNESCO in 2006 and 2007 
which severely increased the level of uncertainty for the design team of No.1 
Blackfriars Road and a number of other tall building projects.  
 
The central role held by Lord Rogers within the GLA evidentially led to the successful 
translation of urban renaissance principles into the London Plan. The 4B policies follow 
the principles of promoting the highest quality of architecture and urban design, 
densification and the acquisition of large amounts of affordable housing through S106 
agreements. In this regard, Lord Rogers' expertise was a crucial factor in achieving 
London Plan policies that successfully implemented the governmental agenda of an 
urban renaissance at the regional policy level. Nonetheless, it appears that the mere 
potential for conflicts of interest, which naturally results from involvement in both 
governmental service and private practice, causes the perception that the central 
principles of the Nolan Report, such as selflessness, objectivity and accountability, 
might have possibly not been upheld by the GLA.   
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Pre-application processes with the GLA are highly effective in providing certainty for 
developers in terms of regional planning decisions. The GLA has a clear approach to 
pre-application discussions, with the agenda being transparent to developers' design 
teams. Design teams have been able to incrementally improve tall building projects by 
incorporating the concerns raised by the GLA. Doing so, high quality standards of 
architecture and urban design have been achieved as well as high levels of S106 
contributions. The information gathering activities of planning and public relations 
consultants as well as the experience architects and townscape consultants have with 
GLA processes are crucial components for the effectiveness of developers in these 
processes. As a result, design teams initially approached Mayor Livingstone and high 
level planning officers, through which, once agreement was reached, the support by 
GLA case officers with regard to the remaining planning process resulted. However, 
these positive aspects of pre-application discussions must be taken with some 
reservation. Typically, pre-application discussions are not inclusive in nature. Only 
developers and the GLA are part of the process, while heritage groups are excluded. The 
result is that accusations of secret decision making are made by opponents of tall 
buildings. Therefore in terms of conflict resolution, pre-applications are only effective 
in resolving conflicts between the GLA and developers, while conflicts with heritage 
groups are not resolved and indeed are not part of the discussion at this stage. 
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3. The London View Management Framework  
 
This chapter considers the development of the supplementary guidance document, the 
London View Management Framework: The London Plan Supplementary Planning 
Guidance (hereunder abbreviated as the 2007 LVMF) (GLA 2007b). The LVMF is the 
Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) to the London Plan regulating the assessment 
of the visual impacts of development on significant views in London. The policies 
existing prior to the LVMF were the PPG15, regulating the visual impact of 
development on heritage assets qualitatively, and the RPG3A, regulating the visual 
impact on central London monuments through ten geometrically defined view corridors 
(Department of Environment 1994; GOL 1998). The LVMF, by contrast, advocates the 
use of both geometric and qualitative visual impact assessments based on the London 
Plan 4.B policies. The development of these specific assessment methods is the focus of 
this chapter. Implementation processes and the processes of public scrutiny, such as 
consultation and the Examination in Public (EiP), impacted on the policy making 
process. The LVMF was developed in three stages with a draft version in March 2005 
(GLA 2005a), a second draft in March 2007 (GLA 2007a) and the finalised version 
which was published in July 2007 (GLA 2007b). The experts employed at all stages to 
write the contents of the LVMF were private sector consultants involved in tall building 
projects regulated via the LVMF. The discussion of the emerging and finalised LVMF 
focuses on the wording of key paragraphs that define visual assessment and the meaning 
of these paragraphs for the different interest groups in the planning process in 
conjunction with their responses in the consultation process.  
 
The case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road is not located within a geometrically protected 
view corridor but is visible in a townscape view from St James's Park which is located 
in the City of Westminster. Sections 1 and 2 focus on the development of the geometric 
measures, the view corridors and visual assessments therein. Importantly, the principal 
governmental and heritage groups involved in the debate about geometric assessments 
were also of significant importance for No.1 Blackfriars Road. Sections 3 to 5 focus on 
the Qualitative Visual Assessment (QVA) method and its application to the St James's 
Park towards Horse Guards Road townscape view, the visual impact on which was a 
primary concern in the planning process of No.1 Blackfriars Road.  
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3.1 Visual assessment in the backdrop of view corridors 
 
This section focuses on the making of the geometric assessment method for the view 
corridors in the 2005 draft LVMF, and in particular on the introduction of the Backdrop 
Advisory Line (BDAL). The BDAL introduced qualitative methods into geometric 
assessments of visual impact in the backdrop of view corridors. The impacts of the 
implementation processes of the London Bridge Tower project, which occurred in 2003 
prior to the publication of the draft LVMF, are analysed. Furthermore, it is analysed 
how the Greater London Authority (GLA), which sought to support tall building 
development in central London, advocated its interests. The GLA employed experts for 
the production of the 2005 draft LVMF who were also consultants working on the 
London Bridge Tower and other projects. The impact of those consultants on the LVMF 
BDAL method is evaluated.  
 
The Backdrop Advisory Line (BDAL) 
In March 2005, the GLA published the draft London View Management Framework 
(hereafter called the 2005 draft LVMF) (GLA 2005a). The purpose of the 2005 draft 
LVMF was to expand on the methods introduced by the London Plan for regulating the 
visual impacts of a development on the historic environment of central London. The 
particular aspects of the draft LVMF discussed hereunder are amendments to the 
regulation of the visibility of tall buildings in the backdrop of view corridors. In the 
RPG3A, the background of view corridors was protected similarly to the foreground: 
proposed buildings could not be higher than the threshold defined through the view 
corridors so as not to block the visibility of the monuments of St Paul's Cathedral and 
the Palace of Westminster (GOL 1998). In addition, the PPG15 national policy requires 
preserving or enhancing views into or from within a conservation area outwards 
(Department of the Environment 1994). Development projects likely to raise issues of 
significant controversy are subject to being called in by the Secretary of State for his or 
her own determination (ibid.). In contrast to this, the 2005 draft LVMF proposed the 
introduction of a Backdrop Advisory Line (BDAL) that would allow some development 
to be permitted in the backdrop of view corridors.27 Paragraph 74 of the 2005 draft 
LVMF states: 
 
                                                 
27 Appendix 11 contains an explanation of the geometric aspects of view corridors. The content of this 
appendix is taken from the revised 2010 London View Management Framework (GLA 2010a). 
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The Mayor will only support developments that exceed the Backdrop Advisory 
Line [BDAL] in truly exceptional circumstances and where significant 
additional benefits to the environment and the quality of the viewing experience 
can be demonstrated by the applicant. […] The Mayor may accept the 
introduction of an unprecedented backdrop to a particular view of a primary 
landmark rising above the Backdrop Advisory Line, when it can be 
demonstrated that such backdrop preserves or enhances the ability of the viewer 
to recognise and appreciate the landmark, in all weather conditions, when 
compared to the existing backdrop.  
(GLA 2005a: 25). 
 
The policy making process of the 2005 draft LVMF was started after a public inquiry 
had been held to determine the appropriateness of the London Bridge Tower in 2003 
(commonly referred to as the Shard) (6 in map 7) (PINS 2003). Critically, this proposed 
tall building would appear highly visible in the backdrop of the protected view corridor 
from Kenwood towards St. Paul's Cathedral (V4 in map 7) (ibid.). Richard Coleman, the 
second expert writing the 2005 draft LVMF, was the townscape consultant for this 
project. He wrote the townscape assessment on behalf of the developer, evaluating the 
visual impact of the London Bridge Tower on heritage assets, such as St. Paul's 
Cathedral in this case. Therefore, Coleman's job as part of the developer's design team 
was to argue in support of the proposal. The argument was made in the public inquiry in 
2003 that the London Bridge Tower would enhance the backdrop of this view because 
of the quality of the architecture (ibid.).  
 
The proposed method for the assessment of the backdrop of view corridors is tested 
next against the perception of John Hare who was employed by the GLA to co-write the 
2005 draft LVMF with Richard Coleman. Hare’s expertise is in the geometric aspects of 
visual assessment while Coleman is an expert in the wording of management plans. In 
an interview, Hare retrospectively analysed the content of paragraph 74.  
 
Truly exceptional circumstances: that is an important one. […] And they argued 
in the AVRs of the Shard of Glass [London Bridge Tower] that that was 
providing a better or more appropriate backdrop than this one. So paragraph 74 
was to allow them [… to] define whatever the mayor meant by truly exceptional. 
They could support this. […] We believe that generally a clear backdrop was the 
best thing you could do for a monument. […] They kept saying: There will be an 
architect who could define this, who would be good enough to define this. 
 
Hare stated that the wording and rationale of paragraph 74 was derived from the 
evidence presented during the London Bridge Tower public inquiry. Furthermore, he 
argued that the defined goal was  to allow for interpretative freedom in decision making 
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by the mayor and the GLA, so that they could determine how the paragraph was to be 
interpreted. The argumentative logic which can be put forward by the design team of the 
project was explained by John Hare. If an architect was chosen whose architecture 
would be of such high quality that his or her building would provide for a backdrop 
better than clear sky does, then this would constitute a case of exceptional 
circumstances and then one would be able to conclude that the building preserves and 
enhances the view. The internationally acclaimed architect, Renzo Piano, was finally 
chosen as the architect. Therefore, the London Bridge Tower served as a precedent case 
within which the meaning of exceptional circumstances was defined in a public inquiry 
in 2003, prior to the writing of the 2005 draft LVMF.  
 
The brief provided by the GLA to the consultants developing the 2005 draft LVMF 
states that there is 'no automatic requirement for clear skyline backdrops to landmarks', 
referring to the London Bridge Tower public inquiry decision, and 'there is no automatic 
requirement for clear sky lateral setting areas, nor is there a requirement to preserve St. 
Paul's, referring to the Heron Tower public inquiry decision (GLA 2004c: 4). 
Furthermore, the brief points out the results of a LVMF focus group which convened 
from October to December 2003 (ibid.). This group concluded that no geometric view 
corridors should be produced for river prospects and, importantly, that new tall 
buildings should be assessed based on their visual quality without automatic 
presumptions against such development (ibid.). Due to these statements, it can be 
concluded that the GLA required consultants to shape the LVMF in a way that 
incorporated the London Bridge Tower public inquiry decision, so that further tall 
building proposals appearing in backdrop areas of geometrically protected view 
corridors might be granted planning permission on the same grounds. As a result, 
heritage groups would not be able to argue against tall building proposals in backdrop 
areas that are tested using the same rationale as in the London Bridge Tower case.  
 
Markham argues that the London Plan policy, which states that planning permission 
will 'normally' be refused in the backdrop of view corridors, allows for exceptions 
(Markham 2008: 282). Taking the London Bridge Tower public inquiry as an example, 
she argues that in the backdrop of views, qualitative management has been introduced 
through the LVMF, the wording of which allows for the reasoning that tall buildings 
can enhance the backdrop (ibid.). Markham recognises that both the London Plan and 
the LVMF were shaped so that more tall buildings could be granted planning 
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permission, in this case in the backdrop of view corridors. This aspect is not 
problematic per se. The production of regional policy and guidance is the statutory 
remit given to the GLA through the 1999 Greater London Authority Act (OPSI 1999). 
Therefore, it is the legal right of the regional planning authority to define the values 
based on which decisions are made regionally. In this case, the GLA values high quality 
tall buildings and planning gains where heritage assets are not harmed.  
 
The problematic aspect is the impact of implementation processes on policy making. 
The implementation process of the London Bridge Tower has produced reasoning that 
later became a part of the contents of the 2005 draft LVMF. Thus, the implementation 
processes partly determined policy contents. Indeed, planning law (the 1990 and 1991 
planning acts) requires policy to emerge from policy proposals and public debate within 
consultation and examination processes (OPSI 1990a; OPSI 1991). The policy contents 
which determine the proof for appropriateness of development to be produced by the 
design team need to be developed first. Then the arguments can be discussed amongst 
policy makers and interest groups. Finally, proposed policy is evaluated by an 
Examination in Public (EiP). Only after this process may policy and guidance be used to 
determine planning decisions in implementation procedures.  
 
This issue has been debated at a public inquiry. The Historic Royal Palaces argued that 
the granting of planning permission to the London Bridge Tower would 'be bound to 
preempt consideration of the emerging policies and predetermine the outcome of the 
plan process' (PINS 2003: 131). The planning inspector disagreed as each case has to be 
treated on its merits and another proposal that would not meet the high standards and 
cause harm would not be granted permission (ibid.). In light of how the London Bridge 
Tower case impacted on the emerging LVMF, it can be argued with hindsight, that the 
planning inspector might have underestimated the impact of the case on emerging 
policy. The current concept of prematurity—used in the planning system to describe the 
granting of planning permission that can not be satisfactorily decided based on existing 
policy and that would therefore predetermine the meaning of emerging policy—is not 
sufficient for dealing with tall building cases. In tall building cases, the impact of 
precedent cases is also a visual one. The merits of a case against a proposed tall building 
are severely weakened when an already consented tall building will be visible in the 
same view. This issue is discussed in detail in chapter 6 which examines the joint No.1 
and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry. It is shown therein how consented precedent 
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cases visible in the St James's Park view affected the reasoning of the planning 
inspector.  
 
The fact that the expert authors of the 2005 draft LVMF were private consultants 
involved in the most significant tall building project in central London raises questions 
of potential conflicts of interest when considering the Nolan Report requirements. 
Coleman and Hare were involved in the London Bridge Tower as well as other tall 
building projects.28 The involvement of the policy writers of the 2005 draft LVMF in 
tall building projects might suggest that the pro tall building stance in the LVMF was 
based on the interests of those experts. This hypothesis is not valid. Ken Livingstone 
and the GLA had supported the London Bridge Tower and indeed all tall building 
developments in central London since the GLA was established (GLA 2001a; b).  
 
Another hypothesis could be that there was a conflict of interest since the London 
Bridge Tower project could have been perceived by interested parties as lacking 
legitimacy if the draft 2005 LVMF had not changed the rules for assessment in the 
backdrop of view corridors. This hypothesis is unreasonable as well.  The project had 
already achieved planning permission in 2003 based on the policy available then. A 
project that has achieved planning consent cannot be challenged based on policy that 
emerges after the fact. Section 77 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act 
determines that decisions of the Secretary of State after a public inquiry are final (OPSI 
1990a). Furthermore, Coleman and Hare wrote the contents of the 2005 draft LVMF but 
their work was scrutinised by planning officers at the GLA who were responsible for 
editing the document. This aspect has been confirmed in interviews with John Hare and 
GLA planning officers. 
 
The hypothesis that appears most plausible is that these particular experts were 
employed by the GLA because, due to their experience with the important London 
Bridge Tower case and their experience in townscape assessments and the visualisation 
of tall buildings, they were able to produce the policy contents that allowed the GLA to 
support the specific tall building projects in the planning pipeline. Coleman had 
developed the arguments based on which the Secretary of State John Prescott chose to 
support the London Bridge Tower following the public inquiry in 2003 (PINS 2003; 
                                                 
28 As demonstrated in appendix 2, Coleman was the townscape consultant for 30 St Mary Axe, Potters 
Fields, Victoria Transport Interchange, 20 Blackfriars Road and the Castle House Redevelopment.   
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ODPM 2003). The London Bridge Tower set an important precedent for the 
acceptability of the visibility of tall buildings in the backdrop of view corridors 
provided they were of the highest architectural quality. It is plausible, therefore, that 
Coleman would have been the best expert to write the LVMF so that the supportive 
arguments became enshrined in the emerging LVMF. This hypothesis is supported by 
Coleman's decision to resign from the Heron Tower project, something which added to 
his credibility amongst heritage groups opposing this project.  
 
Expert consultants have a contract with private developers. They support the project 
because this is what they are supposed to do due to their contract with the developer. 
However, consultants may also withdraw from projects if they reach the opinion that 
impacts may result that are not acceptable. As has also been argued by another 
townscape consultant, Peter Stewart, in an interview, these are issues of credibility. 
Townscape consultants are part of the developers' design team. They advise the 
architect—and therefore the developer—on what is acceptable in terms of scale and 
massing from the outset. Furthermore, they are the key consultants presenting planning 
application documents to CABE and English Heritage with regard to the architectural 
quality and visual impact. A townscape consultant may resign from a project if he or 
she thinks that their support could damage their credibility in the tall building expert 
community. Such an instance may occur if his advice has not been needed and if the 
quality of the project is poor. In summary, the GLA decision to involve Coleman in the 
LVMF process provided a basis for successful conflict resolution since he was able to 
incorporate the supportive stance of the GLA towards tall buildings and had also 
achieved credibility amongst heritage groups.  
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Map 7: The view corridors of the draft London View Management Framework from 2005 in 
relation to the tall building projects proposed. This drawing is based on the map provided in the draft 
2005 LVMF (GLA 2005a: 202, 203). Source: Author 
 
The BDAL would have been applicable in the light grey areas, the backdrop, which are the areas of a 
viewing corridor behind the monument. The dark grey signi fies the foreground in which development is 
strictly unacceptabl e. Tall building schemes with planning permission are shown in blue. Red signifies 
projects that were in the middle of the planning process at the time of the publication of the 2005 draft  
LVMF. 
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Key to map 7 
 
Monuments protected via view corridors 
M1 Palace of Westminster 
M2 St. Paul's Cathedral 
M3 Tower of London 
 
The view corridors proposed in the 2005 draft LVMF 
V1 Alexandra Palace towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V2 Parliament Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V3 Parliament Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V4  Kenwood to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V5 Primrose Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V6 Primrose Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V7 Greenwich Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V8 Blackheath Point to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V9 Richmond Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V10 Westminster Pier to St. Paul's Cathedral 
 
V11 City Hall towards Tower of London 
V12 London Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V13 Southwark Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V14 Millennium Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V15 Waterloo Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V16   Waterloo Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V17 Southbank: close to Gabriel's Wharf towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V18 Hungerford Footbridges towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V19 Hungerford Footbridges towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V20 Albert Embankment towards the Palace of Westminster 
V21 Lambeth Bridge towards the Palace of Westminster 
V22 The Mall towards Buckingham Palace 
V23 Serpentine Bridge (Hyde Park) towards the Palace of Westminster 
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3.2 Management of protected vistas by geometric definition 
 
This section focuses on the finalised version of the London View Management 
Framework: The London Plan Supplementary Planning Guidance, published in 2007, 
and the method for the assessment of projects visible in the backdrop of view corridors 
(GLA 2007b). As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the assessment of tall 
buildings in the backdrop of geometrically protected view corridors was of significance, 
because projects that set precedents were in the midst of the planning process and 
influenced the decision-making. Following the publication of the 2005 draft LVMF, the 
GLA conducted a consultation process to allow interest groups to raise issues and make 
recommendations for amendments. It is evaluated how effective conflict resolution was 
within the LVMF policy process. The discussion includes the reactions to the emerging 
LVMF from heritage groups and private developers. It is argued that the experts writing 
the LVMF learned from previous implementation processes and from consultation 
replies regarding the 2005 draft LVMF, the policy contents of which they needed to 
advance in the 2007 LVMF so that disputes based on heritage values were minimised.  
 
View corridor backdrop assessment in the 2007 LVMF 
The 2005 draft LVMF retained the ten view corridors of the RPG3A but reduced their 
width (see map 7 in the previous section) (GLA 2005a). The impact of the reduction in 
width on tall building development was evaluated by the consultancy, DEGW, in 2002. 
It showed in a report commissioned by the GLA that a significant amount of land would 
become available in the City of London if view corridors towards St Paul's Cathedral 
were reduced in width (DEGW 2002).29 Furthermore, DEGW recommended that the 
view corridor from Richmond Park towards St Paul's be removed based on the argument 
that St Paul's Cathedral is too far away to be properly identified (ibid.). In addition 
within the consultation process regarding the draft London Plan in 2002, the developer, 
Legal & General, lobbied strongly for the reduction of view corridors (Richardson and 
Simpson 2003). However, there were also increases in the protection of heritage assets. 
Thirteen view corridors along the River Thames towards nationally and internationally 
significant buildings—St Paul’s Cathedral,  the Palace of Westminster and the Tower of 
London—were introduced (GLA 2005a). In the consultation process regarding the 2005 
draft LVMF, English Heritage's LAC stated that they welcomed the introduction of 
                                                 
29 Appendix 12 includes a drawing that shows the effects of reducing view corridors towards St Paul's 
Cathedral.  
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geometric protection of additional views (LAC 2005b). The 2005 draft LVMF proposed 
to protect twenty-three views geometrically as opposed to the ten strategic views 
protected via the RPG3A (GLA 2005a). These views are V11 to V23 in map 7.  
 
However, policy analysis of the LAC yielded that the Heron Tower (2 in map 7), which 
had been granted planning consent after a public inquiry in 2002 but was to be 
resubmitted in a taller version, would exceed the Backdrop Advisory Line (BDAL) in 
the view from Waterloo Bridge towards St Paul's Cathedral (LAC 2005a). The LAC 
therefore demanded clarification from the mayor of how 'exceptional circumstances' 
would be interpreted when granting planning consent to a proposal that exceeded the 
BDAL (ibid.: 10). The Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks argued 
that the wording of paragraph 74 would allow the granting of planning permission to 
tall building proposals exceeding the BDAL (WCC 2005; Colvin and Moggridge 2005). 
The Royal Parks identified proposed tall building developments at Bishopsgate 
Goodsyard (i.e.: the Broadgate Tower 16 in map 7), the site of which would lie only 
partly in the backdrop of the view corridor from Richmond Park (V 10) proposed by the 
2005 draft LVMF but would have been fully within the view corridor of the RPG3A 
(ibid.). Heritage groups' criticism of the proposed BDAL method was geared towards 
challenging the expected granting of planning permission in precedent cases.  
 
Another important change proposed by the 2005 draft LVMF was the introduction of 
geometrically protected views along the River Thames (GLA 2005a). On the one hand, 
heritage groups stated in consultation that they were content with the introduction of 
additional geometric protection of river views (LAC 2005b; Colvin and Moggridge 
2005; WCC 2005). On the other hand, developers perceived the additional view 
corridors as an increase in constraints on their projects, as is evident in the GLA 
summary of consultation responses (GLA 2005b). For example, the Heron Corporation, 
developer of the precedent case of the Heron Tower, submitted a planning application 
amending the scheme for which it had received planning permission via public inquiry 
in 2002, with it now proposing a tower of 242 metres, 20 metres taller than the 222 
metres of the consented one (GLA 2005d).  
 
The introduction of additional views would have put the consented Heron Tower (2) 
into the view corridor from Waterloo Bridge towards St. Paul's Cathedral proposed to 
be introduced in the 2005 draft LVMF (V15 in map 7). According to the LVMF, the 
 113 
local borough that is able to oppose a proposed tall building within the consultation 
phase is that borough from within which a protected view originates (GLA 2005a). 
Critically, the assessment point from which the view from Waterloo Bridge can be 
experienced lies within the borough boundaries of the City of Westminster and, as had 
been mentioned in the WCC consultation response, Westminster planning officers were 
likely to object to the project based on the 2005 draft LVMF (WCC 2005). Therefore, 
the developer, Heron Plc, and the GLA had to assume that the WCC, the Royal Parks, 
the Historic Royal Palaces and English Heritage would object and potentially request a 
call-in by the Secretary of State and a public inquiry. According to the interview with 
John Hare, the introduction of the geometrically protected river view corridors into the 
LVMF was perceived as an unwanted additional constraint by senior GLA planning 
officers, such as Colin Wilson, as well as the mayor. This perception of the 2005 draft 
LVMF within the GLA, Hare argued at interview, resulted in him and Coleman not 
being employed to produce the final version of the LVMF. Therefore, the experts, Hare 
and Coleman, suffered a loss of confidence by developers and the GLA through their 
roles as the writers of the LVMF and by seeking to compromise with heritage groups.  
 
In late 2005, the GLA issued a new brief setting out the requirements for the production 
of the final version of the LVMF (GLA 2005c). Key amendments included the 
restriction of the geometric management to the ten views previously protected via the 
RPG3A, only leaving river views protected via the Qualitative Visual Assessment 
(QVA). The GLA also demanded that the geometries of protected views be amended 
(ibid.). The consultation responses to the 2005 draft LVMF should be taken into account 
in the amendments working towards the finalised LVMF (ibid.). The criticism from 
developers of the additional geometric management through view corridors along the 
River Thames was taken into account by the drafters of the 2007 LVMF. As can be seen 
on map 8, the geometrically protected view corridors along the River Thames were 
taken out.30 Furthermore, the finalised 2007 LVMF introduced new wording for the 
regulation of the background of view corridors that sought to further increase the power 
of the mayor and others supporting tall building development:  
 
Applicants whose proposals would exceed the threshold planes defined for any 
LBAA [Landmark Background Assessment Area] or LLAA [Landmark Lateral 
Assessment Area] will be required to show the cumulative effect of their 
                                                 
30 The second draft LVMF, published in January 2007, also proposed not to geometrically protect the 
view towards the Tower of London from City Hall (GLA 2007a). This issue is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5 in relation to the impact of the UNESCO involvement in policy making. 
 114 
proposed development on affected views taken together with previously 
consented developments. Developments will normally be refused when their 
combined effects, when read together with other consented developments, would 
fail to preserve or enhance the ability to recognise and appreciate the 
strategically important landmark, or would create a canyon effect (GLA 2007 b: 
42, 43).31  
 
This paragraph 4.27 in the LVMF gives the power to interpret positive and negative 
visual effects of proposed developments to the mayor and private townscape consultants 
working for developers. The first sentence of paragraph 4.27 determines that precedent 
cases which have been granted planning permission need to be taken into account in 
terms of their visibility. This resembles the consistency principle of the national 
planning system: that planning decisions need to be consistent with previous planning 
decisions (ODPM 2005a). However, it extends the consistency principle by adding the 
visibility of a tall building, cumulatively in relation to the visibility of precedent cases, 
as an additional material consideration when determining the visual impact of a tall 
building project. This would have made it almost impossible for heritage groups to 
argue that the visibility of a new proposal would result in unacceptable harm because 
once a precedent is visible in a protected view then the key value of a view which is a 
clear sky background has already been altered.  
 
The most significant change to a view which currently has a clear sky background 
results from the first tall building case that is visible in this background. As a result, the 
precedent case allows developers of future tall buildings visible in the same view to 
argue that their projects have similar visual impact and, thus, heritage groups' 
opposition is severely weakened. Importantly, the decision regarding a consented tall 
building becomes a material consideration for further tall building cases  (ibid.).  
Furthermore, the visibility of a precedent case also becomes a material consideration 
due to paragraph 4.27 of the 2007 LVMF. The terminology in this 2007 LVMF 
paragraph that refers to the ability to recognise and appreciate the landmark does 
provide some definition of the key terms of enhancement and preservation. It limits 
harm to proposals that would obscure or partly obscure a landmark or monument. Using  
paragraph 4.27 for assessment, it is unclear whether a building that does not obscure a 
landmark should be regarded as harmful. If a proposal which lies in the background is 
                                                 
31 LBAA (Landmark Background Assessment Area) is the area beyond the landmark or monument in a 
viewing corridor. LLAA (Landmark Lateral Assessment Area) are the areas to either side of the viewing 
corridor (GLA 2007b).  
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itself obscured by the monument, then this paragraph would allow the proposal to be 
granted planning consent.  
 
The 2007 LVMF – conflict resolution or marginalisation? 
To begin with, the level of inclusion in the consultation process on the 2005 draft 
LVMF was very high. Stakeholders from public and private sectors as well as further 
interest groups were invited to comment in the consultation process (GLA 2005b). In 
addition, the consultants writing the 2005 draft LVMF had interviewed a large number 
of stakeholders including heritage groups as required by the GLA brief (GLA 2004c). 
There was an attempt to resolve the conflicts at hand between supporters and opponents 
of tall buildings. However, following the consultation process regarding the 2005 draft 
LVMF, the GLA realised that taking into account heritage groups concerns would 
restrict their ability to grant planning permission to tall building projects. In particular, 
the introduction of additional geometrically protected view corridors would allow 
heritage groups to construct strong arguments against precedent cases. As is evident in 
the consultation response submitted by the LAC, the WCC and the Royal Parks, 
heritage groups were aware of specific tall building proposals that were in the midst of 
the implementation process and that would have had a greater chance of success if the 
viewing corridors where reduced in width and the policy wording allowed development 
in the background (LAC 2005b; Colvin and Moggridge 2005; WCC 2005). 
Consequently, the exchange of arguments within this consultation process focussed on 
exactly these aspects of the emerging LVMF that removed tall building constraints in 
areas in which the RPG3A would otherwise have restricted development. These were 
background areas and strips released by the reduction of view corridors. In addition, it 
must be noted that the Heron Tower and Broadgate Tower proposals became another 
focus in the consultation process because their planning processes (they had been 
consented already but were being redesigned) were immediately affected by the 
emerging LVMF. 
 
Following the criticism by developers and taking into account that support for tall 
building projects had already been indicated in pre-application discussions, partly 
known publicly through published Stage 1 letters, the GLA decided that all of the 
concessions made to heritage groups in the 2005 draft LVMF would be withdrawn: this 
is evident in the brief for the 2007 LVMF (GLA 2005c). The criticism made by heritage 
groups within the consultation process prompted the need for the expert consultants 
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writing the LVMF to adopt the background regulations so that the GLA could grant 
permission, and heritage groups would no longer be able to construct strong arguments 
against tall buildings in the background of geometrically protected view corridors based 
on the LVMF. Planning law states that the responses from the consultation should lead 
to policy amendments that take into account the criticism in order to maximise 
consensus and avoid negative impacts on the interests of stakeholders (OPSI 1990a). In 
the case of geometrically protected views and the method for backdrop assessment, the 
conflict was not being resolved here.  
 
However, an additional result of the policy making process of the LVMF was that 
heritage groups felt that they had no reasoned basis on which to protect London's 
heritage assets. In relation to World Heritage Sites UNESCO became involved as a 
result of these concerns (DCMS 2007a).32 The involvement of UNESCO led to political 
turmoil at central government level, and resulted in the re-introduction of a view 
corridor from City Hall towards the Tower of London limiting developments in its 
setting (V 11 in map 8). Although No.1 Blackfriars Road and other tall building projects 
proposed in northern Southwark and Lambeth were not located within geometrically 
protected view corridors, the failure to resolve conflicts with heritage groups threatened 
their success. No.1 Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House were 
mentioned as potential threats to London's WHSs (ibid.). Therefore, even though 
supporters of tall buildings were effective in obtaining policy guidance that assisted 
their cause, their actions led to an increase in conflicts with heritage groups with high 
level political consequences. Conflicting interests should of course be resolved through 
the national planning system, and an external arbiter such as UNESCO should not have 
to intervene. It can be concluded that the LVMF policy making process was very 
ineffective in terms of conflict resolution. The experts writing the LVMF followed GLA 
directions which alienated and marginalised heritage groups by incrementally reducing 
the validity of heritage-based arguments in the LVMF.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 The UNESCO interference and its impact on policy making and implementation processes are 
discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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Map 8: The view corridors of the finalised 2007 London View Management Framework in relation 
to tall building projects proposed. The drawing is based on the map contained in the 2007 LVMF (GLA 
2007b: A7). Source: Author 
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Key to map 8 
 
Monuments protected via view corridors 
M1 Palace of Westminster 
M2 St. Paul's Cathedral 
M3 Tower of London 
 
The view corridors proposed in the 2007 LVMF 
V1 Alexandra Palace towards St. Paul's Cathedral 
V2 Parliament Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V3 Parliament Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V4  Kenwood to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V5 Primrose Hill to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V6 Primrose Hill to the Palace of Westminster 
V7 Greenwich Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V8 Blackheath Point to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V9 Richmond Park to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V10 Westminster Pier to St. Paul's Cathedral 
V11 City Hall towards the Tower of London 
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3.3 Qualitative Visual Assessment (QVA) methodology 
 
This section analyses the methodology of the Qualitative Visual Assessment (QVA) 
which is the second type of view assessment advocated by the LVMF. In contrast to 
geometric management which determines height thresholds within view corridors, a 
QVA focuses on the use of photomontages (called Accurate Visual Representations – 
AVRs) which are evaluated based on qualitative criteria. The production and use of 
Accurate Visual Representations (AVRs) within townscape assessments is discussed in 
relation to the AVR specifications defined in the LVMF (GLA 2007b). Furthermore, the 
roles of townscape consultants and visualisation experts employed by the developer to 
produce townscape assessments are explained. The QVA methodology is evaluated 
against criticism raised by academics who challenged: i) the degree of objectivity of the 
AVR production (Day 2002); ii) the poor representation of human visual perception 
(Bosselmann 1998; Brooks 1999; Malkawi and Augenbroe 2004); and, iii) the focus on 
certain viewpoints at the expense of others, perhaps equally important (Tavernor and 
Gassner 2010). Additional concerns regarding economic issues related to the production 
of AVRs and townscape assessments are evaluated.  
 
The QVA method and AVRs 
As with the geometric management of visual impacts, the Qualitative Visual 
Assessment (QVA) method is defined in the LVMF. As has been determined, a 
development proposal that either blocks or unacceptably imposes visually on 
strategically important landmarks is inappropriate and will not be granted planning 
permission (GLA 2007b). A QVA is used to assess the visual impact of development 
proposals on views designated in the LVMF.33 In terms of the practical application of a 
QVA, a townscape consultant employed by the developer has to use his or her objective 
judgement to determine the degree of visual impact. In order to do this, they cooperate 
with a specialised visualisation company which produces photomontages that show a 
photograph of the view as existing, and a computer-produced three-dimensional 
visualisation of the proposed tall building accurately inserted into this photograph as 
either wireline or rendered image. Wireline images, which accurately show the location, 
form and height of a tall building, are limited to line drawings (see image 3; AVR1). 
                                                 
33 In addition to the ten views protected geometrically, the LVMF designates thirteen river prospects and 
four townscape views (GLA 2007b). All of these views need to be assessed using a QVA (ibid). 
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The technical aspects of producing AVRs are shown in more detail in appendices 17 to 
23 of the 2007 LVMF (ibid.). These technical aspects range from the type of camera 
lens to the step-by-step process to be followed in inserting the visualisation of the 
proposed development. The visualiser has to determine the visual effects of façades 
based on existing projects. The visual façade effects then have to be accurately 
represented using a range of visualisation techniques (ibid.). Image 3 shows the 
different stages of representation used in AVRs.  
 
Typically, the townscape consultant chooses through the scoping process, with the LPA 
responsible a representative range of views on which a proposed project could 
potentially have a visual impact (ibid.) and written evaluations are produced for these 
(Tavernor 2007a). For example, the townscape assessment produced AVRs and 
assessments of fifty views for the No.1 Blackfriars Road project (Tavernor 2006a). As 
can be seen in image 2, the visualisation experts have drawn the outlines (so called 
wireline images) of tall building projects that have been granted planning consent and 
will be visible in the view. The top of No.1 Blackfriars Road (2 in image 2) is located 
centrally in the middle of the AVR. The three-dimensional representation of the project 
shown in the AVR attempts to represent the visual façade effects of a glass façade 
which reflects sunlight differently on each part of the curved surface. The exact location 
of the project in relation to the photographic view is determined by using a 
computerised three-dimensional model of central London which takes into account the 
curvature of the Earth. Over the course of a project, the townscape consultant will 
present AVRs during the consultation processes, which are finalised for the planning 
application submission and, subsequently again, for the purpose of a public inquiry 
should this take place.34 The production of AVRs and townscape assessments using 
QVA is a lengthy and very expensive process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In the case of No.1 Blackfriars Road, a full townscape assessment was produced in 2005, 2006 and 
2007. For the public inquiry in 2008, additional townscape assessments were produced which assessed 
the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road cumulatively, also representing the 20 Blackfri ars Road 
project.  
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Image 2: Example of an AVR taken from the townscape assessment of the No.1 Blackfriars Road 
project from October 2006. Black wireline drawings show the consented tall building projects. Source: 
Tavernor 2006a: 53; © Cityscape3D 
 
 
Image 3: Appendix 21 from the 2007 LVMF explaining the different levels of accuracy of AVRs. 
Source: GLA 2007b: A21; © Greater London Authority, Miller Hare, Hayes Davidson  
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Key to image 2 
1  Bishopsgate Tower  
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road  
4 King's Reach Tower Redevelopment 
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The issue of realism in qualitative view management and technical issues 
A number of interviewees involved in the Qualitative Visual Assessments of tall 
buildings via the LVMF QVA method have argued that the photomontages used to 
represent the visual impacts of proposed buildings do not conform to human perception. 
The concerns presented by Paddy Pugh, a leading officer and director of English 
Heritage's London Advisory Committee (LAC), are typical of such criticism: 
 
There is a real issue about how far something like this accurately portrays what a 
building will look like. You take a building like this [No.1 Blackfriars Road] and 
you actually go and stand on the bridge in St James's Park. That group of 
buildings is much more immediate, is much more prominent than it is shown in 
that photograph. Technically it has something to do with the fact that a 
photograph is two-dimensional and what you [actually] see is three-dimensional 
[…] you can't appreciate the depth of field. The whole thing becomes much 
more recessive. But, when you stand at the bridge in St James's Park, then that 
[the existing Foreign Office building] is much more prominent than it is shown 
in this photograph. Then, what you start to do is undermine the credibility of this 
image.  
 
A central argument made by Pugh is that because AVRs do not accurately represent 
human visual perception, the credibility of AVRs should be challenged. Academics 
have also criticised the lack of realism of still images and provided some alternatives to 
overcome the problems. Day (2002) has suggested that 3D modelling should be 
included in the London approach to visual analysis. Tavernor (2007a) extends this 
argument by suggesting that, since cities are experienced kinetically, moving images 
might be developed for use in future assessments. Indeed, a video sequence was 
produced by the leading visualisation firm, Hayes Davidson, one of the pioneering firms 
for Accurate Visual Representations, in relation to the Heron Tower public inquiry 
(PINS 2002a).  
 
Furthermore, in studies at the University of California at Berkeley it has been noted that 
photographs do not match the human visual field (Bosselmann 1998). Of particular  
relevance is Bosselmann's critique that the human eye perceives what it focuses on 
(represented in the AVRs) including peripheral vision (the field of vision on either side 
of the AVRs which is not included in the photos). Bosselmann reports that at UC 
Berkeley they aimed to develop a procedure for recording exactly what a person would 
see while driving, thus being in motion. It had been concluded that neither photographs 
nor cameras match the visual field of a person (ibid.). 'Any framed view, still or in  
motion, eliminates information available to peripheral vision that might draw attention 
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to right or left' (ibid.: 93). Without peripheral vision, people lose their sense of speed 
and are limited in their ability to orient themselves due to the visual absence of objects 
placed in the periphery of their view. Furthermore, seeing the world through the lens of 
a camera is like seeing with one eye. This property of photographs is referred to as 
monocular vision (ibid.).  It is this aspect of AVRs that Pugh refers to as a lack of depth 
of field in his consideration of the photograph of the St James’s Park view.  
 
This discussion suggests that viewing experiences that do not involve peripheral vision, 
such as AVRs, do not match human visual perception since they do not include 
peripheral vision. Bosselmann's critique is along the lines of Paddy Pugh's argument, 
drawing attention to visual misrepresentation through the use of two-dimensional 
images. Furthermore, since the real world is not completely blocked out when a person 
looks at an image, it is argued that the viewer of the image is not fully immersed with 
all their human senses (Malkawi and Augenbroe 2004; Brooks 1999). It has been 
proposed that the technology of Augmented Reality (AR) could be used to overcome 
some of the limitations resulting from a lack of immersion.35 Using AR technology, a 
person wears headgear which allows combining a visual experience of the existing 
environment with computer generated three-dimensional models (Azuma 1997). In 
addition, it has recently been demonstrated that the gaps between tall buildings  differ 
significantly when the viewpoints from which views are experienced are varied 
(Tavernor and Gassner 2010). The problem of a lack of realism is recognised by 
practitioners as well as  academics and solutions are being recommended. However, 
AVRs have to be used despite criticism since these are advocated by the LVMF.  
 
In addition to these technical limitations on QVAs, there is also an inherent 
disadvantage which relates to the cost of producing AVRs and townscape assessments. 
During the course of designing and planning for a tall building project, AVRs are 
                                                 
35 The purpose of Augmented Reality technology is to combine real and virtual objects in 3D space. The 
basic properties of AR systems are: i) blending real and virtual in a real environment; ii) real time 
interactive; and, iii) registered in 3D (Azuma 1997). Augmented Reality as a field of research has existed 
since the late 1980s, early 1990s (Azuma et al 2001). Since the person using AR technology is visually 
aware of the technology there is still a problem with representing human visual perception. Weiser stated 
that machines should fit the human environment rather than forcing humans to enter the environment that 
is created by machines. He extends this argument stating, 'we believe that people live through their 
practices and tacit knowledge so that the most powerful things are those that are effectively invisible in 
use' (Weiser 1994). Abwod et al defined some areas of research seeking to overcome the problems 
perceived with AR. The everyday practices of people must be understood and supported, the world must 
be augmented through the provisioning of heterogeneous devices offering different forms of interactive 
experience, and the networked devices must be orchestrated to provide for a holistic user experience 
(Abwod et al 2002: 48). 
 125 
produced consecutively throughout a process that may last for several years. Appendix 
8 shows that the planning processes for No.1 Blackfriars Road lasted for almost five 
years. During this process, a townscape assessment with updated AVRs had to be 
submitted for each of the three planning applications (Ian Simpson Architects 2008). As 
part of the design process of a tall building, the townscape consultant uses AVRs to 
advise the design team, and the architect in particular, with regard to potential design 
improvements in relation to the scale and mass of the evolving design – which is at the 
root of townscape. Thereby, the townscape consultant and visualisation specialist are 
required to test the visual impact of a design as part of an intensive process.  
 
Heritage groups on the other hand are less likely to produce AVRs themselves and tend 
to be reliant on what they are presented with. First, they are very expensive and English 
Heritage and other heritage groups are unlikely to have access to an accurate computer 
model of the proposed scheme. These data are owned by the developer who has no 
reason to share them with heritage groups who may oppose the project in the future. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for English Heritage both with regard to its financial 
resources and in terms of the time available to respond to every precedent case, let alone 
every tall building project, that is likely to have a marked visual impact on heritage 
assets. Tavernor has argued that a publicly accessible tool for assessment would provide 
for a more democratic planning process for tall buildings (Tavernor 2007a). If 
independent experts were to be employed as managers of such a publicly accessible 
tool, only then, I suggest, could this option overcome the current disadvantages. Little 
cost would be involved for the organisation undertaking an assessment. Currently, the 
QVA allows the private sector to advocate their interests very well, while other parties 
are at a severe disadvantage.  
 
Criticism that the visual information provided is misrepresentative and overly selective, 
is a fundamental concern (Bosselmann 1998; Day 2002). Peter Stewart, while the head 
of Design Review at CABE, argued that within visual impact assessments both the 
visualiser's images and the townscape consultant's words are used to try and persuade, 
or even mislead, a decision maker that a project does not cause visual harm, while it 
actually might appear harmful when seen from a different viewing angle (Stewart 
2003). In particular, the representation of façade materials involves a significant degree 
of subjective decision making by the visualisation company (Day 2002). Day further 
argued that the visualisation expert—a graphic artist—is naturally tempted to make the 
 126 
building look as good as possible to ensure further work (ibid.). Solving the problem of 
subjective representation is difficult. The architects want their design to look as good as 
possible, as does the visualisation company, and both are employed by the developer. 
These concerns are addressed to some extent by the methodological guidance set out in 
the LVMF, which defines appropriate camera lenses as well as the process by which the 
three-dimensional representations of tall buildings are included within AVRs (GLA 
2007a). Visualisers are required to use specified software to represent façade materials. 
The visual appearance of these is cross-checked against the visual appearance of 
existing buildings using the same materials. However, the visualisation company will 
still adjust the visual appearances of façades by eye under guidance or instruction by 
architects during the design process so that there remains a degree of artistic licence in 
the final representation.   
 
The only way by which subjectivity in QVAs could be removed is to enable all parties 
to produce AVRs using a comparable type of visualisation. The technology of 
augmented reality as discussed above could be suitable for this task. Objectors would 
have to be able to amend the visualisation so that the visualisations represent what they 
think of how the building will look like when finished. The discussion would then 
centre on issues of accuracy of the representation of façade materials. As it stands, from 
economic and practical points of view, the QVA method excludes heritage groups by 
leaving the developers and the design team in control of the process.  
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3.4 QVA background assessment: St James's Park towards 
Horse Guards Road townscape view 
 
This section focuses on the contents of the management plan of the townscape view 
from St James's Park towards Horse Guards Road. The management plan is a section of 
the LVMF that deals specifically with a view and which sets out guidelines for the 
assessment of visual impacts of tall buildings (GLA 2007b). It is considered how the 
experts writing the management plans of the St James's Park view in the 2005 draft 
LVMF (GLA 2005a) and the 2007 LVMF (GLA 2007b) sought to constrain the visual 
impact of tall buildings in the background of this view. Tall building proposals located 
in the northern parts of Southwark and Lambeth, as well as in the Eastern Cluster in the 
City of London have the potential to be visible in the St James's Park view. These 
projects were in the implementation process while the 2005 draft LVMF and 2007 
LVMF were being written. As a result, governmental agencies assessed the impacts of 
these projects on the St James's Park view prior to the publication of the LVMF. Experts 
who produced the 2005 and 2007 versions of the LVMF have also been employed by 
developers of these tall building projects. It is therefore of particular interest to examine 
what the impacts of implementation processes and the private experts were on the 
versions of the LVMF in 2005 and in 2007.   
 
Background assessment in the St James's Park view 
At paragraph 316 of the management plan in the 2005 draft LVMF, the text of which 
was written by Richard Coleman, the view is divided into three vertical zones, each of 
which constrains future development in a different manner.36 The rooftops of Whitehall 
Court and Horse Guards to the left are described as congruent with the sense of mystery 
and the picturesque (zone A in image 4) (GLA 2005a).37 The reasoning provided is that 
the pyramidal shaped rooftops of Whitehall Court and Horse Guards are similar in their 
form to the landscape elements of the surrounding trees  and Duck Island (ibid.).  
According to paragraph 320, new development must blend in with the existing form of 
trees and rooftops (ibid.). As can be seen in image 4, the Bishopsgate Tower proposal—
the Pinnacle—was designed to resemble the dynamic skyline form. English Heritage 
considered that the 2005 proposal for No.1 Blackfriars Road, also in zone A, would 
have been prominent and there was the threat that decision makers may conclude that 
                                                 
36 Appendices 13, 14 and 15 provide annotated versions of the St James's Park view. 
37 The complete text of the management plan of the St James's Park view contained in the 2005 draft 
LVMF can be found in appendix 16. 
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the proposal was therefore unacceptable. The Foreign Office with its rectangular 
geometry is described as providing a less dynamic skyline (zone B) (ibid.). 20 
Blackfriars Road as proposed in 2005 would have been a dominant visual element in 
zone B (Wilkinson Eyre Architects 2008). Therefore, the project might have been 
considered unacceptable if assessed against the wording contained in the management 
plan. To the far right, the Shell Centre, of which only a slither is visible and the London 
Eye are described as breaking the sense of mystery and picturesque quality due to their 
different scale and geometry (zone C) (GLA 2005a). Based on the rationale for 
assessment contained in the management plan, tall building development would have 
been acceptable in zone C and with restrictions in zone B.  
 
In consultation regarding the 2005 draft LVMF, the Royal Parks stated that they were 
willing to accept future development to the right (in zone C). The London Bridge Tower 
was not objected to because it does not appear visible 'from core areas or in views 
where it would cause harm' (Colvin and Moggridge 2005a: 1). A dotted line in image 4 
shows how the Royal Parks wanted the view to be geometrically protected. 
Development would have been acceptable below this dotted line, according to the Royal 
Parks. However, they argued that the visibility of new development is not acceptable 
behind Horse Guards (zone A) or Duck Island (zones A and B) (ibid.). Both the WCC 
and the Royal Parks demanded the geometric protection of the view which they 
considered to be the only acceptable mode of protection that guarantees that the clear 
sky space is not marred by new development (Colvin and Moggridge 2005a; WCC 
2005). The radical position that no development should be visible in the view is the 
same position that had been advocated by English Heritage, the WCC, the Royal Parks 
and the Prince's Foundation in the consultation process regarding the draft London Plan 
in 2003 (GLA 2003b).  
 
By the time the 2005 draft LVMF was published, assessment reports stating the 
conclusions of CABE and English Heritage were available in the public sphere and 
therefore proponents of tall buildings as well as heritage groups were aware that these 
tall building projects were proposed in the background of the St James's Park view. 
English Heritage assessed No.1 Blackfriars Road in December 2006. It concluded that 
both the 2005 planning application with a design 226 metres tall and the 2006 planning 
application at 178 metres were unacceptable when assessed with the 2005 draft LVMF 
because their form and scale were clearly recognisable and 'wholly different from the 
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spires and domes which comprise the existing group' (English Heritage 2006a: 2). 
Although No.1 Blackfriars Road was much further away than the existing historic 
buildings (approximately 2.5 kilometres), the project was assigned a similar visual 
presence in the view of English Heritage. In conclusion, English Heritage recommended 
that the LB Southwark refuse planning permission and if it did not do so, English 
Heritage would seek a call-in by the Secretary of State (ibid.).  
 
CABE reviewed No.1 Blackfriars Road in January 2007. Its Design Review Panel 
(DRP) concluded that its visibility in the St James's Park view was acceptable subject to 
the project being of the highest design quality (CABE 2007a). 20 Blackfriars Road in 
the two tower version as shown in image 5 and assessed in April 2007 was seen as 
'elegant additions to the skyline' (CABE 2007b: 4). 20 Blackfriars Road in its 2005 
planning application included a single tower solution which was criticised for its bulky 
mass within the CABE DRP (CABE 2005c). The design team, certainly considering the 
advice of Coleman, their townscape consultant, opted for a two tower solution as a 
result. The GLA Stage 2 report regarding No.1 Blackfriars from April 2007 takes into 
account the developments of Bishopsgate Tower, 122 Leadenhall Street and King's 
Reach as precedents for visibility. The GLA report concludes that No.1 Blackfriars 
Road would be of the highest architectural quality and the proposal would not dominate 
or overpower the view (GLA 2007e). Regarding 20 Blackfriars Road, the GLA Stage 2 
report from May 2007 concluded that because only a small part of the top is visible, the 
proposal is compatible with the scale of existing buildings and is acceptable (GLA 
2007d). The positive assessment results by the GLA and CABE are both based on 
conclusions regarding the quality of architecture and the visibility of precedent cases.  
 
Background assessment was amended in the 2007 LVMF. Paragraph 7 of the 2007 
LVMF St James's Park management plan divides the view into two parts, left and right 
of the centre (image 5).38 The Bishopsgate Tower which had been granted planning 
permission was not called in by Deputy Prime Minster John Prescott and therefore set a 
precedent for the visibility of a new development in zone A (GOL 2006). The proposed 
projects of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars (2, 3) and Doon Street Tower (5) were located in 
zone B of the view. Zone B to the right of centre includes buildings of rectangular 
geometry, such as the Foreign Office, the Shell Centre and the London Eye. Paragraph 7 
                                                 
38 The complete text of the management plan of the St James's Park view contained in the 2007 LVMF 
can be found in appendix 17. 
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also states that historic and modern buildings both appear in the background. 
Furthermore, the text suggests that because the modern buildings in zone B contribute 
positively to the view, further development could do the same. The King's Reach Tower 
Redevelopment, of which part of the top floor is visible as a horizontal slither, set 
another precedent for the visibility of a modern building in zone B, having been granted 
planning permission in July 2005 (LB Southwark 2005c). The new division of the view 
into two zones left and right of the centre of the view placed the design teams of the 
proposed projects of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road and Doon Street Tower in a better 
position to argue that both projects were acceptable visually since they are located in 
zone B, where modern architecture is already a visible part of the view's composition.  
 
Conflict resolution through the 2007 LVMF 
As has been demonstrated above, there was a significant conflict between supporters of 
tall buildings in the background of the St James's Park view and heritage groups. Thus, 
the effect that the 2005 draft LVMF and the 2007 LVMF had on the resolution of this 
conflict is important. The LVMF management plan regulating the assessment of the 
background of the St James's Park view was incrementally shaped so as to reduce 
constraints on tall building projects which were in the midst of the planning 
implementation processes. During the writing of the 2005 draft LVMF, the No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road and Bishopsgate Tower projects were assessed by governmental 
agencies.39 Thus, these projects and their potential visual impacts on the St James's Park 
view were well known to tall building experts. During the making of the 2007 LVMF, 
amendments to these projects and the King's Reach Redevelopment and Doon Street 
Tower were discussed and reports were publicly available.40 As the discussion on the 
division of the St James's Park townscape view into zones shows, in the policy making 
processes with regard to both the draft and the finalised versions of the LVMF, the 
management plan of the townscape view was shaped to provide the basis for an 
argumentative rationale by townscape consultants such that the tall building projects 
being proposed were consistent with visual assessment criteria in the LVMF.  
 
                                                 
39 The tall building proposals for No.1 Blackfriars Road and 20 Blackfriars Road had been known in 
expert circl es since between January and March 2005. No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road as well as the 
Bishopsgate Tower were considered by the CABE DRP in March 2005 (CABE 2005a; c; d).   
40 The planning application for the Doon Street Tower was first submitted to the LB Lambeth in 
November 2005 (PINS 2009). The King's Reach Tower Redevelopment had been presented to the CABE 
DRP in May 2005 (CABE 2005e).  
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In particular, the separate CABE DRP and GLA reports concluded that the tall building 
projects were acceptable due to existing precedent cases and the proposed high quality 
of architecture (CABE 2007a; CABE 2007b; GLA 2007d; GLA 2007e). These were the 
values foregrounded in the management plan of the St James's Park view in the 2007 
LVMF. The value of integration in the view, on which English Heritage based its 
reasoning, was excluded from the management plan (as is evident in their consultation 
response regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road (English Heritage 2006a)) and, as a result, 
carried little weight in the assessment and decision making by the GLA and CABE. 
English Heritage insisted that the project integrates into the view, relating its scale, 
geometry and form of the tower to the existing buildings of Horse Guards and Whitehall 
Court (ibid.). In the process of writing the management plan for the St James's Park 
view rationale that allowed supporting tall building development in the background of 
the view was strengthened and conflicts between heritage groups and supporters of tall 
buildings were not resolved.  
 
The 2007 LVMF bases the QVA methodology on the aspect of visual dominance (GLA 
2007b). In order to understand the significance of visual dominance, paragraph 7 of the 
2007 LVMF management plan requires further scrutiny. In particular, the scale and 
geometry of the proposal are emphasised in order to assess whether a development 
proposal that is visible in the St James's Park townscape view overpowers and therefore 
claims visual dominance in the view (ibid.). It is concluded that if a development 
proposal does dominate or overpower the view then the proposal would be unacceptable 
and the GLA is likely to direct the LPA to refuse planning permission. 
 
However, the terminology of 'appropriate scale and geometry' does not provide an 
absolute value that would allow for an unambiguous assessment (ibid.: 230). It is 
therefore up to the judgement of the townscape consultant, the decision makers and the 
assessors, the GLA, the responsible LPA, English Heritage and CABE to interpret these 
paragraphs and to define what is appropriate and what is not. Importantly, the term 
'exceptional quality' (ibid.: 230) is based on the quality of design agenda advocated by 
the Urban Task Force Report and the 2000 White Paper, and is enshrined in By Design 
and the London Plan (DETR and CABE 2000a; GLA 2004a). The assessors of design 
quality nationally are CABE, the GLA regionally, and then the local borough. English 
Heritage is only a secondary assessor regarding design since its primary statutory duty 
is the protection of heritage (Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1983). Therefore, decision 
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making power regarding quality of design lies in the hands of organisations that 
supported tall building developments in most cases between 2000 and 2007. Heritage 
groups were excluded to a significant degree from assessments since heritage-based 
values were no longer part of the St James's Park management plan. Based on the above 
discussion, it must be concluded that the LVMF incrementally reduced the constraints 
on tall building development in the background of the townscape view from St James's 
Park as it evolved during this period.  
 
Crucially, the townscape consultant employed to write the contents of the LVMF, 
Richard Coleman, also was advising on the design of 20 Blackfriars Road, which would 
be visible in the background of the view (PINS 2009a). Similarly, the experts writing 
the townscape section of the management plan in the finalised 2007 LVMF were Dr 
Chris Miele and Karen McAllister from RPS Group. Miele also wrote the townscape 
assessments for the Doon Street Tower project which is visible in the St James's Park 
view (Miele 2008). Miele had been involved in the Doon Street Tower project since 
2003, working for Alan Baxter Associates at that time. When he changed jobs from 
Alan Baxter's office to RPS and later to Montagu Evans, he took the Doon Street Tower 
project with him (ibid.). Therefore, there is considerable potential for conflict of 
interests since the consultants worked both as policy makers for the GLA and as 
consultants for the developers of tall buildings that would be visible in the view. Thus, it 
must be examined in more detail whether consultants shaped the LVMF to support the 
projects they were involved in or whether they remained impartial.  
 
The briefs provided by the GLA to the consultants writing the 2005 draft LVMF and the 
2007 LVMF show that the GLA demanded that the constraints on tall building 
development should be reduced (GLA 2004c and 2005c). Furthermore, the GLA, 
following pre-application discussions, had agreed to support all of the tall building 
projects visible in the St James's Park view prior to or during the drafting of the 
different versions of the LVMF (GLA 2005 e, g). Within these pre-application 
discussions, GLA officers had concluded that the visibility of the projects in the St 
James's Park view was acceptable. Therefore, the decision to support the tall building 
projects by reducing the constraints on the visibility of development in the background 
of the St James's Park view was taken by the GLA and not by the consultants employed 
to produce the contents of the LVMF. As confirmed in interviews, the experts had to 
disclose potential conflicts of interest based on the GLA code of conduct (GLA 2008c). 
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Furthermore, the responsible planning officers at the GLA also confirmed in interviews 
with me that they managed the process of producing the LVMF and edited the final 
contents. While there was potential for conflict of interest, consultants do not appear to 
have misused their involvement in policy making to support the projects they were 
involved for private interests. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in previous sections, 
Coleman actually was placed in a difficult situation since his compromise with heritage 
groups, i.e. proposing to introduce heritage values and strengthen visual protection, 
resulted in him not being employed by the GLA for the production of the 2007 LVMF 
(and as we shall see, it resulted also in him being given a secondary role at the joint 
No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry). 
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Image 4: Zones of St James's Park view in the 2005 draft LVMF. The view is divided into three zones 
shown in different grey scales (letters A, B and C). Source: Author 
 
 
 
Image 5: Zones of St James's Park view in the 2007 LVMF. The view is divided into two zones shown 
in different grey scales (letters A and B). Source: Author 
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Key to image 4 
1  Bishopsgate Tower (as proposed in May 2005) 
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road (as proposed in May 2005) 
3 20 Blackfriars Road (as proposed in May 2005) 
 
Key to image 5 
1  Bishopsgate Tower (as amended in 2006) 
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road (as amended in 2007) 
3 20 Blackfriars Road (as amended in 2007) 
4 King's Reach Tower Redevelopment (November 2005) 
5 Doon Street Tower (as amended in August 2007) 
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3.5 Qualitative terminology in QVA 
 
This section focuses on the specific qualitative terminology contained in the 
management plan of the townscape view from St James's Park towards Horse Guards 
Road in both the 2005 draft LVMF (GLA 2005a) and the finalised 2007 LVMF (GLA 
2007b). The previous section analysed the constraints on tall building development in 
the background of the view. In contrast, this section concentrates on terminology that 
describes the values of the view against which the impact of tall buildings is to be 
assessed. The experts writing the 2005 draft LVMF sought to take on terminology 
suggested by heritage groups by way of compromise. However, this terminology was 
neither accepted by supporters of tall buildings nor by heritage groups. The experts 
writing the 2007 LVMF amended the terminology and introduced the notion of quality 
of architecture into visual assessment methodology. Data gained in interviews provide 
insights into the reasoning for choosing and amending the qualitative terminology used 
in the management plan of the St James's Park view. The interviews were conducted 
with the experts, John Hare and Dr Chris Miele, who contributed to the 2005 and 2007 
versions of the LVMF and Paddy Pugh, who is a senior English Heritage officer. 
 
Qualitative wording of the St James Park view  
The wording of the 2005 draft LVMF of the St James's Park view management plan 
includes terms specifically geared towards assigning an experiential value to the view. 
The management plan of the St James's Park view employs the terms, 'mystery' and 
'picturesque', to describe the quality against which new development visible in the 
background should be assessed.41 Mystery and picturesque are emotive terms. The term 
mystery is derived from a number of studies of the visual qualities of the St James's 
Park view. The St James's Park view had previously been assigned similarly romantic 
and Arcadian qualities in reports by LPAC and the London Research Centre (LPAC 
1999; Catchpole 1987), which the 2005 draft LVMF appears to have extended. A clear 
statement that the view should be protected geometrically, similar to the strategic 
RPG3A views, was not advocated at that time. Colvin and Moggridge, the landscape 
architects producing consultation responses on behalf of the Royal Parks, assigned the 
quality of mystery to the St James's Park view in their report in 2001 (Colvin and 
Moggridge 2001). They argued that because the view was of such significant quality it  
                                                 
41 Appendix 16 contains the full text of the management plan of the 2005 draft LVMF.  
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should be protected geometrically, thereby ruling out any new development visible in 
the background (ibid.). I  asked John Hare, one of the two expert consultants who wrote 
the 2005 draft LVMF, what his reasoning for choosing the specific wording was and 
how he reacted to the request of stakeholders to protect the view geometrically. 
 
Juergen: 
Will St James's Park be managed geometrically then? 
 
John Hare: 
No. We decided that it could not be managed geometrically. There were two 
reasons. One is that there was no easy geometric thing you could define, because 
it's a widely irregular skyline with trees in between them, that mystery thing. 
You could not draw the line. […] The second one is Richard [Coleman] and I 
did not sell the argument [to the GLA] that the nature of the Royal Parks should 
be: You never see tall buildings. So we could not accept the argument [for 
geometric control].  
 
From the quote it can be derived that the consultants decided against geometric 
protection of the view because there was no landmark visible in the view with heritage 
values of the calibre of the Palace of Westminster, St Paul's Cathedral or the Tower of 
London. These are the landmarks protected geometrically via the RPG3A and the 
LVMF view corridors. Geometric protection would have resulted in tall building 
development being excluded from the background of the St James's Park view, 
something which was deemed undesirable by the GLA when providing the brief for the 
LVMF (GLA 2004c). However, the brief did recommend that the consultants interview 
stakeholders during the process of drafting the 2005 draft LVMF (ibid.). Taking into 
account the concerns of heritage groups proved difficult.  
 
Heritage groups argued repeatedly that they wanted the background sky to be left 
unaltered. Hence, no development should be visible in the background of the view.42 
However, the GLA had agreed to support the tall building projects of Bishopsgate 
Tower and No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road in pre-application discussions and through 
reports, which would be visible in the view's background (GLA 2007d; e). The 
inclusion of the terms of mystery and picturesque was therefore an attempt made by the 
consultants to reflect the heritage groups' concerns. Although geometric protection was  
                                                 
42 Examples for this argument are the Royal Parks contour map approach as discussed in the previous 
chapter. English Heritage had supported this approach in consultations regarding the draft London Plan 
(GLA 2003b). However, English Heritage changed its position later, most likely to avoid accusations of a 
general bias against tall buildings. The WCC had argued in consultations regarding the 2005 draft LVMF 
that any development in the background would constitute damage to the view (WCC 2005).  
 138 
not provided, the use of emotive terminology acknowledged the significance of the view 
according to the Royal Parks, as set out in the report by Colvin and Moggridge (2001). 
In theory neither mystery nor the picturesque automatically exclude tall buildings from 
the background of the view. This was an attempt to compromise and, through that, gain 
the support of heritage groups in order to reduce the need for public inquiries.  
 
However in the consultation process, the qualitative terminology advanced by Richard 
Coleman did not gain support from either supporters of or objectors to tall building 
development (GLA 2005b). A comparison of interviewee accounts shows that it was 
recognised that there would be severe problems if the terminology of mystery was 
adopted. Dr Chris Miele, sums up the concerns regarding mystery that are characteristic 
for both supporters and objectors to tall building development: 
 
Dr Chris Miele: 
I did not understand the 2005 version description of the St James's Park view. It  
is almost impossible to understand.  
 
Juergen: 
Picturesque, mystery of the view… is that what you mean… 
 
Dr Chris Miele: 
I still don't understand what that means. I understand picturesque because that is  
a term from English landscape architecture, but mystery is one that […] I 
literally could not understand. I know how it has been changed but I did not 
change it. We worked through the whole of the thing and highlighted some 
sections just to draw attention to areas that were unclear because they relied too 
much on judgement of a subjective nature. Because what […] the mayor wanted 
his document to do was to set out clearly how you go about the process, 
accepting that many of these judgements are subjective. 
 
Paddy Pugh from English Heritage also argued that mystery was a term that was 
unsuitable for assessments purposes as it is emotive and lacked the objectivity of 
planning concepts. Consequently, as Miele explains, in 2007 the experts sought to avoid 
subjective terminology. Heritage-based terminology was replaced with a set of values 
that put the quality of architecture at their centre in the 2007 LVMF.  
 
Instead it was proposed that projects should be measured in the assessment against the 
criteria of dominating (negative) and enhancing (positive) (GLA 2007b).43 Whether a 
proposed tall building dominates a view also has to be assessed in relation to precedent 
                                                 
43 Appendix 17 contains the full text of the management plan of the townscape view from St James's Park 
towards Horse Guards Road in the 2007 LVMF.  
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cases that have been granted planning consent, and which are visible in the St James's 
Park view. If a tall building does not appear taller then an existing precedent case then it 
is unlikely that it can be argued that it dominates the view. The quality of enhancing the 
view is related to the quality of the architecture of the proposed tall building, 
particularly its top. Both the GLA and CABE had concluded in their assessments of the 
No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road and the Doon Street Tower projects that these were of 
highest architectural quality (CABE 2007a, b, g; GLA 2007c; d; e; g). Therefore, taking 
into account the importance of the assessment terminology of enhancing, it was very 
hard to argue for detractors that the proposed tall building projects would not enhance 
the view. As a result, the new terminology contributed to establishing greater certainty 
for the developers of the tall building projects visible in the background of the St 
James's Park view.  
 
The 2007 LVMF management plan of the St James's Park view is  taken into account in 
order to determine how effective the amended wording was in terms of conflict 
resolution. Paddy Pugh from English Heritage describes his perception of the 2007 
LVMF as follows: 
 
[Y]ou can't adequately describe [the St James's Park view] or describe its 
significance in a couple of sentences. The other thing that it does not do is give 
you any clear guidance as to how to assess a proposal against the significance 
that it does not describe. So what you get is identification that this view is 
important. You get no real guidance as to why it is important. And you get no 
real guidance as to how to assess a proposal against that view.  
 
Pugh argued that the 2007 LVMF is inadequate for applying the assessment of a visual 
impact. His statement is congruent with the interview accounts of John Hare and Frank. 
John Hare argued that English Heritage was right to be upset about the 2007 LVMF and 
its lack of guidance. Frank also considered that the GLA's removal of terminology from 
the management plans that usefully describes heritage values did not contribute to 
conflict resolution. Frank, who had led the writing of the DEGW report in 2002, stated 
that their vision was that qualifying language would be a central part of management 
plans. Qualitative descriptive language, he argues, should encompass the values that the 
society of that specific time assigns to the views. The amendments made to the 
management plan of the St James's Park view and those made to the QVA methodology 
clearly placed heritage groups in a position from which they were unable to formulate 
arguments against the visibility of tall buildings. Furthermore, English Heritage stated 
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in the LAC minutes from March 2007 that it was only consulted unofficially regarding 
the 2007 LVMF as the GOL had decided that there would not be another official 
consultation process (LAC 2007b). The LAC concluded that their attempts to influence 
the 2007 LVMF had proved ineffective and that it would therefore produce its own 
guidance, Seeing the History in the View: A Method for Assessing Heritage 
Significance Within Views (English Heritage 2008a), setting out its own approach to 
the QVA (ibid.).  Based on this analysis, it must be concluded that conflict resolution 
was ineffective since the 2007 LVMF was not accepted by heritage groups as a tool 
appropriate for assessing the visual impact on London's heritage assets.  
 
A comment by the Royal Parks questioning the impartiality of the consultants writing 
the LVMF necessitates an analysis of conflict of interest. In a consultation response to 
the GLA regarding the Bishopsgate Tower, Colvin and Moggridge insinuated that the 
involvement of the townscape consultant, Richard Coleman, in a number of tall building 
projects questions his impartiality as a contributor to the 2005 draft LVMF.44 Indeed, 
Coleman was also the townscape consultant for 20 Blackfriars Road which appeared as 
a very tall element in the St James's Park view in its 2005 version. In addition, Dr Chris 
Miele, co-author of the 2007 LVMF, was the planning and townscape consultant for the 
Doon Street Tower project. Therefore, there was the potential that the consultants might 
be in conflict over the interests of developers of tall buildings visible in the St James's 
Park view and the GLA for which they wrote the successive versions of the LVMF.  
 
However as has been shown previously, the GLA had strongly supported these tall 
building projects prior to and during the writing of the LVMF (GLA 2005e; 2007d; e). 
In addition, the GLA planning officers overseeing the LVMF production process and 
editing the final document ensured that the finalised LVMF strictly followed the GLA 
agenda. Furthermore, as has also been confirmed in interviews with GLA planning 
officers, there was close scrutiny of the finalised 2007 LVMF by both the DCMS and 
representatives of UNESCO. Thus, the potential argument that the consultants writing 
the LVMF would have misused their positions should be excluded.    
 
                                                 
44 In the consultation response regarding the Bishopsgate Tower, in which the Royal Parks raised strong 
objections to the way in which the 2005 draft LVMF had been applied by the townscape consultant and 
the wording of the draft LVMF management plan of the St James's Park view, they state: 'It  should be 
noted that the author of the draft SPG is a tall building consultant and that the document fails to analyse 
or take account of London's landscape charact eristics, being building based. This may be the reason why 
the qualities of this view are not properly analysed in the draft SPG.' (Colvin and Moggridge 2005b: 2). 
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
Principally, the LVMF policy making process needed to focus heavily on resolving the 
conflicts between the GLA and heritage groups. The costly public inquiries with regard 
to precedent tall building projects and the infighting via published statements in the 
media had negative effects on developers, the GLA, as well as heritage groups. 
Consequently, the LVMF was supposed to provide an assessment method shared by 
both supporters and opponents of tall buildings so that the conflicts could be resolved 
and public inquiries avoided. However, conflict resolution in the policy making process 
proved insufficient.  
 
The consultants writing the 2005 draft LVMF attempted to compromise with heritage 
groups by increasing the number of geometrically protected view corridors as a trade-
off against the reduction of view corridors and the potential for tall buildings to appear 
in their background (BDAL), previously protected through RPG3A. Furthermore, the 
consultants also incorporated values (derived from consultation with heritage groups) 
against which views should be assessed using the qualitative measures of a QVA, as 
discussed in relation to the townscape view from St James's Park towards Horse Guards 
Road. The 2007 version, written by a new group of consultants, neither achieved a 
compromise nor minimised heritage concerns. Any argumentative rationale allowing for 
the value judgements demanded by heritage groups was taken out of the LVMF and 
replaced by a rationale that foregrounded the quality of the architectural design. This 
strong pro-tall building stance by the GLA increased certainty for developers, but did 
nothing for conflict resolution.  
 
A by-product of the consultation process within the LVMF policy making process was 
an increase in uncertainty for developers due to unresolved and indeed exacerbated 
conflicts between the GLA and heritage groups. The overall level of inclusion in the 
consultation process was very high. All the stakeholders that had vested interests and 
also the knowledge and expertise to make significant statements were included in the 
official consultation process. However, the resultant QVA method excludes heritage 
groups in particular through its use of costly AVRs and townscape assessments as well 
as through the inaccessibility to geometrical building data owned by developers. While 
the QVA method as currently practised does not represent actual human visual 
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experience accurately, I believe it is close enough to human visual experience to allow 
for an objective assessment.  
 
The bigger problem it appears is that the QVA method advocated by the LVMF was not 
accepted by heritage groups, and the incremental marginalisation of heritage groups led 
to an increase in conflict. In particular, the emphasis on the quality of architecture as the 
key value against which tall buildings' should be assessed excluded heritage groups 
from making arguments of significant weight in the planning processes: CABE are the 
arbiters of design quality not English Heritage. Heritage groups felt excluded. UNESCO 
got involved to try to put pressure on the national government, and force the mayor and 
the GLA to extend the boundaries of visual protection of London's heritage assets. This 
led to an increase in the likelihood of tall building public inquiries, since the DCMS 
identified No.1 Blackfriars Road and other tall building projects as potential threats to 
central London's WHSs (DCMS 2007a). This in turn resulted in an increase in 
uncertainty for developers. While certainty for developers was increased through the 
strong support of tall building development by the GLA, certainty was decreased 
through the failure to resolve conflicts in the policy making process.  
 
In the LVMF policy making process, implementation processes with regard to tall 
building projects preceding the policy making had significant impacts on the emerging 
policy guidance. In the public inquiry process regarding the London Bridge Tower, the 
argumentative rationale for assessing the background of view corridors (regulated in the 
LVMF via the BDAL) was determined. The emerging line of reasoning for assessments 
was incorporated into the LVMF. Consequently, proposed tall building projects at 
Bishopsgate that would be visible in the background of a geometrically protected view 
corridor, had a much greater chance of success. The No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, 
Doon Street Tower and Bishopsgate Tower projects had been supported by the GLA 
prior to the drafting of the management plan for the St James's Park view in the LVMF.  
 
The management plan of the St James's Park view was shaped, following GLA 
directions, so as to reduce the constraints on tall building development visible in the 
background of the view. These actions resulted in mistrust of the policy making process 
since heritage groups perceived this as a coordinated attempt at marginalisation, 
severely limiting their abilities to represent their interests to heritage protection. As a 
result, heritage groups did not support the LVMF because they perceived it as an 
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inappropriate tool for visual assessments. Furthermore, the simultaneity of the policy 
making and implementation processes focussed the debate in the consultation phase on 
those aspects of the LVMF that would later determine the acceptability of the tall 
building projects in the planning process at the time.  
 
The Royal Parks questioned the objectivity of the 2005 draft LVMF as private sector 
experts involved in tall building projects were its authors. However, no instances were 
identified that give rise to assumptions of misuse of their public sector positions. 
Indeed, the GLA profited from the expertise the experts had gained in practice, which 
resulted in policy guidance that strengthened its position as supporters of tall buildings. 
The writers of the 2005 draft LVMF may have even suffered a loss of credibility by the 
GLA and the developers due to their attempt to compromise with heritage groups, by 
increasing the constraints in the LVMF.  
 
The LVMF constitutes an instance of trading off heritage protection against 
architectural quality. The foregrounding of the values of quality of architecture in the 
LVMF methods, both in background assessments in areas regulated via the BDAL as 
well as in the QVA method, is coherent with the agenda of the national government and 
national policy. Therefore, the principal requirement of the plan-led approach that 
regional policy must be based on national policy is fulfilled. Furthermore, the 
foregrounding of the quality of architecture empowers the GLA, LPAs and CABE in 
assessment processes. Because of the strong focus on architectural quality, it can be 
demanded in assessment processes that developers and architects increase these 
qualities of their projects significantly. Developers in turn tend to be willing to invest in 
architectural quality if this directly reduces the likelihood of strong opposition from 
heritage groups, and results in the support of the GLA, LPAs and CABE. However, 
again, the strengthening of the quality of architecture values through the LVMF has 
marginalised heritage values.  
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4. English Heritage and CABE 
 
This chapter considers the roles of CABE and English Heritage in planning processes 
for tall buildings in central London. CABE was set up by the Secretary for Culture 
Media and Sport in 1999 (PINS 2002a). It emerged out of the Royal Fine Art 
Commission which was disbanded and subsequently replaced by CABE. Its major role 
regarding tall building developments is to ensure that projects granted planning 
permission are of the highest quality in terms of architecture and urban design (DETR 
and CABE 2000a). English Heritage was already set up in 1983 through the National 
Heritage Act (Ministry of Justice 1983). English Heritage's major role in the planning 
process is the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of England, such as monuments, 
conservation areas and World Heritage Sites (ibid.). Both English Heritage and CABE 
are non-departmental governmental bodies sponsored by the DCMS (CABE had been 
co-sponsored by the DETR until the DETR was dissolved). Colloquially, both bodies 
are often referred to as quangos. They fulfil advisory functions to governmental 
organisations but their members are not publicly elected.  
 
Tall buildings are considered to have significant impacts, in particular due to their 
height and the resulting visual impact on heritage assets (Tavernor 2004a; Markham 
2008; Kufner 2009). Furthermore, due to their visibility from a wide range of locations 
across London, the architectural quality of these projects is of paramount importance. 
For this reason, the assessments made by CABE in its Design Review Panel (DRP) and 
English Heritage in its London Advisory Committee (LAC) are highly important forms 
of advice for LPAs, the GLA and the Secretary of State in decision making on the 
granting of planning permission for tall building projects. These assessment processes 
in the expert panels of CABE DRP and English Heritage's LAC are examined in detail 
in this chapter. Furthermore, prior to these assessments, private design teams engage in 
pre-application discussions with both quangos. Because tall buildings are usually 
considered to have a significant impact on the wider city environment and as they are 
often of a very controversial nature, the Guidance on Tall Buildings (GOTB), published 
jointly by English Heritage and CABE, demands that pre-application discussions are 
initiated as early as possible (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). Pre-application 
discussions with both CABE and English Heritage are examined in separate sections in 
this chapter.  
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Of particular importance with regard to tall building projects are the call-in powers of 
CABE and English Heritage. After the design team has submitted a planning application 
for a tall building to the local planning authority (LPA), both English Heritage and 
CABE submit their consultation responses to the LPA and advise on whether they 
support the granting of planning permission for the project, whether they object, or 
whether they request the project to be called in by the Secretary of State. Due to this 
right to request a call-in, English Heritage and CABE hold significant powers, since a 
public inquiry following a call-in extends the planning process for a tall building project 
by up to two years and may even lead to the refusal of planning permission by the 
Secretary of State (see appendix 6). Because of these important roles, both English 
Heritage and CABE have repeatedly been criticised by interest groups that were 
aggrieved by the advice and decisions made in assessment processes (McNeill 2002b; 
Polina 2007; Charney 2007; Markham 2008). The first section of this chapter examines 
these critiques, as well as resulting scrutiny by the House of Commons and the role of 
the GOTB in resolving the divergent assessment outcomes of CABE and English 
Heritage.  
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Figure 3: English Heritage and CABE processes of assessment and advice. The diagram also shows 
the relationship of these processes to the planning application and the potential public inquiry phases. 
Source: Author 
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4.1 Interest group pressures on CABE and English Heritage 
 
This section examines how the national government has sought to streamline the 
assessment outcomes of English Heritage and CABE following criticism by interest 
groups. In the years from 1999 to 2008, English Heritage and CABE were criticised 
repeatedly and fiercely by groups with vested interests in tall building development. In 
particular, the accountability and objectivity of these quangos was the subject of 
inquiries by the House of Commons (2002; 2005; 2006) and AHL Ltd (2004). The first 
part of this section focuses on presenting data regarding the assessments by CABE and 
English Heritage on significant precedent tall building cases and the criticism by 
interest groups that resulted.  
 
The second part of this section considers regularities identified in the positions of 
CABE and English Heritage towards precedent tall building cases and the criticism 
made. In interviews which I conducted with experts who wrote the GOTB and with 
private sector experts who have used it in the planning process, two prevailing 
perceptions regarding the meaning of the GOTB emerged. On the one hand, it was 
argued by Peter Stewart, who had co-written the 2001 draft GOTB for CABE, and 
Paddy Pugh from English Heritage that the GOTB was meant to achieve a common 
position for the assessment of tall buildings. Thus, the purpose of the GOTB was to 
reduce the conflicts between English Heritage and CABE. The GOTB was co-written 
and published in a draft form in June 2001, finalised in March 2003, in an updated draft 
form in January 2007 and finalised again in July 2007 (English Heritage and CABE 
2001; 2003; 2007a; 2007b). The GOTB defines how English Heritage and CABE assess 
tall building proposals through a set of criteria. These criteria are meant to explain to 
applicants which qualities the expert panels of the CABE DRP and the English Heritage 
LAC focus on in assessments (English Heritage and CABE 2001). On the other hand, it 
is argued by Ian Lindsley from Jefferson Communications, a public relations consultant 
on a number of tall building projects, that the GOTB is a failed attempt to streamline the 
assessment process of the two quangos which has not resulted in agreement on the 
assessments of tall buildings and has thus failed to remove the need for public inquiries.  
 
Precedent cases, criticism by interest groups and the Guidance on Tall Buildings  
Between 2000 and 2002 while the first draft version of the GOTB was emerging, 
English Heritage and CABE assessed significant tall building projects deemed to set 
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precedents for further cases. Conflicts between English Heritage and supporters of tall 
buildings first arose in 1996. The development company, Trafalgar House, submitted 
plans to propose what would have been the tallest building in London, the 386 metre 
high Millennium Tower. Due to strong objections from English Heritage and SAVE 
Britain's Heritage, the building was redesigned and reduced in height to 179.80 metres 
(SAVE Britain's Heritage 2008). This project is now known under the name, 30 St Mary 
Axe (popularly called the Gherkin) and was intended to replace the damaged Baltic 
Exchange in the City of London (Short 2004).45 In February 1999, English Heritage's 
London Advisory Committee (LAC) ceased objecting now describing it as a building of 
'such exceptional architectural interest that it would be a justifiable replacement for the 
Baltic Exchange' (LAC 1999: 7). Listed historic buildings like the Baltic Exchange were 
protected by the PPG15 and would have warranted a call-in by the Secretary of State if 
English Heritage had upheld their objection. In reaction, the influential charity SAVE 
Britain's Heritage insinuated that English Heritage had been persuaded to stop objecting 
by a ten million pound donation from Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott's ODPM, as 
Prescott did not follow a request by SAVE to call in the project (SAVE Britain's 
Heritage 2008). Later in 2006, the influential London Evening Standard journalist, Mira 
Bar-Hillel, stated in a House of Commons inquiry that it was the English Heritage 
chairman, Sir Jocelyn Stevens, who decided to support 30 St Mary Axe (House of 
Commons 2006). The turnaround by English Heritage regarding its position resulted in 
fierce criticism and accusations by, SAVE Britain's Heritage. 
 
30 St Mary Axe set a precedent for a new generation of high quality tall buildings in 
central London, and enjoyed support at national, regional and local levels. The Heron 
Tower project, also located in the City of London and proposed around the time of 30 St 
Mary Axe, had been presented to both English Heritage's London Advisory Committee 
(LAC) and CABE's Design Review Panel (DRP). English Heritage's argument was that 
any granting of planning permission would be premature, thereby predetermining policy 
(the emerging City of London UDP) that had yet not yet been finalised (PINS 2002a). 
English Heritage's LAC had concluded in 2000 that the Heron Tower was a potential 
precedent case that would permit a flood of tall building applications if granted planning 
permission (LAC 2000). By contrast, CABE supported the Heron Tower based on its 
assessment in the DRP, stating that the design had improved since earlier comments and 
                                                 
45 See appendix 2 for details of the 30 St Mary Axe project and the preceding Millennium Tower. 
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that it was happy with the impact of the proposed design on views from Waterloo 
Bridge on the basis of the photomontages presented by the design team (CABE 2000).  
 
Due to a request by English Heritage, the Heron Tower was called in by the Secretary of 
State in February 2001 (PINS 2002a). The divergent conclusions reached by English 
Heritage and CABE resulted in criticism by both supporters and opponents, as is 
evident from the House of Commons Report from 2002 discussed later in this section 
(House of Commons 2002). As was confirmed in interviews by Peter Stewart, who co-
wrote the 2001 GOTB, and Paddy Pugh from English Heritage, the GOTB was 
prompted by the controversy surrounding the early precedent cases of 30 St Mary Axe 
and the Heron Tower, and the expectation of similar controversy regarding the 
forthcoming London Bridge Tower proposal. In June 2001, English Heritage and CABE 
co-wrote and published the first draft version of the Guidance on Tall Buildings 
(Consultation Paper) (GOTB) (English Heritage and CABE 2001). In Section 1.2 of this 
document, CABE and English Heritage defined their statutory roles, pointing out that, 
even though they might arrive at different conclusions in their assessments of tall 
buildings, they are not in conflict (ibid.). The GOTB was intended as a means to 
streamline the assessments by CABE and English Heritage so that both quangos would 
eventually arrive at similar conclusions within their expert panel assessments.  
 
The ongoing conflicts regarding tall building development in central London prompted 
the need for an inquiry by a House of Commons Select Committee; the report was 
published on 17 July 2002, shortly before the Secretary of State made his decision on 
the Heron Tower public inquiry on 22 July 2002. The report to the House of Commons 
Urban Affairs Sub-Committee directed criticism towards English Heritage for listing 
tall buildings which were seen as  'eyesores' by the public (House of Commons 2002: 
32). Tony Tugnutt, an officer of the Bloomsbury Conservation Area Advisory 
Committee, argued that English Heritage's LAC had been 'high-jacked' by people with 
sympathetic modern architectural interests in their assessments of 30 St Mary Axe 
(ibid.: 32). CABE, on the other hand, was criticised by Tugnutt and the Chelsea Society 
because of what they considered conflicts of interest by CABE's chairman, Sir Stuart 
Lipton, who was also chairman of property developer Stanhope Plc, as were members 
of CABE's Design Review Committee (House of Commons 2002: 32, 33). However, no 
proof was presented to support this accusation. Furthermore, the Westminster City 
Council, the Chelsea Society and Tony Tugnutt criticised CABE's support for 'trophy 
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architecture' that they thought was designed to visually represent influential private 
companies (ibid.: 33). Professor Tavernor, townscape consultant for the Heron Tower 
project, argued at the House of Commons inquiry that the public inquiries which 
resulted from the adversarial relations between English Heritage and CABE were 
undermining their negotiations regarding future planning applications (ibid.: 32). The 
committee concluded that CABE needed to be careful not to be seen as a representative 
of the 'modernist architectural establishment', a position that might lead to the loss of 
support by amenity groups and the trust of local authorities (ibid.: 5). In March 2003, a 
few weeks prior to the public inquiry regarding the London Bridge Tower which started 
in April 2003, the first finalised version of the GOTB was published (English Heritage 
and CABE 2003). Despite the common position for assessments agreed in the finalised 
2003 GOTB, the quangos again reached divergent conclusions and appeared at opposite 
sides during public inquiries (PINS 2003). 
 
The debate reached another peak in 2004 when the CABE chairman, Sir Stuart Lipton, 
was accused again of conflicts of interest. The Architects' Journal (AJ) reported in 
March 2004 that CABE and its chairman Sir Stuart Lipton was employing Ken 
Shuttleworth of Make, on a project in the London Borough of Croydon (Blackler 2004). 
In response to these accusations, AHL was employed by the DCMS to investigate 
conflicts of interest within CABE (AHL Ltd 2004). AHL recommended that the 
position of chair of CABE should not be held by a person with vested interests in 
development projects that are being assessed by DRP; CABE commissioners should 
have to sign a declaration that they would accept the Nolan Principles; and, CABE 
should monitor and record conflict of interest matters accepting these could not be 
excluded completely due to the need to involve private sector experts (ibid.). In March 
2005, the House of Commons published the report summarising the conclusions of the 
inquiry into conflict of interest allegations regarding CABE (House of Commons 2005). 
It was concluded that DCMS and CABE should cooperate to ensure that CABE became 
more transparent and publicly accountable (ibid.). Furthermore, the number of private 
sector experts who could potentially have conflicts of interest should be limited, and the 
number of commissioners increased (ibid.). Experts from other sectors should be 
employed to ensure that a diversity of apparent interests is represented (ibid.).  
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The impact of interest groups on English Heritage and CABE 
I have argued that both English Heritage and CABE have been subjected to severe 
criticism by private developers and consultants who represent them, as well as by 
heritage groups which feel that their interests were not advocated sufficiently (House of 
Commons 2002; 2005; 2006 and AHL 2004). The accusations ranged from corruption 
and conflicts of interest, to the one-sided advocacy of the interests of specific groups. 
As is evident in these reports, the experts giving evidence to the House of Commons 
inquiries often work for organisations with vested interests in tall building development. 
Their representations were mostly geared towards influencing the quangos in order to 
get them to lean more towards their individual positions. Therefore, Rydin's conclusions 
can be validated with regard to English Heritage and CABE. She reports that quangos 
have been criticised for exhibiting too much discretion (Rydin 2003). Practitioners are 
sceptical because those agencies are insulated from public pressure as they are not 
elected bodies. Rydin states that 'conflicts of interest are not, therefore, mediated by 
locating the different functions and decision-making modes of the state at different 
levels of government, but become buried by the mysticism which surrounds the 
technical expert' (ibid.: 119). Rydin's rationale is that because quangos are isolated from 
democratic control, they are significantly influenced by interest groups whose very 
interests they are supposed to regulate (ibid.). Both English Heritage and CABE 
represent interest groups with particular biases for and against tall buildings.  
 
The transformation of CABE  
It does not appear that the GOTB led to the assessments made by CABE and English 
Heritage being streamlined. As appendix 7 shows, CABE and English Heritage arrived 
at divergent conclusions regarding precedent tall building cases until 2007 and 2008, in 
the case of the Doon Street Tower, and later at the Elizabeth House inquiry. CABE's 
annual reports show that in the years after the former chairman, Stuart Lipton, had been 
accused of conflict of interest, experts with relations to the heritage lobby were 
appointed to leading positions at CABE (CABE 2007h). Joyce Bridges became deputy-
co-chairman of CABE and a CABE commissioner while she was also an English 
Heritage commissioner (ibid.). Furthermore, M.J. Long, an architect reputed for her 
strong conservation skills, and former partner of Sir Colin St. John Wilson (architect of 
the British Library) became a commissioner (ibid.). Diane Haigh, a former associate of 
architects Allies and Morrison, concerned with restoration projects, became the new 
head of CABE's DRP (CABE 2008a). Allies and Morrison were working on the 
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controversial Elizabeth House project at the time. It appears most plausible that changes 
in the assessments made by CABE have been a result of these key staff changes, 
combined with concerns about the visual impacts of the Doon Street Tower project on 
Somerset House and, in the case of Elizabeth House, with a lack of urban design 
quality. Neither appears to have resulted from changes to the GOTB. 
 
The problem of perceived one-sidedness and conflicts of interest  
Later sections of this chapter show that there is a very high level of scrutiny within both 
the CABE and LAC assessment processes. However, as is evident in the House of 
Commons reports, the public accountability of both CABE and English Heritage has 
been seriously challenged if not damaged by repeated accusations made by interest 
groups regarding potential conflicts of interest and a lack of objectivity (House of 
Commons 2002; 2005; 2006). Yet no evidence was presented to the House of Commons 
inquiries of partiality towards projects by experts who were part of CABE and English 
Heritage (ibid.). Therefore, it must be concluded that the problem with the public 
accountability of CABE and English Heritage is a matter of perceptions of conflicts of 
interest and of a lack of objectivity.  
 
It is also evident in the House of Commons reports that expert witnesses were aggrieved 
by the decisions taken by English Heritage and CABE regarding tall building precedent 
cases (ibid.). I conducted an analysis of sixty-three articles published by the London 
Evening Standard and the Architects' Journal which are summarised in appendix 5. The 
reason for conducting this analysis was that three journalists appeared to have strong 
ties with organisations interested in promoting or preventing tall building development. 
Sir Simon Jenkins, who was a main witness in the 2002 House of Commons inquiry, 
has written several polemical articles against tall building development while associated 
with SAVE Britain's Heritage (SAVE Britain's Heritage 2011b). Paul Finch, while 
occupying leading positions at CABE, was also the editor of the Architects' Journal and 
subsequently the Architectural Review, promoters of modern architecture (DCMS 
2009). Mira Bar-Hillel, the planning correspondent for the Evening Standard, wrote a 
large number of articles on tall building projects between 2000 and 2008. Bar-Hillel's 
articles were frequently written in a one-sided manner aimed at persuading the reader to 
take her position against tall buildings, instead of informing the reader in a balanced 
way.  
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In addition, Professor Tavernor had acted as a townscape witness in relation to the 
Heron Tower proposal, which was challenged by English Heritage at public inquiry 
(PINS 2002a). The Croydon councillor who accused Stuart Lipton of conflicts of 
interests was aggrieved that CABE DRP had not supported a major development in 
Croydon by the developer, Arrowcroft, while Lipton's company Stanhope was 
supported by CABE while he was also chairman of CABE (House of Commons 2005). 
However, the AHL report (2004) found that CABE was using a code of conduct suitable 
for managing the potential conflicts of interest arising from the involvement of private 
sector experts, as demanded by the Nolan Report. The Stanhope scheme was simply a 
better project than Arrowcroft's as the inspector ruled at the Croydon Gateway inquiry 
(PINS 2006). 
 
The Nolan Commission concluded in 1997 that the most problematic aspect of public 
accountability is the 'public perception of impropriety', rather than cases of actual 
misconduct or even corruption (Nolan 1997a: 70). This finding of the Nolan Report 
corresponds with my own regarding potential conflicts of interest at CABE and English 
Heritage which are not proven.  
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4.2 Pre-application discussion with CABE 
 
This section examines the effectiveness of pre-application discussions between the 
design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and CABE. Consideration of this process relies 
mainly on interviews with design team members, and in particular Roger, the planning 
consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road, but also Peter Stewart, who was head of design 
review at CABE in 2005 when the initial pre-application discussions took place.  CABE 
supported No.1 Blackfriars Road as a project of the highest quality design in 2005 and 
2007 (CABE 2005b; 2007a; b). The following discussion sheds light on those aspects of 
the pre-application discussions that were most important for achieving CABE's support.  
 
The significance of early agreements within CABE's pre-application discussions 
CABE's role as a non-statutory consultee is set out in the 2001 Statutory and Non-
Statutory Consultation Report (DETR 2001a). Local planning authorities have to 
consult CABE if a development meets 'one or more of the following criteria, (i) 
proposals which are important in themselves; (ii) development on prominent sites; (iii) 
schemes with a significant impact; and, (iv) proposals which initiate regeneration or set 
a standard for further development.' (DETR 2001b: 3). Furthermore, CABE encourages 
informal pre-application discussions before a planning application is submitted (CABE 
2006a). Making use of this potential for discussions, the design team interacts with 
CABE during the design phase of a project. After the planning application is submitted 
to the local borough, the proposed tall building design is discussed and assessed within 
the CABE design review. The CABE Design Review Panel (DRP) consists of leading 
experts from different design fields related to the built environment, such as 
architecture, landscape design and heritage conservation (ibid.).  Roger, the planning 
consultant working on behalf of DP9 Planning Consultants as a member of the core 
design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road, describes the meaning of pre-application 
discussions with CABE as follows:  
 
[Y]ou would first inform the officers, talk them through the scheme, see what 
they think is the best way of taking it through. Do they think it is a full Design 
Review Panel? Do they think it's just a pin up? And then, just basically work 
with them; work with the contacts that we have built up with those various 
bodies throughout the years. This helps you to kind of know the best way to 
approach these processes. 
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Roger acted as the main contact regarding the planning process and provided advice on 
the meaning of policy as part of the core design team. Roger frames the pre-application 
discussion as an informative process, discussing which type of review is applied by 
CABE. Principally, the design team throughout the complete pre-application phase is 
geared towards maximising consensus. Informal discussions allow the design team to 
gather information about the type of review that will be applied by CABE, as well as 
about issues of concern. Peter Stewart, who was head of design review at CABE from 
August 1999 until June 2005, confirmed that, based on a thorough understanding of the 
policy context applicable, he would concentrate on drawing attention to those aspects 
that should be improved prior to the actual design review. The design team is therefore 
in a position whereby they can tackle concerns during the design process. Roger also 
points out that the contacts established with CABE officers are an important factor. DP9 
Planning Consultants worked on a large number of tall building projects from 2000 until 
November 2007 when the interview was held (see appendices 2 and 3).46 There was 
general consensus in the framing by all relevant interviewees from private design teams 
concerning the cooperative nature of informal pre-application discussions with CABE. 
With CABE, a good pre-application discussion is a prerequisite for the design team's 
preparation for the design review process. Therefore, it can be concluded that the pre-
application process with CABE DRP members is effective in reducing conflicts at an 
early stage.  
 
CABE design review comments, which are official publications that summarise the 
assessments of the Design Review Panel experts, allowed for a discussion on the impact 
of CABE's support of No.1 Blackfriars  Road. Since the first assessment within CABE's 
design review process in March 2005, CABE had supported the tall building element of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road (CABE 2005a). This was an important point of support for the 
design team because in 2005 there was no tall building policy for the site and locality, 
neither regionally through the London Plan nor locally through the Southwark UDP, 
that provided the policy basis for granting permission for a tall building at Blackfriars 
Bridge within a plan-led approach. In 2007, English Heritage and CABE rewrote the 
GOTB and included the statement that a plan-led approach was a mandatory 
requirement to be considered in the assessment of tall building proposals (English 
                                                 
46 DP9 Planning Consultants grew out of Montagu Evans when some of the partners in the latter firm 
decided they wanted to go independent and found their own company (DP9 Planning Consultants 2009). 
Therefore, the principal partners and senior consultants at DP9 had already established relationships with 
planning officers of the various governmental organisations before DP9 was founded.  
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Heritage and CABE 2007b). However, in January 2007, CABE wrote a letter regarding 
the assessment of No.1 Blackfriars Road within the CABE Design Review Panel. These 
design review comments stated that:  
 
It would be helpful to consider a scheme such as this in the context of an 
approved tall buildings policy for Southwark. However, it seems clear that this 
proposal is coming forward in an area which is potentially set for significant  
change; we note that a number of tall buildings are proposed or consented both 
for adjacent sites and within the wider neighbourhood (CABE 2007a). 
 
English Heritage and CABE updated the GOTB in 2007 and included in it the 
requirement that 'local authorities should now identify appropriate locations for tall 
buildings in their development plan documents' (English Heritage and CABE 2007b: 3). 
Following this requirement, decision makers such as the LB Southwark, as well as the 
GLA, could only justify the granting of planning permission for a tall building project 
located in an area identified as appropriate within the local development plan. In 2007, a 
local tall building policy that would have defined the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge 
as a tall building area was not available since the emerging policy did not receive the 
consent of Southwark's politicians (Strategic Director of Regeneration 2007). CABE 
had made a reference to consented and proposed schemes adjacent to the No.1 
Blackfriars Road site and in the wider neighbourhood which was provided as supportive 
reasoning for determining that location as appropriate for a tall building (CABE 
2007a).47 This assessment signifies that CABE's conclusion was based on tall building 
development pressure in the surrounding areas and that ongoing implementation 
processes were given significant weight. CABE's support for tall buildings here was 
crucial for the developer's ultimate planning success.  
 
The CABE pre-application process appears to be effective. The design team of No.1 
Blackfriars Road was confronted early on with concerns by CABE. Furthermore, the 
design team was able to achieve a general consensus that a tall building would be 
supported in the location in which it was proposed. The GOTB appears less effective in 
this respect. The statement that LPAs need to identify areas suitable for tall buildings 
does not include the possibility that tall building locations are emergent. In 2006 and 
2007, English Heritage maintained strong objections to No.1 Blackfriars Road based on 
its assessment that, in the absence of a tall building policy, central requirements of the 
                                                 
47 Appendix 18 contains an image that shows developments that took place in the surrounding area of the 
No.1 Blackfriars Road site.  
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GOTB had not been fulfilled (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a; b). Therefore, the GOTB 
was not sufficient in streamlining the assessments and recommendations of English 
Heritage and CABE.  
 
I have not been able to identify drawbacks regarding the CABE pre-application process 
as such. The pre-application discussion tends to take place early in the planning process. 
The design team members appear to be fully informed about: i) the DRP through which 
the project has to pass; and, ii) the principal areas that the design team needs to resolve 
so that all the major design issues have been addressed before the DRP takes place. In 
this sense, it is again less due to the GOTB that the design team members know how to 
prepare for the DRP. The more important issue is the informative and cooperative pre-
application discussion with the leading personnel of the CABE DRP which allows 
issues regarding tall building applications to be resolved early on.  
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4.3 The CABE design review process 
 
This section considers the process within which the CABE DRP assesses the quality of 
architectural and urban design of a proposed tall building. The 2003 GOTB (English 
Heritage and CABE 2003) was used for assessment purposes when No.1 Blackfriars 
Road was assessed by the DRP in 2005 and January 2007, before the second finalised 
version of the GOTB was published in July 2007 (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
The aspects of subjectivity versus objectivity within DRP are discussed hereunder. 
Interviewee accounts by architects and planning consultants who participated in design 
reviews are triangulated with interviewee accounts by CABE officers responsible for 
the DRP. The significance of experts' involvement as DRP members and the experience 
of consultants with the review process are examined with respect to the design team's 
preparation for the DRP and with regard to the presentation during the design review 
process. Presentation materials used by the design team to argue in favour of the design 
in the review process are analysed in terms of how these are shaped so that they best 
serve to convince panel members of the quality of the design and win CABE's support 
in the implementation process. The relevance of the high level experience of private 
sector DRP members is considered with regard to assessing these presentation 
materials.  
 
Using the GOTB within the CABE DRP 
The 2003 GOTB defines how CABE and English Heritage assess tall building 
proposals. The GOTB is applied in assessments when a proposal for a development is 
substantially taller than its surrounding context or when it significantly changes the 
skyline (English Heritage and CABE 2003). The definition of a tall building used within 
the GOTB is therefore relative to its context and is not based on measurable height. 
Section 4.5 sets out the central requirement that tall buildings must be considered in the 
round at both the CABE and LAC assessment processes (ibid.). In order to allow for 
such a detailed assessment, the design team must prepare presentation materials that 
accurately represent the building in its physical city context.  
 
The GOTB lists a set of criteria for an assessment. These include that tall buildings 
should have such an effect on the wider environment that conserves or does not damage 
or detract from heritage assets, including WHSs, conservation areas and views (ibid.).  
Furthermore, the relationship between the top of a building and the skyline, as well as 
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the design of public spaces and the permeability of the proposal site are central 
requirements (ibid.). Based on the governmental agenda advocated through the 2000 
White Paper, the GOTB concludes that proposals for tall buildings should not be 
supported unless the design team can demonstrate that these are of the highest 
architectural quality (ibid.). Because of these requirements, two aspects are of 
paramount importance for the behaviour of the design team within assessment 
processes. First, the design team must prepare presentation materials that meet the 
requirements for accuracy and present the design in the best light possible. Second, the 
presenters of the design must be able to convince the expert panels of the quality of the 
design by using these presentation materials and their verbal skills as presenters. 
 
The roles of private sector experts in the CABE DRP 
CABE advocates the selection of members of the DRP based on their experience and 
track record in one or more professions related to the built environment (CABE 2006b).  
Furthermore, CABE employees have to register any potential conflicts of interest in 
relation to development projects (CABE 2006a). Because CABE (as well as the English 
Heritage's LAC) selects qualified leaders as panel members from the professions related 
to the built environment, it is often the case that assessment panel members are involved 
in tall building projects at the same time. Figure 4 shows the positions of leading 
partners of private firms in the DRP who are also involved at tall building projects in 
northern Lambeth and northern Southwark. Ken Shuttleworth, Bob Allies, Graham 
Morrison, Chris Wilkinson, Jim Eyre and Ian Simpson are principals at leading English 
architecture firms. Chris Miele is a partner in the planning section of Montagu Evans. 
Tim Stonor is the principal of Space Syntax Ltd, a firm that specialises in the analysis of 
relationships between built form and pedestrian movement. In the cases of Allies, 
Morrison, Wilkinson and Eyre, these partners also hold positions at either CABE or 
English Heritage. With principals occupying positions at CABE and English Heritage, 
the firms raise their profile in the architecture and planning market. In particular when it 
comes to a public inquiry, the experts presenting evidence always start by setting out 
their credentials. Therefore, the proof presented gains  credibility since, due to their 
positions at CABE and English Heritage, the experts are evidentially regarded as part of 
the best in England.  
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Figure 4: Diagram showing experts and their involvement in governmental expert assessment 
panels and tall building projects relevant to the case study of No.1 Blackfriars Road. Boxes signify 
that two experts are part of the same firm. Bob Allies and Graham Morrison are the principals of Allies 
and Morrison Architects. Chris Wilkinson and Jim Eyre are the principals of Wilkinson Eyre Architects. 
Source: Author  
 
Due to the roles of private sector experts in CABE, there arises the natural suspicion 
that projects in which these experts are involved could be treated favourably within the 
DRP, as is evident in House of Commons Reports (2002; 2005). Indeed as has been 
discussed in the previous section, based on the criticism of interest groups, the House of 
Commons (2002) recommended that CABE must be careful not to be seen as a 
representative of the so-called modernist architectural establishment. The involvement 
in CABE, however, does not mean that experts receive favourable treatment. According 
to CABE's codes of practice, panel members have to announce conflicts of interest 
when a project is assessed in which they are professionally involved (CABE 2007i). 
The CABE DRP reacts to this flexibly, choosing panel members for the respective DRP 
who are not involved in the projects discussed (CABE 2006a). In the cases of the Doon 
Street Tower, Elizabeth House, 20 Blackfriars Road and to a degree also with No.1 
Blackfriars Road, the CABE DRP critically assessed  design aspects quite severely, as is 
evident in the DRP reports (CABE 2005a; 2005c; 2007e; 2007k). CABE even 
recommended refusal of planning permission for Doon Street due to the visual impact 
of the project on the courtyard of Somerset House and for Elizabeth House due to the 
massing and design of the project (CABE 2007g; 2007k). This evidence shows that the 
tall building projects, including No.1 Blackfriars Road, were scrutinised in detail within 
the CABE DRP.  
 
In summary, from the perspective of private sector experts, the involvement of private 
sector parties within the CABE DRP fulfils two functions. First, it establishes the 
reputation of the expert involved. Second, the expert is able to use knowledge about the 
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assessment process and the decision making structures within CABE in order to 
enhance their preparation for the assessment of their own projects within the CABE 
DRP.  
 
Objectivity versus subjectivity in the CABE DRP 
According to the Nolan Report, a central guiding principle for public bodies is that 
decisions made need to be objective and choices need to be made based on merit (Nolan 
1997a). Thus, it is worthwhile examining how objectivity is established within the 
CABE DRP. In an interview, Nick, head of design review in 2007, and William, also a 
member of the DRP and co-author of the 2007 GOTB, argued that architects tend to 
perceive the DRP as subjective if the assessment outcome is negative. They describe the 
balance between objectivity and subjectivity that CABE aspires to in the design review 
process. 
 
Nick: 
The [...] slight difference between a crit at college and here [DRP] is the 
professional background. Whilst clearly there are egos within that panel, some of 
the greatest architects in the world, the process is depersonalised in that respect. 
When we write up those views of the panel, we make sense of the different  
views that have been put forward. Or, we tie them together in a way that is easy 
to understand. That takes out that ego perspective.  
 
William: 
Ultimately it's CABE's view, not the panel's view. The panel informs our advice. 
Ultimately we have control and ownership of the advice that we give. Part of the 
reason for that is to do with consistencies. That has to do with the kind of 
repeating schemes. […]  It's very important that it is a corporate view not the 
view of a number of individuals, even though the individuals contribute to the 
corporate view. 
 
Nick and William distinguish between the actual panel discussion and the writing up of 
the design review comments, the documents in which CABE publishes the outcomes of 
DRP assessments. Both Nick's and William's role at CABE includes participating in the 
DRP and writing the design review letter that summarises the assessment. In interviews, 
architects who have presented tall building projects within the DRP have argued that the 
assessment process is similar to a crit at architecture school. These architects have 
claimed that the panel members do not seem to remember the criteria of the GOTB in 
the assessments. The architect, Ian Simpson, expressed his disappointment with CABE 
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and its assessment of No.1 Blackfriars Road at a lecture at the LSE in March 2006.48 
The CABE design review letter of March 2005 had concluded that the low rise 
buildings were not well designed and the plaza was unresolved because too much of the 
site was used for pedestrian movement (CABE 2005a). In July 2005 after a revision to 
the design, a CABE commissioner and design review staff concluded that the routes 
were still too narrow now and, in addition, a large overhang above a street junction was 
perceived to be unsuccessful (CABE 2005b). The perceptions of these architects could 
suggest that the GOTB is not applied rigorously within the DRP process.  
 
The design review function of CABE is constrained by planning law. With the 2005 
Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act, CABE was granted statutory status which 
required CABE to answer freedom of information requests (OPSI 2005a). This act also 
granted CABE the right to request a call-in by the Secretary of State (ibid.). Thereby, 
CABE is required to make its assessment responses publicly available. As a result, 
CABE has to stick closely to its statutory remit in the writing of design review letters 
since these could be used to criticise it if assessments depart from the GOTB. It is in the 
light of these legal considerations that Nick and William point out how important it is 
for CABE to make sure that the final design review comments do not contain the 
subjective positions of individual panel members. Therefore, it is the perception of 
architects criticised within the CABE DRP that the comments raised are often based on 
subjective perceptions of panel members. However, the final assessment of CABE is 
made after objectivity is ensured by weighing up the comments and criticism of the 
DRP panel members, and the finalised published comments therefore reflect CABE's 
official position.  
 
Presentation materials and presentation skills 
Regarding the purpose of presentation materials used by design teams within the DRP, 
it is useful to examine the potential that these materials have in terms of persuading 
assessors. As the 2003 GOTB sets out, a proposal for a tall building has to be assessed 
in the round (English Heritage and CABE 2003). Therefore, design teams have to 
produce presentation materials that allow for such in depth assessments. Nick, the head 
of design review at CABE in 2007, defines the role of the use of physical models in the 
DRP. 
                                                 
48 I attended this LSE lecture prior to commencing my PhD studies. A record of the LSE Cities 
Programme public lectures is available online (LSE 2009b).  
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Physical models always help. First, you immediately get a sense for a scheme's  
massing in its context. […] Also, particularly with working models, you can 
begin to see how the architects are thinking about the design process. […] 
Fortunately, all our panel members can read drawings perfectly well. We don't  
need models because we would also understand it otherwise. But clearly models  
are useful. It is very obvious that if a design team has not prepared a model, they 
are not thinking about three dimensions and architecture.49  
 
The panel members of the DRP produce and use the presentation materials in their daily 
practice because they are themselves involved in tall building design. Therefore, they 
are fully able to understand the drawings, models  and visualisations. This means that 
they also know how persuasive these presentation materials can be and that the architect 
will do his or her best to present the project in the best light possible. Image 6 shows  
photographs of context models of No.1 Blackfriars Road. This type of model allows the 
panel members to investigate the proposed project from various positions. It can be seen 
that the tall building is slightly rotated against the axis of Blackfriars  Road. This aspect 
of the design, was suggested by the townscape consultant, Professor Tavernor, in order 
to distinguish the sculptural form of the tall building from the lower buildings and to 
refer to the wider context, orienting the axis of the tall building towards the City of 
London, as was argued by the project architect Christian Male in an interview and by 
Ian Simpson at a public inquiry in October 2008. This adds credibility to the finalised 
design because it shows that the design team has  analysed the physical city context and 
they have reacted to this context by transforming the design.   
 
Presentation materials are also used by the design team to show how the team has 
reacted to a previous critique from the DRP. Figures 2 and 3 of image 6 show two 
models of the lower buildings of No.1 Blackfriars Road. Figure 2 shows the design of 
the lower buildings in 2005 at the stage of the first planning application. CABE had 
criticised the project for the large overhang constituted by the housing block over the 
street and the narrow throughways (CABE 2005a). Figure 3 shows the refined design 
submitted for planning application in 2006 which was subsequently accepted by the 
DRP as a successful solution (CABE 2007a). Using these models, the design team can 
show that they are willing and able to resolve the problems perceived by the assessment 
panel. As a result, the design team establishes credibility with the DRP  
 
                                                 
49 Appendix 22 shows larger context models of the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road projects which were 
used during the public inquiry.  
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members by taking into account and reacting to previous criticism in a constructive 
manner, by resolving problematic aspects and by improving the design quality.  
 
Even though CABE panel members are aware of the persuasive effects that presentation 
materials can have, presentation materials that are well worked out so as to highlight 
positive aspects are still likely to have persuasive impacts on the assessment panel on a 
subconscious level. Academics have pointed out the limitations of the effectiveness of 
assessing design quality. Persuasive effects of presentation materials as identified by 
academics (Carmona 1998a; Carmona et al 2010) are minimised through the expertise 
of the DRP members. Although design quality can not be evaluated without the 
involvement of subjective bias (Parnaby and Short 2008), the fact that the finalised 
comments coming from the DRP are scrutinised again by CABE members minimises 
the impact of those subjective positions. The CABE DRP appears to include a very high 
degree of objectivity in its assessments and must thus be described as an effective 
planning tool with regard to tall buildings in central London.  
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Image 6: Presentation materials contained in the planning application for No.1 Blackfriars Road. 
Source: Ian Simpson Architects 2006: 48, 64  
1 © Ian Simpson Architects 
2, 3, 4 © Andrew Putler 
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4.4 Pre-application discussions with English Heritage  
 
This section examines pre-application processes between the design team and English 
Heritage. The perception by design team members of the interaction with English 
Heritage is assessed against the perception of the same processes by English Heritage 
planning officers. Furthermore, it is considered how English Heritage perceived the 
arguments and presentation materials used by design teams to advocate the No.1 
Blackfriars Road project. It is argued that the design team perceives that English 
Heritage intentionally withholds information and refuses to commit itself to 
unambiguous statements. Thereby, the design team feel they have been placed into a 
state of severe uncertainty due to the potential threat of a call-in. English Heritage and 
LAC members perceive the reasoning put forward by townscape consultants in their 
assessments as an attempt to downplay visual impacts in order to persuade English 
Heritage to withdraw the threat of call-in.  
 
The design team perspective of pre-application discussions with English Heritage 
Roger, the planning consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road, characterised the interaction 
between the design team and English Heritage prior to the planning application 
submission around 2005 to 2006 and then at the time the interview took place in 
October 2007 as follows.  
 
I think when we submitted the first application pack in 2005, at that stage 
English Heritage were kind of very hands-off. There was a very formal 
procedure for doing that [interact with EH], which was [the] LAC; full 
commission […] There wasn't really much informal discussion in terms of pre-
application discussion. […] Because of the number of tall buildings coming 
forward and because of the public inquiries that have been, because of the whole 
raft of issues, they were much more proactive, much more willing to actually 
discuss things outside of the formal procedure. So we got to the stage on the last 
application where we were able to reach quite a level of agreement and certainty 
before we actually submitted the planning application. I guess that is what has 
changed throughout the process.  
 
Comparisons of interviews with the architect, Christian Male, the planning consultant, 
Roger, and the developer, Justin, show that there was the consistent perception that 
resolving the apparent conflict with English Heritage was unlikely to take place in pre-
application discussions in 2005. The typical mode of interaction with English Heritage 
was that the design team would have to submit their planning application documents to 
the LAC, accompanied by a presentation by core design team members. The LAC 
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would then discuss the project's impact on heritage and the project's merits amongst 
panel members without the design team being present. After the discussion, the LAC 
would draw conclusions and put forward their recommendations to the English Heritage 
Commission. Design team members are not present during the LAC panel discussions 
and the minutes of LAC meetings are often withheld from public knowledge when tall 
building projects are discussed.  
 
Withholding LAC minutes from public access was a major issue for the design team of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road. In the LAC minutes from November 2005, it is stated that 
English Heritage was concerned about the unprecedented height proposed at No.1 
Blackfriars Road (LAC 2005a). The LAC minutes regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road 
were exempt from public access in June and September 2006 (LAC 2006b; c).  
Reference is made to the issue of commercial interest described in the 2000 Freedom of 
Information Act. The act states that: 'Information is exempt information if its disclosure 
under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any 
person (including the public authority holding it)' (The National Archives 2000: 
Paragraph 43). In November 2006, the LAC minutes stated that English Heritage would 
seek a call-in if the LB Southwark was minded to grant planning permission (LAC 
2006a). Therefore, there was one year from November 2005 to 2006 in which the design 
team did not know what English Heritage's official position was, and in particular 
whether or not it would seek a call-in. 
 
As has been discussed above, the design team's goals in the pre-application submission 
phase are to maximise consensus and agreement. The agreement that is most important 
for the design team is to get English Heritage's consent not to require a call-in despite its 
objections to potential visual impacts on heritage assets. An agreement not to object at 
all in the event that a tall building is visible in a protected view or from within a 
conservation area is highly unlikely given the statutory remit of English Heritage: to 
protect heritage assets from harm (Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1993). From the 
point of view of the design team, the consultation process with English Heritage is 
characterised by uncertainty that mainly results from the possibility of a call-in which 
would prolong the process of obtaining planning permission by one to two years (as is 
shown in appendix 6) or which might even lead to a negative conclusion by the 
Secretary of State. Since the LAC minutes are not publicly accessible, there are no 
official statements available that show whether English Heritage will require a call-in or 
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not. The design team gets information about English Heritage's position at the earliest at 
the formal consultation stage when the local planning authority, the LB Southwark in 
this case, receives English Heritage's consultation reply. This letter states whether 
English Heritage requires a call-in in the event that the local planning authority grants 
planning permission. As is evident in the LB Southwark's planning reports, English 
Heritage requested a call-in for both of the planning applications from 2005 and 2007 
(LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a). 
 
Both the townscape consultant, Peter Stewart, and the architect, Graham Morrison, who 
were on the LAC panel in 2007 have argued that within the LAC panel there are some 
people who argue very strongly against any visibility of tall buildings. However, both of 
them have also argued that there are experts who are willing to arrive at compromise 
solutions in which tall buildings might be acceptable if design amendments are made. In 
this sense, it can be argued that the assessment made by the LAC panel is also effective 
in increasing its objectivity, while potential subjectivity and bias are limited through 
discussion. However, the fact that decisions on the assessment are made by the English 
Heritage commission limits the effectiveness of the LAC assessment. Even if there is an 
outcome within the LAC that allows the reaching of a compromise solution, it is still 
uncertain whether the commission would take the same view. In contrast to the CABE 
DRP where the assessment results are normally reached by the DRP and the head of the 
design review, the decision making hierarchy within English Heritage presents a source 
of severe uncertainty for designers of tall buildings.50  
 
An LAC assessment created a problem in the Heron Tower inquiry, as supporters of the 
project argued that the LAC assessment contradicted English Heritage's decision to 
recommend a call-in (PINS 2002a). As a consequence of the Heron incident, LAC 
minutes were often withheld from public access. English Heritage argued that the 
reason for withholding LAC minutes was that, in 2002, an architect on the panel feared 
that statements he made there could be taken negatively by his fellow architects (House 
of Commons 2006). Due to the resulting lack of information regarding English 
Heritage's position, the design team is not able to achieve certainty regarding whether 
                                                 
50 CABE, however, diverted from this mode of decision making in the case of the Doon Street Tower, the 
decision on which was referred to the CABE commission (CABE 2007e). The commission reached the 
position of recommending refusal of planning permission due to visual impacts of the project on the 
courtyard of Somerset House (CABE 2007g). 
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English Heritage may request a call-in or not. The pre-application discussion with 
English Heritage therefore has been ineffective in reducing conflict and uncertainty.  
 
The English Heritage assessment of the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Up to now this section has considered the perception of the pre-application discussions 
with English Heritage from the design team's point of view. Paddy Pugh, the senior 
officer and coordinator of the LAC at English Heritage, has characterised the visual 
representation and the arguments put forward by the design team in support of No.1 
Blackfriars Road, and particularly those of the townscape consultant. Townscape 
assessments are the most important presentation materials considered by English 
Heritage as these represent the visual impact of tall buildings on heritage assets. In the 
following quote, Pugh refers to the Accurate Visual Representation (AVR) of the view 
from St James's Park contained in the townscape assessment of the consultant, Professor 
Tavernor, submitted with the 2006 planning application for No.1 Blackfriars Road (see 
image 7). 
 
Their strategy is to produce drawings like this and to say to you: Well this does 
not really harm this view. The building would be a long way back. The centre of 
the view is trees. You are not impacting on the domes and spirals of Whitehall 
Court. Neither is it impacting on the formal composition of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. What you are doing is just being visible in a very 
modest way on part of the view. And it's in a sense […] it's just a discussion to 
try and persuade you that either that does not matter, or that it will actually add 
to the richness and the variety of the view.  
 
Our response is to question all of that. There is a real issue about how far 
something like this [the AVR shown in image 7] accurately portrays what a 
building will look like. You take a building like this [Horse Guards] and you 
actually go and stand on the bridge in St James's Park. That group of buildings is  
much more immediate, is much more prominent than it is shown in that 
photograph. 
 
Pugh specifically refers to what he perceives as persuasive effects in the AVR and the 
arguments of the townscape assessment. The townscape consultant argued that the 
visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road was not sufficient to cause major harm. The 
formal characteristics of the top visual portion of No.1 Blackfriars  Road is described as 
having an 'elegant profile' and 'complex prismatic' form and quality of the architecture 
(Tavernor 2006a: 52-54). The glass skin of the building was said to contrast with the 
historic buildings in the foreground and the distant effects of light reflections were used 
to further emphasise the design's architectural quality. The townscape consultant 
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concluded that No.1 Blackfriars Road would 'provide another point of visual interest on 
the distant horizon, well beyond the picturesque foreground scene' leaving it unharmed 
(ibid.: 52-54).  
 
Pugh does not disagree with the quality of the building, and nor did English Heritage in 
its assessments (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a). Further, he disagrees with the reasoning 
that because of the quality of the architecture what is visible will not harm the view. 
What is perceived by the design team as an objective assessment, based on the London 
Plan and the LVMF methodology, is perceived as an act of persuasion by English 
Heritage. The interview with Paddy Pugh was conducted in November 2007 after the 
2007 LVMF had been published in July and after the LB Southwark had granted 
planning permission to No.1 Blackfriars Road on 21 July. As has been discussed in 
chapter 3, the 2007 LVMF diminished the potential of English Heritage to protect the St 
James's Park view. While the townscape assessment referred to here was based on the 
2005 draft LVMF, which had already allowed the townscape consultant to argue that 
No.1 Blackfriars Road enhances the view, the 2007 LVMF limited English Heritage's 
scope for objecting. While the townscape consultant follows the methodology of the 
LVMF in finding no harm but enhancement, English Heritage's interpretation of the 
LVMF finds harm. This is further evidence of the divergent interpretations that are 
possible based with the LVMF, with English Heritage basing their assessment on 
preserving the historic character of the view. Tavernor, as an architect and architectural 
historian, is able to argue from two points of strength that based on his extensive 
architectural experience this is a first class design and that the urban environment is 
always subject to change and that now buildings should enhance rather than simply 
preserve it.  
 
Image 7 shows the proposed No.1 Blackfriars  Road and the consented Bishopsgate 
Tower and King's Reach Tower Redevelopment (the consented projects are shown as 
line drawings). The townscape assessment compared No.1 Blackfriars Road with these 
consented buildings stating that: like these projects, No.1 Blackfriars Road will appear 
to be a 'distant form' and will be 'no taller than the spiralling top of the Bishopsgate 
Tower' (Tavernor 2006a: 52). The most prominent modern building to remain in the 
view is the London Eye (ibid.). The assessment concluded that No.1 Blackfriars Road 
would enhance the view through the elegance of its design (ibid.). Pugh's disagreement 
with the assessment is also mainly a disagreement with the QVA methodology 
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advocated by the LVMF. First, he does not believe that AVRs as currently used 
represent tall buildings as they would appear when built. Second, he disagrees that the 
visibility of projects granted permission will reduce the harm caused by No.1 
Blackfriars Road. This inherent disagreement exemplifies the argument developed in 
chapter 3: that the cumulative assessment of precedent cases has limited English 
Heritage's ability to advocate its interests in safeguarding heritage assets.  
 
 
Image 7: AVR of No.1 Blackfriars Road in the St James's Park towards Horse Guards Road 
townscape view from 2008. This AVR was also used in negotiations between English Heritage planning 
offi cers and the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road in 2007 prior to the joint public inquiry.  
Source: Tavernor 2008d: 53; © Cityscape3D 
 
 
 
Key to image 7 
1  Bishopsgate Tower  
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road  
4 King's Reach Tower Redevelopment 
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4.5 Negotiation with English Heritage  
 
This section examines the negotiation process between Justin, the developer of No.1 
Blackfriars Road, and Paddy Pugh, director of English Heritage's LAC. This particular 
negotiation took place after the planning committee meeting in July 2007 in which No.1 
Blackfriars Road was granted planning permission by the LB Southwark. In 
consultation, English Heritage had maintained the position that it would request a call-in 
by the Secretary of State if planning permission was granted (LB Southwark 2007a). 
Therefore, it was crucial for the design team to reach an agreement with English 
Heritage so as to avoid a call-in. The section primarily draws on data accessed through 
interviews with LAC members, the developer and the responsible English Heritage 
officer. It is  argued that, on the one hand, LAC members perceived compromise 
bargaining by the design team, who used repetitive height reductions to get English 
Heritage to withdraw its threat of a call-in. On the other hand, the design team was 
threatened by English Heritage's insistence on requesting a call-in request and perceived 
that they would have to go through a lengthy and costly public inquiry. Furthermore, it 
is argued that an agreement was reached and thus any conflict was successfully 
resolved, since the parties were able to find a solution in which both could advocate 
central aspects of their interests despite having to live with trade-offs.   
 
The perception of compromise bargaining  
Graham Morrison, who is a member of the LAC committee and also a principal 
architect in Allies and Morrison who are involved in tall building projects in North 
Lambeth and Southwark, describes  his perception of the implementation process of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road in the LAC. 
 
On the Beetham building [No.1 Blackfriars Road] it has been more complicated 
because […] they know they are not going to get everything they apply for. So 
they ask their architect to make it twenty stories taller than the thing that they 
realistically think it is going to be. Because then they can say: well we consulted, 
we conceded. We wanted to build this [226 metres high], now it's going to be 
that [180 metres high]. But probably in their hearts they are aiming for that [170 
metres high]. So they say they are aiming to do that and it comes down to do 
that. And they are quite pleased because they got more than they thought. 
Everybody knows it's a game. And that's why you have to fall back on as 
objective an analysis as you can possibly do.  
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Morrison insinuates that the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road used compromise 
bargaining strategically to pressure English Heritage into withdrawing its threat of a 
call-in. In his perception, the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road submitted the 
proposals for the 226 metre tall building because they knew that English Heritage and 
other heritage advocacy groups would object so that the proposal could be reduced in 
height, and to show compliance with the consultation responses and still be profitable. 
In fact, the proposal was reduced in height to 180 metres in the 2006 planning 
application and to 170 metres after the negotiations with English Heritage in the autumn 
of 2007 (PINS 2009a) (see image 8 in relation to this paragraph). Other projects visible 
in the St James's Park view had undergone similar processes. The Bishopsgate Tower 
was reduced in height by 16 metres in November 2005 due to an objection by English 
Heritage (GLA 2006b). 20 Blackfriars Road was initially proposed as a single tower 
226 metres high (see appendix 9). CABE, following the assessment within the DRP, 
criticised the visual appearance and the massing of the project (CABE 2005c). In 
reaction, the brief was  amended and a two tower solution was proposed with heights of 
148 and 105 metres (Wilkinson Eyre Architects 2008). The Doon Street Tower was 
reduced from 173.2 metres (as proposed in November 2005) to 144.3 metres due to 
objections by heritage groups (PINS 2008). The height reductions were responses to 
objections by a range of bodies during the consultation process.  
 
Morrison's reasoning in the interview quoted above can be compared with further 
interviews and media data. Fred Manson, the former Director of Regeneration at the LB 
Southwark, argued that it would be typical for planning consultants to advise their 
clients to put forward a planning application for a building with the greatest amount of 
height in order to test whether a project with optimum financial gain could be achieved. 
One way to interpret this action is to take into account the media perception of the 
project and the meaning of this for developers. A central aspect of a very expensive high 
risk tall building project, such as No.1 Blackfriars Road, is to find a company that buys 
the finalised building, as public relations consultant Ian Lindsley has confirmed.  
 
Media reports on such a high profile building attract the attention of potential buyers. In 
July 2005, Beetham Organization published a press release stating that it was planning a 
500 million pound tall building project at No.1 Blackfriars Road (Beetham Organization 
2005). The height of a proposed tall building is an important factor for marketing and 
for finding a company to buy the finalised project. Although I was not able to determine 
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whether the initial proposal at 226 metres and the successive height reductions were part 
of an overarching strategy by the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road or not, it is 
important to note that this perception persisted within English Heritage's LAC.   
 
The agreement reached between the design team and English Heritage 
I discussed the assessment outcomes of face-to-face negotiations between the developer, 
Justin, of No.1 Blackfriars Road and Paddy Pugh from English Heritage. At the time the 
interview took place, it was already known in expert circles that English Heritage had 
agreed not to seek a call-in because it had reached a compromise with the developer to 
reduce the building by another 10 metres to 170 metres in height. The developer, Justin, 
reflects in hindsight on the positive outcome of this negotiation.  
 
Juergen: 
I was wondering why they [English Heritage] did that.  
 
Justin: 
It was partly to avoid getting a call-in.  
 
Juergen:  
Exactly, but what did English Heritage get out of that? 
 
Justin: 
Save face. 
 
Philip Davis who was doing a presentation […] he is so anti tall buildings. He 
basically says you don't need tall buildings. But he said: look how we managed 
to bring that down! He showed the 226 and the 170 without the inter-mediate 
one. It had to be said: if you just look at this tree line with this thing sticking out  
like that in isolation and you are getting a distance effect and so on. You know, 
you can make it look dramatic. But you can make anything look incongruous if 
you take the views, especially in two dimensions.  
 
In the interview quoted above, Justin criticises English Heritage which in his perception 
overstated the visual effects of No.1 Blackfriars Road on the St James's Park view. In 
relation to this, as has been discussed in section 1 of this chapter, English Heritage is 
subjected to strict scrutiny by interest groups which are very likely to issue a complaint 
to the national government if they think that assessments made are unjustified, as is 
evident in the House of Commons reports (House of Commons 2002; 2006). Therefore, 
English Heritage needed to emphasise the negative visual effects of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road to justify its strong objections, while maintaining a fair and objective assessment 
process.  
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In the autumn of 2007, when the developer, Justin, and Paddy Pugh from English 
Heritage negotiated a compromise, the design team had to be convinced that English 
Heritage, and other potential objectors—the Westminster City Council and the Royal 
Parks—would continue to object. They had already raised strong objections to No.1 
Blackfriars Road in 2006 and July 2007 based on the visual impact of the project on the 
St James's Park view (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a). In addition, No.1 Blackfriars Road 
had been mentioned in a report by the DCMS to UNESCO in 2007 which stated that the 
project was one of several projects that were likely to cause serious negative effects on 
the Westminster World Heritage Site (WHS) and that UNESCO was therefore 
considering putting the WHS on its list of endangered monuments (DCMS 2007a). As a 
result, as has been mentioned by several interviewees, the Secretary of State was very 
likely to follow call-in requests for all of these projects including No.1 Blackfriars 
Road.  
 
There is an important aspect of temporal simultaneity with regard to tall building 
projects in the northern parts of Lambeth and Southwark. At the time when Justin and 
Pugh negotiated their agreement, the Doon Street Tower planning application had just 
been submitted to the LB Lambeth (PINS 2008). The Doon Street Tower was 
considered to have a greater negative impact on the St James's Park view due to the 
project appearing higher within the view when compared with the 170 metre tall version 
of No.1 Blackfriars Road (ibid.) (see image 8). In addition, the Doon Street Tower was 
visible from within the courtyard of Somerset House, a Grade I listed building (ibid.).  
Furthermore, the design team of the Elizabeth House project, which comprised three tall 
buildings at Waterloo, was also preparing to submit for planning (PINS 2009b). It has 
been argued by a range of interviewees, such as William and Nick from CABE, that the 
design teams were waiting to see who would submit a planning application first. Due to 
the potentially harmful visual effects of all these projects in the DCMS report from 
2007, it was very likely that whichever project was submitted first would in all 
likelihood be called in by the Secretary of State. In addition, both the Doon Street 
Tower and No.1 Blackfriars Road appeared visible in almost the same part of the St 
James's Park view (PINS 2008; 2009a). Therefore, the respective developers had to be 
very mindful of when to submit for planning.  
 
In the interview quote above, Justin explains that English Heritage entered into the 
compromise agreement and withdrew its request for a call-in because it needed to save 
 176 
face. In order to test this statement, it first needs to be established what the possible 
reasons could have been for English Heritage to withdraw the threat of a call-in. It has 
been argued by a number of interviewees, who shall not be identified by name with 
respect to this issue, that the large number of high level public inquiries regarding tall 
buildings in London financially constrained English Heritage. However, annual 
accounts of English Heritage do not identify how much money was spent on public 
inquiries. Furthermore, English Heritage's  statutory remit is to safeguard heritage assets 
in the whole of England. Indeed, tall building cases also caused considerable 
controversy in Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle upon Tyne and Birmingham (Short 
2007). Furthermore, conservation aspects regarding tall buildings are only one of many 
matters which English Heritage has to manage. Thus, it is not possible to say with 
certainty to what degree English Heritage was or is constrained by its budget in terms of 
its ability to successfully conduct large numbers of public inquiries.  
 
As has been confirmed by interviewees in informal conversations, the cost of a high 
level barrister and supporting instructing solicitor needed to conduct a public inquiry 
successfully can be up to one million pounds, in addition to the costs of the expert 
witnesses. English Heritage was the primary opposing party at six out of eleven public 
inquiries regarding tall buildings in central London between 2000 and 2009 (see 
appendix 7). Based on these issues, it is plausible to assume that English Heritage 
would not have been able to finance three major public inquiries in a short space of 
time. The Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House were called in by the Secretary of 
State following requests by English Heritage (PINS 2008; 2009b). By getting the design 
team of No.1 Blackfriars Road to reduce the height of the project by another 10 metres 
to 170 metres in height, English Heritage was able to show that its consecutive 
objections had led to a significant reduction in the visual impact on St James's Park to 
avoid public inquiry.  
 
In summary, the compromise agreement reached between English Heritage and the 
developer of No.1 Blackfriars Road did not result in the optimum outcome for either 
party. English Heritage would have preferred the project not to be visible from St 
James's Park, as is evident in its objection maintained in 2008 (English Heritage 2008b). 
The developer would have preferred the 180 metre tall version. The price for a 
penthouse suite, located in the upper half of No.1 Blackfriars Road, was estimated at 2.5 
million pounds in 2005 (Beetham Organization 2005). The top floors were proposed as 
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single units, which would have been most likely to be the most expensive and lucrative 
suites in the tall building element. In the development control report published by the 
LB Southwark in December 2007, it is evident that despite the reduction by one floor, 
the number of hotel rooms and private residential units remained the same (LB 
Southwark 2007b). However, compared to the much taller 2005 version, the hotel was 
reduced by 953 square metres, market residential units reduced by 80 square metres, 
and the volume of the sky deck also reduced (ibid.). Therefore, by agreeing to forego 
about three to four floors, the developer had to rebalance the financial equation. 
Nonetheless, the compromise agreement reached needs to be understood as a positive 
outcome in terms of planning since conflicts were resolved and the project would have 
been able to move forward to construction. However, further conflict and an inquiry 
were to ensue.    
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Image 8: Image showing the proposed No.1 Blackfriars Road project with the reductions in height 
relative to other tall building proposals visible in the St James's Park towards Horse Guards Road 
townscape view. The image also shows the height reduction of the 20 Blackfriars Road project which 
resulted from an amendment to the development brief. The latter version proposed two instead of one 
building. I recommend the reader uses appendix 14 to clarify the layering of the tall buildings in the 
background of the view. Source: Author  
 
 
Key to image 8 
1 Bishopsgate Tower 
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road 
3 20 Blackfriars Road 
4 King's Reach Tower Redevelopment 
5 Doon Street Tower 
6 London Bridge Tower 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
In the CABE DRP process, the array of subjective expert opinions is transformed into 
an objective final assessment. Objectivity is achieved because CABE DRP step back 
from the various expert opinions expressed at the DRP when they are writing the 
finalised reports. Of particular importance in the DRP process is the experience of the 
panel members, who are themselves architects and consultants, regarding high end 
architectural and tall building projects. Without this expertise, the DRP assessment 
could easily be biased by the various persuasive effects that are a part of the 
presentation materials produced by architects and visualisation firms. However, the fact 
that many CABE panel members are often also members of design teams working on 
projects that are being assessed by CABE, has led to accusations of potential conflict of 
interest. Architects who have complained about a lack of objectivity by the DRP, tend 
to do so when their projects have been assessed negatively by CABE. Accusations over 
conflicts of interests have also been made by heritage groups aggrieved by CABE's 
support for tall building projects. The conflict of interest issues therefore appear to be a 
problem of perception. Accusations are possible because, of the involvement of CABE 
members in high end projects, leading to a potential for conflicts of interests.  
 
In terms of the pre-application processes, these appear to work rather well between the 
design teams and CABE. Due to discussions between leading CABE DRP personnel 
and design teams early on, the design teams are able to prepare well for the DRP 
process. A high degree of certainty is achieved for developers when CABE is able to 
confirm early on that the location in which a tall building is being proposed is 
acceptable. Due to the level of information exchanged with CABE, the design teams are 
able to effectively address and resolve potentially problematic aspects of the design. In 
contrast, pre-application discussions with English Heritage are characterised by a less 
constructive interaction in the early stages. This is in part a result of radically opposed 
positions. English Heritage would prefer if tall buildings did not have visual impact on 
heritage assets, but this would severely limit the opportunities for developers, indeed 
rendering many tall building projects unfeasible. A significant amount of uncertainty 
results from withholding information regarding the threat of English Heritage 
requesting call-in at the planning application stage. Therefore, conflict resolution at the 
pre-application stage between the design teams and English Heritage is poor. Design 
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teams have to wait until the consultation responses from English Heritage are published, 
and only then can they amend the design and submit it for planning again.  
 
The compromise reached with the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road was a 
departure from this typical pre-application process with English Heritage. Although 
both parties had to accept that optimum results could not be reached, conflicts were 
resolved. The developer agreed to reduce the height of the tall building and in exchange, 
English Heritage withdrew the threat of a call-in. This must be seen as a positive result 
since this agreement opened up the possibility that the planning process for No.1 
Blackfriars Road could go ahead without a lengthy and costly public inquiry. However, 
it needs to be taken into account that it is plausible that a compromise was only 
achieved due to financial and temporal constraints. On the one hand, the design team 
needed to get English Heritage's agreement due to the fact that the DCMS stated that 
No.1 Blackfriars Road was a potential threat to central London's WHSs. On the other 
hand, English Heritage needed to prove that it had taken every measure possible to 
reduce the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road due to the potential criticism it might 
face from interest groups, such as the WCC, the Royal Parks and ICOMOS UK, which 
demanded the project should not be visible from within St James's Park at all. It is 
therefore unlikely that compromise agreements will become the norm since the No.1 
Blackfriars Road case has been a one-off departure from the typical process so far.  
 
English Heritage has not accepted the finalised 2007 LVMF as a method appropriate for 
assessing the visual impact of tall buildings. This created the problem that townscape 
assessments for No.1 Blackfriars Road presented to English Heritage by design teams 
were perceived as attempts to persuade English Heritage to withdraw its call-in threat. 
This results from the lack of conflict resolution in the LVMF policy making process.  
 
A very important factor in enhancing the objectivity of the CABE DRP and English 
Heritage's  LAC is  the involvement of private sector experts. Expertise gained from 
significant development projects, including tall buildings, and the interdisciplinary 
compositions of the panels allow CABE and English Heritage to incorporate a diversity 
of opinions. Objectivity is enhanced since the final assessment reports are prepared by 
CABE personnel and the English Heritage Commission as independent bodies. Experts 
from the private sector are not involved in writing the final reports. Conflicts of interest 
are managed through codes of conduct which are in line with the Nolan Report. Panel 
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members announce any potential conflicts of interest, and then withdraw from the 
assessment of these projects. There is no evidence suggesting that potential conflicts of 
interest have not been managed effectively.  
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5. Local planning authority and UNESCO  
 
The design team's final goal in the planning process is to achieve planning permission 
for their projects. One important step in this process is to secure the support of local 
politicians and planning officers. This chapter considers the processes of local policy 
making, development control and decision making regarding the planning permission 
for No.1 Blackfriars Road by the LB Southwark. The first section discusses the efforts 
made by the LB Southwark to establish a tall building policy for the Blackfriars area so 
that tall building projects located there could be granted permission. In particular, the 
section discusses the policy making process, including the consultation and political 
decision making internal to the LB Southwark. It is determined what the impact of the 
results of the policy making process were on providing certainty for the developers of 
tall buildings located in the north-western corner of Southwark, including No.1 
Blackfriars Road. The second section focuses on pre-application discussions between 
private design team members, GLA, and LB Southwark planning officers. In particular, 
it is examined how design teams prepared for and conducted pre-application 
discussions. Furthermore, the relevance of the principal contacts within the LB 
Southwark, such as planning officers and local politicians, is determined.  
 
The third section focuses on evaluating the impacts of the involvement of UNESCO in 
policy making and implementation. UNESCO became a major third party regarding tall 
buildings in central London because it threatened to put the Westminster and Tower of 
London WHSs on its List of World Heritage in Danger, which could have eventually 
led to their removal from the World Heritage List. The fourth section focuses on the 
debate and decision making processes between the private design team and LB 
Southwark local councillors within the planning meeting regarding the planning 
decision for No.1 Blackfriars Road. The focus is on the issues foregrounded in the 
debate and the efforts made by local councillors to assess the suitability of No.1 
Blackfriars Road. Furthermore, bargaining between councillors and the design team is 
examined regarding central aspects of the projects, such as Section 106 (S106) 
obligations, the allocation of parking spaces, the visual impact and architectural design.  
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Figure 5: Diagram of the most relevant LPA processes regarding tall building development. The 
directions were amended and appeal processes can now be decided by the planning inspector directly, as 
has been the case with Black Prince Road (PINS 2009c).  
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5.1 Tall building policy for the north-western corner of 
Southwark 
 
This section focuses on local policy making—the development of the Southwark Plan—
with a particular focus on the Bankside and Borough area in which No.1 Blackfriars 
Road is located. Critically, the north-western corner of the LB Southwark where the 
project of No.1 Blackfriars Road is located is not identified as an Opportunity Area in 
the London Plan (GLA 2004a). Consequently, the Southwark Plan, the Local 
Development Framework (LDF) for Southwark, has identified Elephant and Castle and 
London Bridge as Opportunity Areas but not the Blackfriars Road area (LB Southwark 
2007c). According to the plan-led approach advocated through the 1991 Planning and 
Compulsory Purchase Act, local policy has to be based on national and regional policy 
(OPSI 1991). Planning decisions regarding the granting or refusal of planning 
permission have to be determined in accordance with national, regional and local 
development frameworks (OPSI 1990a). Thus, despite the strong support for No.1 
Blackfriars Road by the GLA and the LB Southwark, there was doubt as to whether the 
particular location was appropriate for a tall building. First, the section examines the 
efforts made by the LB Southwark to develop a tall building policy for the Blackfriars 
area. Following the discussion of these data, the policy making efforts in conjunction 
with the wider regeneration strategy of the LB Southwark are considered. As it finally 
turned out, the tall building policy for Blackfriars was rejected by local politicians 
(Strategic Director of Regeneration 2007). This lack of a tall building policy specific to 
the area in which No.1 Blackfriars Road is located is examined in terms of its effects on 
certainty for developers and its meaning for the further planning process.     
 
Efforts to develop a tall building policy for the north-western corner of Southwark  
In 2004, a number of developers expressed their interests in proposing tall building 
developments at the north-western corner of the LB Southwark. The King's Reach 
Tower was proposed to be redeveloped and was granted planning permission in July 
2005 (LB Southwark 2005c). The projects of No.1 Blackfriars Road and 20 Blackfriars 
Road were discussed initially with local politicians and planners (Ian Simpson 
Architects 2008; Wilkinson Eyre Architects 2008). At the site of No.1 Blackfriars Road, 
a project for a nineteen story tall building for Sainsbury's, designed by the acclaimed 
practice, Foster and Partners, set a precedent for the appropriateness of a tall building on 
the site (Ian Simpson Architects 2006). In addition, precedents for tall building 
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development in the northern part of Lambeth were set through the London Bridge 
Tower (colloquially referred to as the Shard), which was granted permission following a 
lengthy public inquiry in 2003 (PINS 2003), and Potter's Fields, which was granted 
permission following an appeal procedure (PINS 2004b). Therefore, in addition to 
development pressure for tall building in the Blackfriars area, there were precedents that 
suggested that tall building projects would be acceptable there.  
 
In Southwark, the Elephant and Castle master plan proposed a major restructuring of the 
area located at the fringe of the CAZ. At Blackfriars and in the wider Bankside area, a 
number of projects such as the redevelopment of Tate Modern, the London Eye, 
Bankside 123 and others had already kick-started regeneration (see the orange areas in 
map 9). The LB Southwark was interested in tall building development at the southern 
end of Blackfriars Bridge based on the belief that this would support high end 
development further south at Elephant and Castle where investment was desperately 
needed (Bevan 2008). Since there was not yet a tall building policy specific to the 
Blackfriars area, three consecutive workshops were held between January and March 
2005 focussing on discussing the potential for tall building development at the southern 
end of Blackfriars Bridge (Sparks 2005). The workshop summary document from 26 
January 2005 lists the interested architects, among others the architects of No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road, major planning consultancies as well as planning officers from 
English Heritage, the GLA and local boroughs as participants (ibid.).  
 
Southwark planners advocated tall building development in the borough through local 
policy. In 2004 and 2005, the LB Southwark published drafts of the Southwark Plan, the 
LDF for the LB Southwark (Hollox and Mattox 2005). In July 2005, the inspectors 
reviewing the plan concluded that the Southwark Plan 'gives a very good outline of the 
vitality and character of this part of Southwark' (ibid.: 132). Furthermore, they 
concluded that Policy 1.4 was flexible in approach so as to allow for mixed use 
development although office use was prioritised (ibid.: 133). This was an important 
factor for the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road projects. No.1 Blackfriars Road proposed 
hotel and high end residential uses, while 20 Blackfriars Road proposed offices and 
later a mix of offices and housing (Ian Simpson Architects 2006; Wilkinson Eyre 
Architects 2008).   
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Following the workshops and reports, Southwark planners developed the Draft Tall 
Buildings Supplementary Document for Consultation published in November 2005 (LB 
Southwark 2005b). This draft document identified the northern end of Blackfriars Road 
as an area appropriate for tall building development. The reasoning for tall building 
designation was threefold: i) the area lies outside viewing corridors and that therefore 
there was no risk of damaging significant views towards St. Paul's or the Palace of 
Westminster; ii) the area is very well connected to public transport, a requirement of the 
London Plan; and, iii) planning consent for King's Reach Tower and planning consent 
for a tall building at the site of No.1 Blackfriars Road showed that there was a 
significant potential for tall building development (ibid.). Strengthening these 
assessments, the Director of Regeneration of the LB Southwark wrote a report in June 
2006 requiring this be recognised by local politicians. This report focussed on tall 
building policy in the forthcoming Southwark Plan. The report pointed out Policy 3.20 
of the Southwark Plan that would apply to tall building development in the Opportunity 
Areas of London Bridge (B in map 9) and Elephant and Castle (C in map 9), as well as 
the north-western corner of the borough, Blackfriars Bridge (A in map 9) (Strategic 
Director of Regeneration 2006). Policy 3.20 of the Southwark Plan states that planning 
permission may be granted to tall buildings in the CAZ, and in particular in Opportunity 
Areas (LB Southwark 2006a) 
 
The Southwark Plan was finally adopted by the council members on 29 June 2006 
(ibid.). However, much to the detriment of supporters of tall buildings in the Blackfriars 
area, the final result was that the supplementary guidance specific to the issue of tall 
buildings in the area of Bankside and Borough did not achieve the consent of local 
politicians and was therefore withdrawn (Strategic Director of Regeneration 2007). In 
2007, when the planning applications for No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road were submitted 
to LB Southwark, there was no policy that specifically designated the sites as 
appropriate for tall building development. As a result, objectors such as English 
Heritage, the Royal Parks and the WCC argued in consultation against these projects 
due to the absence of a local tall building policy designating the sites as appropriate for 
tall buildings, any granting of planning permission would be premature (LB Southwark 
2007a; b; 2008b). This posed a serious threat for the design teams of the tall building 
projects since, based on the finalised 2007 GOTB, local boroughs were required to 
produce tall building policies that identify areas appropriate for tall buildings (English 
Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
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The meaning of the absence of an area specific tall building policy  
The north-western corner, the Blackfriars Bridge area, held an important strategic 
purpose in Southwark's planning approach. As both Fred Manson, the former Director 
of Regeneration, and Adrian Dennis, the case officer for No.1 Blackfriars Road, 
explained in interviews, attracting and permitting high end tall building development at 
the southern end of Blackfriars Bridge (A in map 9) was perceived as an attractor for the 
regeneration at Elephant and Castle further south (C), an Opportunity Area that does not 
have the advantage of close proximity to central London and the River Thames. 
Therefore, the reasoning of Southwark's planners was that if they were able to get 
planning permissions for high end tall buildings at Blackfriars Bridge, this would have a 
spin-off effect on Elephant and Castle and help to attract investment interests by 
developers there. Map 9 shows that three tall building projects were proposed during 
2006 and 2007 in the Elephant and Castle area: Castle House Redevelopment (21), 
Elephant and Castle Tower (22) and Eileen House (24).  
 
This spin-off effect in terms of regeneration was enhanced by the significant amounts 
that were expected to be gained for the LB Southwark through S106 obligations. Purple 
lines in map 9 show the linkage of Blackfriars Road to be upgraded through the 
Blackfriars Road improvement scheme, also a part of the S106 agreement, to the river 
frontage, including the link across the River Thames established through the 
Millennium Bridge (see appendix 10 for a full account of S106 obligations for No.1 and 
20 Blackfriars Road) (LB Southwark 2007b; 2008b). Therefore, a tall building policy 
that allowed the granting of planning permission for No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road was 
essential so that the significant planning gain through S106 and the spin-off effect in 
terms of regeneration could be obtained by the LB Southwark. However, in the face of a 
potential call-in by the Secretary of State, what has the absence of a tall building policy 
meant for the design team? 
 
There are reasons to suspect that not having in place a specific tall building policy could 
be an advantage for developers. In interviews in late 2007, the developer, Justin, the 
architect, Christian Male, and Fred Manson, the former Director of Regeneration at the 
LB Southwark, argued that not having a tall building policy can be advantageous for 
developers. Developers can identify sites at which a tall building may possibly be 
proposed before the site has been designated as appropriate for a tall building within a 
policy, when the sites are likely to be cheaper. In November 2010, the site of No.1 
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Blackfriars Road was estimated in the property press at a price of £150 million due to 
the granting of planning permission for the Sainsbury project (Phillips 2010). However, 
the developers Beetham Organization already owned the site in 2007 (Ian Simpson 
Architects 2008). Due to the threat posed by a potential call-in, the design teams would 
have very much preferred if there had been a tall building policy identifying the sites of 
No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, as is confirmed by the developer, Justin, the architect, 
Christian Male, and the planning consultant, Roger. 
 
To resume, the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road managed to obtain the support of 
the GLA, CABE and the LB Southwark due to repeated improvements to the design and 
an agreement reached on S106 obligations (GLA 2007c; e; CABE 2007a; LB 
Southwark 2007b). Another agreement was reached with the LB Lambeth which had 
threatened to object due to visual impacts on the Roupell Street Conservation Area if 
there was no S106 gain for them. Lambeth did not continue to object (LB Southwark 
2007b). Most importantly, a compromise agreement was reached with English Heritage 
which no longer required a call-in by the winter of 2007 (English Heritage 2008b). 
English Heritage, as a co-author of the 2007 GOTB, thereby provided validation that the 
Southwark's policies were sufficient to grant planning permission. Only after this 
agreement was a degree of certainty established that allowed the design team to submit 
a planning application with a high potential of it not being called in and not having to go 
to a public inquiry. Reaching an agreement with the WCC and the Royal Parks was 
impossible since reducing the height of the project so that it would no longer be visible 
from within St James's Park would have resulted in a design that would no longer—
according to the developers—have been financially viable.  
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Map 9:  No.1 Blackfriars Road and Southwark's planning strategy. The drawing is based on the 
Waterloo Opportunity Area Framework (GLA 2007f), the LB Southwark 2010 consultation plans for the 
Bankside, Borough and London Bridge areas (LB Southwark 2010a), and a drawing that identifies 
regeneration schemes in relation to No.1 Blackfriars Road produced by Ian Simpson Architects (Ian 
Simpson Architects 2006). Source: Author  
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Key to map 9 
 
Projects 
Red   No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Yellow  Tall building projects in northern Southwark and Lambeth  
Blue  Other tall building projects in central London 
Purple The Blackfriars Road improvement scheme connected with the river 
walk along the River Thames and the Millennium Bridge 
Orange Locations of developments with planning consent that made significant 
contributions to the regeneration of Southwark 
 
Opportunity Areas as designated by the LB Southwark in 2010 
A    Bankside Opportunity Area 
B    London Bridge Opportunity Area 
C    Elephant and Castle Opportunity Area 
D    Waterloo Opportunity Area 
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5.2 Pre-application discussion with Southwark 
 
This section considers the pre-application process between planning officers from the 
LB Southwark and the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road. According to the 1990 
Town and Country Planning Act, the principal agency that has the power to grant 
planning permission is the local planning authority (LPA) (OPSI 1990a). In the case of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road, the LPA is the LB Southwark. The purpose of a pre-application 
discussion is to resolve issues prior to the planning application submission and decision 
making at the planning committee (Killian and Pretty 2008). Thus, pre-application 
discussions are most effective if conflicts are resolved early on so that time is saved, 
greater certainty is obtained for the design team and the quality of development is 
increased (ibid.). The examination of pre-application discussions in this section 
primarily draws on data gained in interviews with Adrian Dennis, the Team Leader in 
the Major Applications Team in the Regeneration and Neighbourhoods Department of 
the London Borough of Southwark. Dennis was also the case officer for No.1 
Blackfriars Road. Furthermore, data gained in interviews with the No.1 Blackfriars 
Road planning consultant, Roger, and the public relations consultant, Ian Lindsley, are 
considered. The first part of the section takes the perspective of the LPA case officer, 
while the second part takes the perspective of the design team.  
 
The LB Southwark case officer's perspective of pre-application discussions  
In an interview, Adrian Dennis framed his interaction with the architect and the design 
team regarding pre-application discussions on design matters for No.1 Blackfriars Road. 
Adrian Dennis was the case officer for the London Bridge Tower des igned by Renzo 
Piano Building Workshop and No.1 Blackfriars Road.  
 
Again the better example, I know it's outside your area, is the Shard [London 
Bridge Tower]. On the one hand you might not question Renzo Piano's ability to 
design fine buildings. However, he did not hesitate to change the building. The 
same, to some extent, it is with Ian Simpson and Christian Male, his project 
architect. They are constantly looking at their building and find out how to do it  
still better. How they got to where they are in the application: its forty models, 
looking at change. That is the quality: that they change the design to make it 
better.  
 
The London Bridge Tower was subjected to a public inquiry in April and May 2003 and 
the issue of design quality was one of the most significant questions in this public 
inquiry (PINS 2003). The London Bridge Tower's visibility from within the Tower of 
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London World Heritage Site was a central issue of conflict between proponents and 
opponents of the project (ibid.). The planning inspector and the Secretary of State 
concluded that the London Bridge Tower enhanced the view from within the Tower 
because of its quality of architectural design (PINS 2003; ODPM 2003). Regarding 
No.1 Blackfriars Road, the aspect that was discussed most controversially was the 
visual impact on the townscape view from St James's Park. English Heritage, the Royal 
Parks and the WCC maintained in their consultation replies to Southwark that they 
objected to the project due to unacceptable visual impacts on St James's Park (LB 
Southwark 2007a; 2007b). Furthermore, the DCMS stated that No.1 Blackfriars Road, 
as well as the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House might visually harm the 
Westminster WHS (DCMS 2007a). Therefore, the London Bridge Tower provides an 
important precedent case for the argument that a tall building is acceptable if it can be 
proven that it enhances a view through quality of design.  
 
In interviews with me, the project architect, Christian Male, the planning consultant, 
Roger, and the developer, Justin, argued that the quality of the architectural and urban 
design of No.1 Blackfriars Road was of prime importance in the planning process.  The 
design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road took on board criticism regarding the urban 
design quality of the lower buildings by the GLA and CABE (GLA 2005e; CABE 
2005a). Adrian Dennis confirmed in an interview that, in addition to this, Ian Simpson 
Architects also amended the design based on comments he made regarding details such 
as the location of toilets and further functional aspects. Since the design team of No.1 
Blackfriars Road was willing to continuously amend the design until a successful design 
was developed and the concerns of the LB Southwark planning officers were fully taken 
into account, Adrian Dennis arrived at the conclusion in his reports to the Southwark 
planning committee that the design was of highest design quality, thereby fulfilling 
policy requirements of the Southwark Plan, London Plan, 2000 White Paper, PPS1 and 
GOTB (London Borough of Southwark 2007a, 2007b). This is critical since, according 
to the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, a development proposal may only be 
granted planning permission if it conforms to national, regional and local policy (OPSI 
1990a).  
 
In summary, if the architect is committed to improving the design throughout the pre-
application discussions, the case officer will in return be committed to supporting the 
project in his or her report to the local politicians on the planning committee. The 
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architects gain credibility with planning officers if they amend the project so as to take 
into account recommendations. However, design is not the only aspect in which the 
LPA is interested. The Urban Task Force Report, governmental reports and the DCLG 
have argued that LPAs should seek to obtain substantial planning gains through S106 
agreements (Urban Task Force 1999; Barker 2006b; DCLG 2007a). Indeed, S106 
obligations provided as part of the No.1 Blackfriars Road project were quite 
considerable. The project provided for 32 units of affordable housing on site, 15.62 
million pounds for off-site affordable housing and another 8.2 million pounds for 
infrastructure improvements (see appendix 10). Therefore, besides  the discussion of 
design aspects there were also negotiations regarding these financial aspects.  
 
Design team's perspective of pre-application discussions with Southwark 
The second crucial aspect of the interaction between the design team and the LB 
Southwark was of a political nature. Local councillors are the final decision makers in 
the planning meeting regarding the granting of planning permission for tall building 
projects. The planning consultant, Roger, framed the approach of the design team of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road to interacting with the LB Southwark: 
 
Roger: 
Because there is such a wide range of bodies now and so many issues you need 
to consider, each consultant becomes very important for the role that they play. 
For example, political consultants, on a scheme like this you need to know what 
politicians are thinking. You need to know early on and sell the scheme to them 
and make sure that you address the issues. You know what their key concerns  
are, so that you can negotiate. The last thing you want is to go to planning 
committee and not know what their issues are.  
 
Juergen: 
Which politicians do you mean, local politicians, regional or national? 
 
Roger: 
Principally local. So, the council leader. 
 
Two key aspects can be deduced from Roger's quote. First, information about the 
constraints and interests of local politicians is crucial for the design team to prepare for 
negotiations and the planning committee. Second, the most important people who need 
to be convinced of the merits of a tall building are the local politicians. Public relations 
consultants are one important source of information that allows the design team insights 
into the positions and concerns of leading local politicians. In my interview with Ethan, 
the solicitor for No.1 Blackfriars Road from the law firm, Herbert Smith, confirmed that 
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information about the constraints and key interests of local politicians, provided by 
public relations consultants, was crucial for preparing for discussions with the LB 
Southwark. The public relations consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road was Jeremy 
Fraser from Four Communications, a former leader of Southwark Council. Ian Lindsley, 
from Jefferson Communications, who had not been working on No.1 Blackfriars Road 
in 2007, confirmed that one of the principal roles of public relations consultants is to 
obtain information about the key issues that constrain politicians. Furthermore, he stated 
that pubic relations consultants have access to politicians not as lobbyists, but rather as 
gatherers of information. Successful cooperation between the design team and local 
politicians depends on the design team's ability to address the key concerns and 
constraints of local politicians.  
 
Experienced planning consultancies such as DP9 have acquired substantial experience 
in interacting with the LB Southwark planning officers through their involvement in a 
large amount of tall building projects (see appendix 3). The design team then utilises 
previous experience and knowledge about the current political structure of the LB 
Southwark to enhance its interaction. Furthermore, the solicitor, Ethan, also stated that 
DP9 are one of the prime planning consultancies due to the network built up with 
influential people in London's planning scene. The developer, Justin, stated that he 
employed DP9 because they were reputed to be the best planning consultants regarding 
tall building projects in London. Thus, successful pre-application discussions also 
depend on the working relationships and connections between the planning consultant, 
who acts as a communication link with the developer, and local boroughs.  
 
Recently, lobbying has been the subject of a House of Commons inquiry which 
concluded that there was the risk that non-transparent lobbying threatens the 
accountability of political decisions (House of Commons 2010). Therefore, it is 
important to examine how transparent lobbying took place in the case of No.1 
Blackfriars Road. The principal goal of meetings with leading local politicians is to 
achieve their agreement to support a project. Lobbying is perceived as a legitimate 
action as long as it is conducted in a transparent manner (ibid.). The politician must 
know whose interests the lobbyist is attempting to advocate. In this case, based on the 
information gathered about how pre-applications worked, local politicians interacted 
with the developer, public relations consultants and planning consultants, all of which 
were clearly identifiable with the No.1 Blackfriars Road project. Public relations 
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consultants acted as information gatherers. Therefore, this form of lobbying would be 
perceived as a legitimate form of interest advocacy when compared with the findings of 
the House of Commons inquiry.  
 
Regarding pre-application discussions with planning officers, the fact that certainty is 
gained through agreements achieved early in the planning process is a positive effect. 
With the support of leading local politicians, developers can reduce the risks involved in 
tall building projects because they are then more likely to achieve the granting of 
planning permission. The roles played by public relations and planning consultants 
enhance the effectiveness of pre-application discussions due to their positions as 
information gatherers and communication links. Furthermore, the architect's willingness 
to constantly improve the design of a tall building leads to building up credibility with 
local planning officers. Successful pre-application discussions thus reduce the 
likelihood of conflicts between the design team and the LPA in the planning application 
phase. Furthermore, they also reduce the likelihood of potential appeals since the LPA 
is very likely to grant planning permission at the planning committee phase because 
their key concerns and constraints have been addressed.  
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5.3 The UNESCO impact 
 
This section considers the involvement and the impacts of the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in policy making and 
implementation processes in central London. The tall building projects of London 
Bridge Tower, Minerva Tower, Doon Street Tower, No.1 Blackfriars Road and 
Elizabeth House were identified by UNESCO as potential threats to the Tower of 
London and Westminster World Heritage Sites (WHSs) (UNESCO 2007a). The London 
Plan was perceived as a policy that proactively encouraged rather than regulated tall 
building development including those with visual impacts on WHSs (UNESCO 2006a). 
As a result, UNESCO threatened to put the Tower of London and Westminster WHSs 
on their List of World Heritage in Danger (ibid.).   
  
The first part of this section traces the involvement of UNESCO in tall building 
planning in London from August 2006 until July 2007. It focuses on describing the 
actions by UNESCO and the UK government, and the Department for Culture Media 
and Sport (DCMS) in particular. Map 10 is utilised to provide the reader with the spatial 
relationships between the Tower of London and Westminster World Heritage Sites 
(WHSs) and tall building proposals impacting on those, as well as the spatial effects of 
a protective policy and guidance. Second, the section examines the causes for and the 
impacts of UNESCO's involvement. The impacts of UNESCO on policy making 
processes for the 2007 LVMF and 2007 GOTB and the implementation processes 
regarding tall building projects in central London, including No.1 Blackfriars Road, are 
discussed. Finally, the appropriateness of calling in No.1 Blackfriars Road, the Doon 
Street Tower and Elizabeth House is examined in relation to national government 
guidance.  
 
UNESCO involvement in tall building planning in central London 
Prior to UNESCO becoming actively involved in tall building planning in central 
London, a number of tall building projects with potential negative impacts on the Tower 
of London and Westminster WHSs had been granted planning permission. The London 
Bridge Tower was granted permission after an extended public inquiry (PINS 2003). 
Critically, the London Bridge Tower is located at the other side of the River Thames 
from the Tower of London and therefore the project will be highly visible from within 
the Tower of London once built. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Eastern Cluster in 
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the City of London, incrementally adding new tall building, has led to significant 
controversy. 30 St Mary Axe was granted planning permission in 1999 (Short 2004). 
The projects of 51 Lime Street (in 2002) and 122 Leadenhall Street (in 2004) were 
granted planning permission by the City of London and supported by the GLA (GLA 
2002e; 2004b) (see image 9). As discussed in the previous chapters, the Heron Tower 
project was granted planning permission by the Secretary of State following a public 
inquiry in 2002 (ODPM 2002). Call-in was sought but Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott refused to call in the Bishopsgate Tower project based on the argument that the 
issues arising from the development did not justify a call-in (GOL 2006). As can be 
seen in image 9, the Bishopsgate Tower was largely obscured by 122 Leadenhall Street 
in critical views from within the Tower of London. The Minerva Tower was the subject 
of great controversy too, but was supported by the GLA and the City of London (GLA 
2002g). As image 9 shows, the Minerva Tower was located some distance away from 
the Eastern Cluster which might have given rise to more tall building proposals in its 
vicinity if granted permission. Critically, as is evident in appendix 7, heritage groups 
lost every tall building public inquiry in central London including  appeals regarding the 
London Bridge Tower, Heron Tower and the Vauxhall Tower which were visible in 
views from and in relation to the Palace of Westminster.  
 
UNESCO had been aware of the impacts of tall building projects on World Heritage 
Sites in central London since 2002. ICOMOS UK, the UNESCO's national advisor, had 
submitted written evidence during a public inquiry opposed to the Heron Tower in 2001 
(PINS 2002a). During three consecutive sessions of UNESCO's World Heritage 
Committee (WHC) in 2003, 2004 and 2005, concerns were raised about tall building 
projects in central London that would potentially have negative impacts on the Tower of 
London WHS (UNESCO 2003; 2004; 2005). In August 2006, UNESCO's WHC in its 
30th session raised concerns about London Plan policies and development proposals 
impacting on the Tower of London and Westminster World Heritage Sites (UNESCO 
2006a: 110). UNESCO stated that policies of the London Plan were proactive towards 
tall building development, thereby permitting visual impacts on world heritage. 
Critically, this report stated that UNESCO would review whether the Tower of London 
(M3) and the Westminster WHS (M1) should be put on the 'List of World Heritage in 
Danger' (ibid.: 10). Importantly, an inclusion of the Tower of London WHS on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger would have been a major embarrassment for the UK 
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government because it would have been the only WHS in the developed world on this 
list (Reuters 2007).  
 
The UK government promptly produced a reactive monitoring report in February 2006 
(DCMS 2007a). The UK report was discussed by UNESCO and it was concluded that 
London Plan policies were insufficient to protect the WHS (ibid.). A delegation 
consisting of members from UNESCO and ICOMOS was sent to London in November 
2006. The delegation met with the national government officials and representatives of 
the GLA, the affected boroughs, as well as academics and practitioners with special 
expertise in London development to discuss and analyse potential threats to the setting 
of the Tower of London (ibid.). The outcome of this was the Report to UNESCO World 
Heritage Committee: Tower of London and Westminster World Heritage Sites 
published in January 2007 (ibid.). Five development proposals were mentioned as 
potential threats to central London's WHSs. Two related to the Tower of London WHS: 
the London Bridge Tower, which had been granted planning permission by the 
Secretary of State in November 2003, and the Minerva Tower, which in the meantime 
had been cancelled by the developer, were visible from within the Tower of London 
(ibid.). In addition, and most critically for ongoing planning processes, three 
development proposals were identified as potential threats to the setting of the 
Westminster WHS: the Elizabeth House Redevelopment, No.1 Blackfriars Road and the 
Doon Street Tower (ibid.).51 Furthermore, the forthcoming Further Alterations to the 
London Plan (FALP) and LVMF were mentioned as regional policy and guidance that 
would be subject to an EiP by the national government and, once published, would 
include measures for the additional protection of WHSs. Evidentially, the DCMS had 
made several promises to UNESCO to show that it was willing to constrain tall building 
development in order to avoid the danger listing of London's WHSs. 
 
Following these official exchanges, UNESCO published a report on its mission to 
London in May 2007 that would eventually prove to have significant impacts on 
implementation processes (UNESCO 2007a). UNESCO put serious pressure on the 
DCMS, stating that if the view from the South Bank to the Tower of London were not 
protected on a statutory basis, or if a management plan protecting the immediate and 
wider setting of the WHS had not been produced by the 31st session of the WHC in June 
                                                 
51 No.1 Blackfriars Road was referred to as the 'Beetham Tower' in both the DCMS and the UNESCO 
reports (DCMS 2007a: 17; UNESCO 2007a: 12).  
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2007, then the Tower of London WHS would meet the criteria for being placed on the 
List of World Heritage in Danger (ibid.: 13, 14). In addition, the report recommended 
reviewing the planning applications for No.1 Blackfriars Road, Doon Street and 
Elizabeth House Redevelopment, because visual impacts of these projects on the WHSs 
had been identified (ibid.). These recommendations implied that the national 
government should call in these tall building projects. 
 
The UNESCO report also resulted in a number of amendments to policy and guidance. 
As is evident in a freedom of information response from the DCMS, there was extensive 
communication between the DCMS, the GLA, English Heritage and CABE so as to 
ensure that all of the actions taken as a response to UNESCO were coordinated properly 
(DCMS 2007c). A management plan for the Tower of London was published in a draft 
form (Historic Royal Palaces 2007). Furthermore, the finalised 2007 LVMF introduced 
a geometrically protected townscape view towards the Tower of London (V11 in map 
10). This view had been proposed in the 2005 draft LVMF but not included in the 2007 
draft LVMF (GLA 2005a; 2007a). With regard to the Westminster WHS, the finalised 
2007 LVMF reduced the threshold heights of the viewing corridors from Kenwood (V3 
in map 10) and Primrose Hill (V6 in map 10) from 51.3 metres to 43.5 metres, thereby 
limiting the height of any new development in the viewing corridor (GLA 2007b).  
 
In addition, the finalised 2007 LVMF included the statement that consultees may 
publish additional guidance regarding the assessment of views. English Heritage's 
Seeing the History in the View was due to be published in April 2008 to fulfil the 
requirement of a visual impact study of the WHSs (English Heritage 2008a). The WCC 
published Metropolitan Views, a document with which they outlined how views from 
within the City of Westminster outwards would be protected (WCC 2007a). The WCC 
proposed forty-five protected views from Westminster's borough boundaries. In effect, 
many of the views would have covered large areas of neighbouring boroughs, and in 
particular, Lambeth, Southwark and the City of London, and also Wandsworth and 
Camden (ibid.). It was established in the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars public inquiry that 
even the mayor's office and Deputy Mayor Simon Milton, the former head of planning 
at the WCC, objected to this overly ambitious document and its approach to regulating 
development within a range of London boroughs by the WCC. 
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Revisions to call-in directions were published for consultation in January 2008 (DCLG 
2008b). Critically, the review included the direction that the Secretary of State would 
have to call in projects if English Heritage was unable to withdraw its objections (ibid.).  
Thus, English Heritage's call-in powers were increased from being able to request a 
call-in, which could be refused by the Secretary of State, to the power to require a call-
in.52 In September 2007, ICOMOS UK exerted pressure on local boroughs, stressing 
that in its perception the townscape assessments produced on behalf of developers of the 
four projects mentioned above were inadequate (ICOMOS UK 2007). Furthermore, the 
DCMS reported that the projects that had been perceived as a threat to the Westminster 
WHS were being monitored closely and that the Doon Street Tower had already been 
called in by the Secretary of State, while No.1 Blackfriars Road and Elizabeth House 
were about to be called in shortly (DCMS 2008b). In July 2007, the UNESCO WHC 
stated that a decision on whether to put the Tower and Westminster WHSs on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger would not be made as it was still 'open ended whether all 
of the WHC Committee's requests had been met' (UNESCO 2007b: 99). David Lammy, 
then culture minister of the UK, commented that he welcomed UNESCO's decision not 
to put the Tower of London and Westminster WHSs on the list (DCMS 2007b).  
 
Reasons for the UNESCO involvement 
In interviews with private consultants, a number of interviewees argued that UNESCO 
was lobbied by heritage groups to get involved. Ian Lindsley from Jefferson 
Communications stated that London's heritage groups to some extent comprise the same 
people as in ICOMOS UK. As is evident in the reports referred to above, UNESCO had 
been aware of tall building projects with impacts on London's WHSs since 2003 
(UNESCO 2003; 2004; 2005). Furthermore, Hall Moggridge is a member of ICOMOS 
UK's Cultural Landscapes and Historic Gardens Committee as an expert on visual 
assessment (ICOMOS UK 2011). Moggridge, who is the landscape architect for the 
Royal Parks, had produced consultation responses in relation to tall building proposals 
visible from St James's Park and the London Plan and the LVMF (Colvin and 
Moggridge 2005a; 2005b; 2001). Furthermore, Moggridge appeared on behalf of the 
Royal Parks at public inquiries regarding the Doon Street Tower and No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road (PINS 2008; 2009a). Therefore, there are direct relations between 
                                                 
52 English Heritage's right to require a call-in was consolidated in 2009 based on conclusions by the 
DCLG (DCLG 2009c).  
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London's heritage groups and ICOMOS UK. However, despite these relations, there is a 
duty to protect WHSs which is part of the process of recognising WHSs. 
 
According to the World Heritage Convention, each state party has the duty to conserve 
and protect their nation's WHSs (UNESCO 1972). Importantly, the duty to protect falls 
to the state party, in this case the UK national government and the DCMS in particular. 
When the state party accepts that UNESCO has placed a site on the WHS list, the state 
party agrees that threats to the WHS will be counteracted by all means available and, if 
necessary, with international assistance (ibid.). What exactly constitutes a threat to a 
WHS is not defined in greater detail; in particular, it is not defined whether a visual 
impact on the setting of a WHS necessarily constitutes a failure to conserve. 
Importantly, it is also not defined whether the visibility of any new development would 
automatically mean damage (ibid.). As academics have noted, UNESCO emphasises the 
protection of Outstanding Universal Value (OUV), and there is no doubt that the 
material destruction of parts of a WHS would be considered to be damage (Pendlebury 
and Short 2009). However, UNESCO's approach to protecting the setting of an urban 
WHS was further defined in a report in 2007, which lists iconic architecture and high 
rise development in or in the vicinity of city centres as the major threat posed to urban 
WHSs in western countries (Rodwell and van Oers 2007). The intention of the members 
attending this meeting was to regulate development beyond agreed buffer zones so as to 
protect a WHSs from the visual intrusion of new development (ibid.). The report cites 
Vienna and Cologne as examples in which development that was perceived to impact 
negatively on a WHS has been stopped (ibid.). Thus, the intervention of UNESCO in 
London was a result of the struggles by UNESCO in a number of European cities 
against the visual intrusion of tall buildings.  
 
UNESCO's impact on policy 
The WCC and the Historic Royal Palaces both either updated or produced management 
plans for the WHSs (Historic Royal Palaces 2007; WCC 2007b). However, the 
production of management plans for the Westminster and Tower of London WHSs did 
not clarify whether tall building projects proposed in northern Southwark and Lambeth 
are acceptable. As is shown in map 10, No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street 
Tower and Elizabeth House are located at distances between one and two kilometres 
from the WHSs. Therefore, the management plans, as one of the outcomes of the 
 202 
UNESCO involvement, were not effective measures in clarifying the acceptability of 
these tall building proposals.  
 
The GLA amended the LVMF, including a townscape view from City Hall, located in 
the London Borough of Southwark, towards the Tower of London (GLA 2007b). The 
Trinity Three (25 in map 10), 33-35 Commercial Road (28 in map 10) and Goodmans 
Fields (34 in map 10) projects were now located in the setting of this townscape view. 
Furthermore with regard to the Westminster WHS, the finalised 2007 LVMF reduced 
the threshold heights of the viewing corridors from Kenwood (V3 in map 10) and 
Primrose Hill (V6 in map 10) from 51.3 metres to 43.5 metres, thereby limiting the 
height of new development proposed in the viewing corridor (GLA 2007b). In 2009, the 
Black Prince Road project, 77 metres high and visible from within the Westminster 
WHS, was granted planning permission after an appeal procedure (PINS 2009c). 
Therefore, the increased protection of the Palace of Westminster by the 2007 LVMF did 
not produce greater clarity regarding the acceptability of No.1 Blackfriars Road and the 
other projects in northern Southwark and Lambeth. In addition, the FALP published by 
the GLA in September 2006 and endorsed by national government following the EiP in 
September 2007 did not result in a reduction in tall building development. Indeed, the 
FALP determined an Opportunity Area that included the locations of the No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House projects (GLA 2006a; 
Shepley, Langton, Nixon 2007). Thus, the FALP encouraged tall building development 
there.  
 
Another policy measure caused by the UNESCO involvement was an update of the 
GOTB. The finalised 2007 GOTB included three requirements that are of particular 
importance in relation to the protection of WHSs. These requirements are that: i) the 
UK government has an international obligation to protect WHSs; ii) regional and local 
governments have to include specific policies safeguarding WHSs in their development 
plans; and, iii) WHS management plans have the status of material consideration in the 
planning process (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). The impact of these changes can 
be examined by comparing the requirements with regional and local policy existing 
prior to the updated version of the GOTB. The finalised 2004 London Plan already 
included the Policy 4B.13 which stressed the protection of WHSs (GLA 2004a). The 
same is true for the local development frameworks of Southwark (LB Southwark 
2007c). A number of tall building proposals had been called in due to their visual 
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impacts on WHSs but the Secretary of State granted permission following public 
inquiries and having had regard to the relevant material considerations (see appendix 7). 
In fact 20 Fenchurch Street, which is visible from within the Tower of London WHS 
(see image 9), was granted planning permission by the Secretary of State after the 
UNESCO involvement, following a public inquiry (PINS 2007; DCLG 2007b). Finally, 
WHS management plans have been used as material considerations in public inquiries 
since the Heron Tower public inquiry (PINS 2002a). On the whole, the update to the 
GOTB has not had much impact on emerging policy, since all of the requirements laid 
out had already been in use in policy and implementation processes regarding tall 
buildings. Instead, the emphasis on the protection of WHSs has been strengthened.  
 
UNESCO's impact on implementation 
The three projects that were mentioned in the UNESCO report of 2007, the Doon Street 
Tower, No.1 Blackfriars Road and Elizabeth House, were called in by the Secretary of 
State (PINS 2008; 2009a; 2009b). This suggests that the UNESCO influence on call-in 
directions caused a change regarding which projects were being called in. As noted, the 
Bishopsgate Tower was not called in in 2006, since English Heritage had withdrawn its 
request for a call-in and the Secretary of State had decided that no sufficient degree of 
controversy had been caused by the project (GOL 2006). However, were the call-ins 
justified in the cases of the Doon Street Tower, No.1 Blackfriars Road and Elizabeth 
House? A comparison of images 9 and 10 shows that tall buildings in the Eastern 
Cluster had significant visual impact on the Tower of London WHS, while 20 
Blackfriars Road, which had also been called in in 2008, had a much more limited 
visual impact.  
 
In the cases of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, only the WCC in consultation with the 
LB Southwark maintained the argument that the projects still caused negative visual 
impact on the Westminster WHS (LB Southwark 2007b; 2008b). English Heritage had 
withdrawn its request for a call-in and had not mentioned visual impact on the 
Westminster WHS despite its objections due to visual impact on the St James's Park 
view (ibid.).  In the public inquiry in 2008, the inspector concluded that only 20 
Blackfriars Road had a limited visual impact on the Westminster WHS (PINS 2008). In 
the 2008 public inquiry regarding the Doon Street Tower, the inspector, while 
concluding that planning permission should be refused due to visual impacts on the 
courtyard of Somerset House, also concluded that, due to the very limited visibility of 
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the project, there was no negative impact on the Westminster WHS (PINS 2009a). 
Elizabeth House had been criticised by CABE with regard to the quality of architecture 
and urban design (PINS 2009b). The project was refused planning permission by the 
Secretary of State after a public inquiry due to the visual impact on the Westminster 
WHS and insufficiencies in the quality of its architecture (DCLG 2009b). Therefore, 
there were justifications for calling in the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House, but 
was this also the case for No.1 Blackfriars Road? 
 
Due to the reduction in height from 226 metres to 170 metres, No.1 Blackfriars Road 
was no longer vis ible from the Westminster WHS, as is evident in image 10. English 
Heritage also did not object to the project on the grounds of visual impact on the WHS 
(LB Southwark 2007b). However, the WCC and the Royal Parks maintained their 
objections but, once the call-in had been initiated, they limited the scope of their 
objections to the visual impact on the townscape view from St James's Park (GOL 
2008d; 2008e). Therefore, there was no justification for calling in No.1 Blackfriars 
Road based on visual impact on world heritage. 
 
Pendlebury and Short (2009) argue that cities should adopt an approach to planning for 
a wider historic city instead of protecting tightly defined heritage assets. I would argue 
that this is a very dangerous approach because this would mean that the heritage groups, 
which are against any visibility of tall buildings from within conservation areas, would 
start controlling whole city centres. There is a difference here to cities such as Bath, St 
Petersburg or Vienna where large parts or even whole city centres are WHSs (Rodwell 
and van Oers 2007). In these cases, I believe that it is justified to draw a larger buffer 
zone around the protected areas and within this area new development should follow 
strict rules so that the WHS is not harmed. Thus, the setting of a WHS would remain 
visually dominant, but within a limited area. Pendlebury and Short fail to recognise that 
local heritage groups might call on UNESCO to interfere in planning processes based 
on their individual interests in conserving heritage assets other than a WHS. It appears 
that this was the case with regard to No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road. The DCMS failed to 
examine whether the opponents to the project actually had a case of merit. The 
proposals do have visual impacts on other conservation areas but not on the 
Westminster WHS to a degree that would justify a call-in. The public inquiry regarding 
No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road is discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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Image 9: AVR showing tall building proposals in the Eastern Cluster in the City of London visible 
from within the Tower of London World Heritage Site.  Annotations have been inserted by the author. 
Source: Tavernor 2006b: 89; © Cityscape3D 
 
 
Image 10: AVR showing the visibility of 20 Blackfriars Road from Parliament Square. Annotations 
have been inserted by the author. Source: Tavernor 2008a: 171; © Cityscape3D 
 
 
 
 
 
 206 
Key to images 9 and 10 
 
1 Bishopsgate Tower 
3 20 Blackfriars Road 
7  20 Fenchurch Street 
8 51 Lime Street 
9 122 Leadenhall Street 
10 30 St Mary Axe 
11 Heron Tower 
12 Minerva Tower 
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Map 10: The impact of UNESCO on policy making and tall building projects. The drawing is based 
on a draft version of the LVMF from March 2007 (GLA 2007a) and the finalised 2007 LVMF (GLA 
2007b). Source: Author 
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Key to map 10 
 
View corridors amended due to the UENSCO involvement 
V3 Parliament Hill to Palace of Westminster 
V6 Primrose Hill to Palace of Westminster 
V11 Townscape view from City Hall towards the Tower of London 
 
Monuments that are designated as within World Heritage Sites 
M1 Palace of Westminster 
M3 Tower of London 
 
Tall building projects considered to be threats to World Heritage Sites in 2006 to 
2007 
(marked in red colour in the map) 
 
6 London Bridge Tower  (consented in 2003) 
8 Potter's Fields   (complete redesign) 
10 Minerva Tower   (withdrawn) 
11a-c Victoria Station   (height lowered to avoid visual impact) 
 Redevelopment 
17  Bishopsgate Tower  (consented in 2005) 
22 No.1 Blackfriars Road (consented in 2009 after a public inquiry in 2008) 
24 20 Fenchurch Street    (consented in 2007 after a public inquiry) 
25 Trinity Three   (stopped in 2008) 
27 Doon Street Tower  (consented in 2008 after a public inquiry) 
35 Elizabeth House  (refused in 2009 after a public inquiry) 
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5.4 Planning committee at Southwark: LPA decision making 
 
This section considers the processes of decision making in the planning committee at 
Southwark Council regarding the No.1 Blackfriars Road project. The first part of this 
section presents the data gained from observing the debate and negotiation processes by 
the parties present. Regarding the process, at the planning committee a panel of local 
councillors considered the merits of the proposed project (see figure 6). 53 The central 
purpose of the planning committee is to determine whether or not the proposed project 
should be granted planning permission based on a democratic vote. The committee is 
moderated by a chairperson. Initially, the policy context relevant for decision making 
regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road was introduced alongside the issues of concern that 
had been raised in the consultation process. In such a case, this introduction is  based on 
the development control report which is submitted by the development control officer to 
all the parties present in the committee. The concerns by local residents are raised and 
addressed by the developer. This is followed by a presentation of the project, 
undertaken by the architect, who explains the reasons for the various design decisions in 
relation to the concerns. Then, councillors are given the opportunity to question the 
architect, and where appropriate other design team members, to ensure that all of the 
concerns are addressed appropriately. Councillors also question aspects of the design 
which they might want to see amended. The final debate then takes place regarding 
S106 obligations. In it, the conditions regarding the design of the project, its operation 
and potential financial arrangements to mitigate possible impacts are agreed between 
the committee and the developer. At the end of the committee stage, the councillors vote 
democratically on the granting of planning permission for the project.   
                                                 
53 List of the councillors present at the planning meeting showing the wards within which they were 
elected and their political affiliations: 
 
James Gurling   Chair    Newington   (Liberal Democrat) 
Aubyn Graham   Councillor   Peckham Rye  (Labour) 
Gordon Nardell   Councillor  The Lane   (Labour) 
Althea Smith  Councillor  Nunhead  (Labour) 
Robin Crookshank Hilton Councillor  Village    (Conservative) 
James Barber   Councillor  East Dulwich  (Liberal Democrat) 
Helen Jardine-Brown Councillor  South Bermondsey (Liberal Democrat) 
 
Adele Morris &  Councillors  Cathedrals   (Liberal Democrat) 
David Noakes  (Representing the interests of the residents of the Cathedrals ward and not 
voting on the granting of planning permission) 
 
The names of the councillors were taken from the minutes of the planning meeting (LB Southwark 
2007d). 
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The second part of the section examines the assessment and decision making processes 
regarding three issues: Design (including visual impact), parking and S106 agreements. 
These are the matters that appeared central to the committee discussion in the above 
case. The focus here is on the effectiveness of the councillors in their assessment of 
these issues. This includes the policy considerations, the role of expert knowledge and 
the pressures and constraints under which councillors and the design team operate. 
Furthermore, the quality of the assessment outcomes and the agreements reached are 
examined.   
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Figure 6: The planning committee process regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road 
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Debate and decision making at the planning meeting 
The planning committee meeting took place on 24 July 2007 in Southwark town hall. At 
the start, the relevant planning decisions and current proposals in the immediate 
surroundings of the application site were listed, thereby drawing attention to the LB 
Southwark's planning strategy of encouraging regeneration in the Southbank area. Local 
residents were able to state a number of concerns which they feared might result from 
the development. One local resident stated that she welcomed the proposed project and 
the improvements this would bring to the area, but also that she was concerned that 
noise would arise during the construction work. Furthermore, she was concerned that a 
reduction in the water pressure and TV reception might result. The developer, Justin, 
takes the comments as fair concerns and agreed that drilling could be used to minimise 
noise emissions during the construction work.  
 
The chairperson, Gurling, shifted the discussion to the topics of sustainability, such as 
the energy consumption of the building and recycling. The architect, Christian Male, 
and an energy consultant described the energy strategy for the building and how TV 
reception and wind issues were covered within the Section 106 agreement. The debate 
then shifted to aspects of the design, the details of which councillors wanted to test. 
Councillor Jardine-Brown asked why the amount of parking spaces proposed was 
higher than what was defined in the London Plan. The developer, Justin, explained that 
because the tall building element of the development was a mixed use building 
comprising a five star hotel and high end residential housing, the future tenants would 
expect to have this amount of parking spaces available. He remarked that a reduction in 
parking spaces would present a marketing problem for him but that that could be 
resolved. A transport consultant proceeded to explain how the technical aspects of 
underground parking were resolved.  
 
The architect, Christian Male, presented the project and discussed the major design 
decisions regarding the tall building element as well as the plaza and lower buildings.54 
Councillor Crookshank Hilton requested more information about the conceptual nature 
of the design of the tower element. Male went over to the model, joined by Councillor 
Crookshank Hilton.55 He explained the formal relationships of the project to the wider 
                                                 
54 The topics of design and visual impact were the most crucial ones in the pre-application stage. English 
Heritage, the Westminster City Council and the Royal Parks had objected to the project due to visual 
impacts on conservation areas and LVMF views (LB Southwark 2007a; b). 
55 Appendix 22 contains photographs of context models. 
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context including the London Bridge Tower and how the design of the low rise 
buildings related to pedestrian movement in the adjoining streets and the Southbank 
riverfront.  
 
The architect, Male, continued his presentation by drawing attention to details of the 
design thinking that had been applied to embed the building in its physical and social 
context and, in particular, how it positively contributed to the regeneration agenda of the 
LB Southwark. Councillor Nardell stepped in and asked why the tall building element 
was not located at the southern edge of the site so as to be further away from the River 
Thames, thereby having less impact on river views. The townscape consultant, 
Professor Tavernor, explained how the project had been designed so as to reflect quality 
of design issues enshrined in the London Plan and the Southwark UDP and how the 
proposal constituted a gateway marker to the LB Southwark from the northern side of 
the River Thames. He pointed out that a precedent decision for a smaller tower existed 
for the site and that, in his expert assessment, the design contributed positively to the 
London skyline. Concluding the design debate, the architect, Male, added that the tall 
building was  located in the northern corner of the site since that allowed the large 
shadow to fall on the river instead of on neighbouring residential accommodation.  
 
Councillor Barber asked why a large portion of the affordable housing was located off-
site while the London Plan demanded this to be on-site. The developer, Justin, argued 
that the project was targeted at a very special market to create a high quality 
environment for likeminded people, but that nevertheless affordable housing was an 
important part of the project. The architect, Male, explained that the decision to put 
affordable housing off-site came out of consultation and assessment processes with the 
GLA and CABE which thought that too much built volume was placed on the site. A 
consultant from Affordable Housing Solutions drew attention to technical issues 
regarding affordable housing. He explained that locating affordable housing within a 
five star hotel would be unsuitable since the service charges would not be affordable for 
the low income tenants. The most sustainable solution he concluded was to locate the 
affordable component off-site.  
 
Following the design discussion, objectors were invited to raise concerns. On behalf of 
other residents, it was stated that people felt that the proposed building was too tall for 
the local area. Councillor Crookshank Hilton stated that she perceived the visual impact 
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not to be as detrimental as stated by English Heritage, the Royal Parks and the WCC. 
Councillor Jardine-Brown stated that she was happy with the design and the affordable 
housing solution but that the number of parking spaces needed to be reduced. 
Councillor Crookshank Hilton stated that she did not agree with reducing the amount of 
parking. The atmosphere became tenser and it could be perceived that this was a crucial 
moment in the planning meeting. Despite the very controversial discussion in the 
planning process about the visual impact, it now seemed that the decision on granting 
planning permission was dependent on the details on the parking spaces.  
 
The debate reached a peak in tension when Councillor Graham shifted the debate to the 
sums of money provided through Section 106. He wanted to know whether the sums of 
money which the LB Lambeth was requesting to mitigate visual impacts on its 
conservation areas would be deducted from the Section 106 money designated to be 
used within the LB Southwark. He asked whether the money Lambeth wanted should be 
added on top of what had been agreed so far. The chairperson, Gurling, stated that the 
issue with Lambeth would come up again and again and that that would be a separate 
discussion. He argued that the LB Southwark had made use of Section 106 
contributions to the furthest extent possible. The design team members remained silent 
during this debate. Councillor Crookshank Hilton stated that she liked the project's 
design and she restated her conclusion that the project would bring considerable 
benefits to the borough, signifying the way forward for Southwark. Furthermore, she 
argued that the number of parking spaces should be left as proposed. The chairperson, 
Gurling, summarised the discussion and concluded that the final decision would have to 
focus on the details of the Section 106 agreement. The meeting was adjourned so that 
the councillors could discuss the matters raised before voting on the granting of 
planning permission.  
 
When the meeting resumed, the councillors reached the conclusion that the amount of 
parking would be reduced from fifty to thirty-three spaces. The councillors also 
supported the site specific transport improvement contributions through Section 106. 
Furthermore, the councillors decided that public accessibility to the plaza needed to be 
regulated via the Section 106 agreement with the condition that the LB Southwark, as 
the local planning authority, had to agree every case in which the plaza was restricted 
from public access. The chairperson asked for the final vote on whether, following the 
discussion and the conclusions reached, the proposal could be granted planning 
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permission. All councillors with the exception of Councillor Barber voted in favour of 
granting planning permission.  
 
Assessing design issues 
It is surprising that, the issues of design and visual impact appeared to be matters of 
little controversy at the planning committee stage. The development control report 
referred to assessments by CABE and the GLA and pointed out that the specialised 
planning officers at the LB Southwark reached the same conclusion (LB Southwark 
2007a). The planning officers' assessment was that No.1 Blackfriars Road was 
acceptable in terms of its visual impact and design (ibid.). Therefore, the credibility of 
the arguments in support of the project made by the architect and the townscape 
consultant was enhanced through the support of the assessments made by the Southwark 
planning officers, the CABE DRP and the GLA. The detailed presentation by the 
architect using models and visualisations as additional aids provided further convincing 
arguments substantiating the quality and thoroughness of the design and the impact 
assessment.  
 
The councillors themselves were no experts on matters of visual impact and design 
quality. They had to rely on the expert assessments of their planning officers and on 
those made by CABE, the GLA and English Heritage. Compared to other issues, such 
as parking, design aspects cannot be assessed based on numbers. As has  been 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, the design and visual impact can only be 
assessed based on interpretations of national, regional and local policy. These 
interpretations can only be made successfully if the assessor has in depth expertise in 
design issues, as has been shown in previous chapters regarding the CABE and English 
Heritage assessment processes. The councillors were not able to challenge these 
assessments since they lacked the necessary expertise. English Heritage, the WCC and 
the Royal Parks argued that No.1 Blackfriars  Road should be refused planning 
permission due to visual impacts on St James's Park (ibid.).  However, the councillors 
had to rely on the development control report and the expertise of their planning officers 
who concluded that the visual impacts did not justify the refusal of planning permission 
(ibid.). The development control report to the councillors showed that the project had 
been reduced in height to take into account the interests advocated by the objectors 
(ibid.). Therefore, it was possible for the councillors to support the granting of planning 
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permission since most of the relevant governmental organisations agreed with this 
interpretation of policy and guidance made by the Southwark's planning officers.  
 
Negotiating the amount of parking spaces  
The issue of proposed parking spaces was subject to repeated discussion and negotiation 
between the councillors and the developer. In legal and policy terms, the issue of 
parking spaces is regulated regionally through the London Plan and locally through the 
Southwark Plan. According to the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, the local UDP 
has to be based on the regional development plan, which is the London Plan in this case, 
and decisions within development control have to be based on these policies (OPSI 
1990a). Policies 3C.22 and 3C.23 in the 2004 London Plan define that local boroughs in 
their UDPs and development control functions should seek to encourage sustainable 
means of transport (e.g. public transport, cycling) in order to reduce congestion in town 
centres (GLA 2004a). Annex 4 of the London Plan specifies that no car parking spaces 
should be allocated for hotel use and one or less than one for residential development in 
town centre areas (ibid.). Policy 5.6 of the Southwark Plan (UDP) follows the London 
Plan, specifying that no car parking should be designated for hotel use, while residential 
parking in the CAZ is limited to 0.4 spaces per residential unit (LB Southwark 2007c). 
Therefore, the fact that the design team applied for a larger number of parking spaces—
50 for the hotel, while none was specified in policies for the hotel—was a legal and a 
policy issue for the councillors of the panel. The councillors needed to be mindful that 
their decision could be challenged if any party aggrieved by their decision requested a 
judicial review. However, Policy 3C.23 of the London Plan encourages flexibility in 
decision making so that a development that is subject to a planning decision can be 
managed successfully when built (GLA 2004a). Accordingly, there is some leeway in 
the decision making by the planning committee.  
 
In the final decision of the committee, the parking spaces for the hotel were reduced 
from fifty to thirty-three. Taking into account that the design team had proposed a 
number of 29 for residential use, which is lower than the 39 they could have applied for 
to be in compliance with the Southwark Plan's recommended 0.4 per unit, the 
development exceeded the parking provision only by thirteen parking spaces. The 
developer, Beetham Organization, was experienced with tall buildings that included 
hotel use. Beetham had developed the Holloway Circus in Birmingham and Beetham 
Hilton Tower in Manchester, both of which are mixed-use tall buildings that include 
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hotel use (Ian Simpson Architects 2008). Both of these tall buildings, completed in 2006 
and 2007, were designed by Ian Simpson Architects, the architects of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road (ibid.). 
 
Negotiating Section 106 obligations 
The discussion of Section 106 obligations was not very long, but it could be observed 
that councillors, as well as design team members, became nervous when Councillor 
Graham brought up the issue. It was possible to observe the tense atmosphere in the 
town hall meeting room. Indeed, the financial contributions that had been agreed before 
the planning meeting were rather high, with around 8.2 million pounds designated for 
improvements to infrastructure and the local neighbourhood and 15.6 million pounds 
for affordable housing to be located off-site (LB Southwark 2007a). The LB Lambeth 
had stated in their consultation reply that they would object to the project, but in the 
event that planning permission were granted, Lambeth would demand a contribution of 
160,000 pounds to mitigate negative visual impacts on conservation areas (ibid.).  A full 
account of the planning obligations through the S106 agreement regarding both No.1 
and 20 Blackfriars Road is included in appendix 10. 
 
ODPM Circular 05/2005 regulates the use of planning obligations through Section 106 
agreements (S106) (ODPM 2005b). This document defines that the S106 agreements 
may contain restrictions on the use or development of land and may require payments to 
be made to the local planning authority (ibid.). Issues discussed at planning committee, 
such as the requirement that the top floor viewing gallery and the public plaza must be 
open to the public, are therefore justifiable claims. Regarding financial contributions, 
the circular states that contributions with the aim of mitigating impacts of the proposed 
development project can be negotiated between local authorities and the developer 
(ibid.). Furthermore, financial contributions must be fairly and reasonably related to the 
proposed development (ibid.). In other words, local authorities are not allowed to 
demand overly large financial contributions from developers, nor are they allowed to 
seek contributions towards local improvements that are not directly related to the 
development proposal. The LB Southwark's use of S106 contributions for local 
infrastructure improvements was therefore fully justified. However, there was a degree 
of interpretation involved. Individual judgements had to be made as to how significant 
the impact was that was being sought to be mitigated, and how high the sum of money 
was that could be demanded to mitigate these negative impacts.  
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In an interview with me, the former Director of Regeneration at the LB Southwark, Fred 
Manson, argued that local boroughs are dependent on S106 contributions. In his 
perception, local boroughs are often afraid to ask for large contributions because they 
fear that then developers will not go through with their projects. This hypothesis would 
suggest that the LB Southwark might not have fully exploited the possibilities of S106 
contributions. Furthermore, the hypothesis suggests that Southwark planners and 
councillors would be very mindful not to ask for S106 contributions that put the 
developer in a position where he has to reconsider the financial feasibility of a project. 
In the case of No.1 Blackfriars Road, this hypothesis does not seem plausible. On the 
one hand, several design team members argued in informal conversations that they 
perceived the S106 contributions as too high, comparing them to a sort of Robin Hood 
approach, taking from the rich and giving to the poor. However, it never seemed to be 
an option for the design team not to go forward with the project because of the amount 
of S106 demands by Southwark. S106 contributions had been agreed during the pre-
application phase in advance of the planning meeting, as is evident in the development 
control report (LB Southwark 2007a). Therefore, all of these figures were no surprise to 
the design team or to local councillors. The LB Southwark had negotiated rather high 
financial contributions through Section 106.  
 
The tense atmosphere arose when Councillor Graham questioned whether the sums 
agreed were final, or whether the money that Lambeth demanded in return for not 
objecting had to be added on top of what had been agreed already. Adrian Dennis, the 
case officer for No.1 Blackfriars Road, argued in an interview that the LB Lambeth was 
trying to get a share of the S106 contributions to finance road improvements there. 
While Dennis agreed that No.1 Blackfriars Road impacted on conservation areas in 
Lambeth, he perceived the proposed usage of S106 money to make road improvements 
in Lambeth to be unjustified. A better use he suggested would be improvements to the 
local parks which were also used by Southwark residents. The chairperson argued in the 
meeting that Southwark had gone as far as possible on S106 already.  
 
In summary, the discussion on design matters and visual impact did not occur 
effectively at the planning committee stage. The councillors had to rely on the expertise 
of their planning officers and the assessments conducted by the GLA, CABE, English 
Heritage, as well as on those assessments prepared by the consultants of the design 
team. The assessment of the parking spaces resulted in a compromise that worked for 
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both the council and the developer. The flexibility provided by the London Plan allowed 
for the reduction in the parking spaces but also allowed the functionality of the hotel use 
to be maintained, which was crucial for the developer in terms of marketing. The 
recommendation outlined by the central government and in reports that local councils 
should seek to secure large amounts of planning gains via S106 were met (Barker 
2006a; DCLG 2007a, DETR 2000b). High amounts of S106 contributions were 
negotiated for the LB Southwark.  
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
The development of the local tall building policy by the LB Southwark has largely been 
a struggle to produce a policy basis for tall building projects that have already been 
supported by the LB Southwark, CABE and the GLA. The north-western corner of 
Southwark was not designated as an Opportunity Area in the final 2004 London Plan. 
Thus, the LB Southwark planners had to incrementally develop the basis for justifying 
the appropriateness of the locations for tall buildings. The fact that the tall building 
policy specific to these locations did not pass the local political process successfully 
was a major setback for the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and the LB 
Southwark planners. It created a significant amount of uncertainty. However, this was 
resolved successfully through a compromise agreement with English Heritage.  
 
Pre-application discussions between the design team and the LB Southwark were rather 
effective. The well-informed approach of the design team, based on information 
provided by planning and public relations consultants, allowed them to address the 
relevant key issues. These early agreements with local politicians and planning officers 
led to a significant increase in certainty for the design team. Architects and developers 
incrementally build up their credibility with local planners by taking on board their 
suggestions. This also led to significant improvements in the overall design quality of 
the No.1 Blackfriars Road project.  
 
The involvement of UNESCO in tall building planning in London has embarrassed the 
UK national government internationally. UNESCO is concerned about the visual 
impacts of tall buildings on WHSs in European cities, including London. The fact that 
important experts representing the interests of London's heritage groups are also part of 
ICOMOS UK has certainly contributed to UNESCO becoming involved. However, 
UNESCO has been aware of tall building proposals that visually impact on the Tower 
of London and Westminster WHSs since 2003. The World Heritage Convention sets out 
the responsibility of national governments to protect WHSs. Therefore, UNESCO 
became involved in tall building planning in London because it thought that the UK 
government was not protecting WHSs sufficiently.  
 
The impact of the UNESCO involvement on policy has not been very large. Critically, 
greater certainty regarding the No.1 Blackfriars Road, Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth 
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House projects did not result from the UNESCO involvement. Instead, the level of 
uncertainty for developers increased dramatically due to the higher likelihood of a call-
in and public inquiry. Management plans for WHSs were produced, but in the absence 
of clear geometric measures, the acceptability of the projects only remained dependent 
on the assessments of quangos as well as regional and local government. The protection 
of WHSs has been increased by amendments made to the LVMF. However, the 
amendments did not have an impact on the three projects challenged by UNESCO in 
their reports. The GOTB, while putting a stronger emphasis on the protection of WHSs, 
also did not produce guidance that would have provided certainty to the planning 
processes of the three projects.  
 
Most critically, No.1 Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House did 
get called in and went through lengthy public inquiry processes. While there was 
significant controversy regarding these three projects, it must be doubted whether there 
was a valid case regarding the objections to No.1 Blackfriars Road. English Heritage 
withdrew their request for a call-in and CABE, the GLA and the LB Southwark 
supported the project. The amended call-in direction explicitly states that the Secretary 
of State must call-in projects if English Heritage maintains its request for a call-in. 
Therefore, the Secretary of State should have scrutinised the validity of the case by the 
objectors prior to issuing a call-in.  
 
At the planning committee stage regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road, issues of design and 
visual impact could not be assessed by the councillors alone. Councillors depend on the 
expertise of their planning officers, who in turn depend on the expertise of CABE, 
English Heritage and the GLA. Consequently, regarding design aspects, decisions have 
to be based on the assessments of quangos, regional government and local planning 
officers. However, the compromise agreements reached between the local councillors 
and the developer regarding parking and S106 obligations must be seen as positive 
results. Within these compromises, agreements were reached that were acceptable for 
both the developer and the local councillors. Furthermore, the agreements reached also 
strengthened the validity of the planning decision regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road. The 
final decision increased the compliance of the project with the London Plan policies 
regarding parking and the national agenda of sustainable development set out in the 
PPS1. Furthermore, the final decision concerning the S106 obligations was in line with 
the recommendation of the national government to aim to secure high amounts of 
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planning gains at local levels. The compromise agreements reduced uncertainty because 
conflicts were resolved successfully. The successful resolution of conflicts allowed 
planning permission to be granted.   
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6. Public inquiry  
 
This chapter considers the joint public inquiry regarding the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road projects which took place from 9 September to 2 October 2008. I attended each 
day of the inquiry and, thus, large parts of this chapter are based on data gathered 
through participant observation. Section 1 explains the step-by-step processes that are 
part of a public inquiry procedure. Section 2 focuses on the space within which the 
public inquiry took place. The spatial layout, presentation materials and models as well 
as the spatial behaviour of experts and barristers are considered. The examination and 
cross-examination of the townscape consultant are discussed in section 3. Issues of the 
visual impact on the townscape view from St James's Park, protected through the 
LVMF, were of considerable controversy throughout the planning process for No.1 and 
20 Blackfriars Road, as has been demonstrated in the chapters 3, 4 and 5. Particular 
attention is paid to the concept of precedence. Critically, the Doon Street Tower, which 
had already been granted planning permission in August 2008, was regarded as an 
important precedent case, in particular because this project largely obscured No.1 
Blackfriars Road in the St James's Park view (DCLG 2008a).  
 
Section 4 discusses the proof of evidence presented, and the cross-examination of the 
LB Southwark's planning policy expert regarding the issues of the appropriateness of 
the location for tall buildings. The appropriateness of the location was a highly 
controversial issue, in particular since a place specific tall building policy for the north-
western corner of Southwark had not been established, as has been discussed in chapters 
1, 3 and 4. According to the plan-led approach, the GOTB requires LPAs to establish 
tall building policies prior to granting planning permission (English Heritage and CABE 
2007b). Finally, section 5 considers the issue of the credibility of the arguments made 
by opponents and proponents, comparing the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road case with 
that of the Doon Street Tower. The arguments made by the townscape consultants and 
English Heritage's principal witnesses in the Doon Street case are compared with the 
arguments made by the WCC and the Royal Parks in the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road 
public inquiry.  
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6.1 The public inquiry procedure explained 
 
This section explains the step-by-step processes of a public inquiry procedure by direct 
reference to the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road inquiry. Legally, the public inquiry 
procedure is regulated via the 2000 Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) 
(England) Rules (referred to hereafter as the 2000 Inquiries Act) (OPSI 2000a). The 
public inquiry procedure can be distinguished by three phases: i) a pre-inquiry phase 
within which the call-in takes place, the parties prepare for the public inquiry hearing 
and produce proofs of evidence; ii) the actual public inquiry procedure within which an 
inspector from the Planning Inspectorate hears evidence presented by expert witnesses 
who are cross-examined by barristers; and, iii) the decision making phase which 
includes the report written by the inspector setting out his or her recommendation to the 
Secretary of State and the decision making by the Secretary of State him- or herself. 
Figure 7 includes a diagram summarising the three phases.  
 
The pre-inquiry call-in and preparation phase 
The pre-inquiry phase starts after the call-in letter has been sent to the LPA by the 
Secretary of State. In the consultation process, administered by the LB Southwark in the 
case of No.1 Blackfriars Road, the parties who are being consulted state whether a call-
in will be requested if planning permission is granted. In the case of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road, English Heritage had stated up to June 2007 that it would request a call-in (LB 
Southwark 2007a). After a compromise agreement was reached, English Heritage no 
longer maintained its request for a call-in, as is evident in the development control 
report from December 2007 (LB Southwark 2007b). However, a call-in was requested 
by the Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks. On 10 March 2008, No.1 
Blackfriars Road was called in by the Secretary of State (GOL 2008a), and 20 
Blackfriars Road was called in two months later (GOL 2008e). Based on Richard 
Carborn's parliamentary statement from 1999, the Secretary of State has to be very 
selective regarding the calling in of planning applications (ODPM 2005a). A planning 
application may be called in if,  in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the planning 
application: 
 
- 'may conflict with national policies on important matters; 
- could have significant effects beyond their immediate locality; 
- give rise to substantial regional or national controversy; 
- raise significant architectural or urban design issues; or 
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- may involve the interests of national security, or of foreign Governments.' 
(Hansard, Written Answer, 16 June 1999, col.138) 
 
In the case of No.1 Blackfriars Road, the call-in letters stated in summary that the 
proposed projects: i) might not conform with the London Plan due to visual impacts on 
the townscape view from St James's Park, protected via the LVMF, and because the 
location in the north-western corner of Southwark is not designated as an Opportunity 
Area; ii) might not conform with the GOTB because Southwark had not established a 
tall buildings policy for the location; and, iii) might not conform with local planning 
policy since the location is not specified as a tall buildings area in the Southwark UDP 
(GOL 2008a; e). Based on the information provided in the call-in letter, the opposing 
parties prepared for the public inquiry procedure.   
 
After the call-in, the barristers are instructed by solicitors on behalf of the client (the 
developer) to prepare their case in conjunction with expert witnesses. Expert witnesses 
prepare their proofs of evidence which they need to submit at least four weeks prior to 
the start of the public inquiry hearing according to article 13 of the 2000 Inquiries Act 
(OPSI 2000a). Furthermore, a Statement of Common Ground is prepared that sets out 
the reasons why the parties, in this case the design teams for No.1 and Blackfriars Road 
and the LB Southwark, appear on the same side as set out in article 14 of the 2000 
Inquiries Act. The statement must also be submitted four weeks prior to the public 
inquiry (ibid.). Once these documents have been submitted and distributed amongst the 
parties, the expert witnesses of both the proponents and the opponents of the projects 
have the opportunity to produce rebuttal proofs of evidence. These documents seek to 
provide additional proof that addresses the issues raised in the opposing proofs of 
evidence. 
 
The public inquiry  
The second phase is the public inquiry itself within which presentations of evidence and 
cross-examinations take place in front of an inspector from the Planning Inspectorate. 
The inquiry is inquisitorial rather than adversarial in nature (Landmark Chambers 
2010b). Thus, barristers cross-examine expert witnesses after they have presented their 
proofs of evidence, while the inspector's role is restricted to observing the presentations 
and cross-examinations, and to request clarification, verbally or in written form as 
necessary. According to the code of conduct, the inspector must make his or her 
decisions and recommendations in the public interest, and he or she must be 
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independent from the opposing parties (PINS 2011b). Article 15 of the 2000 Inquiries 
Act sets out how the public inquiry process must be conducted (OPSI 2000a).  
 
The following description is based on my observation of the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road public inquiry. On the first day of the inquiry, each barrister representing the cases 
of the opponents presented their opening statement summarising the major arguments in 
support of the case of the party that they represented. Over the next few weeks, each 
expert witness provided a presentation of their evidence when called by the representing 
barrister. The presentation of evidence was often accompanied by visual evidence 
displayed on monitors for the benefit of the inspector and public attending. Following 
the presentation, the witness was cross-examined by the barrister of the opposing party. 
In the cross-examination, the barrister attempted to discredit or weaken the expert 
witness's argumentative rationale so that their case lost credibility. This was followed by 
re-examination by the barrister who called the expert witness to aid his or her case. If 
necessary, the barrister attempted to re-establish the credibility of the expert witnesses' 
proof by aiming to discredit the counter arguments made by the opposing barrister. At 
the end of the hearing procedures, the barristers made their closing submissions. 
Throughout the inquiry, the inspector, the barristers and the witnesses were bound to 
follow the principles of fairness. According to the legal practice, Landmark Chambers, 
'it is well settled that one of the principal concerns of a public inquiry is that it should 
behave fairly to all witnesses' (Landmark Chambers 2010c). Matrix 2 listing the 
planning inspector, the barristers and the expert witnesses appearing at the joint No.1 
and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry is included at the end of this section. The 
following sections focus on the hearing.  
 
Post-inquiry decision making 
The third phase, which I call the decision making stage, takes place after the public 
inquiry has been concluded. In the months after the public inquiry, the planning 
inspector reviews the various documents submitted as evidence, focussing primarily on 
the major issues argued and taking into account everything that was said during the 
inquiry hearing. Eventually, the inspector publishes a report that includes a review of all 
the major arguments made by both supporting and opposing parties. The report 
concludes with a recommendation of whether to grant or refuse the planning 
permission, as is set out in article 17 of the 2000 Inquiries Act (OPSI 2000a). This 
report is submitted to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then take some 
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weeks or months to revisit the major issues of the inquiry. Finally, the decision is 
published which, at its core, states whether the Secretary of State supports the 
inspector's conclusions or a different conclusion has been reached. There are two 
overriding principles of decision making with regard to public inquiries. First, decisions 
must be consistent with previous decisions (PINS 2010a). Second, decisions must be 
made based on the merits of each individual case (ODPM 2005a). This means that 
relevant policy and guidance as well as other material considerations must be taken into 
account. According to article 18 of the 2000 Inquiries Act, the Secretary of State must 
notify the parties taking part in the public inquiry and every person who has appeared at 
the inquiry and who has asked to be notified (ibid.). The Secretary of State's conclusion 
is usually final.  However, parties aggrieved by the decision made by the Secretary of 
State have the right to appeal to the High Court in order to get the decision quashed if it 
can be demonstrated that there has been some procedural or other injustice committed 
during the inquiry (PINS 2011c).  
 
This section has introduced the generic phases of the public inquiry procedure. The 
principal purpose of this introduction has been to enable the reader to better understand 
the following sections. Furthermore, how the public inquiry procedure is regulated via 
planning law and guidance has also been introduced. No.1 Blackfriars Road was called 
in on 10 March 2008 and the Secretary of State published her decision on 25 March 
2009 (PINS 2009a; DCLG 2009a). Thus, from the call-in to the final decision making, 
the whole public inquiry procedure took about one year. The rest of this chapter focuses 
on the actual public inquiry itself which lasted from 9 September 2008 until 2 October 
2008 (PINS 2009a). The next section analyses the space in which the public inquiry 
hearing takes place and the spatial behaviour of barristers and witnesses. Sections three, 
four and five evaluate the arguments made by barristers and expert witnesses in 
processes of cross-examination during the hearing phase of the public inquiry.  
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Matrix 2: The inspector, barristers and expert witnesses at the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road 
public inquiry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 The abbreviation QC stands for Queen's Council. A barrister may be awarded the title of QC by the 
Lord Chancellor (Wass 2004). Besides their duties towards a client, a barrister has a prime duty towards  
the court and towards upholding the English legal system (ibid). QCs 'are selected for thei r all-round 
qualities including their integrity and service to the Bench' (ibid.: 1).  
Planning Inspectorate 
John L. Gray 
 
Planning inspector  
No.1 Blackfriars Road 
Russell Harris QC56 
Ian Simpson 
Professor Robert Tavernor 
Alan Simmonds 
 
Barrister, Landmark Chambers 
Architect, principal of Ian Simpson Architects 
Townscape consultant, Robert Tavernor Consultancy 
DP9 planning consultants 
20 Blackfriars Road 
Christopher Katkowski QC 
Jim Eyre 
Professor Robert Tavernor 
Hugh Bullock 
 
Barrister, Landmark Chambers 
Architect, principal of Wilkinson Eyre Architects 
Townscape consultant, Robert Tavernor Consultancy 
Partner at Gerald Eve, surveyors and property consultants 
 
LB Southwark 
Timothy Corner QC 
Adrian Dennis 
 
 
Simon Bevan 
Michael S. Tsoukaris 
 
Barrister, Gray's Inn Square 
Team Leader in the Major Applications Team in the 
Regeneration and Neighbourhoods Department  
 
Lead officer in preparing the Southwark Plan 
Group Manager, Design & Conservation Team of the 
Development Control section  
 
Opponents 
Richard Banwell 
Robert Ayton 
 
 
Hall Moggridge 
Michael Ball 
 
Barrister, Chambers of Stephen Hockman QC 
Westminster City Council; Head of Design and Conservation 
in the Central Area Team 
 
Landscape consultant for the Royal Parks  
Director of the Waterloo Community Development Group 
(WCDG) 
 
 229 
 
Figure 7: Diagram showing the step-by-step processes of the public inquiry procedure.  
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6.2 The public inquiry space 
 
This section focuses on the design of the space within which the public inquiry was 
held. The spatial set-up of this case is particularly interesting because presentation 
materials, such as posters and physical models of the projects, were made an integral 
part of the inquiry space. The data analysed in this section are photographs and sketches 
of the space produced by the author. The sketches have been reconstructed based on 
memory and on the photographs taken.57 First, the requirements of a public inquiry 
space are set out based on guidance provided by the Planning Inspectorate (PINS) and 
the Council on Tribunals. Second, the inquiry space is examined using photographs and 
a sketch of the space (figure 8). For the convenience of the reader, appendix 19 explains 
the elements of the public inquiry space. It can be used to better understand the public 
inquiry space in conjunction with images 11, 12, 13 and figure 8 provided at the end of 
this section. The Doon Street inquiry space is discussed alongside this in order to gain a 
comparative perspective. Finally, the section considers the relevance of presentation 
materials in relation to policy issues that are central to the inquiry.  
 
The requirements of the public inquiry space 
Public inquiries are subject to the highest standards of 'openness, fairness and 
impartiality' (Council on Tribunals 2006: 1). The actual space within which a public 
inquiry is held must be located and designed so as to support these requirements. 
Guidance regarding the requirements of the venue for a public inquiry is provided by 
the Planning Inspectorate. The venue must be: i) accessible, including wheelchair access 
through elevators; ii) located so that it is accessible via public transport; and, iii) located 
so that the majority of the people who might be interested can conveniently attend 
(PINS 2002b). The room within which the inquiry takes place must be large enough to 
accommodate the parties in favour and those who argue against the proposed 
development as well as  the public (ibid.). Furthermore, a separate room must be 
provided for the inspector so that he or she does not come into contact with the 
opposing parties during inquiry breaks (ibid.). In addition, the layout of the inquiry 
room is also specified in generic terms, such as the locations of the opposing parties 
                                                 
57 Photographs were taken in the breaks so that the inquiry process would not be disturbed by flashes and 
to avoid any distractions of the witnesses, the inspector and the barristers.  
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relative to the inspector and the public (ibid.).58 Landmark Chambers has stated it is a 
primary function that at a public inquiry it is possible for the public to see how evidence 
is heard and determined (Landmark Chambers 2011a). All of these requirements were 
met by the venue for the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry. However, 
the placement of presentation materials such as images, posters and physical models is 
not regulated to a great extent. It is only stated that displays should be visible and 
accessible to the public (PINS 2002b). The following discussion in this section mainly 
focuses on the visual impact of presentation materials at a public inquiry.  
 
The visual presence of imagery and physical models in the inquiry space 
Visual materials, such as AVRs and images used to market the project, are the key 
elements of proof of evidence for public inquiries regarding tall buildings. As has been 
shown in chapter 4, the assessments made by townscape consultants as well as those 
made by objectors are based on these images. Large posters, shown as thick lines in A 
in figure 8, are placed on partitions so that they visually create spaces between the 
opposing parties and the planning inspector and public spectators. Whichever direction 
the inspector (1) looks, he or she always sees the large posters in the background. In the 
case in question, large posters showing exemplary views of the projects were placed 
directly opposite the inspector, behind the area in which the public spectators sat (18) 
(see appendices 20 and 21 for more detailed images). In the background of the 
proponents are posters of critical AVRs, mainly the St James's Park view, a prime focus 
of debate at this public inquiry (see image 11). Behind the seating space of the 
opponents are AVRs taken from townscape assessments (see appendix 21). In addition, 
small computer screens are located on the desks of the inspector, the expert witnesses 
and the barristers. Large computer screens are located in front of the public spectators. 
As sketch A in figure 8 shows, AVRs that had been enlarged to poster size are arranged 
to create visual axes that span from the planning inspector to the public spectators and 
from the proponents to the opponents. Thereby, all the parties present at the public 
inquiry have visual access to these large images whenever they look across the room.  
 
In three zones of the inquiry space, large numbers of physical models of No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road are located. The models are shown as thick-lined rectangles in B in 
                                                 
58 A generic diagram of the layout of the inquiry room is provided at page five of the Public Inquiry 
Facility Note published by the Planning Inspectorate (PINS 2002b). A comparison of this diagram with 
figure 8 at the end of this section shows that the inquiry room for the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road 
public inquiry was designed in accordance with these requirements.  
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figure 8. These models, which were used to aid the presentation of evidence and cross-
examination, were located in the vicinity of the planning inspector (1) and expert 
witnesses (2, 3). The models for No.1 Blackfriars Road were stored behind the objectors 
(14). The models for 20 Blackfriars Road were located in a corner close to the entrance 
to the inquiry space (17). These storage spaces also functioned as exhibition spaces 
during the inquiry (see appendix 20 for photographs). Public spectators and journalists 
visit these exhibition spaces which the inspector, witnesses and barristers examine 
relation to the presentation of evidence and cross-examination. During the inquiry, 
models are taken from these exhibition zones to the area in front of the inspector's desk. 
The models allow the parties and the inspector to examine in detail the three-
dimensional effects of the designs of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road (see appendices 20 
and 22 for photographs of the models). In summary, the public inquiry space was 
visually dominated by posters showing AVRs and physical models.  
 
The policy relevance of presentation materials  
Posters and physical models contain important information regarding policy issues that 
are central to the public inquiry. First, the AVRs used in the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road case were different from the ones typically used in townscape assessments (see 
appendix 23). They were in a 4:1 (width/height) ratio instead of the normal 3:2 format. 
During the public inquiry, these images are termed panoramic images. This format 
included the periphery of the view. The visual focus was on the centre of the view, 
while the right and left sides were distorted so that they appeared to represent peripheral 
perception. The inclusion of peripheral vision in visual representations is considered a 
necessary component in the representation of human visual perception (Bosselman 
1998). As has been discussed in chapter 3 section 3, the lack of a peripheral perception 
in AVRs is perceived as a critical drawback regarding the effectiveness of the QVA 
method of the LVMF. These panoramic AVRs were not used in the official consultation 
process prior to the public inquiry.  
 
A central requirement of the 2007 LVMF is that tall buildings 'should not overpower the 
built form' in the St James's Park view (GLA 2007b: 230). Therefore, the panoramic 
AVRs could have a persuasive effect: To claim that the visual presence of the proposed 
buildings was not as great as argued by the opponents, and that therefore visual harm 
would be done to the setting of St James's Park, is an overstatement. At the same time, 
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the panoramic AVRs represented a creative attempt by the design team to remedy the 
shortcomings of the QVA method by including peripheral vision.  
 
Posters located behind opponents and public spectators showed iconic views that 
represented the projects from the best angles and underscored the visual coherence of 
the projects acting together as a cluster (see appendix 21). The London Plan 2004 
determined that new tall buildings should contribute to the visual coherence of London's 
townscape by generating overarching clusters of tall buildings (GLA 2004a). The 2007 
LVMF requires the consolidation of existing and new clusters of tall buildings where 
these 'enhance the composition of the cluster' (GLA 2007b: 35). The GOTB demands 
that tall building projects be considered from all directions and applicants have to 
demonstrate that the proposed development has a positive relationship with 
topographical features and other tall buildings (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
Therefore, the GOTB requires 360-degree views of the project. In addition, iconic views 
of the project have persuasive effects that aim to convince a viewer that a coherent 
cluster has been created and that therefore central policy and guidance requirements are 
met by the proposed development.  
 
Furthermore with regard to the iconic images, central policy criteria of the 2004 London 
Plan and the 2007 GOTB are that tall building projects must contribute positively to 
their surroundings at street level (GLA 2004a; English Heritage and CABE 2007b). The 
central national planning policy PPS1 sets out the principles for urban design (ODPM 
2005c). A development has to be integrated into the existing urban form and allow for 
accessible public spaces (ibid.). Models and drawings provide explanations regarding 
how the design of the projects meets these requirements. The exhibition zones are then 
used to allow everybody attending the inquiry to see how much effort has been put into 
improving the project between the various application steps to meet these central policy 
criteria regarding urban design so as to improve the local context.  
 
In the case of the Doon Street Tower public inquiry, there was insufficient space for 
exhibiting much of their presentation material. As can be seen on photograph 13, a 
contextual model was located in the space between the inspector and the opposing 
parties and a few AVRs were placed behind the proponents of the project. However, the 
most dominant visual aspect was the brown wooden benches and interior wall finishes. 
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Due to a lack of space, most of the documents had to be stored in spaces outside of the 
inquiry space. The visual focus was on the witnesses, barristers and the inspector. 
 
During the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road inquiry, the WCC, the Royal Parks and the 
Waterloo Community Development Group (WCDG) sought to use their own 
presentation materials. Both the WCC and the Royal Parks provided images that were 
taken from the AVRs produced by the townscape consultant. They amended these 
images drawing attention to potentially negative visual effects in order to aid their case 
(see appendix 24). However, the images were dismissed as evidence since it was 
established by townscape consultants and barristers that they were geometrically 
incorrect and had been manipulated in a way that did not resemble the visual appearance 
of the projects in a manner as set out in the LVMF methods section. Furthermore, the 
WCDG brought a map and statistical data in order to draw attention to potential impacts 
of gentrification by the projects on the Waterloo area. These materials did not have an 
effect on the inquiry since gentrification was not one of the policy issues being 
examined. The critical policy issues were the visual impacts on the St James's Park view 
and the Westminster WHS, as well as the quality of architecture and urban design and 
the appropriateness of the location for tall buildings (PINS 2009a). The objectors to the 
projects were disadvantaged in the sense that they were not able financially, in addition 
to a lack of time, to produce posters and physical models that they could use to 
underscore the merits of their case. Likewise, the objectors did not have the financial 
means to hire experts to produce presentation materials that could potentially be used to 
aid their case.  
 
In summary, it has been demonstrated that the space within which the No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road public inquiry was held was  dominated visually by presentation 
materials such as posters and physical models. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that the content of posters aided arguments in favour of the projects in question. The 
central question therefore is whether the space conformed to the regulations provided by 
the Council on Tribunals. Decisions in tribunals such as public inquiries must not be 
influenced by resources or other external considerations and be held in an appropriate 
hearing accommodation not connected with one or the other of the parties (Council on 
Tribunals 1997). While posters can have persuasive effects, a planning inspector is used 
to these effects based on his or her experience. Inspector Gray had also led the public 
inquiry into the London Bridge Tower in 2003 (PINS 2003). Furthermore, an inspector 
 235 
must make decisions consistent with previous decisions and must base his or her 
reasoning on the merits of the case presented (PINS 2010a; ODPM 2005a). In the event 
that a departure from these central requirements can be proven, then the objectors can 
potentially succeed with a challenge to the decision through a Judicial Review in the 
High Court. Throughout the inquiry, I observed the inspector and concluded that he had 
regard for the merits of the case presented throughout. He did not show any signs of 
being influenced by potentially persuasive materials. However, it should be questioned 
whether the design of inquiry spaces could be regulated to a greater degree by limiting, 
for example, the visual presence of presentation materials so that potentially persuasive 
effects are minimised.   
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Image 11: Photograph of the advocates for No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road. The photograph was taken 
from the pubic spectators' seating area (18 towards 4, 5, 6 in figure 8). Source: Author   
 
 
Image 12: Photograph of the opponents for No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road. The photograph was taken 
from the pubic spectators' seating area (18 towards 9, 10, 11 in figure 8). Source: Author   
 
 
Image 13: Photograph of the Doon Street Tower public inquiry space. Source: Author   
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Figure 8: Sketches of the hearing space for the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry.  
The spatial layout has been reconstructed based on photographs and notes from the fieldwork process.  
Bold large rectangles represent physical models; bold small rectangles represent screens; bold lines 
represent large posters containing images of No.1 and 20 Blackfri ars Road. Appendix 19 provides a key 
to all the numbers used in this image. Source: Author  
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6.3 Precedence and quality of architecture in visual 
assessments  
 
This section considers the examination of the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road on 
the St James's Park to Horse Guards Road townscape view. This view is protected by 
the LVMF (GLA 2007b). In the public inquiry, the visual impact on the St James's Park 
view was one of the most crucial issues (PINS 2009b). As has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapters, there was significant controversy because the Westminster City 
Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks maintained that the project should not be granted 
planning permission due to the project's visual impacts. The first part of the section 
traces the presentation of the proof of evidence by the townscape consultant, Professor 
Robert Tavernor, and the arguments developed by the barrister, Russell Harris QC. To a 
large extent, the data presented were accessed through observation of the inquiry 
process.  
 
The second part of the section examines the weight given to the precedent decision 
regarding Doon Street Tower at the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road inquiry. The 
principles of the planning system for considering precedent decisions are examined. In 
relation to this, the impact of assessments made by the GLA, CABE and English 
Heritage regarding the quality of architecture is discussed. Quality of architecture is 
important in a visual assessment because, according to the LVMF, only projects of the 
highest quality are acceptable in the backgrounds of protected views (GLA 2007b). 
Finally, it is established how precedent cases permitted the conclusion that No.1 
Blackfriars Road will not overpower the St James's Park view.  
 
The examination of the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road on St James's Park  
In his opening statement, the barrister, Harris QC, argued on behalf of Beetham 
Landmark Ltd that due to the high quality of design and the policy context, and in 
particular that of the LVMF, No.1 Blackfriars Road was acceptable and should be 
granted planning permission (Harris and Cameron 2008a). Harris stated that if the Doon 
Street decision was taken into account, then the Royal Parks' argument that the 
proposed project would harm the view from St James's Park could not be upheld (ibid.).  
Opening on behalf of the Westminster City Council and the Royal Parks, the barrister, 
Banwell, argued that, while recognising that the Doon Street decision was a material 
consideration, it was likely to be challenged in the High Court (Banwell 2008a). 
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Therefore, Banwell sought to weaken the weight given to the precedent set by the Doon 
Street decision. The Doon Street Tower had been granted planning permission by the 
Secretary of State following a public inquiry in August 2008 (PINS 2008). The opening 
statements of the barristers representing the opposing parties showed that the precedent 
decision on the Doon Street Tower was of significant importance for the forthcoming 
public inquiry.  
 
The examination of Professor Tavernor started by establishing the relevant policy 
context and the weight of the Doon Street decision as a material consideration. Tavernor 
was the main witness for Beetham Landmark Ltd regarding the visual impact and was 
the townscape consultant for the No.1 Blackfriars Road project. The barrister, Harris, 
asked Tavernor to evaluate how much weight should be given to the LVMF in decision 
making processes. Professor Tavernor answered, full weight. Harris quoted the 2007 
LVMF, determining that if further development were proposed, it had to be of 
appropriate form, of exceptional design quality and it must be ensured that the project 
did not dominate or overpower the view. Harris then asked Tavernor to state which 
approach should be taken in visual assessments. Tavernor answered, the same as in the 
LVMF. Continuing this examination, Harris asked which approach was taken by the 
Secretary of State in the Doon Street case. Tavernor answered, the same approach. 
Finally, Harris asked Tavernor to determine which criteria for assessment were 
contained in the management plan for the St James's Park view. Tavernor answered that 
the issue of quality was important when buildings are visible in the background, and 
that if they did not overpower the view they should be acceptable. Harris concluded that 
there was no defined height threshold contained in the LVMF concerning the St James's 
Park view.  
 
Regarding the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road on the St James's Park view, 
Harris asked the parties to take in hand appendix 2 of the rebuttal proof of evidence by 
Professor Tavernor (see images 14 and 15 in relation to this discussion). Professor 
Tavernor stated that in the image, No.1 Blackfriars Road, did not overpower the view. 
He made a comparison of the height that appeared in the view between No.1 Blackfriars 
Road and the consented Bishopsgate Tower and concluded that the two projects 
appeared to be of similar height in the view. Therefore, he reasoned, it could not be 
concluded that No.1 Blackfriars Road overpowered the view. Harris then asked 
Tavernor to assess the visual impact of the façade materials of No.1 Blackfriars Road. 
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Tavernor argued that Portland stone, which had been used as the dominant façade 
material in the existing buildings, reflected sunlight to a greater extent than the glass-
façades of No.1 Blackfriars Road located a considerable distance away. The glass-
façades, he argued, did not catch the eye as much and therefore these provided for an 
appropriate contrast between new and old. Harris then asked Tavernor to include the 
precedent of Doon Street in his assessment. Tavernor stated that if the Doon Street 
project were built, then only a slither of No.1 Blackfriars Road would be visible. The 
aspect of the layering of built elements would then be the predominant aspect visually. 
Therefore, he argued, taking into account the Doon Street decision, it would be 
inconsistent if the Secretary of State were not to grant planning permission for No.1 
Blackfriars Road.  
 
Later in the inquiry process Robert Ayton argued on behalf of Westminster City 
Council (WCC) that if the Doon Street Tower were built, then it would be hard to argue 
that No.1 Blackfriars Road had a negative impact (Ayton 2008). The case of whether 
the Doon Street decision was taken as a precedent would therefore be limited to the 
visual impact of 20 Blackfriars Road. Ayton pointed out that if these projects and the 
projects of Bishopsgate Tower, King's Reach and Doon Street are built, a wall of tall 
buildings would start appearing in the background of the St James's Park view (see 
images 14 and 15) (ibid.). The barrister, Harris, discredited Ayton's reasoning by 
establishing that Ayton had not taken into account the precedent cases visible in the St 
James's Park view. Therefore, Harris argued, Ayton was not applying the LVMF 
methods in the appropriate manner. Similarly, Harris recited arguments made by Hall 
Moggridge opposed the Doon Street Tower. Harris concluded by stating that 
Moggridge's arguments were not contained in the 2007 LVMF. Harris proceeded to 
state that the Secretary of State had granted planning permission to Doon Street and that 
given this decision and that Doon Street appeared much more dominant and still 
concealed most of No.1 Blackfriars Road, one could not argue that No.1 Blackfriars 
Road was unacceptable. Moggridge insisted that No.1 Blackfriars Road in combination 
with the other consented projects would cumulatively overpower the view (Moggridge 
2008). Harris concluded by stating that even if the Secretary of State took Mr Ayton's 
approach, there would be no part of the case left against No.1 Blackfriars Road. This 
had been established since even if the small slither visible of No.1 Blackfriars Road (see 
images 14 and 15) would have been regarded as harmful, it could not possibly be 
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argued that it alone overpowers the view due to the visibility of the precedent cases, in 
particular the Doon Street Tower which largely concealed No.1.  
 
The planning inspector concluded in his report that the Doon Street decision along with 
other decisions had to be taken as valid and lawful with regard to this case because there 
is the principle that it is in the public interest that planning decisions should be 
consistent with other relevant decisions (PINS 2009a). Furthermore, the inspector 
reasoned that the approach taken by the WCC that the skyline of St James's Park should 
remain unaltered was too restrictive (ibid.). The Shell Building and the London Eye 
were described as the most dominant elements in the background of the view (ibid.). 
Based on the facts that a number of tall buildings had been granted permission and that 
No.1 Blackfriars Road would be concealed by the Doon Street Tower, the inspector 
concluded that No.1 Blackfriars Road would not have a harmful effect on the protected 
St James's Park view. The Secretary of State took the same approach and recommended 
granting the planning permission (DCLG 2009a). As is evident from this discussion, 
precedent decisions and the visibility of precedent cases are eminent in the assessment 
and decision making.  
 
The weight of precedent decisions in assessing the visual impact 
With regard to precedent decisions, the most important case was that of the Doon Street 
Tower which had been granted planning permission by Secretary of State Hazel Blears 
on 19 August 2008 (DCLG 2008a). According to guidance published by the Planning 
Inspectorate, the Secretary of State is required to take an approach in decision making 
that is consistent with previous decisions (PINS 2010a). As is stated in The Planning 
System: General Principles, 'Material considerations must be genuine planning 
considerations, i.e. they must be related to the development and use of land in the public 
interest' (ODPM 2005a: paragraph 11). Considered in conjunction, these two principles 
mean that the case in question in the public inquiry here had to be decided by taking the 
same approach to decision making as has been taken in the previous case (i.e. in the 
case that established the precedent). Thus, since the public inquiry regarding No.1 and 
20 Blackfriars Road started on 9 September 2008, after the Doon Street decision had 
been published, the Doon Street decision had to be regarded as a material consideration.  
 
The issues of the quality of architectural and urban design were straightforward matters 
in the inquiry. The GLA, CABE and English Heritage had already concluded in the 
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assessment processes that No.1 Blackfriars Road was of very high quality (GLA 2008a; 
CABE 2007f; English Heritage 2008b). These assessment results had been achieved by 
a series  of amendments to the design made by Ian Simpson Architects. In relation to 
this, the management plan for the St James's Park view contained in the final 2007 
LVMF includes the reasoning that proposals are acceptable if these are of exceptional 
quality and do not overpower the view (GLA 2007b). The assessments by the GLA, 
CABE and English Heritage had established that the proposal was of the highest design 
quality. Therefore, the only possible avenue left open for an objection by opponents was 
to attempt to prove that No.1 Blackfriars Road would contribute to overpowering the St 
James's Park view.  
 
In relation to the aspect of overpowering, particular attention had to be paid to the 
visibility of precedent cases. As is evident in image 14, the Bishopsgate Tower (1) was 
of a similar height to that of No.1 Blackfriars Road (2) in the St James's Park view. 
Furthermore, as is evident in image 15, the Doon Street Tower (5) was located in front 
of No.1 Blackfriars Road and indeed largely obscured No.1. Using the assessment 
method advocated by the LVMF, No.1 Blackfriars Road would have had to be visible to 
a greater extent than the other consented projects in order to overpower the view. Based 
on these considerations, the barrister, Harris, and the witness, Tavernor, demonstrated 
convincingly that the accusation of overpowering was not valid. In addition, they also 
weakened the weight of the evidence presented by Moggridge and Ayton by 
establishing that the two had not applied the LVMF in the appropriate manner, and 
inspector, Gray agreed (PINS 2009a).  
 
In summary, the precedent principle was applied in coherence with the decision making 
principles determined by guidance from the Planning Inspectorate. Inspector Gray's 
assessment included the Doon Street Tower decision based on the facts that: i) the cases 
were similar with respect to the applicability of policy and guidance, and the LVMF in 
particular; and, ii) both cases appeared in almost the same location in the view from St 
James's Park, another aspect of case similarity. Due to the applicability of the 
consistency principle and the weight given to the Doon Street Tower decision as a 
material consideration, the inspector, Gray, appropriately concluded that the visual 
impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road on the St James's Park view could not be regarded as a 
sufficient reason for recommending refusal to grant planning permission (PINS 2009a).  
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Image 14: AVR showing the townscape view from the Blue Bridge in St James's Park towards 
Horse Guards, including consented schemes and the projects subject to the public inquiry.  
Source: Tavernor 2008c: 6; © Hayes Davidson; The original image (contained in Appendix 23) has been 
cropped. 
 
Image 15: Analytical drawing foregrounding the consented schemes and the proposed No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road projects. In particular, this image shows that due to the visual presence of the 
consented schemes, No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road are hardly visible in the view.  
Source: Author, based on the image contained in Tavernor 2008c: 6 
 
Key to images 14 and 15 
1 Bishopsgate Tower   blue 
2 No.1 Blackfriars Road   red 
3 20 Blackfri ars Road   red 
4 King's Reach Tower Redevelopment blue 
5 Doon Street Tower   blue 
6 London Bridge Tower   blue 
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6.4 The appropriateness of the location for tall building 
development  
 
This section examines how the appropriateness of the proposed site of the No.1 
Blackfriars Road project was determined in the public inquiry process. The call-in letter 
from March 2008 stated that one of the major issues to be determined at the inquiry 
should be the appropriateness of the location for a tall building (GOL 2008d). The 
Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks had argued that the LB 
Southwark might not have followed a plan-led approach in its decision making. 
According to the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, decisions made at local level 
must be based on national, regional and local policy (ODPM 2005a). The Guidance on 
Tall Buildings (GOTB) requires that local boroughs designate areas suitable for tall 
buildings within their local development plan (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
Therefore, the proponents of No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road had to establish proof that 
regional and local policy permitted a coherent decision to be made regarding the 
granting of planning permission.  
 
The first part of the section traces the presentation of proof of evidence by the LB 
Southwark policy officer, Simon Bevan, and his cross-examination by Richard Banwell,  
the barrister representing the WCC and the Royal Parks. Furthermore the re-
examination of Bevan by the barrister, Timothy Corner QC, is considered. I accessed 
the data in this part by observing the public inquiry. The second part of the section   
examines the policy background and the policy making processes related to the 
appropriateness of the location of No.1 Blackfriars Road. It is established why the 
arguments made by the barrister, Corner, and the witness, Bevan, were particularly 
effective in proving that a plan-led approach had been followed by the LB Southwark.  
 
Proof by and cross-examination of the LB Southwark officer, Simon Bevan  
After lunch on day five of the inquiry, the barrister, Timothy Corner QC, called Simon 
Bevan as the policy witness for the London Borough of Southwark. Bevan was the lead 
officer regarding the policy making process for Southwark's UDP. Bevan's proof of 
evidence focussed in particular on the policy criteria for the designation of tall building 
areas established in the 2004 London Plan and the 2003 and 2007 Guidance on Tall 
Buildings (GOTB). Furthermore, Bevan discussed the Further Alterations to the London 
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Plan (FALP) and pointed out that the Southwark Council objected to the designation of 
the Bankside Opportunity Area which included Blackfriars Bridge (see map 11).  
 
Bevan proceeded to examine the 2007 Southwark UDP, the Southwark Plan, which was 
amended following the recommendations of the inspectors at the EiP process. As a 
rationale for the failure to produce a tall buildings policy specific to the Blackfriars area, 
Bevan explained that council members supported the emerging policy in 2006 but then 
objected to it in 2007. He concluded his proof of evidence by pointing out that the latest 
Southwark UDP followed GOTB criteria and that it contained policy that allowed for 
the identification of tall building locations. Furthermore, Bevan drew attention to the 
fact that English Heritage had agreed that Southwark had followed a plan-led approach 
in determining the granting of planning permission for No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road. 
Importantly, he pointed out that the objection by council members was limited to 
procedural grounds. The planning inspector mentioned that he concluded from Bevan's 
presentation that the LB Southwark would define the same boundaries for the tall 
buildings area as had been proposed in the FALP.  
 
Following the presentation by Mr Bevan, the barrister, Richard Banwell,  on behalf of 
the WCC and the Royal Parks, began his cross-examination. Banwell reviewed Bevan's 
written proof of evidence in relation to the plan-led approach advocated by the GOTB. 
In his written evidence, Bevan had stated that the LB Southwark had stressed that the 
GOTB was not prescriptive but informative towards policy making (Bevan 2008) and 
that this was stated in the GOTB (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). Banwell,  
seeking to establish that the LB Southwark might not have had sufficient regard for the 
GOTB, argued that paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6 of the 2007 GOTB talked about the 
production of maps that defined tall building areas. Bevan stated that a precise map had 
not been produced by the LB Southwark.  
 
Banwell then proceeded to examine the progression of tall building policy by the LB 
Southwark. He stressed that the GLA had objected to the November 2002 version of the 
Southwark UDP. The conclusion of the EiP process had been that the Blackfriars area 
was not located within an Opportunity Area. Furthermore, Banwell stressed that the 
draft tall building policy produced by the Southwark planners had been withdrawn in 
2007 and was asked whether this document included maps defining the Blackfriars area 
as a tall building area. Bevan stated that there were various diagrams contained in the 
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draft SPG. Banwell then stated that the 2004 London Plan did not include an 
identification of areas that could be harmed by tall buildings and concluded that there 
was not the level of detail contained in it to allow the identification of areas suitable for 
tall buildings. Bevan argued that the 2004 London Plan identified points of transport 
accessibility at which tall buildings were generally perceived as suitably located. Mr 
Ball asked Bevan to further define the concept of transport nodes. Bevan stated that 
three main stations were within a short distance of the locations of No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road.  
 
Following cross-examination, the barrister, Timothy Corner QC, re-examined his 
witness, Simon Bevan. Corner asked Bevan to make a comparison between the 
approach to identifying appropriate locations for tall buildings taken in his proof and the 
proof of evidence by Mr Ayton from the Westminster City Council. Corner established 
that the WCC did not object to tall buildings in principle and that a reduction in height 
of the projects proposed to 120 metres would still constitute tall buildings. He 
concluded that there was no disagreement in the approach between the LB Southwark 
and the WCC regarding what constituted an appropriate location for a tall building. 
Corner then cited a paragraph from the written representation submitted by English 
Heritage. This document stated that by the time its representations to this public inquiry 
had been written, English Heritage did consider that the LB Southwark had followed a 
plan-led approach (English Heritage 2008b). Corner then established that CABE had 
also not objected to the draft SPG on tall buildings by the LB Southwark in November 
2005 (LB Southwark 2005b). Corner finally asked Bevan whether the mayor and the 
GLA objected to the Southwark UDP because the LB Southwark had not produced 
maps defining tall building areas. Bevan said that that was not the case.   
 
In the final report, the planning inspector reasoned that a plan-led approach as 
demanded by the GOTB had been followed (PINS 2009a). The London Plan Policy 
4B.9 was crucial for his assessment, which states that tall buildings must be located so 
that they create attractive landmarks, and that these are particularly appropriate if 
located in Opportunity Areas (GLA 2004a). The fact that the 2006 FALP had 
designated an Opportunity Area that included the location of the proposed 
developments was an additional aspect that weakened any doubt over the 
appropriateness of the location for tall buildings (GLA 2006a). Map 11 shows the 
London Bridge Bankside Opportunity Area relative to the proposed tall building 
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projects and the St James's Park view. Furthermore, the inspector concluded that the 
criteria of the 2007 Southwark UDP had been met (PINS 2009a). These criteria were 
that tall buildings: i) must have excellent access to transport facilities; ii) must not be 
located within protected view corridors; and, iii) must, through their location, contribute 
to an interesting skyline (ibid.).  
 
The effectiveness of the decision making regarding the appropriateness of the 
location 
The issue that there was no specific tall building policy for the north-western part of 
Southwark Blackfriars Bridge was described as the biggest problem for the planning 
process by several design team members of No.1 Blackfriars Road in interviews with 
me in late 2007. It was therefore no surprise to me that the original call-in letter from 
March 2008 focussed heavily on this aspect (GOL 2008d). Thus, it was all the more 
surprising to learn that by the start of the public inquiry, the WCC had withdrawn the 
original claim made and now focussed only on the visual impact of the proposed 
projects on the townscape view from St James's Park as shown in map 11. The 
following discussion examines why the matter of the appropriateness of the location for 
No.1 Blackfriars Road led to a rather straightforward decision by the planning inspector 
although it had been a highly problematic issue during the preceding planning process.  
 
The reasoning provided by the LB Southwark planning officer, Bevan, in the 
presentation of proof and the cross-examination was largely based on the policy making 
processes that had been geared towards establishing a tall buildings policy for the 
Blackfriars area. Taking into account the central requirement posited by the GOTB of 
following the plan-led approach, the argument that the FALP had established an 
Opportunity Area that included Blackfriars was particularly strong. According to the 
plan-led approach, local policy has to be based on regional policy (ODPM 2005a). 
Since the London Plan had designated an Opportunity Area, the local development plan 
had to do the same. The GLA had already objected to the Southwark Plan in 2002. 
Because of this and in order to strengthen the argument, Bevan had to demonstrate that 
the GLA had not objected because no maps were drawn, so that any doubt that the 
GOTB had been followed could be removed.  
 
In fact, the GLA had objected to the tall building policies of the forthcoming Southwark 
Plan because it perceived those to be too restrictive to tall building development (Hollox 
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and Mattocks 2006a). Based on the GLA objection, the inspectors reviewing the 
Southwark plan within the EiP concluded that planning permission for tall buildings 
may be granted on sites that have excellent accessibility to public transport, are located 
in the CAZ and are outside of strategic view corridors (ibid.). Furthermore, tall 
buildings have to contribute to the London skyline and consolidate a cluster within the 
skyline or provide a key focus within views (English Heritage and CABE 2007b). 
Neither English Heritage nor CABE had objected to the tall building policies therein, 
which is evident in the annex to the EiP report (Hollox and Mattocks 2006b). Therefore, 
even though local politicians did not support the draft tall buildings policy in 2007, the 
recommendations of the EiP panel had to be followed and the designation of Blackfriars 
as a tall building area was a necessary result that had to be expected to happen sooner or 
later. Based on these facts, the barristers, Corner and Bevan, were able to demonstrate 
successfully that the compliance of the LB Southwark policy making with the GOTB 
had not been questioned by the GLA, CABE and English Heritage or within the EiP.  
 
Another critical requirement of the GOTB was that specific maps have to be produced 
that clearly designate areas appropriate for tall buildings (English Heritage and CABE 
2007b). The GOTB states that a plan-led approach is only followed if maps are 
produced (ibid.). As a matter of fact, a map had not been produced. Therefore, the most 
important factor that allowed the conclusion that, in the absence of a precise map, a 
plan-led approach had been followed in the decision making was the agreement of both 
CABE and English Heritage. Based on these agreements, it could not be reasonably 
argued that the LB Southwark had not followed a plan-led approach in decision making 
regarding No.1 Blackfriars. The planning inspector, John L. Gray, reasoned that the 
application site was not located within an Opportunity Area (PINS 2009a). The 
inspector then went on to argue that the FALP had established an Opportunity Area, 
defined within a map that included the Southwark side of Blackfriars. Furthermore, it 
would not be necessary for the application site to be located within an Opportunity Area 
since Policy 3.20 of the Southwark Plan did require that tall buildings should not only 
be located in Opportunity Areas (ibid.). The Secretary of State agreed with the 
inspector's reasoning (DCLG 2009). 
 
In conclusion, despite the problematic aspects identified in evaluating the compliance of 
the decision making with the plan-led approach, it is possible to argue that the critical 
evaluation of the planning inspector was effective. The interpretation in favour of the 
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acceptability of No.1 Blackfriars Road allowed the granting of planning permission and 
thus did not hold up development that would have surely been legitimised in the near 
future. The location at which the project was proposed fulfilled all the criteria required 
to be designated as an Opportunity Area. In particular, the planning permission for a 
train station that was part of the Thameslink 2000 project established the fact that in the 
future a transport hub would be in close walking distance to the application site 
(Department for Transport 2006).  
 
In addition, the LB Southwark had made significant efforts to establish a specific tall 
building policy (LB Southwark 2005b). Thus, there could be no doubt that the location 
would fulfil the necessary criteria for being designated as an Opportunity Area. 
Hypothetically, the prerequisite for recommending refusal of planning permission 
would have been to conclude that the planning permission was granted prematurely 
(ODPM 2005a). The developers would have had to wait until the LB Southwark had 
established a tall building policy specifically designating the locations as  a tall building 
area. Then, however, any development would have been delayed unnecessarily. 
According to reports, delays in planning processes have been described as a major 
factor hindering the effective functioning of the planning system (Barker 2006a). 
Building on this report, the Secretaries of State have recommended that 'commercial 
development should not be delayed simply on the basis of prematurity' (DCLG 2007a: 
200). Therefore, the interpretative freedom applied in this case led to an effective 
assessment and decision making.  
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Map 11: The No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road projects in relation to precedent cases and Opportunity 
Areas established through the FALP and the view from St James's Park.  
The map shows the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road projects (red) in relation to precedent cases used in the 
examination during the public inquiry (orange), the London Bridge Bankside Opportunity Area 
established in the FALP (A) and St James's Park (light green). In addition, the townscape view from the 
Blue Bridge in St James's Park is indicated (light grey, opaque). The drawing is based on the map 
contained in the 2006 draft FALP (GLA 2006a: A83). Source: Author 
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6.5 The credibility of arguments regarding the visual impact  
 
This section considers the reasoning of the planning inspectors in the Doon Street 
Tower and No.1 Blackfriars Road cases regarding the weight given to arguments made 
by the parties opposing the projects in question. First, the arguments made by the 
barrister, William Hicks QC, and Dr Chris Miele in support of the Doon Street project 
are introduced. Second, the counter arguments made by English Heritage and its 
barrister, Neil King QC, as well as the conclusions reached by the planning inspector, 
Philip Wilson, and the Secretary of State are discussed. In both the Doon Street Tower 
and the No.1 Blackfriars Road cases, objectors took the position that the visibility of tall 
buildings in the backgrounds of views was not acceptable and would warrant the refusal 
of planning permission (PINS 2008; 2009a). In the Doon Street case, the inspector, 
Wilson, concluded that the visual impact of the project on the courtyard of Somerset 
House was unacceptable (PINS 2008). In contrast in the No.1 Blackfriars Road case, the 
inspector, Gray, concluded that the visual impact of the project on the setting of St 
James's Park was not sufficient to recommend refusal (PINS 2009a). The section 
compares the policy background, and in particular the applicability of precedent cases 
as well, regarding both Doon Street and No.1 Blackfriars Road. It is established why the 
objectors were successful in the Doon Street case but not in the No.1 Blackfriars Road 
case. 
 
The visual impact on Somerset House in the Doon Street case 
The Doon Street Tower was called in on 25 September 2007 by the Secretary of State 
following a request by English Heritage (PINS 2008). The central issue in the public 
inquiry was to determine whether the project was in accordance with national, regional 
and local policy due to its visual impact on the courtyard of Somerset House, a Grade I 
listed building (ibid.). Image 16 at the end of this section shows the relevant view. Due 
to the significance of the issue of the visual impact, the townscape assessment provided 
by Dr. Chris Miele was of particular importance for the case of Coin Street Community 
Builders (CSCB), the developers of the Doon Street Tower. In the proof of evidence, 
Miele argued that the top of the Doon Street Tower was only visible from the entrance 
to Somerset House (Miele 2008). The further a visitor proceeded to the south of the 
courtyard, the more the proposal disappeared (ibid.). Finally, the tower was no longer 
visible as soon as one stood in the centre of the courtyard. The high quality of the 
design in addition to the limited visibility resulted in an impact that was not intrusive 
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and not harmful (ibid.).  Miele's reasoning rested largely on the assumption that the 
courtyard of Somerset House was experienced mainly from within and thus the limited 
visual impact, which could only be experienced from the entrance, should be 
outweighed by the high design quality of the project.  
 
Arguments seeking to employ the precedence principle were made in support of the 
Doon Street Tower. William Hicks QC, the barrister for the developer, CSCB, argued in 
his closing statement that the London Bridge Tower decision should be used as 
guidance, as the appropriate approach to the visual assessment and the decision making 
(Hicks 2008). He argued that just because the background to a particular view was an 
unspoilt skyline, that did not mean that the visibility of a tower would be harmful 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the DEGW in its 2002 report discussed Somerset House and 
concluded that, in a city context, maintaining an open sky as a background to views 
would be impractical and unrealistic (DEGW 2002). Hicks recited precedents such as 
King's College buildings and those on the Citybank site to show that there were already 
buildings visible from within the courtyard (Hicks 2008).59 In conclusion, Hicks 
asserted that English Heritage used an 'extreme historicist approach' since it accepted 
the visibility of church spires to the north, and therefore it appeared that it simply 
expressed a dislike of modern buildings being visible whatever the quality of their 
design (ibid.: 22). The barrister, Hicks, attempted to establish the applicability of 
precedent cases while also seeking to weaken English Heritage's position by asserting 
that it was arguing on the basis of a biased position.  
 
The case for the opponents of the Doon Street Tower gained significant momentum, not 
least due to very convincing arguments made by English Heritage planning officers. As 
I was able to observe at the inquiry, Dr. Gordon Higgott pointed out tall building cases 
in cross-examination, such as 30 St Mary Axe and 122 Leadenhall,  in which English 
Heritage had not objected. Furthermore, English Heritage had not objected to the 
London Bridge Tower in relation to the St James's Park view. Crucially, Higgott was 
able to establish that the courtyard of Somerset House was better understood spatially if 
one stood further behind, such as was the case at the entrance. The view from the 
entrance is shown in image 16. Thus, Higgott attempted to weaken the argument made 
                                                 
59 Appendix 25 contains photographs that show buildings visible from within the courtyard of Somerset 
House when looking towards the northern side.   
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by Miele that the courtyard of Somerset House was better appreciated once a visitor was 
inside the courtyard.  
 
Of crucial importance to the case of English Heritage was the convincing reasoning by 
the barrister, Neil King QC, a leading barrister at Landmark Chambers. He argued that, 
unlike the Tower of London, the setting of the southern part of the Somerset House 
quadrangle had not been altered since the building was built. King argued that the 
projects which had been referred to as precedents by the barrister, Hicks, had all been 
constructed before Somerset House was listed. Hence, English Heritage had not 
objected to those buildings. The construction of the Citybank building to the north had 
been reduced in height so that no part of the building was visible from within the 
courtyard. Hence, there were no grounds that would have merited refusal of this 
planning application. Furthermore in his closing statement, King argued that the 'key 
moment of visual drama' was when a visitor entered the courtyard through the entrance 
from The Strand (King 2008: 31).  
 
In conclusion, the visibility of the Doon Street Tower from the entrance was sufficient 
for English Heritage to justify the refusal of the planning application (ibid.).  The 
barrister, King, managed to successfully nullify the London Bridge Tower public 
inquiry decision as a precedent. Furthermore, he also managed to protect the credibility 
of English Heritage regarding Doon Street by establishing that it had taken a consistent 
approach in its assessment and decision making. It was crucial for this point that there 
was no necessity for English Heritage to object to buildings visible on the northern side 
of the courtyard of Somerset House. Most importantly, King managed to successfully 
establish that an approach equating visibility with harm, as in this instance, would merit 
refusal of the planning application. The basis for this was that the visibility of the Doon 
Street Tower would have been the first alteration to the setting of Somerset House when 
experienced from within the courtyard. 
 
The arguments presented by English Heritage convinced the planning inspector. 
Inspector Philip Wilson stated that people experiencing the courtyard of Somerset 
House would perceive the Doon Street Tower as a distinguishable element in the view 
(PINS 2008). Wilson based his reasoning on the façade material of Portland stone and 
glass which would be discernible from the background of sky and clouds (ibid.). In 
conclusion, Wilson appeared convinced that the compositional power of Somerset 
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House lay in its symmetry. Therefore, he deduced that the visibility of the Doon Street 
Tower would detract from an appreciation of this symmetry and the architectural 
composition (ibid.). Hence in conclusion, he recommended that the Secretary of State 
refuse planning permission (ibid.). As a result, the design team arguing in support of the 
Doon Street Tower was not as successful as  hoped at the public inquiry. After the 
negative recommendation by the inspector, Wilson, the decision regarding the granting 
of planning permission was in the hands of the Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government, Hazel Blears.  
 
Blears overturned the inspector's recommendations and granted permission to the Doon 
Street Tower. The reasoning was that although the Doon Street Tower would detract 
from the setting of Somerset House, this impact was mitigated by the existing projects 
visible to the north of the courtyard (DCLG 2008a). Blears decided that the benefits the 
project offered outweighed the harm done (ibid.). Subsequently, English Heritage 
attempted to get the decision quashed in the High Court, its case being based on 
questioning whether planning policy had been applied correctly by the Secretary of 
State (Bircham Dyson Bell LLP 2008). Finally, the High Court ruled that the Secretary 
of State had correctly based her decision on relevant policy and that the granting of 
planning permission should be upheld (Landmark Chambers 2008). Thus, the design 
team of the Doon Street Tower proved successful in the end. However, English Heritage 
had also successfully made the case that the visual impact on Somerset House should 
have warranted a refusal of planning permission. The decision made by Secretary of 
State Blears was a matter of values that did not diminish English Heritage's reasoning. 
Blears reasoned that the community benefits provided by a publicly accessible 
swimming pool and further S106 obligations outweighed the visual impact on Somerset 
House.  
 
Comparison of the weight of arguments made by objectors in the Doon Street and 
the No.1 Blackfriars Road cases 
In the case of the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road, the barrister, Russell Harris 
QC, cross-examined Robert Ayton, appearing on behalf of the Westminster City 
Council (WCC), and the landscape architect Hall Moggridge, appearing on behalf of the 
Royal Parks. Harris managed to establish that in the Doon Street case both the opposing 
barrister, Neil King QC, and the planning inspector, Wilson, had applied the LVMF 
with regard to the visual impact on the St James's Park view. Crucially, the inspector, 
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Wilson, had reached the conclusion that the visual impact of the Doon Street Tower, 
which largely obscured No.1 Blackfriars Road, was not sufficient to recommend refusal 
of the granting of planning permission (PINS 2008). Furthermore, Wilson concluded 
that the approach advocated by the LVMF was to manage change, and that a position 
that does not allow change, such as the introduction of visible tall buildings, was 
incoherent with the LVMF (ibid.). Regarding both Ayton and Moggridge, Harris 
established in the No.1 Blackfriars Road case that they had not applied the LVMF 
correctly. Precedent cases had not been taken into account in the assessment and the 
position taken was that no building should be visible in the view, as was evident in the 
proofs of evidence (Ayton 2008; Moggridge 2008). Furthermore, Harris established that 
both the WCC and the Royal Parks had argued in consultation regarding the LVMF that 
the St James's Park view should be protected geometrically, and hence no building 
should be allowed to be visible in the background, and that this argument had been 
rejected within the EiP. In conclusion, Harris discredited the arguments made by the 
WCC and the Royal Parks which had argued that the visibility of No.1 Blackfriars Road 
in the St James's Park view resulted in unacceptable harm.  
 
The planning inspector, Gray, noted that the WCC would have preferred if no new tall 
building was visible in the background of the view and that the Royal Parks opposed the 
visibility of a tall building behind Duck Island (PINS 2009a). Applying the LVMF, the 
inspector concluded that these approaches were too restrictive and that it was the design 
quality of a tall building that determined whether a tall building was acceptable within a 
view (ibid.).  Furthermore, the inspector refuted the arguments made by the WCC and 
the Royal Parks that the tall building would dominate or overpower the St James's Park 
view (ibid.). The Shell Building and the London Eye, a modern structure very different 
in materials and shape to the historic buildings  visible in the view, are visible. Thus, he 
questioned the argument that a very well designed building like No.1 Blackfriars Road 
should not be acceptable (ibid.). The Secretary of State agreed with the planning 
inspector's reasoning and granted planning permission to both No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road (DCLG 2009a). Based on this discussion and the discussion of the arguments 
made by English Heritage regarding the Doon Street case, it must be questioned why 
the arguments made by English Heritage were accepted by the planning inspector while 
the arguments made by the WCC and the Royal Parks in the No.1 Blackfriars Road case 
were not. In the end, the positions taken were rather similar. English Heritage took the 
position that the clear sky background seen from within the courtyard of Somerset 
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House should be preserved. The WCC and the Royal Parks took the position that tall 
buildings in the background of the St James's Park should not be visible.   
 
To what extent were precedent cases applicable in the Doon Street Tower case? The 
proponents of the Doon Street Tower sought to establish the applicability of the London 
Bridge Tower case as a precedent (Hicks 2008). However, the London Bridge Tower 
replaced an existing building which had been identified as bad architecture and which 
had also been visible from within the Tower of London WHS (PINS 2003). The main 
question was whether the new background provided by the proposal would be an 
improvement compared to the existing backdrop (ibid.). In the Doon Street Tower case, 
the project introduced the visibility of a tall building where there was a clear skyline 
background (PINS 2008). Thus, the cases were not similar enough, for which reason the 
London Bridge Tower could not be used as a precedent in terms of the visual impact.  
 
The objectors' arguments in the Doon Street Tower case were soundly based on existing 
policy, in this case the PPG15 applied regarding the visual assessment. Planning Policy 
Guidance 15 (PPG15) requires preserving or enhancing views into or from within a 
conservation area outwards (Department of the Environment 1994). Section 72 of the 
1990 Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act grants these 
considerations the status of material consideration in the implementation process (OPSI 
1990b). English Heritage successfully established that the entrance to the courtyard was 
a significant viewing point from which to enjoy the view out of the southern part of the 
courtyard (King 2008). Furthermore, it successfully established that the setting of this 
portion of the courtyard had not been altered since the building was built (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, the arguments provided by English Heritage gained significant weight 
because CABE did not accept the argument that the quality of architecture would 
outweigh the visual harm done to Somerset House. In fact, CABE in its visual 
assessment concluded that the mere visibility of the Doon Street Tower within the 
entrance sequence to Somerset House detracted from the setting of Somerset House 
(CABE 2007e). Therefore, it recommended that the proposal be refused planning 
permission (ibid.). If CABE had concluded that the quality of design outweighed visual 
harm then it could have been argued that the proposal followed the London Plan and 
Lambeth UDP policies. This was not the case. Therefore, the inspector had to conclude 
that a precedent for the visibility of a tall building in this part of the view would be set 
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by the Doon Street Tower and, importantly, that significant harm would be done (PINS 
2008).  
 
In the No.1 Blackfriars case, the arguments provided by the WCC and the Royal Parks 
were discredited successfully by the barrister, Russell Harris QC. In principle, the 
position taken by the witnesses, Moggridge and Ayton, was similar to the English 
Heritage rationale in the Doon Street case: no tall building should be visible in the 
background of the view in question so that no visual harm is caused (Ayton 2008; 
Moggridge 2008). However, the policy context and the preceding planning processes 
were rather different. First, a number of precedents had been established and, in the 
assessment of these, the LVMF had been applied by both the supporting and opposing 
parties involved and the planning inspector. Both Ayton and Moggridge had resorted to 
methods that were not based on those determined by the LVMF. In conjunction with the 
townscape consultant, Harris established that the images provided by Ayton and 
Moggridge were inaccurate.60 Therefore, their arguments were countered by Harris who 
established that the LVMF had been applied correctly in precedent cases (Harris 
2008b). Thus, the LVMF had to be applied in the same manner regarding No.1 
Blackfriars Road based on the consistency principle in assessment and decision making. 
Importantly, the Doon Street Tower provided an important precedent case due to the 
similarity in terms of the visual impact with No.1 Blackfriars Road. Indeed, both 
projects appeared almost in the same location in the St James's Park view and Doon 
Street obscured large parts of No.1 Blackfriars Road, as is evident in figures 14 and 15 
in section 2.  
 
In both inquiries, the inspectors made correct use of precedent cases. In the Doon Street 
Tower inquiry, precedent-based reasoning proposed by supporters was dismissed and 
not taken into account on the basis of a lack of relevance to the case in question (PINS 
2008). In the No.1 Blackfriars Road case, precedents were rightly taken into account 
due to their relevance to the case (PINS 2009a). The arguments provided by the 
supporters and objectors were correctly tested with regard to their compliance with 
applicable policy and guidance. In conclusion, the planning inspectors were very 
effective in assessing the credibility of the argumentative rationales of supporters and 
objectors in both cases.  
 
                                                 
60 Examples of these images are contained in appendix 24. 
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Image 16: AVR of the Doon Street Tower seen from the entrance to the courtyard of Somerset 
House. The wireline drawing of the Doon Street Tower is marked with number 5. Source of image: 
Tavernor 2008b: 53; The copyright holder for this image could not be determined. I would be grateful i f 
the copyright holder would get in contact with me.   
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6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has considered the public inquiry process regarding the No.1 Blackfriars 
Road project. The space within which the public inquiry was held as well as the 
presentation processes for proofs of evidence, cross-examinations and decision making 
by the planning inspector and the Secretary of State have been examined. The key 
issues in the public inquiry were the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars Road on the 
townscape view from St James's Park protected through the LVMF and policy 
determining the appropriateness of the north-western corner of Southwark for tall 
building development. Regarding the cross-examinations of expert witnesses, only the 
determination of these most central issues has been examined.  
 
The space within which the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry was held 
was dominated visually by posters and physical models of the projects. In comparison, 
at the Doon Street Tower inquiry there was far less visual dominance by posters and 
models. This aspect of the inquiry room is not regulated in detail. However, guidance by 
the Council on Tribunals (1997) sets out that public inquiry must be conducted 
uninfluenced by external considerations and in hearing accommodation that is not 
connected with the opposing parties. I do not believe that the inspector was influenced 
by the presence of visuals and models. The planning inspectors are bound by the rules 
for decision making set out in the 2000 Town and Country Planning (Inquiries 
Procedure) (England) Rules (OPSI 2000a). Inspectors have to base their decisions on 
the merits of each case. Therefore, the interior of the public inquiry space is highly 
unlikely to have an impact on an inspector's decision. If a departure from the rules of 
decision making can be detected by a party aggrieved by the decision, then the decision 
can be challenged in the High Court (ibid.). Thus, the risk of a High Court challenge is 
far too great. Therefore, it is unreasonable to suspect that inspectors would depart from 
the rules of decision making based on the design of the inquiry space. Nonetheless, 
presentation materials do have persuasive effects, as has been demonstrated in chapter 
4. Thus, it should not be assumed that planning inspectors are immune to persuasion 
due to the strict regulation of inquiry decision making procedures. Furthermore, the 
opponents of the projects in question might have been intimidated by the immense 
visual presence of the projects they were trying to stop. It might thus be reasonable to 
consider regulating the visual appearance of the interior of inquiry spaces so as to avoid 
such effects.  
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The discussions on the presentation of proofs of evidence and the examination of the 
townscape consultant and the arguments developed by the barrister have shown that 
precedent decisions and the visibility of precedent projects in protected views were 
central to determining the acceptability of No.1 Blackfriars Road. In the examination, 
significant proof was developed which showed that No.1 Blackfriars Road had been 
designed in accordance with national, regional and local policy. Furthermore, the 
precedent decision regarding the Doon Street Tower was an important part of the 
examination. This project largely obscured No.1 Blackfriars Road in the St James's Park 
view. The two projects were similar in many respects in terms of their visual impact. 
Therefore, the Doon Street decision was considered an important material consideration 
for determining the acceptability of No.1 Blackfriars Road. Thus, the inspector's 
reasoning that the visual impact could not be regarded as a sufficient reason to refuse 
the granting of planning permission was coherent with the principle of consistent 
decision making.  
 
The determination of the appropriateness of the No.1 Blackfriars Road location for tall 
building development was more complicated during the planning process than at the 
public inquiry. While the project was being assessed by the GLA, CABE, English 
Heritage and the LB Southwark, the London Plan was amended via the FALP, the 
Southwark local tall building policy that emerged, and the GOTB was also amended. It 
has been demonstrated that the location conformed to the criteria for an Opportunity 
Area which was designated in the FALP and consolidated through the EiP  in 2007. The 
only problematic aspect that was left was whether the absence of a local tall building 
policy specific to the north-western corner of Southwark would be sufficient to refuse 
the granting of planning permission. However, both English Heritage and CABE, the 
co-authors of the GOTB which demanded the production of a location specific tall 
building policy, agreed that the LB Southwark had followed a plan-led approach in its 
decision making. It has also been demonstrated that the conclusion by the planning 
inspector to recommend the granting of planning permission was coherent with the 
objectives set out by governmental reports and the 2007 DCLG white paper. 
Development should not be held up merely on the grounds of prematurity (DCLG 
2007a).  
 
The Doon Street and the No.1 Blackfriars Road cases have been compared in terms of 
the credibility of the proofs of evidence regarding the visual impact. At first glance, the 
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positions taken by the objectors appeared to be similar, the mere visibility of a tall 
building proposed being sufficient to recommend refusal of planning permission. 
However, in the Doon Street Tower case, the southern side of the courtyard in Somerset 
House has never been obstructed by tall buildings in the background of the view. Thus, 
Doon Street would have been the first precedent case visible in the background of the 
view. As a result, the evidence provided by English Heritage convinced the planning 
inspector, Wilson, of the merits of its case. This was not so with St James's Park. There, 
a number of precedent cases had already established that the visibility of tall buildings 
in the background was acceptable provided the projects conform to national, regional 
and local policy. Therefore, the conclusions by the planning inspectors in both cases 
were coherent with the principle of consistent decision making.  
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7. Key patterns in tall building planning 
 
This chapter brings together the results of chapters 2 to 6. In these chapters, the 
processes of policy making and implementation conducted by the GLA, English 
Heritage, CABE and the LB Southwark, as well as the impact of UNESCO, have been 
examined in relation to the cases mentioned. Furthermore, the public inquiry regarding 
No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road has also been discussed. While the previous chapters 
have considered each of these processes individually, this chapter seeks to reveal the 
interdependencies between the most important factors that contributed to and detracted 
from the effectiveness of the tall building planning system applied in central London at 
that time.  
 
First, conflict resolution in the policy making processes regarding the London Plan and 
the LVMF is discussed. It is established that the London Plan and the LVMF led to 
significant improvements in the design quality of tall buildings. The flexibility provided 
to developers resulted in an increase in proposals for tall buildings. However, conflicts 
exacerbated and finally culminated in the involvement of UNESCO due to the 
incremental marginalisation of heritage groups. Second, conflict resolution within the 
implementation processes is examined. It is established that pre-application processes 
were a major source of conflict resolution. Third, the effectiveness of visual assessments 
based on the LVMF is discussed. While the LVMF was improved step-by-step, it 
continued to allow for assessments based on divergent values held by supporters and 
opponents. Thus, the acceptability of the visual impacts of precedent tall building 
projects had to be determined in the public inquiry processes. Fourth, the central issue 
of certainty is examined in relation to policy making and implementation processes. It is 
reasoned that unresolved conflicts and the marginalisation of heritage groups were a 
crucial source of uncertainty for developers. Fifth, the need for expertise from private 
sector experts is examined in relation to accusations of conflicts of interest. The GLA, 
CABE and English Heritage depended on private sector expertise. However, these 
organisations repeatedly had to defend their public accountability due to accusations 
made by parties aggrieved by their decisions.  
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7.1 Conflict resolution in policy making processes  
 
This section considers the pattern of conflict resolution in the policy making processes 
regarding the London Plan and the London View Management Framework (LVMF). 
Section 13 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act requires that every person is 
given the opportunity to make a representation for or against a proposed draft policy 
within a process of consultation (OPSI 1990a). Once a draft version of a policy has been 
produced, stakeholders are asked to submit written representations commenting on the 
impact of the policy on their interests. This consultation process is carried out by the 
relevant regional or local planning authority (ibid.). Within the process of the 
Examination in Public (EiP)—as defined in Section 20 of the act—government 
appointed inspectors from the Planning Inspectorate examine the draft policy in 
conjunction with objections and concerns raised within consultation (ibid.).  
 
As has been demonstrated in chapters 1 and 2, a fierce conflict about the acceptability of 
tall building projects in central London emerged in the cases in question. The London 
Plan strongly supported tall building development. However heritage groups came to 
consider the LVMF as guidance that did not constrain the visual impacts of tall 
buildings to a sufficient degree. The first part of this section states the essence of the 
divergent positions taken by supporters and opponents of tall buildings. In addition, it is 
examined to what extent conflicts resulting from these positions were resolved in the 
policy making processes. Furthermore, the impacts of the apparent lack of conflict 
resolution are examined. It is argued that the lack of conflict resolution led to a 
significant increase in uncertainty for developers of tall buildings in northern Southwark 
and Lambeth. Evidentially, conflicts were not resolved which led to an upward 
spiralling of antagonistic interactions, culminating in the involvement of UNESCO. 
Finally, a hypothetical scenario of a compromise solution for resolving the conflicts is 
discussed.  
 
Conflict resolution in the drafting of the London Plan and the LVMF  
Proponents of tall buildings, such as the GLA, the City of London and the LB 
Southwark, and opponents, such as English Heritage, the Westminster City Council 
(WCC) and the Royal Parks, formed radical positions towards tall building development 
between 1999 and 2001. The initial projects at 30 St Mary Axe and the Heron, Minerva 
and the London Bridge Towers caused significant controversy amongst supporters and 
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opponents of tall building development, as has been demonstrated in chapter 2. On the 
one hand, the GLA took a particularly favourable approach towards tall buildings, as is 
evident in the interim guidance and statements made by Mayor Ken Livingstone (GLA 
2001a; b).  
 
On the other hand, English Heritage, the WCC and the Royal Parks, joined by SAVE 
Britain's Heritage, the Historic Royal Palaces and the Dean and Chapter of St Paul's 
Cathedral, assumed positions which were both strongly restrictive and radically adverse 
to some extent towards tall buildings. This was best exemplified by the initial response 
to the emerging London Plan by Colvin and Moggridge for the Royal Parks. They 
proposed a contour map which would have ruled out tall building development in most 
of central London (Colvin and Moggridge 2001). As a result of these radically divergent 
positions, a number of tall building projects were called in and decided on within a 
public inquiry (see appendix 6). Thus, conflicts regarding these early projects were 
resolved by means of following through extended and expensive public inquiries or by 
the Secretary of State granting planning permission and refusing call-ins.  
 
Conflicts did not get resolved in the London Plan policy making process. The GLA 
continued and indeed increased its support for tall building development through the 
proposals made in the draft London Plan. The whole of the CAZ was proposed as an 
area potentially appropriate for tall building development (GLA 2002a). Furthermore, it 
was proposed that quality of architecture and urban design be the core aspect for future 
tall building development in London (ibid.).  It was proposed that the ten protected view 
corridors be reduced in width and two of them abolished (ibid.). Furthermore, the 
London Plan remained ambiguous in the sense that the extent of locations appropriate 
for tall building development was not further developed. In addition, the London Plan 
and the FALP were shaped in a way that allowed local boroughs to grant planning 
permission to precedent tall building projects, such as  No.1 Blackfriars Road, 20 
Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House.  
 
In the process of drafting the LVMF, a compromise solution was proposed to try and 
find a middle ground between supporters and opponents of tall building development. 
However, the compromise proposed by the experts writing the 2005 draft LVMF was 
only partly accepted by the supporters and opponents of tall building development. In 
response to strong opposition by developers and concerned GLA officers, the 2007 
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LVMF took a step back from the attempted compromise. Geometric view corridors 
which had been introduced in 2005 to protect more views than the RPG3A permitted 
were removed. In addition, the QVA method, as discussed by way of example in 
relation to the St James's Park view, introduced a language for assessment that no longer 
constrained forthcoming precedent cases, such as No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road and the 
Doon Street Tower, to a degree that could have satisfied English Heritage, the WCC 
and the Royal Parks. This point is evident in their consultation responses regarding the 
LVMF (LAC 2005b; WCC 2005; Colvin and Moggridge 2005a). Instead, architectural 
quality was made the prime assessment criteria. Since heritage groups were excluded 
from assessments of architectural quality, this measure further contributed to the 
marginalisation of heritage groups. Furthermore, the QVA method also partly excluded 
heritage groups through the use of expensive visualisations, the AVRs. As a result, 
heritage groups perceived both the London Plan and the LVMF as overly permissive 
policies. Heritage groups did not accept the LVMF as an appropriate guidance for 
assessing visual impacts in central London.  
 
The strong supportive stance towards tall buildings taken by the GLA in the London 
Plan and the LVMF encouraged developers to submit more tall building projects, also in 
locations that had not seen investment in tall building development previously, such as 
northern Lambeth and Southwark. The strong support for precedent tall building cases 
by the GLA posed an immediate threat to heritage groups which feared that if these 
precedent cases were granted permission, then heritage protection would be severely 
weakened. Critically, the 2007 LVMF gave greater weight to precedent cases in visual 
assessments (GLA 2007b). As a result, heritage groups felt severely marginalised 
through what they perceived to be overly permissive tall building policy and guidance.   
 
In summary, conflicts between supporters and opponents of tall building development 
were not resolved to a sufficient degree in the drafting of the London Plan and the 
LVMF. With the London Plan and the LVMF, the GLA developed policy that 
supported, or at least did not constrain, tall building projects to a degree that was 
acceptable to heritage groups. However, the GLA chose not to follow the demands 
made by heritage groups to limit the extent of the areas appropriate for tall building 
development and to increase the protection of heritage assets through the LVMF. The 
limitation on the tall building advocacy by the GLA in the London Plan resulting from 
EiPs was not sufficient to resolve the conflicts between supporters and opponents. Thus, 
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the conflict spiralled upwards and peaked when UNESCO got involved, threatening to 
put the Westminster and Tower of London WHSs on their List of World Heritage in 
Danger (UNESCO 2006a). 
 
The effects of the lack of conflict resolution in policy making 
The apparent lack of conflict resolution in policy making was a primary reason for the 
involvement of UNESCO in tall building planning in London. The involvement of 
UNESCO caused amendments to the call-in directions (DCLG 2008b). In turn, this 
severely increased the level of uncertainty for the design teams of No.1 and 20 
Blackfriars Road, the Doon Street Tower and Elizabeth House. However, the 
amendments made to the LVMF and the GOTB did not lead to a greater level of 
certainty in determining the appropriateness of these projects. In fact, all of these 
projects were called in by the Secretary of State who needed to be seen to be 
scrutinising these projects since these had been mentioned in UNESCO reports as 
immediate threats to WHSs (UNESCO 2007a).  
 
Moreover, it needs to be questioned whether the calling in of these projects was 
necessary. After all, neither the Doon Street Tower nor No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, 
once the planning applications had been amended, had impacts on central London's 
WHSs that would have justified the call-in, as is evident in the assessments in public 
inquiries (PINS 2008; 2009a). The call-in of Elizabeth House appeared to have had 
greater merit since the quality of architecture was deemed insufficient by CABE and 
due to its impact on the Westminster WHS (PINS 2009b). Therefore, the lack of 
conflict resolution in policy making, which caused the UNESCO involvement, resulted 
in a severe increase in uncertainty for the developers and potentially avoidable public 
inquiries, in addition to the embarrassment caused to the national government.    
 
Based on this examination, it is possible to consider what the alternative, a compromise 
between supporters and opponents, would have meant for tall building development. 
The goals of a compromise would have had to be a reduction in conflict and, resulting 
from that, the removal of the need for public inquiries. In order to reach these goals, the 
GLA would have had to limit areas appropriate for tall buildings to precisely designated 
locations. Furthermore, the LVMF would have had to include greater amounts of strict 
geometric thresholds and incorporate the possibility that values based on conservation 
might have to be given greater weight than the quality of architecture and urban design.  
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However, these measures would have restricted developers who needed the flexibility 
provided by the loose designation of tall building areas in order to identify profitable 
locations on which to propose tall building projects. Furthermore, an increase in the 
constraints on tall building development would have most likely led to a decrease in the 
amount of tall buildings proposed. The large amount of risk involved in tall building 
development, due to the fierce opposition and the possibility of call-ins, would have 
been increased dramatically. For these reasons a compromise, as outlined above, would 
not have been compatible with the strategic planning agendas of the GLA and the local 
boroughs, such as the City of London and the LB Southwark, which sought to attract 
more tall building development.  
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7.2 Conflict resolution in implementation processes  
 
This section considers the conflict resolution during the implementation processes for 
No.1 Blackfriars Road. Section 71 of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act defines 
that local planning authorities (LPAs) have to consult every statutory and non-statutory 
consultee affected by a proposed development (OPSI 1990a). The consultation takes 
place after the planning application has been submitted to the LPA. However, it has 
been recognised by the national government and within expert reports that resolving 
conflicts in pre-application discussions prior to submitting the planning application is 
desirable (Killian and Pretty 2008). Hereunder, the pre-application discussions between 
the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and the GLA, CABE, the LB Southwark and 
English Heritage are discussed. It is determined how successfully the conflicts were 
resolved in them. Furthermore, the related aspect of lobbying in these discussions is 
examined.  
 
Successful conflict resolution with the GLA, CABE and the LB Southwark  
In pre-application discussions between the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and 
the GLA and CABE, potential conflicts were resolved successfully. This is evident in 
the consultation responses by these organisations (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a, 2007b). 
Similarly, the design team and the LB Southwark were able to resolve conflicts prior to 
the consultation stage (ibid.). The design team was successful in those processes due to 
the information provided by public relations consultants and the advice given by 
planning and townscape consultants. On the one hand, based on knowledge and advice, 
the design team was able to address the issues of greatest concern to regional and local 
politicians and planning officers. On the other hand, the design team's willingness to 
make further amendments enabled the design team to advance the design until issues of 
concern had been removed. This is evident in the GLA Stage 2 reports, the CABE 
reports and the LB Southwark planning reports which have been discussed in chapters 
1, 2, 3 and 4. It has also been established in these chapters that the design team 
benefited from access to key decision makers such as the Mayor of London, the local 
council leader and leading personnel in the CABE Design Review Panel (DRP).  
 
While the privilege of having access to key decision makers helped to resolve conflicts, 
it brings with it the need to examine whether the lobbying activities conducted therein 
were in accordance with related regulations. The national government and 
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commissioned reports on the planning system have repeatedly recommended including 
all of the interested parties in the planning process (DTLR 2001; Killian and Pretty 
2008). Thus, the national government has emphasised greater inclusion of all parties in 
policy, most recently in the PPS1 (ODPM 2005c). However, in the planning system, the 
actual forms of access to and the ways of influence on governmental organisations have 
not been defined in these documents. It is therefore useful to define which legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of access and influence there are. In 2007, the Public 
Administration Select Committee (PASC) was commissioned to inquire into the issue of 
lobbying. A report which included a series of recommendations was published in 2009 
(PASC 2009).61 The House of Commons defines lobbying as:  
 
'Lobbying', in our view, relates to activity which seeks to influence public 
policy, legislation or practice, or decisions of the executive. For political 
consultancies lobbying is  about helping organisations – their clients – who want 
to achieve policy, legislative or regulatory change; to understand the people, 
policies and processes involved; who the key decision makers are, when to 
approach them, and how best to make their case. (House of Commons 2010: 3) 
 
Other activities by political consultancies, such as monitoring, providing intelligence 
about political processes or advising on the relations of clients with the media, are not 
regarded as lobbying. Thus, generally, lobbying is regarded as a wholly legitimate 
activity of interest advocacy that contributes positively to processes of policy making 
and implementation (ibid.). However, some forms of lobbying have been labelled 
illegitimate and undesirable. Hiring people as consultants who have personal contacts at 
the heart of government is seen as an attempt at buying access and influence. For 
example, members of the Greater London Assembly are not allowed to be employed by 
political consultancies (PASC 2009). The PASC stated that people are most likely to be 
influenced by those that they perceive as friends (ibid.). Improper influence is therefore 
linked to the power of informal networks of friendships and relationships (ibid.). Based 
on these requirements, lobbying in pre-application discussions is legitimate if it is 
conducted in an honest and transparent manner.  
 
In as far as I have been able to examine this aspect within the thesis, the lobbyists for 
tall building projects were known to public servants at all times. Greater London 
Assembly reports show that there are records at the GLA detailing the participants of 
                                                 
61 The House of Commons arrived at the conclusion that the Blair government had encouraged the 
moving back and forth of government officials between government and the private sector, thereby 
encouraging lobbying activities by government officials for the private sector (House of Commons 2010). 
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pre-application meetings between the mayor, the GLA planning officers and design 
team members (Greater London Assembly 2002). In interviews with the planning 
consultant, Roger, and the GLA officer, Martin Scholar, it has also been established that 
lobbying took place in a transparent manner. Furthermore, in negotiations between the 
No.1 Blackfriars Road developer, Justin, and the English Heritage officer, Paddy Pugh, 
there appears to have been full transparency. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
lobbying in these pre-application discussions was legitimate since it was the developers, 
their architects or their consultants who transparently lobbied with regard to the No.1 
Blackfriars Road project.  
  
In order to fully establish whether the lobbying activities of design teams are legitimate, 
a second test is necessary. This test examines the kind of access the private sector has to 
public servants. It is useful to distinguish between three forms of access and intent on 
the part of core design team members to key players. Some design team members, such 
as public relations consultants, have direct access to politicians and other key players. 
They can potentially use this access to try and directly influence their opinions and 
future decisions to the benefit of a project. Furthermore, highly established planning 
consultants, such as DP9 and Montagu Evans, establish long term relationships with 
regional and local politicians and planning officers. A second form of direct access is 
geared towards gathering information so that the design team is informed about the 
constraints under which the decision maker operates and therefore knows which actions 
by the design teams are most likely to be successful and when is a good time to submit a 
planning application.  
 
The third form of access is through being an insider. A number of consultants have been 
members of an expert panel on a quango or have represented design teams within panel 
assessments. These experts can use this knowledge within the design team so that the 
approach to working with the quangos—English Heritage and CABE in this case—can 
be enhanced. Ultimately, it was not possible to determine which forms of lobbying 
public relations consultants conduct. On the one hand, a number of interviewees, who 
shall remain unnamed, insinuated that public relations consultants might directly lobby 
regional and local politicians. The PASC perceived this form of lobbying as illegitimate 
since informal networks of personal relationships are then being used to influence 
political decisions (PASC 2009). On the other hand, the public relations consultant, Ian 
Lindsley, argued that they are only providers of information regarding a politician's 
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interests and that they use their direct access to politicians, which they have obtained 
through having been employed by the government previously, to talk to them. The 
information gathered is used to advise the design team on constraints, opportunities and 
forthcoming policy changes. The actual lobbyist for the project, Lindsley argued, is 
always the developer. It could not be unequivocally established in the thesis whether 
there have been instances in which political decisions were directly influenced by 
illegitimate forms of lobbying. However, the fact that various forms of lobbying are 
integral parts of tall building planning suggests that these aspects might need further 
attention in terms of regulation. 
 
Unsuccessful conflict resolution with heritage groups  
Compared to the GLA, CABE and the LB Southwark, pre-application discussions with 
English Heritage take place under different preconditions. While design teams are able 
to align their interests with those of the GLA, the LB Southwark and CABE, this is not 
the case with English Heritage. With the GLA and the LB Southwark, the design team 
of No.1 Blackfriars Road was able to incrementally improve the design of the project so 
that the regional and local policy requirements were met. Furthermore, it was possible 
to find common ground regarding the amounts and nature of the S106 obligations. It 
proved possible to obtain CABE's agreement by taking into account the constructive 
criticism and amending the design accordingly. The agreements reached with the GLA, 
the LB Southwark and CABE are evident in the development control reports written by 
Southwark planners (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a; 2007b).  
 
With English Heritage, it was not possible to identify any common ground between 
2005 and 2007. As has been established in chapter 4, the optimum goal for English 
Heritage would have been a complete removal of the visual impact of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road on heritage assets. In addition, concerned parties that are not themselves part of 
pre-application processes, such as the Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal 
Parks, expected English Heritage to use all the means available to it to stop potentially 
harmful projects. The fact that English Heritage was criticised by representatives of 
heritage groups in House of Commons inquiries for failing to object to tall building 
projects is evidence of this (House of Commons 2002; 2006). The result was that 
English Heritage requested a call-in when planning permission was granted by the LB 
Southwark (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a). Thus, in the early stages of No.1 Blackfriars 
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Road project, the design team and English Heritage were not able to resolve their 
conflicts. 
 
The further reasons for the lack of success in resolving conflicts with the heritage 
groups were manifold. As has  been established in chapter 3 and 4, English Heritage did 
not accept the LVMF as suitable guidance for assessing the visual impact. 
Consequently, English Heritage perceived the townscape assessments, which were 
based on the LVMF and concluded that No.1 Blackfriars Road was acceptable in terms 
of the visual impact, as acts of persuasion seeking to get English Heritage to withdraw 
its request for a call-in. Thus, there was a lack of trust both in the LVMF method and in 
the validity of the townscape assessments.  
 
Another factor that contributed to an adversarial relationship between English Heritage 
and the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road lay in the mode of exchange of the 
information. The results of assessments in the CABE DRP and the GLA are 
communicated transparently, as has been established in chapters 2 and 4. In contrast to 
this, the minutes of English Heritage's London Advisory Committee (LAC) are often 
withheld from public access, as was the case with No.1 Blackfriars Road (LAC 2006b; 
c). One reason for why English Heritage withholds its LAC minutes was their use in the 
Heron Tower process. In this case, the LAC minutes were used by proponents of the 
project at the public inquiry to argue that the English Heritage commission had diverged 
from the LAC recommendations (PINS 2002a). This lack of information exchange, 
resulting from the withholding of the LAC minutes, represented a significant 
uncertainty factor for the design team. The design team had to wait for the consultation 
process after the planning application submission in order to get confirmation with 
regard to whether English Heritage would request a call-in or not. As a result, the 
planning process was extended. Finally however, English Heritage and the developer of 
No.1 Blackfriars Road were able to reach a compromise agreement. Despite the 
problematic nature of the previous planning process, this compromise must be seen as a 
positive result since conflicts had now finally been resolved with English Heritage.  
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7.3 Assessing the visual impact of tall buildings  
 
This section considers the disadvantages for heritage groups resulting from the LVMF. 
In fact, the visual impacts of tall buildings have been the most controversial aspect 
regarding tall building public inquiries, as is evident in the respective Planning 
Inspectorate reports (PINS 2002a; 2003; 2004a; b; 2007; 2008; 2009a; b; c). Thus, I 
believe that this topic merits a separate section. Based on the results from chapter 3, 
within which the QVA method and its application to the townscape view from St 
James's Park view have been examined, it is argued that the use of AVRs disadvantages 
heritage groups economically. In addition, it is argued that the use of individual viewing 
positions and the foregrounding of the quality of architecture and precedent cases 
disadvantage heritage groups. Furthermore, it is established that the LVMF advocates a 
method for visual assessments that is ambiguous. Based on assessment reports and data 
gained from public inquiries, it is shown that the GLA, the townscape consultants, 
English Heritage, as well as the Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks 
each use different values as bases for their assessments of the visual impacts of tall 
buildings.  
 
Disadvantages for heritage groups based on the LVMF method for visual 
assessments  
It has been established in chapter 3 that the Qualitative Visual Assessment (QVA) 
method disadvantages heritage groups. This discussion examines how QVAs were used 
in the public inquiries regarding the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road and the Doon Street 
Tower projects. First, the production of Accurate Visual Representations (AVRs)—the 
images used to represent the visual impacts of tall buildings on a protected view—is 
very expensive. The problem arising from this circumstance for heritage groups was 
well illustrated by the public inquiry regarding No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road. In the 
inquiry process, the principal witnesses for the Westminster City Council (WCC) and 
the Royal Parks used images to try and convince the planning inspector that the AVRs 
used by the townscape consultant might downplay certain visual effects (see appendix 
24). However, the barrister and the townscape consultant representing the developer 
established that these images lacked geometric accuracy and had not been produced 
according to the specifications set out by the LVMF. This aspect was evident when 
observing the public inquiry procedure. The LVMF specifies the requirements of 
geometric accuracy and the accuracy of the representation of façade materials (GLA 
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2007b). Therefore, heritage groups are disadvantaged because they are not able to afford 
the production of expensive AVRs. Developers, however, are able to afford the 
production of AVRs. In the case of No.1 Blackfriars Road, complete sets of AVRs were 
produced in 2006, 2007 and 2008, as is evident in the townscape assessments submitted 
as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Tavernor 2006a; 2008a; c; d). 
 
Second, the LVMF protects views from specified viewing points (GLA 2007b). 
Therefore, other potentially important view points nearby are not given the same weight 
in an assessment. In the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry, Hall Moggridge, 
the principal witness for the Royal Parks, submitted an image that showed No.1 
Blackfriars Road from a view point a bit further south, from the southern end of the 
Blue Bridge, at which the designated view point of the townscape view from St James's 
Park is located (see appendix 13). Moggridge sought to establish proof that greater harm 
to the view resulted when No.1 Blackfriars Road was seen from this location 
(Moggridge 2008). However, the barrister, Harris, on behalf of the Beetham 
Organization, showed that English Heritage had not relied on the view suggested by 
Moggridge (Harris and Cameron 2008b). Furthermore, Harris also established that 
impacts on other views, such as the one suggested by Moggridge, had to be considered 
as secondary impacts which had to be given less weight than the townscape view from 
the middle of the footbridge in St James's Park designated in the LVMF (ibid.).  
 
In comparison, no viewing points were specified from the courtyard of Somerset House 
in the Doon Street Tower instance. The PPG15, which was applied in this case, does not 
specify viewing locations (Department of the Environment 1994). As a national policy, 
the PPG15 is generic, only setting out a qualitative method for visual assessment but not 
providing place specific measures, such as viewing locations or view corridors. 
Therefore, it was possible for heritage groups to choose a viewing location—the 
entrance to the courtyard of Somerset House—from which the Doon Street Tower had 
the highest degree of potential negative visual impact (PINS 2008). Since the LVMF 
was specific to the St James's Park view, the LVMF had to be used to assess the visual 
impact on this townscape view. By specifying exact viewing locations, the LVMF 
weakened the weight given to evidence showing potential visual harm from other 
nearby viewing locations. In this regard, the LVMF disadvantaged heritage groups 
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seeking to find the visual impacts from those locations where the greatest visual harm 
could be experienced.62   
 
Third, it has been established in chapter 3 that the LVMF foregrounds the value of 
architectural quality and strengthens the weight of precedent cases visible in protected 
views at the assessment stage. It has been established in chapter 3 and 4 that English 
Heritage is excluded from the assessments of the quality of architecture. Its remit is to 
assess impacts on heritage assets (Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1983). Furthermore, 
the public inquiry regarding No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road exemplified the heightened 
use of precedence within the assessment of the visual impact. On the one hand, the 
barrister, Banwell, representing the WCC and the Royal Parks, sought to weaken the 
weight given to the precedent decision (Banwell 2008b). On the other hand, the 
barrister, Harris QC, representing the developer, Beetham Organization, established that 
full weight had to be given to the Doon Street decision (Harris and Cameron 2008b). 
Therefore, the foregrounding of quality of architecture and the weight given to 
precedent cases disadvantage heritage groups. However, the focus on precedent 
decisions is vital in providing for consistency in decision making, in particular in 
instances such as No.1 Blackfriars Road where Doon Street is  visible in the same view. 
In this regard, greater certainty arises incrementally since decisions have to be based on 
the emergent precedent cases.  
 
The technical problem of not representing the human visual experience adequately, as 
demonstrated in chapter 3, is a secondary problem from my point of view. 
Improvements regarding this matter are important in terms of creating a basis for a 
judgement that achieves greater realism. However, these improvements are unlikely to 
create greater consistency in assessments. The different parties with vested interests in 
tall building development use different values as bases for their assessments. Heritage 
groups interpret the visual impacts of tall buildings based on considerations of 
conservation values, while the GLA and supporters of tall buildings foreground positive 
properties, such as the contribution to a world city image and regeneration effects. 
These different potential ways to interpret the visual impacts of tall buildings by using 
the LVMF are the subject of the next paragraphs.  
                                                 
62 English Heritage has sought to introduce the use of sequences of view points within visual assessments. 
The document, Seeing the History in the View: A Method for Assessing Heritage Significance Within 
Views, uses a view from Southwark towards the Tower of London as an exemplary case (English 
Heritage 2008a). 
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The LVMF methods allows for divergent assessment conclusions  
The parties involved in assessing the visual impact of tall buildings in central London 
use different values as bases for their assessments. The GLA concluded in 52.5% of the 
43 tall building cases that no harm was found and that therefore the visual impacts were 
acceptable. Appendix 4 includes a table summarising the GLA assessment results. 
Indeed, in 10.5% of the cases, the GLA concluded that the visibility of tall buildings 
enhanced views. It must be taken into account when considering these numbers that 
37% of all cases were not visible in protected views. Only in 8% of all cases did the 
GLA conclude that a height reduction would result in a better project due to reducing 
the visual impact. In 8% of the cases, the GLA even recommended that the projects 
would be better if they were higher. However, amendments were demanded by the GLA 
in terms of increasing the affordable housing contributions provided through S106 (in 
39.5% of the cases) and the urban design (in 18.5% of the cases). Thus, it must be 
concluded that the GLA valued the world city image associated with tall buildings, as 
well as quality of architecture and contributions to regeneration, over potential visual 
impacts on heritage assets.  
 
Townscape consultants work for developers. Therefore, they advise the developer, the 
architect and the other core design team members in relation to any visual impacts. 
Townscape consultants suggest improvements to the design and amendments to the 
form and height of a tall building during the design process. This aspect has been 
established in chapter 4 in relation to the CABE DRP assessments and is also evident in 
the architects' proofs of evidence at public inquiries (Ian Simpson Architects 2008; 
Wilkinson Eyre Architects 2008).  
 
English Heritage has consistently sought to limit the visual impacts of tall buildings on 
heritage assets. In public inquiries, English Heritage has strongly argued in favour of the 
refusal of planning permission due to negative visual impacts (PINS 2002a; PINS 2003; 
PINS 2004a; b; 2009a; b). In cases in which precedent decisions limited the merits of 
English Heritage's case against planning permission, such as was the case with the 
Bishopsgate Tower and No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road, it has tended to step back from 
requesting a call-in (GLA 2005g; English Heritage 2008b). Principally, English 
Heritage's approach to visual assessments is set out in detail in their document, Seeing 
the History in the View (English Heritage 2008a). The central values of the English 
Heritage method as advocated in this document are derived from their publication, 
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Conservation Principles, which focuses on identifying the significance of the heritage 
asset (English Heritage 2006b). Thus, based on this examination, it can be concluded 
that English Heritage values the conservation of heritage assets over otherwise 
beneficial aspects such as the quality of architecture and contributions to regeneration. 
 
A more radical approach is advocated by the WCC and the Royal Parks. In both the 
Doon Street Tower and No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiries, these 
organisations insisted that no visibility was acceptable in the background of the St 
James's Park view (PINS 2008; 2009a). The same approach was evident in the contour 
map produced by Colvin and Moggridge as a response to the London Plan. This map 
defined height thresholds in a way so that tall buildings could only be granted 
permission when these were not visible from within central London's Royal Parks 
(Colvin and Moggridge 2001). However, this approach was dismissed as invalid by 
planning inspectors since it was not based on the LVMF QVA method and the 
management plan of the St James's Park view (PINS 2008; 2009a).  
 
The WCC had also sought to produce a visual assessment policy applicable within the 
boundaries of the City of Westminster. The document, Metropolitan Views, Draft SPG, 
defines a large set of views from within the City of Westminster outwards, thereby 
defining views across borough boundaries (WCC 2007a). As was established by the 
barristers, Harris and Katkowski, in the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public inquiry, 
this approach was rejected by consultees, including the GLA (Katkowski and Lyness 
2008). The planning inspector, Gray, also concluded that the WCC and the Royal Parks 
advocated the position that no visibility was the only acceptable visual impact (PINS 
2009a). As is evident from this discussion, the WCC and the Royal Parks value the clear 
skyline background to their heritage assets over the considerations of other parties, such 
as the quality of architecture and regeneration contributions. The WCC and the Royal 
Parks raise the strongest objections when a tall building is visible in relation to 
conservation areas and monuments under their jurisdiction.  
 
In summary, it has been shown that the GLA, the private sector townscape consultants, 
English Heritage, as well as the WCC and the Royal Parks each use different values as 
their bases for the assessment of visual impacts. All of these different approaches to 
visual assessments have been applied based on the prerequisite that the LVMF is the 
appropriate Supplementary Policy Guidance (SPG) to be used for assessments. 
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Therefore, it must be concluded that the LVMF is an ambiguous policy in terms of the 
different conclusions that can be reached using it for the assessment of visual impacts. 
John Hare has argued in the interview that in 2005 he and Richard Coleman attempted 
to incorporate the values of the different parties. However, as has been established in 
chapter 3, qualitative language was excluded in the final 2007 LVMF. As has been 
argued by both the co-author of the 2007 LVMF, Dr Chris Miele, and the English 
Heritage officer, Paddy Pugh, the specific terminology used to describe the values of the 
St James's Park view, such as mystery, was unsuitable since it did not comply with 
planning terminology. In conclusion, the different value sets used by the various parties 
are the cause of the divergent interpretations and conclusions, exploiting the ambiguity 
contained in the LVMF. Thus, I recommend that one value set be established for the 
LVMF based on democratic debate, in consultation processes or in addition to using 
working groups that consist of members from the different interest groups. Then it 
might be possible to provide a better basis for decision making in which conclusions are 
more streamlined.   
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7.4 Certainty in tall building planning 
 
This section considers policies and implementation processes regarding tall building 
development in central London in the light of planning certainty. Reports commissioned 
by the national government have concluded that greater certainty in regulation is one of 
the primary aims of the plan-led approach (Barker 2006a). Developers should be in the 
position to know the conditions under which proposed projects would be granted 
planning permission, since regional and local policies have to be based on national 
policy (ibid.). However, it has been concluded that these goals were often compromised 
by the length and complexity of the planning process (Barker 2006b). It is discussed in 
this section how effective the tall building policies of the London Plan and the LVMF 
have been in establishing certainty for developers. Implementation processes are 
examined with a particular focus on pre-application discussions. It is concluded that the 
London Plan policies have been a trade-off in foregrounding and achieving the highest 
quality architecture and flexibility for developers of tall buildings against certainty. 
Furthermore, the lack of conflict resolution between supporters of tall buildings and 
heritage groups is identified as the major source of uncertainty in tall building planning 
processes.  
 
Certainty through regional and local policy and guidance 
The policies of the London Plan relevant for tall building development provided 
flexibility for developers and architects. This flexibility arose from the 4B policies and 
the designation of Opportunity Areas and the CAZ in the London Plan. In the earliest 
stages of the development of a tall building policy, the 2001 interim guidance, Mayor 
Ken Livingstone sought to assure developers of tall buildings of his support. He made 
the unequivocal statement that he would support controversially discussed precedent 
cases, amongst others, the Heron, London Bridge and Vauxhall Towers, and that 
emerging policy would be shaped so as not to unnecessarily constrain those (GLA 
2001b). Furthermore, the policies 4B.1, 4B.2 and 4B.3 of both the draft 2002 and the 
final 2004 London Plan are manifestations of the agenda of an urban renaissance. These 
policies set out the requirements of the highest quality of design and the maximisation 
of built density in key locations (GLA 2002a; 2004a).  
 
Importantly, policy 4B.8 defines locations appropriate for tall building development in a 
loose manner. The final 2004 London Plan maintained that tall building projects might 
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be appropriate in the CAZ and in designated Opportunity Areas (GLA 2004a). In 
addition, the Blue Ribbon policy 4C.20 states that tall building projects are appropriate 
at water spaces if these are successfully integrated into the urban fabric (ibid.).  These 
policies have encouraged developers to propose more tall building projects. This is 
evident in appendix 2 which shows that more than forty tall building projects were 
proposed between 2000 and 2008. Furthermore, the policies provide flexibility for 
architects since no height thresholds or specific details on the form of tall buildings are 
prescribed by the London Plan. At the same time, the tall building policies of the 
London Plan provide for certainty for developers in so far as developers could be certain 
that the GLA will support their projects if they meet the requirements set out. An 
important role regarding achieving conformity with GLA policy is played by planning, 
public relations and townscape consultants who provide advice to private developers 
and architects on policy matters. Appendix 7 shows that the GLA supported all of the 
controversial tall building projects at the public inquiries.  
 
Despite the certainty provided by the GLA policy, the London Plan policies have also 
caused a significant degree of uncertainty for developers and architects. The planning 
process regarding the No.1 Blackfriars Road project illustrates this. It has been 
established throughout the previous chapters that the lack of a precise determination of 
the extent of the areas appropriate for tall buildings resulted in a high degree of 
uncertainty for the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road. The policies in the 2004 
London Plan did not allow regional and local planning authorities to arrive at the 
decision that the location was appropriate for a tall building without the right of a 
challenge by heritage groups. The maintenance of the call-in request by English 
Heritage in consultation processes in 2006 and 2007 is evidence of this (LB Southwark 
2006a; 2007a). Furthermore, as has been established in interviews with the developer, 
the architect and the planning consultant for No.1 Blackfriars Road, the lack of a local 
tall building policy was the main cause for this high level of uncertainty. Certainty 
regarding this aspect first arose out of the compromise agreement achieved between the 
developer and English Heritage. The discussion on the joint No.1 and 20 Blackfriars 
Road public inquiry in chapter 6 has shown that the appropriateness of the location was 
accepted in the autumn of 2008. While a degree of certainty arose for the design team 
from the supportive assessments made by the GLA, CABE and the LB Southwark, a 
high degree of uncertainty resulted from the lack of determining a local tall building 
policy or the precise extent of tall building areas in the London Plan.  
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Regarding the LVMF, it has been established above that unresolved conflicts with 
heritage groups have resulted in a lack of acceptance of the QVA method and indeed of 
the LVMF as a whole. Consequently, as has also been established above, the LVMF has 
been interpreted differently based on the divergent values held by the different interest 
groups. A high degree of uncertainty for developers has arisen from these divergent 
interpretations.  
 
The appropriateness of the visual impacts of tall buildings could not be determined prior 
to resolving the granting of planning permission in relation to the most controversial 
cases. This is evident in appendix 7 which shows that eleven of forty-three tall building 
cases were called in by the Secretary of State to determine the appropriateness of the 
visual impacts in public inquiries. Certainty regarding visual impacts gradually arose 
out of these public inquiries. The discussion on the No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road public 
inquiry in chapter 6 shows that precedent decisions and precedents in terms of the 
visibility of tall building projects with planning consent provided certainty in the 
decision making. In summary, the reduction in constraints on tall building development 
in the LVMF has enabled developers to propose tall buildings visible within protected 
views but has failed to provide the degree of certainty needed to avoid public inquiry 
procedures.  
 
Certainty in implementation processes 
In the implementation processes, certainty was established mainly within pre-
application discussions between the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and the 
GLA, CABE and the LB Southwark. Based on constructive criticism by decision 
makers and respective amendments to the design, these organisations chose to support 
the project, as is evident in assessment reports (GLA 2005e; 2007c; e; CABE 2005b; 
2007a; LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a; b). The knowledge and expert advice provided by 
planning, public relations and townscape consultants, as well as the skill and 
willingness shown by architects to amend the design, were crucial for the success of the 
conflict resolution and the certainty resulting from this, as has been established in the 
previous chapters. Likewise, as has been established in section 4 of chapter 5, the most 
critical issues regarding No.1 Blackfriars Road were resolved in pre-application 
discussions prior to the planning meeting. Therefore, it can be concluded that certainty 
for the design team here depended to a higher degree on the pre-application discussions 
than on the planning meeting.  
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A significant amount of uncertainty arose for the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road 
from the unresolved conflicts with heritage groups. Important interest groups such as 
the Westminster City Council (WCC) and the Royal Parks did not need to be included 
in the pre-application discussions. They were consulted by the LB Southwark after the 
planning application had been submitted (LB Southwark 2006a; 2007a; b). 
Furthermore, conflicts could not be resolved in pre-application discussions with English 
Heritage. Only after face-to-face negotiations between the developer of No.1 Blackfriars 
Road and leading English Heritage officers in late 2007 was a compromise agreement 
established. This agreement resulted in an increase in certainty since English Heritage 
withdrew its request for a call-in (English Heritage 2008b). The DCLG revised the call-
in directions, determining that the Secretary of State had to follow call-in requests by 
English Heritage (DCLG 2008b). Therefore, the call-in threat by English Heritage 
represented the greatest source of uncertainty for the design team. 
 
Despite the agreement reached with English Heritage, certainty could ultimately not be 
established. The reason for this, as I have argued in chapter 4, was the involvement of 
UNESCO in tall building planning in central London. Reports by the DCMS and 
UNESCO required heightened scrutiny of the No.1 Blackfriars Road, Doon Street 
Tower and Elizabeth House projects (DCMS 2007a; UNESCO 2007a). It appears that 
this, in conjunction with the call-in request by the WCC and the Royal Parks, was the 
reason for calling in No.1 Blackfriars Road despite English Heritage's agreement not to 
seek a call-in. In reports addressing the UNESCO critique, the national government 
agreed to scrutinise the planning processes of these projects in detail (DCMS 2007a). 
There was the option for the Secretary of State to refuse a call-in on the basis that No.1 
Blackfriars Road did not depart from policies to a degree sufficient to warrant a call-in. 
This happened in the case of the Bishopsgate Tower (GOL 2006). However, the 
national government did not apply this measure in the case of No.1 Blackfriars Road.  
The most plausible explanation for this is the heightened pressure on the national 
government caused by UNESCO.  
 
In summary, the London Plan policies are a trade-off in foregrounding and achieving 
the highest quality architecture and flexibility for developers of tall buildings against 
certainty. Certainty could be provided through a more precise determination of locations 
for tall buildings. However, such a measure would most likely result in smaller amounts 
of tall building proposals due to a lack of flexibility. Similarly, the reduction in 
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constraints on tall building development by the LVMF has increased the likelihood that 
such projects are granted planning permission. Despite this advantage for the design 
teams of tall buildings, the ambiguous nature of the QVA assessment in the LVMF has 
led to the circumstance whereby certainty regarding visual assessments has arisen 
gradually out of successive precedent decisions. Beyond doubt, the most significant 
source of certainty in implementation processes are the pre-application discussions. 
Even the conflict between the design team of No.1 Blackfriars Road and English 
Heritage was resolved there. Yet the pressure exerted by UNESCO on the national 
government negated the degree of certainty achieved and resulted in a public inquiry.  
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7.5 Required expertise versus conflicts of interest  
 
This section discusses the impacts of the work done by private sector experts for the 
GLA as well as for English Heritage and CABE. The section starts by outlining the 
contributions that private sector experts have made to the work of these governmental 
and non-governmental departmental bodies. It is concluded that private sector expertise 
was indispensable for successfully drafting the London Plan and the LVMF. 
Furthermore, the assessment panels of CABE and English Heritage would not function 
appropriately without the contributions made by highly regarded private sector experts. 
However, the GLA as well as CABE and English Heritage have been subject to conflict 
of interest and bias allegations. It is argued that as a result of these allegations, 
governmental organisations have repeatedly had to defend their public accountability. 
Stricter codes of conduct to safeguard against the mere potential for conflicts of interest 
have been introduced. The section concludes that the accusations are a problem of 
perception rather than actual misconduct. Accusations have been based on the potential 
for conflicts of interest while proof of misconduct has not been produced. 
 
The importance of private sector expertise for governmental bodies 
The GLA depended on private sector expertise in the writing of the London Plan and 
the LVMF. The significant contribution by Lord Rogers of Riverside to the 
development of the London Plan is indisputable. As has been confirmed by Professor 
Grant from the Standards Committee, Lord Rogers' experience in having chaired the 
Urban Task Force was crucial for incorporating the principles of an urban renaissance 
into the London Plan (Brown 2001a). Furthermore, the GLA depended on private sector 
expertise in the development of the complex methods of visual assessment in the 
LVMF. In 2002, the consultancy, DEGW, was commissioned to produce a report 
defining visual assessments regarding tall buildings in London (DEGW 2002). In order 
to develop the necessary expertise in the field of three-dimensional visualisations and 
townscape assessments, John Hare and Richard Coleman were employed to produce the 
2005 draft LVMF. Chris Miele and Karen Mc Allister were employed to produce the 
2007 versions of the LVMF based on the criticism voiced in the consultation process. 
GLA officers managed the LVMF policy making process and edited the final document. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the London Plan and the LVMF could probably not have 
been successfully produced without the expertise provided by private sector experts.  
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The assessment processes within CABE's Design Review Panel (DRP) and English 
Heritage's London Advisory Committee (LAC) depend heavily on experts from the 
private sector. Private sector experts, such as architects and a range of consultants, allow 
for multidisciplinary assessment panels. The diversity of opinions that this brings to 
both the DRP and the LAC panels allows for assessments of tall building projects from 
the perspectives of architecture, urban design, heritage conservation and development. 
Both English Heritage and CABE have been criticised by aggrieved parties for being 
one-sided (House of Commons 2002). Thus, both CABE and English Heritage depend 
even more on this range of expertise to establish an objective basis for assessments. 
Furthermore, the expertise from experts with the highest reputations in England 
enhances the effectiveness of the assessment processes. As has been demonstrated in 
chapter 4, architects and consultants that are part of the DRP panel work on high end 
tall buildings themselves. Therefore, they are much more likely to spot potential 
insufficiencies in designs, in addition to being more resistant to the persuasive effects of 
skilfully developed presentation materials. Thus, private sector experts have made vital 
contributions to the assessment processes conducted by CABE and English Heritage.  
 
Conflict of interest allegations and their impacts 
The involvement of private sector experts has led to a series of allegations over potential 
conflicts of interest. The central role occupied by Lord Rogers was subject to fierce 
criticism by the Greater London Assembly and planning related media (Greater London 
Assembly 2001; Booth 2001; Taylor 2001). The criticism was picked up by academics 
who also doubted the independence of Rogers due to his involvement in tall building 
projects in London (Charney 2007). However, critics were not able to substantiate their 
claims and did not produce evidence of wrongdoing. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated in chapter 2 that the tall building projects in which Rogers' architectural 
practice, RRP, was involved did not get treated favourably by the GLA. However, the 
accusations led to heightened scrutiny of Rogers' involvement by the Standards 
Committee and to further definitions of Rogers' role at the GLA so as to avoid the mere 
potential for conflicts of interests (Brown 2001a; b). Thus, conflict of interest 
allegations regarding Lord Rogers' role at the GLA necessitated the need to defend the 
public accountability of the GLA.  
 
The only instance of a potential conflict of interest allegation that I found in relation to 
the policy process of the LVMF is a consultation response regarding the Bishopsgate 
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Tower by Colvin and Moggridge on behalf of the Royal Parks. Therein they argued that 
the LVMF, based on which the Bishopsgate Tower was assessed, was written by a 
consultant involved in tall building development (Colvin and Moggridge 2005b). This 
involvement, they argued, resulted in a guidance that did not analyse the qualities of the 
townscape view from St James's Park (ibid.). However, no further consequences arose 
based on these accusations.  
 
CABE and English Heritage have been subjected repeatedly to accusations of one-
sidedness and bias, as well as conflicts of interests. English Heritage was criticised by 
SAVE Britain's Heritage and the Evening Standard journalist, Mira Bar-Hillel, for 
withdrawing their objections to 30 St Mary Axe in 1999 (SAVE Britain's Heritage 
2008; House of Commons 2006). In the House of Commons inquiry, English Heritage's 
LAC was accused of having been high-jacked by architects (House of Commons 2002). 
Also at this inquiry, Sir Stuart Lipton, then the chairman of CABE, was accused of 
conflicts of interest due to his position as chairman of the development company, 
Stanhope (ibid.). Eventually, Lipton was again accused of conflicts of interest following 
a dispute with a Croydon councillor in 2004 which led to his  resignation from his 
chairman position at CABE (House of Commons 2005). These accusations resulted in 
changes to the staff of CABE. As has been demonstrated in chapter 4, the leading 
positions at CABE have been diversified since 2006. In particular, the position of the 
chairperson of CABE has since been held by a person not related financially to interest 
groups, while representatives of the heritage sector have been appointed as 
commissioners of CABE (2007e; h; 2008a). Furthermore, architects have been 
appointed as English Heritage commissioners (DCMS 2007d). Based on these facts, it 
can be concluded that both CABE and English Heritage are rather vulnerable to 
accusations of conflicts of interest. Both organisations have struggled to maintain their 
credibility as independent advisors to the Secretary of State.  
 
Measures to safeguard against conflicts of interest 
The basis for documents setting out codes of conduct, including guidance on how to 
deal with potential conflicts of interest, arises from the 1997 Nolan Report. A check of 
the documents that set out the codes of conduct for the GLA, CABE, English Heritage 
and local boroughs revealed that all of these documents incorporate the Nolan 
principles. These codes of conduct documents are listed hereunder, including brief 
descriptions. The code of conduct of the Greater London Authority is applicable to the 
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Mayor of London, assembly members and every person working for or on behalf of the 
GLA (GLA 2008c). As is evident based on the comparison of several interviews, the 
LVMF process is and has been managed by GLA planning officers. Therefore, the 
experts writing the LVMF could not have advocated personal interests without the 
knowledge of the GLA. Local planning authorities (LPAs) are governed by the 2001 
Local Authorities (Model Code of Conduct) (England) Order (OPSI 2001).  
 
English Heritage and CABE, as departmental non-governmental bodies, have to adhere 
to national regulations such as  Public Bodies 2009 (Cabinet Office 2009). Furthermore, 
English Heritage has published Standing Orders of the Commission and Committees 
(English Heritage 2005a) and CABE have set out regulations regarding conflicts of 
interest, in particular those of DRP panel members who are normally practising 
architects, as well as consultants or other private company members specialised in the 
built environment, in Design Review: How CABE evaluates quality in architecture and 
urban design (CABE 2006a). In addition, CABE uses the document, Managing conflicts 
of interest: Guidance for Commissioners, Staff and CABE Family, internally to provide 
detailed guidance for commissioners and staff members, as well as for further guidance 
for DRP panel members (CABE 2007i). As is evident, the GLA, CABE, English 
Heritage and local boroughs are using codes of conduct which are based on the Nolan 
principles of public life.  
 
Perceptions of conflicts of interest as an issue in tall building planning 
As has been shown above, the expertise provided by private sector experts was crucial 
for the development of the London Plan, the LVMF and for assessment processes 
within CABE's DRP and English Heritage's  LAC. However, parties aggrieved by either 
the contents of policies or the decisions made by assessment panels have repeatedly 
made accusations over potential conflicts of interest. Crucially, proof of actual misuses 
of the positions held by experts has not been established. On the contrary, it has been 
established that experts have not misused their powers. Lord Rogers was subjected to 
detailed scrutiny by the Standards Committee (Brown 2001a). It has also been 
established that tall building projects designed by Lord Rogers' architectural practice, 
RRP, were not treated favourably by the GLA. Furthermore, the AHL report concluded 
that Sir Lipton had not misused his position as chairman of CABE (AHL Ltd 2004). Yet 
for that, codes of conduct and strict scrutiny have not been sufficient to avoid 
accusations of conflict of interest.  
 288 
The Nolan Report concluded that in planning, it appears that the most problematic 
aspect is the 'public perception of impropriety' rather than actual cases of misconduct or 
even corruption (Nolan 1997a: 70). This conclusion of the Nolan Report from 1997 can 
be validated based on the discussion set out above. Aggrieved parties have developed 
positions of mistrust which have led to perceptions of conflicts of interest. It must thus 
be concluded that the codes of conduct applied by the GLA, CABE and English 
Heritage are not sufficient to safeguard public bodies from accusations of conflicts of 
interest. Therefore, it appears necessary to improve the codes currently used so that the 
perception of conflicts of interest can be minimised, if not avoided, prior to accusations 
being raised. One way forward might be to scrutinise private experts who hold key 
positions in public bodies to a greater extent from the outset. Independent experts from 
bodies, such as the Standards Committee, could be appointed to establish a level of 
heightened scrutiny that is adequate to the power inherent in key positions.  
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7.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has brought together the conclusions from chapters 2 to 6. The purpose of 
the chapter has been to examine the key patterns that were identified as the most 
important factors for the effective functioning of tall building policy making and 
implementation in central London.  
 
A lack of conflict resolution between supporters of tall buildings and heritage groups in 
the policy making processes of the London Plan and the LVMF was identified as one of 
the main causes for the increase in uncertainty for developers. The GLA reduced the 
constraints on tall building development through the 4B policies of the London Plan. 
The loose definitions of areas appropriate for tall buildings have provided flexibility for 
developers. At the same time, the loose definitions have also caused uncertainty about 
the acceptability of tall building projects at these locations. The planning process for 
No.1 Blackfriars Road was a case in point. Certainty about the appropriateness of the 
location arose only after a compromise agreement resulting from face-to-face 
negotiations between the developer and English Heritage officers.  
 
The LVMF process has been characterised by an incremental marginalisation of 
heritage groups. View corridors were reduced in width in it. Qualitative language 
embodying heritage-based values for assessment was taken out of the management plan 
for the St James's Park view. Values of architectural quality were foregrounded. A 
rationale for assessments was introduced within which the application of precedent 
cases limited the ability of heritage groups to oppose new tall building projects. As a 
result, heritage groups opposed the introduction of these measures in consultation 
processes. However, their demands did not get taken into account to a satisfactory 
degree. The marginalisation of heritage groups through the policy making of the 
London Plan and the LVMF was one of the causes for the involvement of UNESCO in 
2007 which severely increased uncertainty for developers.  
 
Pre-application discussions have been the main source of conflict resolution in 
implementation processes. Using the exemplar of No.1 Blackfriars Road, it has been 
shown that conflict resolution with the GLA, CABE and LB Southwark was effective in 
pre-application discussions. The main reasons for that were: i) accessibility of decision 
makers for the design team; ii) knowledge and advice provided by expert consultants 
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within design teams; and, iii) the possibility to align the interests of the design teams 
with those of governmental and non-governmental departmental bodies. Conflicts with 
English Heritage only got resolved after an extended process. An adversarial 
relationship based on mutual mistrust and opposing interests made it impossible to 
resolve conflicts until autumn 2007. The ambiguous nature of the LVMF resulted in 
divergent assessments of the visual impact up to that point in time. Conflicts got 
resolved once the developer and English Heritage were able to identify a common 
interest in a compromise agreement. Thus, due to the effectiveness of the conflict 
resolution within pre-application discussions, these have been a significant source for 
producing certainty in tall building planning.  
 
The visual assessment has proven to be the most controversial aspect of tall building 
planning in central London. It has been established in the cases in question that the 
different value sets held by the different interest groups in tall building development 
were the reason for divergent results in visual assessments. This was possible since a 
shared value basis for visual assessment had not been developed within the LVMF 
policy making process. The compromise attempted by the consultants writing the 2005 
draft LVMF of seeking to develop such a shared value basis did not get established. The 
reason for this was that in the LVMF consultation process, supporters and opponents of 
tall buildings did not soften their radical positions. Therefore, the LVMF remained an 
ambiguous guidance document allowing for divergent assessment conclusions. Due to 
this ambiguous nature of the LVMF, tall building cases such as No.1 Blackfriars Road 
had to be decided within public inquiries which extended the planning processes by 
more than one year. Certainty arose gradually out of the successive precedent decisions.  
 
Private sector expertise has been proven to be essential for governmental and non-
governmental departmental bodies. The London Plan and the LVMF could not have 
been developed to the level of quality achieved without this expertise. The CABE and 
English Heritage assessment processes would not have reached the levels of objectivity 
and would not have resulted in such high quality tall building projects without the 
involvement of private sector experts. However, perceptions of conflicts of interests 
have not been managed sufficiently. Thus, accusations have arisen which challenged the 
public accountability of the GLA, CABE and English Heritage. In this respect, private 
sector experts need to be scrutinised to a greater degree before accusations are raised. 
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Increasing scrutiny first as a reaction to accusations is too late since by then the 
reputation of governmental bodies has already been damaged.  
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8. Conclusions  
 
This thesis has examined the particular processes of policy making and implementation 
that occur in managing the visual impacts of tall building development in central 
London. The reason for this focus is the overarching conflict regarding the protection of 
central London's conservation areas, monuments and World Heritage Sites. These 
conclusions elaborate on the most important results of the thesis, addressing in turn the 
three research questions set out in the introduction. Thus, the key aspects of tall building 
planning will be summarised that have been identified as  most crucial to the translation 
of the urban renaissance agenda into tall building policy, as well as the effectiveness of 
implementing those policies and the impacts of planning processes on visual impact 
assessments. 
 
By answering the research questions and addressing the major issues of the planning 
processes for tall buildings in central London, the conclusions reached will—it is 
hoped—provide a starting point for a coherent debate regarding the management of the 
visual impact of tall buildings by extending the relevant existing research literature. 
Finally, an overview will be provided of the era since Ken Livingstone was elected 
Mayor of London in 2000—a left-leaning mayor in place when New Labour were in 
power nationally—and replaced by the conservative former MP Boris Johnson in 2008, 
just prior to the election of the Conservative Party nationally. In this changing political 
context, it will be discussed how far the issues raised in this thesis are likely to continue 
to be of primary importance in the next policy cycle. Finally, recommendations will be 
made regarding potential new research on tall building planning and how this may 
affect the visual impact of London's skyline in the future.  
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8.1 The translation of the urban renaissance into tall building 
policy 
 
The urban renaissance agenda has been translated for the London Plan into a policy 
proactively encouraging tall building development (UNESCO 2006a; McNeill 2002a; 
Charney 2007; Tavernor 2004a; b, and 2007a; b). The reason for this, some have 
concluded, is that Mayor Ken Livingstone supported tall building development for 
financial reasons, which were supposed to be provided through significant contributions 
of affordable housing and other benefits through S106 mechanisms (Ross 2001; 
Thornley et al 2005; Gordon 2003; McNeill 2002a). Others have argued that aesthetic 
considerations were a major concern, in particular the vision of a world city image 
symbolised by tall buildings (Buck et al 2002; McNeill 2002b; Tavernor 2007a). The 
thesis confirms that both of these arguments are correct, and has gone further, asking 
how exactly the central values of architectural and urban design, and densification 
around transport nodes, have been translated into the tall building policies that relate to 
visual impact.  
 
The primacy of quality of design in policy 
In the London Plan, the quality of architecture and urban design has been determined as 
the top priority in its 4B design policies. However, this has not been due to the wishes 
of the mayor, or those of his architectural advisor Lord Rogers in support of tall 
building development, as has been argued by Charney (2007). Rather, the 
foregrounding of quality of design is a direct result of the policy hierarchy determined 
through the plan-led approach, as Tavernor has argued (2004a; 2007b). Regional and 
local policies were required to incorporate this approach, and highest quality of design 
had to be regarded as a primary consideration in the planning process. Previous policies 
primarily approached the visual impact of tall buildings as having a negative influence 
on urban configurations, and they were excluded from areas where potentially negative 
visual impacts would occur. The LVMF introduced an approach that managed visual 
impacts within protected views, with design quality the primary consideration.  
 
Private sector expertise 
Of particular importance for the London Plan policy process was the expertise of private 
sector experts. The wording of methodological guidance and management plans for 
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visual assessments has proven particularly difficult. Aspects of quality cannot be 
defined in absolute terms using numerical values. Consequently, the GLA employed a 
range of private sector experts charged with writing the London Plan and the associated 
London View Management Framework (LVMF). The involvement of private sector 
experts raises questions of conflicts of interest. The role of Lord Rogers in this process 
has been challenged repeatedly, and claims made of potential conflicts of interest and 
favourable treatment (McNeill 2002b; Charney 2007). Since there is no proof available 
to sustain these claims, it must be concluded that the concerns  are based on perceptions 
of potential rather than actual conflicts of interest. The conclusion made by Polina 
(2007) and Tavernor (2004a), that Lord Rogers had been hired by the mayor due to his 
international experience and credibility is also valid.  
 
Attempted conflict resolution 
Due to the heightened conflicts regarding the visual impacts of tall building projects and 
the resulting public inquiries, attempts have been made to resolve conflicts through 
policy making. Compromise with heritage groups was sought by introducing value 
laden language, as the LVMF was formulated and derived from consultation processes. 
However, attempts to compromise failed. Both developers and heritage groups 
perceived the resulting policies to be insufficient in taking into account their interests.  
 
The Guidance on Tall Buildings (GOTB), which was intended to streamline the advice 
of the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) and English 
Heritage, failed as a means of conflict resolution. It defined the remits of the two 
organisations but did not produce a resolution of conflicting expectations. The tendency 
was that the objectivity of English Heritage's advice was challenged when decisions 
were made that were incompatible with the interests of one or more of the interest 
groups. A streamlining of advice was achieved to a certain degree by changes to the 
leading staff at CABE by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). 
 
Resulting marginalisation of heritage interests 
Much of the discourse regarding methods for visual assessment focuses on technical 
aspects. The insufficiency of two-dimensional photographs to represent the three-
dimensionality of actual human visual perception and the alleged potential for 
downplaying negative visual aspects of tall buildings have been identified as serious 
flaws in the visual assessment methods (Nicolaou 2004; Tavernor 2004a; Carmona et al 
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2010; Bosselman 1998; Day 2002; Stewart 2003). Yet the LVMF is based on this 
system, and I have demonstrated that the methods currently advocated in the LVMF 
needs to be optimised in order to overcome these shortcomings by incorporating depth 
of field, peripheral vision, immersion and multiple viewpoints.  
 
However, even more important than these technical problems are the disadvantages 
faced by those less capable financially of using the visual assessment methods, and their 
consequent reliance on the findings of specialist consultants. The very high production 
cost and the inaccessibility of the 3D data usually exclude heritage groups and 
especially community groups from producing Accurate Visual Representations (AVRs) 
themselves. Thus, they are bound to make use of the AVRs produced by visualisation 
companies in conjunction with the townscape consultants and architects on behalf of the 
developer-client. Moreover, community groups are rarely able to afford the high level 
planning consultants who are needed to interpret policy on their behalf. 
 
Furthermore, the foregrounding of the significance of quality in architecture, and the 
formulation of the London Plan and LVMF that supports tall building projects in 
appropriate locations, circumscribed the influence of heritage groups. The main 
assessors of design quality are CABE, the GLA and local borough planning officers – 
and not English Heritage. Likewise, as scholars have argued, the LVMF has made tall 
buildings permissible in the backgrounds of protected view corridors (Markham 2008; 
Kufner 2009; Craggs 2007). Also significant in this respect was the removal of value 
laden language that would have identified the historic significance of views, but which 
was deemed impractical by planners: instead, legal language was preferred which 
stressed the principle of precedence. As a result, heritage groups were compelled to 
reject the London Plan and the LVMF, including the measures contained for the 
assessment of tall buildings and their visual impacts, because they perceived the policy 
making as a coordinated attempt at marginalisation.  
 
Ambiguity and uncertainty 
In isolation, the marginalisation of English Heritage and others might suggest that the 
policies regarding visual assessment would ease the planning process of tall building 
projects. This has not proved to be the case. On the contrary, the ambiguity that remains 
in the implemented policies has only heightened the doubts – in the minds of heritage 
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groups and certain London boroughs (particularly the City of Westminster) regarding 
the acceptability of the visual impact of tall buildings.  
 
The visual impact of tall buildings is intimately related to policies defining those 
locations considered appropriate for tall buildings. Allmendinger (2011) has made the 
general observation that a great deal of the current ambiguity is due to the policies 
produced under New Labour. In relation to the London Plan, Nicolaou (2004) and 
Tavernor (2007b) have concluded that locations appropriate for tall building 
development are defined too imprecisely. This thesis demonstrates the implications of 
these ambiguous definitions.  
 
A significant amount of uncertainty arose from the imprecise and flexible definition of 
locations appropriate for tall building development. A flexible and ambiguous policy in 
the London Plan resulted on the one hand from developers' lobbyists, and on the other 
hand from Livingstone's wish that tall buildings should be built in greater numbers 
throughout central London. The local policies of individual London boroughs have been 
very clear in demonstrating support for tall buildings, as with the City of London, or 
limiting their building, as  with the City of Westminster. Less decisive boroughs such as 
Southwark initially struggled to produce policy agreement locally. The resulting 
absence of a tall building policy defining appropriate locations in the London Borough 
of Southwark has led to an even higher degree of uncertainty amongst developers and 
decision makers.  
 
The flexibility and ambiguity contained in regional and local policy documents 
provided the basis for the increase in tall building proposals. At the same time, however, 
design teams were facing the threat of not obtaining planning permission because it was 
difficult to prove the acceptability of tall buildings in locations for which clear 
boundaries had not been defined.  
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8.2 The effectiveness of London's planning system regarding 
tall buildings 
 
An appropriate way to evaluate the effectiveness of tall building planning is to consider 
the goals set out by the urban renaissance agenda. The quality of design, densification 
around transport nodes and regeneration were primary objectives: the widespread 
introduction of large numbers of tall buildings was never advocated, while the 
protection of heritage assets was only a secondary goal (Urban Task Force 1999). 
Furthermore, reviews of the planning system and reports commissioned by national 
government have defined issues of how the planning system is ideally supposed to 
deliver desired outcomes (Nolan 1997a; DTLR 2001; Barker 2006b; Killian and Pretty 
2008). These are: conflict resolution, inclusion, speed, objectivity and certainty. In the 
following paragraphs each of these issues are addressed in turn.  
 
Design quality and S106 
The purpose of this thesis is not to consider the quality of tall building projects being 
proposed and permitted in central London. Rather, the focus is on the circumstances and 
processes that have contributed to raising the quality of tall building design. In central 
London, as discussed at length with regards to No.1 Blackfriars Road and as shown 
through the discussions of GLA and CABE assessment processes and their outcomes, 
the quality of architecture and urban design has been judged by others to have been 
raised significantly. No.1 Blackfriars Road is one of many projects that have been 
redesigned several times over the course of several years to result in a greater quality in 
the urban surroundings in the form of public places, throughways and a balanced 
streetscape.  
 
Of crucial importance for increasing the design quality of tall building projects is the 
heightened controversy regarding precedent cases and, resulting from that, the deep 
level of scrutiny that has been exerted by regional and local government, quangos and 
third parties. The high risk of failure to achieve planning consent if one or several of 
these bodies does not support a project has provided the basis for regional and local 
planning authorities to demand of developers and their architects that they redesign their 
projects and, at the same time, agree to higher S106 contributions. Thus, additional 
planning gains through S106 agreements and quality of design have been achieved in 
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cases in which there were heightened conflicts regarding visual impacts, and which 
were bound to set precedents for further tall building development.  
 
The conflict resolution, lobbying and inclusion relationship 
Conflict resolution takes place most effectively in the phase prior to the planning 
application submission. Governmental reports have repeatedly stressed that pre-
application discussions should be used to a greater degree with all the statutory 
stakeholders, so that planning authorities and developers arrive at agreements prior to 
the planning application submission (DTLR 2001; Killian and Pretty 2008). Despite 
these measures, conflicts remain at regional and local levels. Eleven out of forty-four 
tall building cases had to be decided through public inquiries and appeals between 2000 
and 2009 (see appendix 6).  
 
One reason for these failures is that pre-application discussions have only been effective 
in resolving conflicts between developers and regional and local authorities as well as 
CABE. Conflicts have not been resolved with English Heritage and other regional and 
local interest groups. Those heritage and local interest groups that are not statutory 
consultees are not included in pre-application discussions. The results of this exclusion 
are accusations by opposition political parties in the Greater London Assembly of secret 
decision making rather than conflict resolution (Greater London Assembly 2002).  
 
The issue of lobbying is intimately related to conflict resolution. Existing research has 
identified lobbying as a critical issue regarding the London Plan policy making with 
privileged access to the mayor and leading officers being provided to developers 
(Gordon 2003; Thornley et al 2002) and through the LDA (Travers 2004; Thornley et al 
2005). The discussions of GLA, Southwark and CABE pre-application processes have 
shown that developers' design teams have good access to high level decision makers. 
Thus, these parties are able to discuss and resolve conflicts. Public relations and 
planning consultants, as well as architects, provide useful information and contacts with 
politicians and leading planning officers on behalf of developers. Importantly, the 
discussions that take place are not transparent. Often, the PR agencies that are most 
frequently hired by developers for tall building projects include former members of 
local and regional government. It is likely, therefore, that lobbying of networks of 
former colleagues and perhaps friends occurs, which places those outside such networks 
at a disadvantage. It appears that lobbying regarding specific planning projects is an 
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under-researched area, but it remains an important one if accusations of secrecy and any 
suspicion of corruption are to be eliminated.  
 
Community groups and other representatives of residents are not able to afford high 
level lobbying agencies, and they are unlikely to have the resources to offer significant 
financial gains in negotiations with planning authorities. This confirms Hall's (2002) 
general conclusion on the planning system that the financially able profit from greater 
inclusion, while those less financially able are disadvantaged.  
 
The planning decision speed, conflict resolution and policy relationship 
Increasing the speed at which planning decisions are taken has been a primary goal 
defined by national government and reports (DTLR 2001; Barker 2006b). Planning 
regarding tall buildings in central London has been rather inefficient in this respect. 
Planning processes for tall building projects tend to take between three and four years 
from the inception of a project to the planning application submission. A public inquiry 
or appeal process tends to add another one to one and a half years to the planning 
process (see appendix 6). This is particularly the case with important precedent projects 
that are subject to heightened conflicts and which have to be called in by the Secretary 
of State.  
 
Despite the time added to the planning process, public inquiries are a very effective 
mode of conflict resolution. This is particularly so in precedent cases in which 
heightened scrutiny is appropriate because they tend to be the ones that initiate new 
clusters of tall buildings  and set the standards for the design quality of subsequent 
projects nearby. Furthermore, there is evidence of a very high level of objectivity and 
consistency in decision making. However, public inquiry processes can only be as good 
as the policies available for use in decision making. Thus, if policies remain ambiguous, 
there is great leeway in decision making here. Moreover, other material considerations 
can be considered to be of greater importance than policy requirements. This tends to 
lead to case-by-case decision making, causing a great amount of uncertainty for 
developers and other interest groups. If a greater amount of pressure is exerted by 
powerful interest groups such as UNESCO, then the Secretary of State is more likely to 
call in the project for public inquiry.  
 
 
 300 
Objectivity in assessments and decision making 
Decisions and assessments can potentially be influenced in an inappropriate manner 
through skilfully developed arguments by experts and persuasive presentation materials. 
This point has been raised generally (Carmona 1998a; Carmona et al 2010), and 
specifically in relation to the CABE Design Review Panel (DRP) (Parnaby and Short 
2008), as well as with regard to townscape assessments (Stewart 2003). Indeed, all of 
these points are valid. The spaces in which public inquiries are conducted tend to be 
used as exhibition spaces for visualisations and models that contain information which 
presents projects to their best advantage. Further guidance regarding this issue is 
needed. However, architect-inspectors in particular are likely to be mostly immune to 
any graphic persuasion unsupported by design quality.  
 
Lobbying efforts that take place away from public scrutiny are vulnerable to efforts of 
persuasion. Politicians isolated from their own professional experts are usually unable 
to evaluate the validity of design issues and the complex argumentation used by private 
sector experts promoting the acceptability of tall building proposals. In addition, the 
production of the materials by which the acceptability of tall buildings is assessed is 
contracted out to expert consultants, as Allmendinger (2011) has demonstrated. A 
presumption that assessments are entirely objective is unfounded, since the consultants 
producing assessments are employed by the developers of the proposals being assessed. 
The reputation of high level consultants would be compromised if they failed to support 
the developer's team when seeking a planning consent.  
 
Assessment processes conducted by CABE DRP and English Heritage's London 
Advisory Committee (LAC) appear to be based on a rather high degree of objectivity 
due to the interdisciplinary and diverse nature of the assessment panels. This ensures 
that all of the relevant disciplines are represented. Changes to leading staff at CABE 
through the interventions of DCMS have contributed to increasing the level of apparent 
objectivity. Further, the expertise brought to these processes by private sector experts, 
who are themselves involved in similar projects, is crucial to avoid being overly swayed 
by persuasive presentation materials or arguments. Objectivity is further enhanced by 
decoupling the panel assessments from the drafting of the final written advice.  
 
Serious accusations over conflicts of interest have been raised where assessment results 
were contrary to the aspirations of interested parties. In the case of Lord Rogers' role in 
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relation to his advisory position at the GLA, independent scrutiny by the Standards 
Committee has proved to be an effective means of safeguarding objectivity and 
propriety. The codes of conduct as used by governmental organisations have proved 
insufficient for avoiding accusations of misconduct due to the involvement of private 
sector experts. However, proof of actual wrongdoing has not been established. Thus, it 
has been concluded that the problem is one of perception, which is due to the existence 
of the potential for actual conflicts of interest.  
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8.3 Impacts of the planning process on visual assessments 
 
Processes of policy making and implementation have had significant impacts on the 
management of visual impacts in central London. Importantly, implementation 
processes—pre-application discussions and planning decisions—have influenced 
emerging policy and decision making regarding future projects. Research into town 
planning in England and Wales has stressed repeatedly that policy making and 
implementation are interdependent (Barrett and Fudge 1981; Allmendinger 2003). It has 
been argued that within the plan-led approach, the duality between discretion and 
prescription creates an 'unhappy ideological conflict' (Tewdwr-Jones 2002: 84). The 
following section discusses how tall building projects and visual assessments have been 
affected by early-on agreements, unresolved conflicts and issues of precedence, as well 
as the resultant impact on emerging policy and implementation processes.  
 
Impacts of early-on agreements on emerging regional policies 
The meaning of the central policies regulating tall building development—the London 
Plan and the LVMF—has been shaped to a significant degree by the planning processes 
regarding tall building projects which were decided during the policy making processes 
and prior to finalising the policies. The emerging London Plan was influenced by the 
agreement of the GLA to support tall building projects which were already in planning 
between 2000 and 2002, with the 2001 interim guidance suggesting that the tall 
buildings proposed at that time were appropriately designed and located. The 2002 
Draft London Plan sought to legitimate the whole of the CAZ as appropriate for tall 
buildings, thus seeking to provide flexibility to developers and enable them to propose 
tall buildings at a large number of locations. The finalised 2004 London Plan confirmed 
the Opportunity Areas and the primacy of the value of quality of design. The Draft 
Further Alterations to the London Plan (FALP) reacted to agreements made by the GLA 
to support tall buildings in the northern parts of Southwark and Lambeth by introducing 
an Opportunity Area spanning along the south bank of the River Thames from London 
Bridge towards Vauxhall. These policy developments allowed design teams to argue 
that the projects they proposed were acceptable in terms of their location despite the 
visibility of the tall buildings proposed in regionally protected views.  
 
Moreover, the LVMF was shaped under the leadership of Mayor Ken Livingstone in its 
earliest versions to reduce the constraints on tall building development by narrowing the 
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width of view corridors, strengthening the weight of architectural and urban design 
quality over heritage considerations, and by producing wording to be used for 
assessments which allowed the conclusion that tall building projects which had been 
proposed during the drafting of the LVMF were appropriate (GLA 2005a; 2007a; 
2007b). The results of pre-application discussions thus had causal effects on the making 
of policies and also on how the visual impact of tall buildings was assessed. Following 
his election, Mayor Boris Johnston subsequently reasserted the pre-Livingstone view 
corridor widths in the recent edition of the LVMF (GLA 2010a). 
 
In the light of these impacts, the current concept of prematurity needs to be questioned. 
Planning decisions are regarded as premature if they are taken prior to the finalisation of 
an emerging policy, the meaning of which would be predetermined by the planning 
decision (ODPM 2005a). Agreements by decision makers in pre-application discussions 
are not planning decisions. However, their impact on policy has been proven in sections 
2.5, 4.2, 5.2. Policies regarding visual assessments and locations of tall buildings have 
been predetermined by pre-application discussions. These have led to the shaping of 
policies such that it can be argued that tall building projects are acceptable in terms of 
their locations and visual impacts.  
 
Impacts of unresolved conflicts on the management of visual impacts 
Conflicts regarding the pro-active stance of the London Plan and the LVMF towards tall 
building development could not be resolved in the policy making processes. Rather, 
policies were shaped so as to reduce the constraints on projects that had already 
achieved agreement by regional and local decision makers. As a result of this, conflicts 
have tended to centre on the planning processes associated with the precedent cases. 
These are those cases that either established or enlarged potential new clusters of tall 
buildings. In most cases, the visual impact on just a few significant views was the focus 
of debate in public inquiry processes.  
 
The increase in antagonistic interaction among competing parties has caused planning 
processes to be ineffective. Heritage groups have interpreted the formulation of policy 
regarding tall buildings to be a coordinated attempt to marginalise their influence, and 
they have sought alternative tactics in order to prevent the granting of planning 
permission for tall buildings with—what they consider to be—negative visual impacts 
on significant heritage assets. Developer teams on the other hand have raised concern 
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that heritage groups are likely to oppose their projects for tall buildings as a matter of 
principle, and have consequently limited their exposure to a negative response, 
engaging only with those parties that policy requires them to. Simultaneously, developer 
teams have been known to engage in bargaining tactics with English Heritage and to use 
the greater financial muscle of the developer: with heritage groups being likely to 
withdraw their objections because of their financial inability to conduct multiple public 
inquiries unless supported by a wealthy neighbouring borough affected by the proposals 
(such as WCC in the case of proposals in Lambeth and Southwark) (PINS 2008; 2009a). 
 
In combination, the gradual marginalisation of heritage groups through pro-active tall 
building policies and the growing numbers  of tall building projects having a potentially 
negative visual impact on nationally and regionally significant heritage assets and 
WHSs have culminated in the involvement of UNESCO which has threatened to de-list 
the Westminster and the Tower of London WHSs. The precise impact of experts from 
ICOMOS and regional interest groups on the involvement of UNESCO is unknown. 
Pendlebury and Short (2009: 357) argue that 'weaker local conservation interests' tend 
to call in UNESCO as an ally in order to safeguard the integrity of heritage assets, but 
the processes of communication and interaction are not transparent.  
 
The involvement of UNESCO had significant effects on policy and implementation. 
Regional policies were strengthened in terms of WHS protection. However, 
amendments to policies failed to produce certainty about the appropriateness of projects 
with potentially negative visual impacts on a WHS. The likelihood of a call-in for 
precedent cases rose dramatically, finally resulting in public inquiries regarding all the 
projects mentioned in WHS related reports (PINS 2008; 2009a; 2009b). 
 
Impacts of precedence on policy and visual impact assessments  
The issue of precedence has had significant impacts on the visual assessments, and 
indeed on tall building planning in central London as a whole. In the principal precedent 
cases regarding the Heron and London Bridge towers, it was argued by heritage groups 
in public inquiries that these decisions would pre-determine emerging regional and local 
policy (PINS 2002a; 2003). However, planning inspectors reasoned that pre-maturity 
was not the case (ibid.). With hindsight, it is evident that these decisions did indeed set 
precedents, with the Heron Tower for the enlargement of the Eastern Cluster in the City 
of London and perhaps also for the acceptability of tall buildings in central London 
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more generally – its success at the inquiry opening the flood gates for subsequent tall 
building applications. For the acceptability of tall buildings south of the River Thames, 
the Vauxhall Tower Inquiry and London Bridge Tower Inquiry were significant, even 
despite the visibility of both towers in views of international and national significance, 
which EH regarded as severely negative (PINS 2003; 2004a). 
 
The concept of visual precedent—the visibility of tall building projects that have been 
built or that have achieved planning consent—appears particularly important regarding 
planning processes that occur subsequently to important precedent cases. Based on such 
precedent cases, tall buildings have since been proposed at Blackfriars, Waterloo and 
Vauxhall, and the planning consents regarding these projects have set precedents for 
potential clusters there. Crucially, these projects taken together are visible from a large 
number of nearby conservation areas and also from the Westminster WHS (in relation 
to Vauxhall and Waterloo) and Tower of London WHS (London Bridge and the Eastern 
Cluster in the City of London). Due to the principle of consistent decision making it will 
be very hard if not impossible for future decision makers to prevent new tall building 
projects which may incrementally enlarge clusters where these have been started. If 
built, these projects are likely to agglomerate over time to establish large parts of central 
London as tall building areas separated only by conservation areas. 
 
The related issues of precedence and potential prematurity give rise to doubts about the 
successful application of the plan-led approach. Planning decisions have the status of 
material consideration in future planning processes. Certainty about how policies 
regulating the visual impact of tall buildings are to be interpreted has arisen gradually 
out of the precedent decisions determined in public inquiry cases.  
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8.4 Managing visual impacts of tall buildings beyond the 
Livingstone era 
 
There are two major changes to regional planning in London and nationally which merit 
discussion in relation to the findings of this thesis. First, Mayor Ken Livingstone's 
successor Boris Johnson has revised the central policies of the London Plan and the 
LVMF since being elected in 2008. Second, the more recently elected conservative 
government (elected 2010) has reformed the planning system through the Localism Act. 
Its primary thrust is to concentrate planning powers at local levels (The Stationary 
Office 2011). Based on the approach of Localism, central national planning policy is 
currently being reformed. The Draft National Planning Policy Framework (Draft NPPF) 
integrates the various planning policy statements of the former Labour administration 
into one single document and advocates a strong position in favour of economic 
development (DCLG 2011). This final concluding section will consider the relevance of 
the results of the thesis in relation to this emerging approach to planning.  
 
Tall building planning under the Johnson mayoralty 
Mayor Boris Johnson has revised both the London Plan and the LVMF. Quality of 
design has been retained as the overarching value in planning (GLA 2011a). As 
determined in the revised 2011 London Plan, new tall building development will be 
encouraged only in the Opportunity Area of Vauxhall, Nine Elms and Battersea (ibid.). 
Heritage protection has indeed been strengthened, in particular through the revised 2010 
LVMF. In the management plan for the protected St James's Park view, for example, it 
is stated that new development beyond Duck Island (and therefore in north Lambeth 
near Waterloo and Southwark near Blackfriars) will not only be detrimental to the view, 
but should normally be refused (GLA 2010a). The consultants employed to produce this 
revised LVMF were Hare and Coleman, who prepared the 2005 Draft LVMF, and who 
provided consistency for the new mayor as well as a return to increased planning 
constraints. 
 
Despite the new planning restrictions and the recurring global financial crisis of recent 
years, tall buildings have since been proposed in the northern areas of Southwark and 
Lambeth and they have been supported by the GLA. 40-46 Weston Street (also known 
as 'The Quill') has been supported despite its visual impact on the Tower of London 
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WHS and objections by English Heritage and Historic Royal Palaces (GLA 2010b). 
King's Reach Tower, Wedge House and 231-241 Blackfriars Road have been supported 
by the GLA and will enlarge the cluster established in the Blackfriars area, based on the 
precedents set by No.1 and 20 Blackfriars Road (GLA 2011 b; c; d). Future research 
might usefully focus on the impacts of precedents, how these are used in the new 
planning system, and whether the clusters that have been started will be enlarged even 
further.  
 
It appears that conflicts between regional government and heritage interests remain 
topics of concern. UNESCO announced a new mission to London in December 2011 
(Liverpool City Council 2011). The DCMS has mentioned projects in the vicinity of 
London Bridge, across the River Thames from the Tower of London WHS, as potential 
issues (DCMS 2011a). Due to the reoccurrence of the problem of visual impacts on 
WHSs, UNESCO has recently published a document which provides for the 
international regulation of visual impacts on heritage assets (UNESCO 2011). In 
accordance with this, the mayor's administration has produced a draft SPG, London 
World Heritage Sites – Guidance on Settings, published for consultation in 2011 (GLA 
2011e). This document seeks to integrate the UNESCO approach to assessment, based 
on the concepts of Outstanding Universal Value, integrity and authenticity, into 
London's regional policy framework (ibid.).  Whether or not London's revised regional 
policy can provide for a higher degree of certainty by adopting a more restrictive 
approach is another important topic for future research. 
 
The emergence of Localism and the National Planning Policy Framework 
A dramatic change to the national planning system will arise with the advent of 
Localism. The general thrust of the 2011 Localism Act, developed by the conservative 
government, is decentralisation: the transfer of governmental powers from the national 
to the local level (The Stationary Office 2011). Pertinent novelties introduced by the 
2011 Localism Act relating to the management of the visual impact of tall buildings are: 
the abolition of the Standards Committee, the transferral to local councils of the 
responsibility to monitor propriety, and the introduction of neighbourhood plans and 
increased potential powers for local people in influencing those plans (ibid.). Moreover, 
regional authorities have been abolished with the exception of London (ibid.).  This 
particular change will therefore not affect planning in London.  
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It cannot be assessed as yet how vulnerable regional and local levels will be to the 
lobbying efforts of interest groups. However, regulation demanding a greater degree of 
transparency has not yet been produced. It is likely that parties less financially able will 
remain disadvantaged in making representations to political decision makers. Although 
the inclusion of all members of the community continues to be stated as an issue of 
prime importance, measures to establish equality in interest representation have yet to 
be produced. Importantly, objectivity in assessments and decision making is very likely 
to be more difficult to maintain. This is because the budget of English Heritage is set to 
decrease by 32% over the next years (DCMS 2010) and CABE has been merged with 
the Design Council and will cease to be a quango (DCMS 2011b). Due to these 
changes, it should be assessed how well the Design Council CABE and English 
Heritage will continue to be able to function as the guardians of design quality and 
heritage. Moreover, the Standards Committee has been abolished through the Localism 
Act (The Stationary Office 2011). The responsibility to monitor propriety of public 
employees has now been granted to local councils (ibid.). Whether the Nolan principles 
(Nolan 1997a) will be upheld is an important question to ask.  
 
Somewhat contradictory to the proposed increase in powers at the local level is the 
recent DCLG publication of the Draft NPPF. This proposed policy document highlights 
sustainable development which is supposed to be the overriding value against which 
development projects should be assessed (DCLG 2011). However, the Environmental 
Audit Committee concluded that the meaning of sustainable development is 
insufficiently defined, a claim supported by the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), 
the National Trust (EAC 2011a; b) and Lord Rogers who strongly criticised the 
proposed NPPF in the House of Lords (House of Lords 2011).  
 
If the conclusions of this thesis are also valid for planning under Localism, then the 
ambiguous definitions of central planning values will most likely lead to an increase in 
uncertainty regarding determinations of the appropriateness of tall buildings. I share the 
concern of Lord Rogers who argued that the generalities included in the proposed Draft 
NPPF increase the risk that planning decisions are likely to be determined through legal 
rather than planning means. As has been shown in this thesis, ambiguous policy allows 
for great flexibility in interpreting policy for the private sector. At the same time, it will 
be very hard to establish a strong basis for refusing development that is deemed 
inappropriate by planning authorities. If planning permission is refused, high level 
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experts and barristers are likely to produce evidence for the acceptability of 
controversial projects based on the ambiguity contained in the Draft NPPF.  
 
These measures could severely restrict the powers of planning authorities to demand 
improvements and to refuse planning applications. Since the thesis has concluded that 
quality of design and high S106 obligations resulted from heightened controversy and 
the subsequent heightened scrutiny, it appears less likely that the Draft NPPF will allow 
planning authorities and advisors to remain effective in safeguarding these important 
aspects of the urban renaissance. 
 
It is evident, therefore, that the principal findings of this thesis of weaknesses in conflict 
resolution, ambiguity in regulation, privileged influence of the private sector, the 
marginalisation of weaker groups and the Nolan principles will remain issues of 
concern in the management of visual impacts on regionally protected views in London. 
It remains to be seen whether the successful aspects of achieving design quality, 
obtaining high S106 contributions and objectivity in assessments can be sustained. In 
any case, a gradual tightening of policy and guidance will be necessary to improve the 
weaknesses and ensure that those planning processes which appear to work well 
continue to do so. 
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